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ABSTRACT 
 
After briefly examining the history of trade marks and establishing the theoretical 
framework of trade mark functions, an analysis from the perspective of semiotics is 
conducted, viewing the trade mark as a sign. This analysis serves as a tool for the 
suggestions and conclusions drawn in relation to the role of trade mark law today.  
 
The issues of trade mark registration, use and protection are examined, as main 
facets of the trade mark functions. An analysis of the legal provisions, legal doctrine 
and case law on trade mark registration and use in Greece, before and after the entry 
into force of the First Council Directive on the Harmonisation of trade mark laws in 
Europe 89/104/EEC is undertaken, so as to denote the effect of the European 
harmonisation on these issues. The Court of Justice case law is examined, in 
juxtaposition to the Greek case law on the respective implementing provisions. The 
similarities and differences are noted and analysed. Throughout, examples from a 
common law jurisdiction, namely the UK, are taken into account.   
 
The issues of risk of confusion and dilution are analytically examined at a national 
(Greek) and European level. In comparison to the Court of Justice jurisprudence, the 
national legal framework and case law of Greece on these issues is analysed. 
Examples from other European jurisdictions are taken into account. The theory of 
dilution in the context of the European trade mark framework is further analysed 
against developments in the USA. 
 
The controversial doctrine of trade mark dilution, introduced by Fr. I. Schechter, is 
of primary interest in the course of the thesis and suggestions are made for a new 
perspective of the theory. The controversial doctrine of Schechter is seen, in view of 
the above, under a new light. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this thesis will encompass the theoretical framework of trade mark 
protection  and the application of it in pieces of legislation and case law. Through 
the analysis of the European Courts‘ case law in comparison with examples from 
national courts, the evolution of trade mark law in the European context shall be 
examined.  
 
In part I of the thesis, a reconsideration of the categorisation and the systematisation 
of trade mark functions will be made, in view of the First Council Directive on the 
Harmonisation of trade mark laws in Europe
1
. The historical background of trade 
marks and the evolution of their role in every day life and subsequently in the legal 
reality shall be analysed. It shall be argued that a trade mark is a sign; an analogy 
between trade mark functions and semiotics shall be drawn. The theory of semiotics 
supporting the interpretation of the law on trade marks, as well as examples of 
application of the theory of semiotics on European case law, shall be examined.  
 
In part II of the thesis, the notion of a trade mark as defined by the Directive, in 
comparison with the view taken by the courts of Greece before and after the entry 
into force of the Directive shall be examined. The criteria for registration and, 
respectively, the absolute grounds for refusal of registration shall be examined at a 
European and national level and a comparison between the existing tendencies prior 
to the Directive, on the one hand and the case law as developed after the guidelines 
of the European Courts, on the other,  shall be analysed.  
 
Within the same lines, in part III of the thesis, the rights conferred to the trade mark 
owner and, more closely, the issue of trade mark use shall be examined. A 
comparison between the particularities of the Greek law against the interpretative 
lines of the European case law shall be made, in order to conclude whether the 
                                                 
1
 First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Trade Marks, (89/104/EEC), OJ L40/1, 11 February 1989. Henceforth referred to as: the 
Directive. 
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Directive has contributed to the evolution of national trade mark law in relation to 
trade mark use or not.   
 
In part IV, the traditional protection of trade marks in the European Union shall be 
examined, as against the legislation and case law developed by the Greek courts 
prior and after the entry into force of the Directive. The notion of ―likelihood of 
association‖ shall also be analysed. The degree of harmonisation and the 
discrepancies between the guidelines given by the case law of the  European Court 
of Justice
2
 and the Greek courts shall be examined. Examples from a common law 
(UK) jurisdiction shall also be drawn upon. 
 
Lastly, in part V of the thesis, the notion of trade mark dilution, a theory that was 
originally introduced in the USA by Fr. I. Schechter
3
 shall be analytically examined. 
The infringement provisions of the European Directive as well as the national trade 
mark law in Greece regarding dilution shall be considered. The evolution of the case 
law of the European Court of Justice on famous marks and protection thereof shall 
be examined. Such evolution shall be compared to the USA case law on dilution. 
Throughout,  the examination shall be made against the background of the Federal 
Anti-Dilution Act in the USA
4
.The European Court of Justice case law shall also be 
examined in relation to case law of the courts of Greece prior and after the entry into 
force of the Directive. The extent of harmonisation in Greece shall be analytically 
concluded. Examples by the UK courts shall also be drawn upon. In view of the 
practical application of the doctrine by the European and Greek courts, the inherent 
inconsistencies of Schechter‘s seminal work will be shown. 
  
Finally, it is suggested that trade mark legislation should offer adequate protection to 
the trade mark, against any detrimental unauthorised use by a third party. The value 
of trade marks as a property asset and their significance as signs is beyond any doubt 
a result of the development of modern economy and culture. The mass media, 
advertising and the globalisation of commerce dictate an overall reconsideration of 
                                                 
2
  Henceforth referred to as: the ECJ. 
3
  Fr. Schechter, “The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection”, 40 Harv L Rev, 813, [1927]. 
4
  Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995, as revised by the Trade Mark Dilution Revision Act of 
2006. 
 10 
trade mark functions, so that the rights conferred to the trade mark owner can be 
fulfilled to their full extent.  
 
 11 
PART I.   EXPLORING TRADE MARK THEORY  
A.  THE  ROLE  OF TRADE MARKS THROUGH TIME  
―There is upon some subjects, a touching absence of curiosity among English 
lawyers. Institutions which are the very heart of modern business life, the fountain –
heads of not ungrateful streams of litigation, are accepted as though, like the image 
of Ephesus, they fell direct from heaven for the benefit of deserving profession. The 
legal questions to which they give rise are studied with minute care, the legal 
relationships which they create are made the occasion of microscopic analysis. But 
the subject itself, the really interesting and important matter, is left untouched‖5. 
Trade marks and goodwill represent an important  factor in commercial life today 
also because out of the so-called law of technical trade marks has grown the law of 
unfair competition
6
. The examination of the historical development is not merely of 
academic interest. The determination of the question as to the legal nature of the 
right in a trade mark is also linked to the basis of relief in trade mark cases. In 
common law as well as civil law countries courts have accepted that the basis of 
relief is the deception of the public but also the protection of the trade  mark owner. 
Where shall we find the germs of the modern trade mark, the history of which is 
inexorably linked with the development  of trade mark law? The answer will be 
found in the mass of records of the organisations of merchants and craftsmen of the 
medieval ages, supplemented by the researches of archaeological bodies. 
A. a. Antiquity 
No one really knows how and why trade marks started to exist. It is highly likely 
that their use began even before writing was invented. Many theorists have 
speculated on the subject (not only lawyers, but also archaeologists or historians), 
                                                 
5
  Edward Jenks, ―Select Essays in Anglo – American Legal History‖, iii, 51. 
6
  In the USA the law relating to technical trademarks was fully developed before the law on unfair 
competition. Technical trademarks were considered those non registered trademarks that were 
―fanciful, arbitrary, unique, distinctive and non descriptive in character‖ see 3 R. Callmann, ―Unfair 
Competition and Trademarks‖ par. 66.1. 3rd e. [1955],  cited in 408 F. 25 54 K-S-H- Plastics 
Incorporation v. Carolite Inc. and K-S-H- Plastics Inc v. Sunbeam Lighting Company, 9
th
 Circuit US 
Court of Appeal [1969], In both cases the redress is based upon the right to be protected in the 
goodwill of a trade or business, see Harvard Law Review, Vol. 29 [1916] 762 ―The Relation of  
Technical Trademark to the Law of Unfair Competition‖, Rodgers in ―Goodwill, Trade Marks and 
Unfair Trading‖, 127, Hopkins, Trademarks, 2nd ed., par.1, Pitney J in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. 
Metcalf  240 US 403 ―In fact the common law on trade marks is but a part of the broader law of 
unfair competition‖, i.e.  from an analytical point of view, law on unfair competition is the genus and 
law on technical trademarks is the species.  
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based on findings from the pre-historian period and antiquity. In all likelihood the 
first kind of marking was the branding of  cattle and other animals
7
. A linguistic 
explanation  that could support the previous speculation is that the English word 
―brand‖ is derived from the Anglo-Saxon verb ―to burn‖8. Wall paintings of Ancient 
Egypt and cave paintings of South Europe dating from the pre-historical age show 
cattle branded on the fields
9
.  
 
These first marks where mere visual designs
10
, which could even be regarded as the 
origin of ancient alphabets or an already existing system of writing
11
. The above 
speculation has not yet been confirmed, but still it shows the strong link between 
writing and the visual signs used as marks in trade. A great number of marks (over 
5.000) have been discovered by archaeologists with regard to the Greek and Roman 
civilisations
12
. More clearly  marking started to appear at a later stage after ceramic 
objects were widely used. The ruins of the prehistoric settlement at Korakou, near 
Corinth, have yielded up saucers and bowls bearing potters‘ marks at least four 
thousand years old
13
. However, these first marks were mere indications of the 
manufacturers, in order for them to be protected from theft
14
. 
 
As human society and human culture evolved, so did merchandising and exchange 
of goods, even between different countries. The need then for an identification of the 
source or origin of the goods revealed itself as overwhelming. The findings bearing 
trade marks date from the period of 100 BC and they usually bear the initials of the 
                                                 
7
  See L. E. Daniels, ―The History of the Trade-Mark‖, 7 TM Bull. 239, at 240-41 as found in S. A. 
Diamond, ―The Historical Development of Trademarks‖, 65 TMR 265, at 266; also I. M. Azmi, Sp. 
M. Maniatis, B. Sodipo, ―Distinctive Signs and Early Markets: Europe, Africa and Islam‖, in 
―Perspectives on Intellectual Property- The Prehistory and Development of Intellectual Property 
Systems‖ A. Firth ed., London, Sweet and Maxwell, [1997]. 
8
   W. H. Browne, ―A Treatise on the Law Trade Marks and Analogous Subjects‖, 11 [1898], as cited 
in S. A. Diamond, Ibid at 266. 
9
  See S. A. Diamond, Ibid. 
10
  Ibid. 
11
  G. Ruston, ―On the Origin of Trade Marks ―, 45 TMR 127, [1955], at 128.  
12
  See Io. A. Sakellaridis, ―Trade Marks‖, Dimokratia Politon, Athens, [1995], at 13. 
13
  See, C.W. Blegen, ―Korakou, A Prehistoric Settlement Near Corinth‖, American School of 
Classical Studies at Athens, 1921, No 6, p.p. 5, II. See also for the early time of trademarks, Joseph 
Kohler, ―Das Recht des Markenschutzes‖, Wurzburg, [1884]. 
14
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 11. It is worth clarifying, that the markings were made by the potter not by the 
owner of the object, so they indeed functioned as commercial trade marks, even if the aim was 
protection against theft. 
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potter‘s name15. As A. S. Greenberg claims: ―... the maker of articles for sale in 
commerce used a symbol to indicate the source of the articles regardless of where 
trey went‖16.  
 
Greeks marked their pieces of art with the name of the sculptor and in the case of 
pottery with the name of the maker. However, the most important source of 
knowledge of the development of the role  of trade marks is pottery. This was a 
widely developed craft in ancient times, due to the fact that clay objects were used in 
everyday life. Amphora, cups, jars, lamps, decorative objects - apart from depicting 
ancient art, they also unravel the course of civilisation which was expanding and 
flourishing because of trade. In classical Greek society, the manufacturers used signs 
that were usually found on the undersurface of the objects. The inscriptions were 
most commonly the name of the manufacturer and on decorated pieces the name of 
the designer (as recognition of personal achievement, or the ―early‖ form of 
copyright)
17
. However, according to E. S. Rogers some of the ancient Greek findings 
bore more elaborated  trade marks (in the sense that they were not merely the 
signature of the potter) such as figures of Hermes, bees, lion heads and others.
18
 He 
also provides some examples of possible trade mark (unauthorised by the potter) 
copying : Greek inscriptions found on Etruscan vases  that could be a mere copy of 
the trade mark of some celebrated Greek maker (―as the Roman engravers and 
sculptors were in habit of doing in later times‖)19. It is worth mentioning the case of 
a very successful  mark that was used on Roman oil lamps. These lamps were an 
important article of trade and many different Roman potters manufactured them 
under various marks; the most widespread  was the mark ―FORTIS‖20. The mark 
                                                 
15
  See, A. S. Greenberg, ―The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks‖, 33 Journal of the Patent Office 
Society, 876, (No. 12, 1951), at 879. 
16
  Ibid. 
17
  According to A. Verona‘s, ―Pravo Industrijskog Vlasnivsta‖, (Industrial Property Law), at 6, 
[1978], there were three signs on pottery products in Greece: the manufacturer‘s (which was to be 
found in almost every object), the designer‘s sign and the purchaser‘s sign; found in M. Vukmir, 
―The Roots of Anglo-American Intellectual Property Law in Roman Law‖, 32 IDEA [1992], at128. 
18
  The ―early‖ form of the figurative marks. See E. S. Rogers, ―Some Historical Matters Concerning 
Trade Marks‖ 9 University of Michigan Law Review 29, [1910], at 10, citing also Kohler, ―Das 
Recht des Markenshutzes‖ Op. Cit. Supra n. 13. 
19
  Ibid, at 30. 
20
  It would be interesting to note that classic names are still used as trade marks; very successful 
ones, indeed!; for example, NIKE, which is the ancient Greek personification of Victory () or 
NIVEA which comes from the Latin Niveus that means snow white.  See I. M. Azmi, Sp. M. 
Maniatis, B. Sodipo, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7, at 135. 
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was so successful that it became a generic term designating a particular kind of oil 
lamp!
21
  
A. b.  Middle Ages 
The judicial conception of the alternative functions of trade marks, namely the 
designation of origin or ownership of goods, rests upon the uses to which marks 
were put in the Middle Ages. It has been argued that strictly speaking, marks 
designating ownership are not trademarks at all but merely proprietary marks, which 
may, or may not, incidentally serve to designate the origin or source of the goods to 
which they are affixed
22
.  
 
The Middle Ages were characterised as a general ―dark‖ period of learning and most 
of the people (including artisans) did not know how to read and write. Therefore, no 
substantial use of marks was effected in the earlier years of feudalism
23
. However, 
later on (roughly the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries)
24
 a significant expansion of 
commerce had as a consequence the increased use of trade and other kinds of marks 
(e.g.  proprietary).
25
  
 
Until the 15th century, the line of demarcation between the merchant and the 
craftsman was not yet sharply defined. The same mark did often serve the dual 
function of  proprietary mark and production mark
26
.  
 
Another very important element that established more firmly  the use of marks in 
trade at that time was the organisation of guilds
27
. These were tightly controlled 
organised groups of artisans, who used a compulsory production mark. The mark 
was obligatory; used to identify the guild‘s products. The principle purpose of this 
                                                 
21
  See S. A. Diamond, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7. 
22
  W. H. Browne, ―Treatise on the Law of Trademarks‖, 1898, Op. Cit. Supra n. 8. This is of course 
true. However, it is not the same if the owner of  the object makes the marking on its property and if 
the manufacturer makes the marking on the object he wishes to sell further. In the former case, the 
owner is acting on a private basis, in the latter it is an act related to the manufacturer‘s commercial 
business.  
23
   See A. Diamond, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7. 
24
  Ibid, at 272. 
25
  For a detailed study See S. A. Diamond, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7. 
26
  F.I. Schechter, ―The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade Marks‖, Columbia 
University Press, 1925, at 21. 
27
  Ibid, at 15; also, M. Azmi, Sp. M. Maniatis, B. Sodipo, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7, at 138-139. 
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was dual: on the one hand, to be able to account and identify  responsibility for poor 
quality merchandise; and on the other hand, to be able to control the manufacturers 
28
. It is obvious that the system had an inherently judicial character: the 
manufacturers were held responsible in cases where the products did not have the 
expected quality
29
. 
 
 The past role of marks in trade and society, as presented above, is   similar to the 
role of trade marks today, as such role is  put forward in modern legal texts on trade 
marks: the identification of the source of the product, i.e. identification of the 
manufacturer and, additionally, the guarantee of quality of the product
30
. There are 
considerable differences owed to the diverse cultural and economic organisation of 
the society.  
 
With the growth of industrialisation there was an important development of trade 
marks, as well. The expansion of machines that replaced the handwork of 
manufacturers increased production. Consequently the need to attract consumers led 
to an increase of the value and significance of trade marks. However, the use of 
these early marks has set the preliminary basis on which modern trade mark theory 
lies. 
A. c. Contemporary Era
31
 
A typical scene taken from everyday life will be used as an example depicting the 
changes that have effected in contemporary society and economy. In a traditional 
flea market the consumer shall try one producer and the following week will revert 
                                                 
28
  See S. A. Diamond, Op. Cit. Supra n. 7, at 276. 
29
  It is worth citing the following passage from the 1266 first bakers‘ compulsory marking law in 
England: ―[A] baker must set his owne proper marketh and selleth, to the end that if any bread be 
faultie in weight, it may bee knowne to whom the fault is.‖; found in Rogers, Op. Cit. Supra n. 18, at 
141. Another example is the order of the Cutlers of London in 1642 saying  that: ―No man from 
hensforth shall have a proper marcke unless he be a forger and be able of him self to forge and temper 
his stuf as a worckman sholde do‖. See Welch, ―History of the Cutlers of London‖ [1923], at 344  
found in Schechter Op. Cit. Supra n. 26, at 111.  
30
 As shall be examined further in the present thesis. Although the “quality guarantee” purpose of the 
trade mark  used to rely on a  different basis (namely the accountability for bad quality of the 
manufacturer)  and was also legally enforceable. 
31
 Since the present discourse is in a historical context, it would be interesting to mention that the 
Colgate mark is continuously used since 1866, Gordon ‗s Gin since 1769, Quaker since 1845, Singer 
since 1851, Campbell‘ s and Kelloggs since 1915, Kodak since 1888 and Coca Cola since 1886. See 
Julius R. Lunshford Jr, ―Consumers and Trade Marks: the Function of Trademarks in the Market 
Place‖, 64 TMR 75, at 76. 
 16 
to the same one if he is satisfied. Looking for the same producer, as the last time the 
consumer will identify the products based on quality and price estimated on personal 
experience. The conclusion that evidently comes about is that no labelling is needed 
in the case where the identification of the product is effected after a direct contact 
with the product and the producer. In a world however which has ceased to trade 
face to face (a complex and impersonal marketplace) a mark becomes the only 
medium ―through which the benefits that flow from the [manufacturer‘s] good 
repute can be realised‖32. A trade mark is therefore a ―creative silent salesman 
through which direct contact between the owner of the mark and the consumer is 
obtained and maintained‖33. 
 
The contemporary era is characterised by an over abundance of goods leading to 
extensive consumerism. The mechanism of consumption can  be rational, based on 
criteria such as quality and price, according to current economic theory; in that way  
effective competition is promulgated. However, consumption is also  a social 
function, rather than the mere satisfaction of individual needs. As Jean Baudrillard
34
 
remarks, consumption does not derive primarily from a vital necessity or from 
―natural law‖, but rather from a cultural constraint. People consume more than they 
need to. They consume goods in order to follow the trends, the life style, the fashion. 
They feel compelled to do so, because if not, they do not fit the cultural ―model‖, 
they are in this sense not integrated in the society. The use value of goods is 
reduced; the symbolic exchange value of goods has replaced it
35
. This is so because 
goods, and thus their labels, no longer designate the world, but rather the being and 
social rank of their possessors. Trade marks are the basic tools of this mechanism. 
As will be made evident throughout the course of this thesis, trade marks, especially 
the famous ones, attract consumers because they designate much more than the mere 
origin or identity of the product. They symbolise prestige and social recognition 
                                                 
32
  Grismore, ―The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names‖, 30 Mich L Rev 489, [1923], at 
492. 
33
  Fr. Schechter, ―Fog and Fiction in Trade - Mark Protection‖, 36 Colum L Rev 60, [1936],  at 64 
and 65. Emphasis Added.  
34
  J. Baudrillard, ―For a critique Of the Political Economy of the Sign‖, Telos Press, [1988] and 
especially his essay ―Sign Function and Class Logic‖. 
35
  Ibid. 
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therefore acquiring goodwill as such
36
. The issue of trade mark functions will be 
thoroughly analysed later on. 
A. d.  Trade Marks in the European Union 
From their inherent relationship and interaction with consumers, it follows that trade 
marks can have an adverse effect on competition. They can, under certain 
circumstances, be found to impede effective competition, because of the exclusivity 
of the rights linked to them. Prohibition of parallel importation, partitioning of the 
market, even the refusal to grant a licence are some examples of the obstacles that 
trade mark protection can impose on competition within the Union
37
. Although the 
relationship between competition and Intellectual Property Rights (including trade 
marks) is not to be examined under the present thesis, a few observations could be 
made. 
 
A paradox is revealed when one looks at the interactions between trade mark 
protection and effective competition
38
. On the one hand, it is suggested that trade 
mark protection (i.e. the exclusivity of the rights granted to trade mark owners) 
encourages and facilitates competition. If the proprietor of an Intellectual  Property 
right enjoys adequate protection, he is allowed and encouraged to compete more 
effectively. The consumers have access to valid information and can thereby base 
their choice on this. Otherwise they would not be able to benefit from a competitive 
economy that offers a wide variety and range in the quality and price of goods and 
services. Hence, effective competition is promoted, as consumers are able to 
distinguish the relevant differences between products and every identified 
manufacturer seeks to improve the quality of his products in order for them to appeal 
to the public.  
                                                 
36
  See, S. M. Maniatis ―Trade Mark Rights: A justification based on property‖, [2002] I.P.Q.  at 123. 
37
  See Magill/Television Listings Cases 241/242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent 
Television Publications Limited v. Commission,[1995], 4 CMLR 718, which concerned Copyright, 
but could obviously have an analogous application to all Intellectual Property rights. In this case, the 
refusal by a Copyright holder to grant a licence was said to constitute abuse of a dominant position, 
thereby infringing EU Treaty. See also, R. Annand and H. Norman, ―Guide to Community Trade 
Mark‖, Blackstone Press Limited, [1998], at 6-7. 
38
  See, among others, R. Whish, ―E. U. Competition Law‖, London, Butterworths, [2002], p. 733 
seq., Torremans and Holoyak ―Intellectual Property Law‖, Butterworths, [2001], Anderman ―EC 
Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights; the Regulation of Innovation‖, Clarendon Press, 
[1998], Govaere ―The use and abuse of Intellectual  Property Rights in EC Law‖,  Sweet & Maxwell, 
[1996]. 
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On the other hand, it seems that the Single Market cannot coexist with the broad 
legal protection of rights the objective of which is actually to impede the entrance of 
new competitors in the market. The ECJ had the opportunity to adjudicate cases with 
regard to trade mark issues that were allegedly restricting competition
39
. The need to 
have a uniform trade mark legal framework throughout the European Union in order 
for such tensions to be diminished became gradually apparent. These reasons, 
together with the general need for modernisation of national laws of the member 
states, lead to the introduction of harmonising legislative measures on trade marks. 
 
The Member States of the European Union were largely following similar concepts 
on trade mark protection. However, significant discrepancies existed as well
40
. EC 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC on the Approximation of Trade Mark Laws was 
promulgated on December 21, 1988
41
. According to Recital 1 of the Preamble to the 
Directive ―trade mark laws at present applicable in the Member States contain 
disparities which may impede the free movement of goods and freedom to provide 
services and may distort competition within the common market […] it is therefore 
necessary, in view of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, to 
approximate the laws of Member States‖. In order for the approximation of laws to 
be effected, there should be national uniformity on the conditions for obtaining and 
continuing to hold a registered trade mark
42
 as well as protecting it. It is now 
accepted that the protection of trade marks does not necessarily impede, on the 
contrary, it enhances competition, through the protection it gives to trade mark 
owners and confidence in the efforts they are putting into establishing a good name 
in the market
43
.  
 
                                                 
39
  See relevant case law, e.g. Hag I, Case 129/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag, ECR 731 [1974] and 
Hag II Case 10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, [1990], ECR  1711.  
40
 For the pre-existing legal framework on trade mark protection and the need for harmonisation See: 
F. Beier, ―The Development of Trademark Law in the Last Twenty-five Years‖, [1995], 26 IIC 769; 
and ―Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trade Mark Law‖, [1975] IIC 285; 
also, A. Kur, ―Harmonisation of the Trademark Laws in Europe-An Overview‖, [1997], 28 IIC 1.    
41
  Op. Cit. supra n. 1. 
42
  See Recital 7 of the Directive. 
43
  See also Ch. Chrisanthis, ―Free Competition, Origin Function and Risk of Confusion in trade mark 
law‖, EpiskED [2007], 33. 
 19 
However, some issues have intentionally remained unregulated. According to 
Recital 3 of the Preamble to the Directive ―it does not appear to be necessary at 
present to undertake full-scale approximation of the trade mark laws of the Member 
States and it will be sufficient if approximation is limited to those national 
provisions of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal market‖.  
In some areas, it was considered more appropriate to leave a wide discretion to the 
Member States of whether to include in their legislation the relevant provisions or 
not. These areas concern, for example, some questions of procedure concerning 
registration, or formalities of licensing agreements
44
. Member States were also free 
to apply cumulatively laws other than trade mark law (as already mentioned) such as 
special laws on unfair competition, civil liability, tort or consumer protection. The 
legal framework introduced by the Directive will be examined in detail later. 
B.   FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS 
The word ―functions‖ denotes the possible use of the mark with regard to the 
products, the producers and the consumers and determines the scope of trade mark 
protection: legal provisions aim at protecting trade marks when they perform one of 
these functions. The following are the factors defining trade mark functions: the 
holders, the recipients and the potential rivals. The direct relationship between trade 
marks and consumers is of primary importance. It is unavoidable that trade marks 
themselves, as well as their functions, are defined in relation to the purchasers of the 
products, because they are the recipients of the signified meaning conveyed by the 
marks. However, in determining trade mark functions not only the consumers‘ 
perception of a mark must be considered; but also that of the mark‘s competitors. A 
wide scope of protected functions, resulting in broad legal protection restricts 
competition, because it creates wider monopoly rights. The opposing interests of the 
                                                 
44
 See, Ch. Gielen, ―Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in  Europe: The First Trade Mark 
Harmonisation Directive of the European Council‖, 8 EIPR 262, [1992]‖. In Greece, for example, the 
law provides as a condition of validity, that the license agreement of a trade mark is heard before the 
Trademark Administrative Committee and that the respective ruling (granting such license) is 
registered with the trade mark registry. The rationale is that the consumers must be protected from 
licenses that entail risk of confusion. In practice, the hearing before the Trademark Administrative 
Committee is merely a formality and all licenses are thereby granted. However, the non registration 
of a license (if the licensor does bring it before the Trademark Administrative Committee) has 
practical implications. For example, the licensee has no locus standi for intervening in proceedings 
initiated by the licensor.  
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trade mark owner and his competitors must always be balanced. The most widely 
accepted
45
 categorisation of trade mark functions is the following: 
 
a.  The Origin or Source function.  
b.  The Guarantee or Quality function. 
c.  The Advertising function. 
 
It should be noted that the functions which the trade mark performs has a direct 
impact on a) registrability, b) trade mark use (by a third party)whereby a sign is used 
in the context of trade mark infringement by a third party as a trade mark and not, 
for example, as a descriptive or explanatory term, c) liability to revocation of the 
trade mark for non use (by the trade mark owner), and of course, as mentioned 
earlier, d) the scope of trade mark protection
46
.  
B. a. The Origin Function
47
 
Trade marks are protected so that they may serve as indicators of the trade source 
from which goods or services come, or are in some other way connected
48
. An 
analogy could be drawn between people‘s names and trade marks49. The latter can 
be viewed as products‘ names, thus helping consumers to identify and easily 
distinguish the products
50
. As A. Kamperman Sanders and Sp. Maniatis have put it, 
                                                 
45
 See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn , ―Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks 
and Allied Rights‖, 6th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, [2007], at 623; also, R. Annand and H. Norman, 
―Blackstone‘ s Guide to Trade Marks Act 1994‖, Blackstone Press Ltd., [1994], at 13-17; A. Firth, 
―Trade Marks: the New Law‖, Jordans, [1995], 1-14, Maniatis in Sterling (ed.) Intellectual Property 
and Market Freedom [1997]. 
46
 See, R. Annand and H. Norman, ―Guide to the Community Trade Mark‖, Blackstone Press Ltd., 
[1998], at 10.  
47
  The European Court of Justice has defined the ―specific subject matter‖ of trade marks, in a series 
of decisions the most important of which is Hag II Op. Cit. Supra n. 38. The Court held that the 
―specific subject matter‖ was, in particular, the origin function. The words ―in particular‖ show that 
the Court wanted to leave some flexibility to the framework of trade mark functions. In the Arsenal 
case [2003] ETMR 19, Advocate General Colomer stated in his opinion (par. 46) that to recognise 
only the origin function of trade marks constitutes ―simplistic reductionism‖.  This case shall be 
examined further below in the present thesis.  
48
  See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn  Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 623.  
49
 See the study of Lars Holmqvist, ―Degeneration of Trade Marks‖, Library of Law and Social 
Sciences, Sweden.  In this the author  discusses the semantic aspects of trade marks in an analogy 
with proper names: ―Both living creatures and inanimate objects have designations attached to them, 
either proper names or common nouns, which are meant to convey to those referring to them in 
speech or in writing a notion of some kind.‖ p. 64. 
50
  See W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, ―The Economics of Trademark Law‖,  78 TMR 267, at 270; 
in this analysis, written from an economic perspective, the authors stress on the economising benefits 
of trade marks, coming from the fact that  they reduce ―consumer search costs‖: if there were no trade 
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a trade mark ―enhances the ability to conceptualise the abstract notion of a 
product.‖51 With the help of easily distinguishable visual (or non visual) signs52, 
consumers can individualise and consequently identify a certain product as opposed 
to other products bearing different brands.
53
 From the multiplicity of information 
that trade marks carry, the law recognised, as already mentioned, only that 
connected to the product‘s origin. The origin function designates that products 
bearing the same mark either emanate from one identified producer or group of 
producers; or alternatively that they emanate from the same albeit anonymous 
source
54
.  
 
As already discussed, the primary function of a trade mark was to identify the owner 
or the source of the product (namely the manufacturer). In modern society, 
important changes of the economic status quo have been introduced: for example, 
the increase of production and of product variety. These changes have had  a certain 
influence on  the functions of trade marks as commercial tools in the hands of 
producers. Firstly, it is even more important now for a producer to have a strong 
identifier of his products with which he avails the market. In order for him to 
―survive‖ within the abundance of consuming goods, he has to give his products an 
identity, so that consumers could easily find and select his goods, rather than 
someone else‘s.     
 
In the earlier years, trade marks were used specifically to denote the owner or the 
manufacturer of the product. When social communities were smaller, it was feasible 
                                                                                                                                         
marks to identify the products, the consumers would have to remember more and waste time in 
describing the specific product they were looking for; in the same way that it would be much more 
time and effort consuming to identify people, if they did not have names. 
51
  See A. Kamperman Sanders and Sp. M. Maniatis, ―A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on 
Origin and Quality‖, 11 EIPR 406, [1993], at 406. 
52
  Non-visual signs, such as smells and sounds, can also be registered as they are capable of graphic 
representation, provided they are distinctive.  See Directive art. 2 par.1, UK Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 
1(1) and Greek Law n. 2239/1994  On Trade Marks, art. 1 par. 2. This issue will be examined  later 
on. 
53
  It will be shown that in order for a mark to be eligible for registration it must necessarily be able of 
distinguishing the products. See, for example, article 3(1)(a) of the Directive which explicitly states 
that trade marks lacking a distinctive character will  not be registered. 
54
 Some commentators consider the origin and the distinguishing functions as two separate notions. 
See, for example, R. Francheschelli, “Trademarks as an Economic and Legal Institution”, 8 IIC 293, 
[1977]. In this article the author draws a line between Identifying and Distinguishing. However, it 
should be noted that these two aspects of the same function cannot be presented separately. Whenever 
a sign identifies a certain denominator, at the same time it distinguishes that from others.  
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for people to know the person that manufactured the goods. However, this is not the 
case any more. Usually the name of the owner is not known, even when the brand is 
of high reputation
55
. The average consumer neither knows nor cares about the 
identity of the originator of the product. The buyer of Marlboro cigarettes, for 
example, does not necessarily know that these are manufactured by Philip Morris 
Products Inc.
56
 Even if the company changed owners or management, or even if it 
assigned the trade mark to another manufacturer, the consumer would not care
57
.  
 
It should be noted that UK Courts accepted this change of the context of the origin 
function in the early passing off decisions
58
. English judges stated that it did not 
matter whether the mark conveyed the identity of the proprietor. Rather, it should 
indicate that a common source existed for the marked goods or services. Some USA 
decisions could also be mentioned, which early enough assisted in making that issue 
clear. In Shredded Wheat Biscuit
59
 for example, it was pointed out that: ―the public 
has become accustomed to regard its familiar wheat biscuit, as emanating, if not 
from it by name
60
, at least from a single though anonymous
61
 maker, and the second 
is as good for these purposes as the first‖. Greek doctrine and case law were also 
supporting on the basis of the old (before the entry into force of the Directive) trade 
mark law that trade marks should be able to denote that all products they were 
registered for emanate from the same source but without also necessarily denoting 
the name and particulars of that source
62
. According to this doctrine the only 
                                                 
55
 See, for example, Fr. I. Schechter, ―The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
4 at 335. It would be interesting to cite an example mentioned by Schechter: a survey was effected, at 
the time when the article was published, on employees of a company, named Cheney Bros. The 
results of this survey revealed that (a) 66.6 % of the employees tested, identified certain products by 
well-known trademarks,  and that (b) only 28.4% knew who made the products bearing the marks 
(footnote, n. 8, at 347). 
56
  T. Martino and P. Groves, ―Trade Marks-Deliver Us From Days of Old‖, 10 EIPR 255, [1991] at 
357. 
57
  With one reservation: he would have a vested interest in the product not being diverse from the 
one he used to buy. This is the guarantee function of trade marks which will subsequently be 
examined . 
58
  See, for example, Powell v. Birmigham Vinegar Brewery, AC 710, [1897]. 
59
  Shredded Wheat  Co. V. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250, Fed. 960, 963, [CA2 1918]; see also, 
Saalfield Pub. Co. V. Merriam Co., 238Fed. 1, 8-9, [CA  6 1917]; Bayer Co. V. United Drug Co., 272 
Fed 505, 509 [SDNY 1921]. 
60
  Emphasis added. 
61
  Ibid. 
62
  See, for example, StE (Greek Conseil d‘ Etat) 1757/78, 1058/84, 4294/86, 4718/86 and 
Pamboukis, ―Distinctive Signs‖, at 88, Liakopoulos ―Collective Marks. Problems arising from 
parallel use of a trade mark‖ [1974], at 72, Tzouganatos, EEMpD [1992], at 308. 
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protected trade mark function should be the origin function
63
. Note, however, that 
under a different doctrine which was not the prevailing one, the origin function 
consisted of the ability of trade marks to certify that the products have a consistent 
quality, form and substance independent of whether they all come from the same 
source
64
.  
 
Statutory recognition of the origin function can be found in section 68(1) of the  UK 
Trade Marks Act 1938
65
. According to this a trade mark was defined as : ―...a mark 
used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating ...a 
connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the 
right...to use the mark, whether with or without any indication of the identity of that 
person.‖  
 
Before the entry into force of the Directive, the law regulating trade marks in Greece 
was Law 1998/1939
66
. Under this law the origin function was recognised and 
considered  as a close bond between the mark and the producer‘s business 67. 
According to art. 1 par. 1 of this law a trade mark was initially defined as ―Any sign 
useful for the indication of the products emanating from a certain …. enterprise 
…..‖. After the amendment of this article by Presidential Decree 317/1992 trade 
mark was defined as ―Any sign that can be graphically represented and can 
distinguish the products or services of one enterprise than those of other 
enterprises‖68.  
 
A direct implication of the source function is that the trade mark cannot be 
considered as an item of property on its own, and so it cannot be independently 
transferred or assigned. In many European countries, including Greece, national 
                                                 
63
 See, Aik. Delouka and Chr. Chrysanthis in N. Rokas (ed.) ―Trade Mark Law‖, Nomiki Vilviothiki, 
Athens, [1996], 30, Th. Liakopoulos ―Industrial Property‖, Sakkoulas, Athens, [2000], 316-317, V. 
Antonopoulos, ―Industrial Property‖, Sakkoulas, Athens [2005], 420. See also Kalampouka-
Giannopoulou P., ―The protection of trade marks in the Greek and European case law‖, [2006] 
ETrAxD 858. 
64
  See, N. Rokas, ―Trade Mark Law‖, [1978] 4-7. 
65
  With regard to the Directive see further par. B.d. of the present chapter. 
66
  This law was subsequently amended by Law 3205/1955 and Presidential Decree 317/1992 
(Official Gazette A 160). 
67
  Art. 1 par. 1 (definition), 17 par. 2 (trade mark use), 15 par. 1 (cancellation) of Law 1998/1939. 
68
  This definition of a trade mark remains exactly the same after the implementation of the Directive. 
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legislation did not permit the independent assignment and transfer of trade marks
69
. 
Such transfer  was  possible only in case of transfer of the trade mark owner‘ s 
business  as a whole. Furthermore,  licensing was  possible only if  a connection  
between the  trade mark owner and the licensee could be established. Lastly, non 
operation of the trade mark owner‘ s business, for a certain period of time, 
constituted a ground for recovation of the trade mark
70
.  
 
Under the new Trade Mark Law 2239/1994 it could be argued that the origin 
function of trade marks is not the only one recognised
71
. To this view the following 
arguments are mentioned: trade marks are freely transferred and licensed, the trade 
mark owner is allowed to consent to the registration of a similar mark, the use by the 
licensee is considered  as use by the trade mark owner (art. 18 par. 2c), famous 
marks are protected not only as an obstacle to registration but also as enjoying 
protection on a civil law basis (art. 4 par. 1c and 26 par. 1)
72
. However, other 
provisions of the same law denote the origin function (the definition of trade marks 
(art. 1 par. 1), the distinctive character of a trade mark is defined upon its ability to 
distinguish the products of a certain company thus eliminating risk of  confusion 
(art. 3 par. 1 and 4 par. 1a and 1b), trade marks are open to cancellation if not used 
substantially for a period of five years or if the use is discontinued without due cause 
for a period of five years (art. 17 par. 1a and 1b), third parties are allowed to use a 
registered trade mark so long as they do not use it ―as a trade mark‖ (Art. 20 par. 1).  
Whether only origin or other functions are protected under the currently in force 
trade mark law shall be clarified when examining trade mark protection as perceived 
and given by the Greek courts
73
. 
                                                 
69
  Art. 20 par. 1 of Law 1998/1939. 
70
  Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 316. 
71
  See M. Th. Marinos, ―Risk of Confusion and scope of protection of distinctive signs according to 
trade mark law and Law 146/1914 on Unfail Competition‖, EllDik [1995], at 1219, N. Rokas, case 
comment on PolPrAth (Multi Member Athens Court of First Instance) 8393/1994 EEmpD [1995], at 
497. 
72
  See, Liakopoulos, [2000], Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 318. However the author is of the view that even 
in the light of the new trade mark law the origin function is the only one that is protected. He also 
contends that an offence of the origin function would also harm the guarantee and the advertising 
function which are only indirectly protected. The author argues that the recognition of protection 
beyond the origin function independent of any criteria based on this function, would confer to the 
trade mark owner an absolute right with unlimited possibilities of use and enforcement. See also, A. 
Psarras case comment on Supreme Court 751/1995, DEE [1996], at 257. 
73
   See infra Part III.B.d. 
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B. b. The Guarantee Function
74
 
Trade marks are protected because they symbolise qualities associated by consumers 
with certain goods and guarantee that the goods satisfy consumers‘ expectations75. 
This function encapsulates the obligation of trade mark owners to maintain a 
consistent quality. When the consumer purchases products of the same brand, he 
believes that these will be of consistent quality.
76
 It is of no importance whether the 
quality will be good or bad.
77
 Yet, it is of the utmost importance for  consumers that 
products bearing the same marks  and emanating  from the same producer  are of  
consistent quality
78
.  
 
From the reverse side, this function can be seen as an incentive for firms to improve 
the quality of their products, and build on their reputation. If the mark was not linked 
with the stability of quality, the manufacturers would compete for a worse (rather 
than a better) quality, that would sell under the same price and therefore result in 
more profit. The standard quality of products would be lower and  consumers would 
be affected by that 
79
. 
 
However, this function cannot be legally enforceable
80
. The consumers do  not have 
any legal claims against a firm that shows inconsistency with regard to its product 
                                                 
74
  For an analysis of ―marks of quality‖ which fall outside the scope of trade mark law see 
Liakopoulos,  Op. Cit. Supra n. 63 at 317 and Aik. Delouka and Chr. Chrysanthis in N. Rokas (ed.) 
―Trade Mark Law‖, [1996], Op. Cit. Supra n. 63 at 54. 
75
  W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 620 and W. R. Cornish, and J. 
Phillips, ―The Economic Function of Trade Marks: An Economic Analysis With Special Reference to 
Developing Countries‖, 1 IIC 41, [1982], at 43. 
76
  See, for example, R. S. Brown, ―Advertising and the public interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols‖,  57 YLJ 1165, [1948], at 1187, from which quoted: ―Since the owner of a symbol 
probably guarantees by it nothing  more than his hope that the buyer will come back for more, the 
term smacks strongly of the ad-man‘s desire to create the illusion of a guarantee without in fact 
making more than the minimum warranty of merchantable quality‖; also, R. A. Posner and W. M. 
Landes, ―The Economics of Trademark Law‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 50, at  271, from which quoted: ―The 
benefits of trademarks in reducing consumer costs require that the producer of a trademarked good 
maintain a consistent quality over time and across consumers‖.  
77
  See A. Kamperman Sanders and S. M. Maniatis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 51, at 404. 
78
  This has been quite vividly described by Landes and Posner, Op. Cit. Supra n. 50, at 271: ―A trade 
mark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, I need not investigate the 
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trade mark is a short-hand way of telling 
me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.‖ 
79
 S. M. Maniatis remarks that ―without trade marks the market economy based on choice would 
break down into a number of single  product markets. For each type of product there would be only 
one –the lowest marketable-quality, at one- the lowest possible-price‖ in ―Trade Mark Law and 
Domain Names: Back to Basics?‖ E.I.P.R., [2002], 397. 
80
  See F.K. Beier, (as quoted in A. Kamperman Sanders  and S. M. Maniatis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 51, at 
407), who explains why no legal backing can be given to the mark as a warranty, F. K. Beier and U. 
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quality. The cost that a firm pays has the form of an economic loss, as a result of  
reduced customers. Market rules themselves will oblige the producers to keep a 
consistent quality in their products as this is the only way to retain consumer loyalty. 
 
Courts and commentators in the UK have not been willing to acknowledge this 
function, in the case of registered marks
81
. The UK Trade Marks Act 1938
82
 made it 
explicitly clear that a mere change in the form of connection between the proprietor 
and his goods or services would not invalidate the mark. The Trade Marks Act 1994 
does not expressly mention the guarantee function; UK case law has accorded it only 
limited recognition. It could be noted that in Colgate-Palmolive v. Markwell 
Finance,
83
 Slade LJ said: ―... there is nothing incongruous in holding that a 
registered trade mark is infringed in relation to goods which do not conform to an 
identifiable quality which purchasing members of the public in this country receive 
by reference to the mark.‖  
  
However, the above mentioned link between the firm and its trade mark could also 
be held to protect the consumer and his expectations with regard to the quality of the 
branded product. If a firm owner changes, there should be some guarantee that the 
profile or the quality of the products will remain the same.
84
 
 
According to Greek doctrine the guarantee function is  only indirectly, and not as 
such, protected by trade mark law to the extent that the origin function dictates a de 
facto preservation of a standard product quality
85
. However, the fact that according 
                                                                                                                                         
Krieger, ―Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung, Functionen, und Zweck der Marke‖, [1976], 3 GRUR Int. 125-
128, at 127. ―Were one to focus only on the quality function and the protection of the public against 
quality disappointment, the logical consequence would be that the mark owner would never be 
allowed to change the quality of the marked product, because then every competitor that produces 
products of the same nature and quality should be allowed to use the same mark. Therefore, the mark 
would lose its individuality and adopt the character of a common indicator of attribution or 
certification of quality that everybody should be allowed to use for the same good.‖ (translation). 
Also, Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 321. 
81
  See, A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 10; also, T. Martino and W. Ullah, ―The Quality Guarantee 
Function of Trade Marks: an Economic Viewpoint‖, 8 EIPR 267, [1989]. 
82
  Section 62. 
83
  Colgate Palmolive Ltd v. Markwell Finance Ltd., [1988], RPC 283. Falkoner J in his judgement 
paid considerable attention to the quality function. See also, Colgate II, Colgate Palmolive Ltd. v. 
Markwell Finance Ltd., [1989], RPC 497 (CA). 
84
  See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, [2000], at 316. 
85
  See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, [2000], at 325. According to Antonopoulos the new Greek 
trade mark law has not changed this.  The author further contends that only famous marks (sic) have a 
guarantee function and this in an economic sense, to the extent that product quality is in the 
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to art. 3 par. 1 f and 17 par. 1 of Law 2239/1994, a trade mark is open to cancellation 
if it is considered to be misleading indicates that the guarantee function  has been 
taken into consideration by the Greek legislator. It should be noted that the 
guarantee function of trade marks could also be protected under Greek unfair 
competition law provisions. 
 
B. c. The Advertising Function. 
 
Trade marks are units around which investment in the promotion of a product is 
built and that investment is a value which deserves protection as such, even where 
there is no infringement arising from misrepresentations either about origin or 
quality
86. According to Griffiths ―… trade marks can gain a ―psychological‖ hold on 
the minds of the consumers, which gives them a selling power above that of the 
underlying goodwill‖87. 
 
Let us take an example denoting the importance of that function in modern life. It is 
often the case that fruit (apples, bananas) are individually labelled on super market 
shelves. Next to the labelled ones, consumers may also find the same products, 
without any individual labelling. The consumer would buy the individually labelled 
ones for several reasons: first, the label will catch his eye; second, he might 
recognise the name of the label by a previous purchase of his or of someone that he 
knows; third, buying a special apple will make it the fruit is carefully chosen and 
displayed. Lastly, it is possible that the consumer has seen or heard an advertisement 
about the specific brand of fruit that will urge him to buy.  The basic element that 
needs to be noticed in the above example is the large variety of products (fruit) and 
the similarity of their quality to a great extent. However, in order for the different 
producers to be distinguished, a single label on the box containing the fruit would 
suffice. The reason why each one fruit is labelled individually is not related to the 
identifying or the guarantee function (which are, certainly, fortified) but rather, to 
the advertising function. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
producers‘ interest. See V. Antonopoulos, ―Industrial Property‖, [2002], Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 420, 
and MonPrPeir (Single Member Piraeus First Instance Court) 2400/1993 Arm. 48.47, cited therein. 
86
  W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn,  Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 620. 
87
  Griffiths I.P.Q., [2001], 326 at 329. 
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Frankfurter J indicated in 1923 that ―the protection of trade marks is the law‘s 
recognition of the psychological function of symbols. It is true that we live by 
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them‖88. Its recognition as a 
separate function introduces the acknowledgement of the mark‘s own goodwill 
(different than that of the producer or the product)
89
.  
 
The advertising function has gradually evolved over the last years in parallel with  
the increase of the importance of advertising: trade marks are symbols and 
advertising ―depends on the remote manipulation of symbols‖90. Therefore, trade 
marks are indispensable tools of advertising.  
 
However, the recognition of such a function would entail the adoption of an 
analogous (extended) framework of legal protection. Not many national laws  were 
ready to proceed with such a result.
91
 Extended protection of the mark would mean a 
limited freedom of competitors, and therefore, a further restriction of free trade. As 
already mentioned, the tension between industrial (and intellectual) property rights, 
on the one hand, (conferring legal monopolies and absolute rights to their 
proprietors) and effective competition on the other, is an issue that should be very 
carefully balanced.  
 
It is indisputable that trade marks have an advertising power
92
. They can be used in 
advertising as identifiers of certain products, but they also have an inherent and 
                                                 
88
 Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Mfg Co. V. SS Kresge Co. 316  US 203, [1942],  at 205. Emphasis 
Added. 
89
  It would be quite interesting to note that marks are, in certain cases, considered as one of the most 
valuable assets of a company.  See, G. V. Smith, ―Brand Valuation: Too Long Neglected‖, 5 EIPR 
159, [1990].   
90
  See, R. S. Brown, Op. Cit. Supra n. 76 at 1166. 
91
  The adoption of Directive has altered this, as will be shown later. Suffice to say at present that the 
use of a similar mark on dissimilar goods, although not infringing the origin or the quality functions, 
is quite detrimental to the advertising power of the mark. Therefore, according to the Directive and 
under certain circumstances, such a use is prohibited. [Art. 5(2)]. 
92
  Is it? Some argue that not all trade marks have an advertising power, but only those of a 
reputation. See, for example Advocate General Jacobs‘words in his opinion delivered on 21 March 
2002 on Case C-292/2000, Zino Davidoff & Cie SA, Zino Davidoff  SA v. Gofkid Ltd., stating: ―… 
Such situations will concern above all marks which enjoy a reputation in themselves rather than 
those which function only as a guarantee of origin…‖. From these words it is clear that Advocate 
General Jacobs believes there are trade marks that have an advertising power and trade marks that do 
not. If this were the case then we would have to accept that the three functions of trade marks are not 
linked together but are separate and in each case one should determine ad hoc which functions are 
 29 
independent advertising effect. If the brand has gained high reputation, and has 
established a powerful mark in the market place, the mere allusion to this trade mark 
is an advertisement
93. As T. Martino and W. Ullah have put it: ―Trade marks are a 
species of advertising. Both share three fundamental characteristics: brevity, 
continuity of use and control. They also perform two similar functions: conveying 
information and persuasion‖94.  
 i. information
95
 
The basic function of advertising is information. This means that advertising 
contributes to the consumer‘s knowledge of the existence and availability of goods. 
It also helps to form consumer expectations of the products‘ utility96 They lower 
consumer search costs. This means that they provide the information necessary for a 
consumer to make a choice that would satisfy his needs and expectations. Some of 
the information is evident and observable (such as the colour of the product, the 
material of which it is made, or its aesthetic appeal). Some other characteristics, 
though, are unobservable
97
. Namely,  the attributes of the product (such as the 
mechanical reliability, or the chemical composition), its quality and its effectiveness. 
The latter ones are made accessible by trade marks, in an indirect way. This means 
that when a consumer sees a trade mark, all relevant information comes to his mind; 
it forms part of his knowledge on the specific product, emanating either from his 
personal experience, from recommendation or from some advertisement. This is 
why the informational context of a trade mark differs from consumer to consumer.
98
 
It applies to his personal accumulation of knowledge coming from diverse sources. 
All the above, of course, are ―filtered‖ through the distinguishing function of trade 
marks, in that they relate to the mark‘s ability to individualise the product. 
                                                                                                                                         
applicable in order to decide on the protection accorded. This finally would lead to a different level of 
protection of trade marks depending on their reputation, as shall be examined further below. 
93
 W.R. Cornish mentions that many consumers are against the manipulative persuasion of so much 
advertising, see W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 624. 
94
  See T. Martino and W. Ullah, Op. Cit. Supra n. 81, at 267. 
95
  This will not be examined from the perspective of competition, although full consumer 
information is a prerequisite for a competitive market economy. Suffice to say that the ability to 
inform potential purchasers of the superior qualities of a product encourages the entrance of that 
product in the market. 
96
  According to T. Martino and W. Ullah, ―The mark is transmitting information in a summary-as 
opposed to an analytic- form‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 81, at 269. 
97
  Ibid, at 268. 
98
   See, W. R. Cornish and J. Phillips, Op. Cit. Supra n. 75 at 48. 
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 ii. persuasion 
One of the basic purposes of advertising is persuasion. In parallel, one feature of the 
advertising function of trade marks is their ability to persuade consumers. The 
relationship between trade marks and advertising is a very close one. Trade marks 
provoke the initialisation of the advertising process. In effect, the medium and the 
message in this case are one and indivisible, incorporated in the brand‘s name.99 
Suffice to say that one of the oldest advertising techniques is the simple reiteration 
of the brand name.
100
   
 
However, those who object to the recognition of the advertising function of trade 
marks
101
 raise the following arguments: 
 
a) the unconditional endorsement of absolute rights is contrary to free competition. 
Neither national legislation nor the Directive give a definition of what famous or 
marks with a reputation are
102
. Whereas in the area of unfair competition, for 
example, abuse is considered on a bona mores basis. 
 
b) a trade mark cannot be seen as a literary work or a work of art so as to enjoy an 
unconditional protection in terms analogous to Copyright protection. 
 
c) the protection of advertising function would lead to the protection of the trade 
mark per se (not the trade mark owner, or the consumers or competition). This 
would not be a justifiable extension of protection and in any case the advertising 
                                                 
99
   See, A. K. Sanders and Sp. Maniatis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 51 at 409. 
100
  See, R. S. Brown, Op. Cit. Supra n. 76 at 1185. 
101
 For an analysis of these views see Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 333-334. 
102
 In contrast, the US Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, provided in s. 43 c that for a mark to 
be considered as a famous mark the following should be taken into account: a) the distinctiveness that 
the mark has or has acquired, b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in relation to the goods or 
services that it is registered for, c) the duration and extent of the advertising and publicity of the 
mark, d) the geographical extent as well as the distribution network of the commercial sector in 
which the mark is used, e) the degree of recognition of the mark in the respective commercial sector 
of the trade mark owner and of the infringer, f) the character and the extent of the use of the mark 
itself  or similar marks by third parties. Under these conditions protection is given to the famous mark 
irrespective of any competition relation, risk of confusion or risk of misleading the public (see, 
among others Vassallo/Dickey IBL, [1999], at. 173). The 2006 Revision Act provides for the 
following, inter alia, criteria: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and 
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties, (ii) The amount, 
volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark, (iii) The extent 
of actual recognition of the mark. Also see infra Chapter V.  
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expenses that the trade mark owner has engaged into and the unfairness 
promulgated by that could be resolved by the application of unfair competition 
or passing off provisions. 
 
Undoubtedly one of the key issues in contemporary consumer society is the 
relationship between the three aforementioned functions. Does a  consumer actually 
base his choice on the information conveyed by the trade mark regarding the 
product? Is he really interested in the origin of the product and is he actually 
attracted by the advertising power of a mark? Should the answer be affirmative as to 
the latter question, the role of trade marks in advertising and as advertising becomes 
even more critical. However, legal systems have taken up different positions in the 
scope of protection. A critical factor on that issue is the possibility of legal 
protection under other provisions beyond trade mark law. Unfair competition law in 
continental systems and passing off protection in common law systems provide this 
alternative legal framework of protection. As an overall observation it could be 
noted that common law jurisdictions in the EU have tended to be rather cautious in 
extending trade mark protection whereas civil law jurisdictions in some cases 
through the use of unfair competition rules have eradicated competitive behaviour 
which could be found to be detrimental to the advertising power of brands.  
 
B. d. Trade Mark Functions and the Directive 
According to its Preamble, the aim of the Directive is –as we have already stated-  to 
approximate the trade mark laws of the Member Sates in so far as – but only in so 
far as – they may impede free trade, distort competition and directly affect the 
functioning of the internal market
103
. Registered trade marks must therefore enjoy 
the same protection in all Member Sates although the latter may still grant, within 
the scope of the Directive, extensive protection to those trade marks which have a 
reputation.  
 
                                                 
103
 The role of trade marks in the community was established by the ECJ case law before the entry 
into force of the Directive, see Hag II Case 10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 38, at par. 13: ―Trade mark rights are […] an essential element in the system of undistorted 
competition which the Treaty seeks to establish and maintain‖.  For an analysis of trade mark 
functions in the European regime, see Hannes Roesler, ―The Rationale for European Trade Mark 
Protection‖, [2007] EIPR 100. 
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The ECJ case law dealt with trade mark issues before the entry into force of the 
Directive in  cases on free movement of goods provisions
104
. As already mentioned 
the ECJ in those cases stated that the essential function of trade marks is the origin 
function
105. However in defining as the ―specific subject matter‖ of trade marks ―in 
particular‖ the origin function the Court left a discretion for protection beyond 
this
106
.  
 
An allusion to the guarantee function is in fact made in HAG II 
107
. In this case the 
Court began by noting that trade mark rights are an essential element in the system 
of undistorted competition which the Treaty establishing the European Community 
seeks to establish (par. 13). It went on to recall the origin function of trade marks 
and the conditions for trade marks to be able to fulfil that role. The ECJ further 
noted that the scope of the exclusive right which is the specific subject matter of the 
trade mark must be determined having regard to its function (par. 14). It stressed that 
in that case the determinant factor was absence of consent of the proprietor of the 
trade mark in the importing state to the putting in circulation in the exporting state of 
products marketed by the proprietor of the right in the latter state (par. 15). It 
concluded that free movement of the goods would undermine the essential function 
of the trade mark: ―consumers would no longer be able to identify for certain the 
origin of the marked goods and the proprietor of the trade mark could be held 
responsible for the poor quality of goods for which he was in no way 
responsible‖108.  
 
                                                 
104
 See, for example, case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, [1974], E.C.R. 1183, case 102/77 
Hoffmann La Roche v. Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 and Hag II.  See also P. Craig and G. De Burca, 
―EU Law‖ [2003], at. 1092-1093.  
105
 In case 102/77 Hoffmann La Roche v. Centrafarm,  par. 7 the Court held ―Regard must be had to 
the essential function of the trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade 
marked product to the consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any possibility of 
confusion to distinguish that product from products which have another origin‖.  
106
 In case 102/77 Hoffmann La Roche v. Centrafarm,  par. 7 the Court held that the essential function 
of trade marks was ―in particular to guarantee to the proprietor of the trade mark that he has the 
exclusive right to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting a product into circulation for the first 
time and therefore to protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and 
reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark‖.  
107
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 103, par. 38. 
108
 See also par. 13: ―an undertaking must be in a position to keep its customers by virtue of the 
quality of its products and services, something which is possible only if there are distinctive marks 
which enable customers to identify those products and services. For the trade mark to be able to fulfil 
this role, it must offer a guarantee that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control of a 
single undertaking which is accountable for their quality‖. 
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The tenth recital of the Directive states that the function of trade marks is in 
particular
109
 to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin
110
. This wording 
evokes again the question whether the origin function is the only one to be ascribed 
to trade marks under community law, even though the presence of the words ―in 
particular‖ could suggest a negative response111. The ECJ seemed reluctant for some 
time after the entry into force of the Directive to recognise in its case law the 
advertising function of trade marks
112
. The tenth recital was cited in a number of 
ECJ cases according to which the only function recognised and protected under 
community law is the origin function
113
. However, whilst repeatedly reiterating the 
principal origin function of trade marks, rulings  of the ECJ  confirm   that the 
Community system also protects the guarantee function of trade marks
114
.  
 
An allusion to the guarantee function of the trade mark in similar terms as in HAG II 
can be found in the Ideal Standard case
115
 and in the ECJ` s statement in Bristol 
                                                 
109
  Emphasis added. 
110
 Even though the Community Trade Mark is beyond the scope of the present thesis it should be 
noted that Recital 7 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94  Regulation on the Community Trade 
Mark [1994] OJL11/1, is substantially identical to Recital 10 of the Directive. 
111
  See Annand and Norman, Op. Cit. Supra n. 46 at 10. 
112
  See case C-317/91 Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG, ECR [1993] I-06227. 
113
 See, for example, Case C-251/95 Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, ECR [1997], I-
06191, par. 9,  Case C-39/97 [1998] I-05507, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc., 
ECR [1998], I-05507, par. 15, Philips Electronics v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., Case C-
299/99,  [2002] ECR I-5475.par. 30, Frits Loendersloot v George Ballantine & Son Ltd. And  Others, 
Case C-349/95, ECR [1997], 6227, par. 22 and 24. 
114
  See in particular Case C-228/03 The Gillette Company, Gillette Group Finland Oy v. 
Laboratories Ltd. Oy, Judgement of 17.3.2005, par. 26, Philips Ibid par. 30, Case C-206/01 Arsenal 
Football Club, [2002] ECR I-10273, par. 48, Hoffman La Roche, Op. Cit. Supra n. 104, par. 7. See 
also W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 621. See also, for example, Christian 
Dior SA v. Evora BV case C-337/ 95, [1997], ECR 6013, although Advocate General Jacobs 
considered that the advertising function was a derivative of the origin function, stating in par. 42 of 
his Opinion: ―It is also argued that trade marks have other functions, which might be termed 
`communication', investment, or advertising functions. Those functions are said to arise from the fact 
that the investment in the promotion of a product is built around the mark. It is accordingly reasoned 
that those functions are values which deserve protection as such, even when there is no abuse arising 
from misrepresentations about either origin or quality. However, those functions seem to me to be 
merely derivatives of the origin function: there would be little purpose in advertising a mark if it were 
not for the function of that mark as an indicator of origin, distinguishing the trade mark owner's 
goods from those of his competitors. In my view, therefore, even if other facets of trade marks might 
require protection in certain circumstances, the Court's emphasis on the origin function of trade 
marks was, and remains, an appropriate starting point for the interpretation of Community law 
relating to trade marks‖.  
115
  Case C-9/93, IHT International Heitztechnik BmbH and Uwe Danzinger v. Ideal Standard GmbH 
and Wabco Standard GmbH, ECR [1994] I-02789. However, it is interesting to note that in this case 
the ECJ states that the object of trade mark law is to protect owners against contrivances of third 
parties who might seek by creating a risk of confusion amongst consumers to take advantage of the 
reputation accruing to the trade mark. 
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Meyers Squibb v. Paranova 
116
 that the trade mark owner can object to defective, 
poor quality and untidy repackaging. 
 
As regards the advertising function this has been mentioned in the opinion of the 
Advocate General Jacobs in the case Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV 
117
 to 
the effect that a trade mark owner should have the right to oppose the use of the 
mark by a reseller in advertising, where such advertising is liable to damage 
significantly the reputation of the mark and its owner. The opinion of the Advocate 
General was  followed by the subsequent ECJ ruling 
118
. 
 
Advocate General Colomer clearly recognised the importance of the advertising 
function in its opinion delivered in Arsenal where he stated that a trade mark 
―acquires a life of its own, making a statement about quality, reputation and even, in 
certain cases, a way of seeing life. The messages it sends out are, moreover, 
autonomous. A distinctive sign can indicate at the same time the trade origin, the 
reputation of its proprietor and the quality of the goods it represents, but there is 
nothing to prevent a consumer, unaware of who manufactures the goods or provides 
the services which bare the trade mark, from acquiring them because he perceives 
the mark as an emblem of prestige or a guarantee of quality […] I see no reason 
whatever not to protect those other functions of the trade mark and to safeguard only 
the function of indicating the trade origin of the goods and services‖119. 
 
                                                 
116
  Cases C-427/93 and others, ECR [1996], I – 3457. 
117
 Case C-337/ 95, Parfums Christian Dior SA and  Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV,  ECR 
[1997], 6013. 
118
  The ECJ stated that ―…the damage done to the reputation of a trade mark may, in principle, be 
[….] a legitimate reason within  the meaning of Article 7 (2) of the Directive allowing the proprietor 
to oppose further commercialisation of goods which have been put on the market in the Community 
by him or with his consent [….]‖. The ECJ concluded that the proprietor may not rely on Article 7(2) 
of the Directive to oppose the use of a trade mark by a reseller who habitually markets articles of the 
same kind but not necessarily of the same quality as the trade marked goods , in ways customary in 
the reseller‘s sector of trade for the purpose of bringing to the public‘s attention the further 
commercialisation of those goods, unless it is established that given the specific circumstances of the 
case the use of the trade mark for this purpose seriously damages the reputation of the trade mark. It 
is interesting to note that the EJC states  the reseller is not obliged to market goods of the same 
quality, whereas in Case HAG II the Court states quite the opposite (Op. Cit. Supra n. 103, at 38).   
119
  Case C- 206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed , IIC Vol. 34, [2003], 542 at par. 46-
47. 
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In Zino Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid Ltd 
120
 the Court recognised 
that marks with a reputation must enjoy  a stronger protection and in order to do that 
ECJ did not hesitate to employ an interpretative method that goes beyond the 
wording of the Directive and even its Preamble
121
. The ruling went beyond the 
literary interpretation of the Directive. As Jane Cornwell observes: ―While there are 
numerous examples of purposive reasoning in ECJ case law on trade marks, the 
ECJ‘s decision in Gofkid is striking for the fact that there is no Recital or textual 
basis in the Directive which can be relied on to support the ECJ‘ s interpretation of 
Arts. 4(4)(a) and 5(2).  
 
Even in its decision in General Motors v. Yplon
122
, in which the ECJ also referred 
expressly to the ―general scheme of the Directive‖ it was possible for the ECJ to 
derive support for its conclusions from certain translations of the text of the 
Directive‖123.  It is interesting to note that the course of the ECJ in gradually 
recognising the advertising function of trade marks. ECJ had made a step in 
interpreting the Directive in the light of the actual purpose of trade mark protection 
and not the mere wording of the Directive Articles
124
. Since then the Court has in 
many instances recognised the advertising function, albeit always ―at the side‖ of the 
origin function. Abiding with the Preamble of the Directive mentioned above, the 
Court  talked about the functions of the trade mark and ―in particular‖ the origin 
function, thus obscurely and hesitantly alluding to the fact that something more than 
the ability of the mark to distinguish trade origin was worth protecting, i.e. the 
advertising function
125
.  
                                                 
120
  Case C- 292/00, E.T.M.R. [2003] 42. 
121
  See Chr. Morcom Q.C. case comment ―Extending Protection for Marks Having a Reputation-
What is the Effect of the Decision of the European Court of Justice in Davidoff v. Gofkid?‖, 6 
E.I.P.R. [2003], 279. See also par. 24 of the ruling stating ―The Court observes that Article 5(2) of the 
Directive must not be interpreted solely on the basis of its wording but also in the light of the overall 
scheme and objectives of the system of which it is a part‖ 
122
  Case C-375/97 [2000] R.P.C., 572 (par. 23) General Motors Corporation v. Yplon S.A.. 
123
  Jane Cornwell ―The Davidoff v. Gofkid Case Comment‖ 11 E.I.P.R. [2003]. 
124
  It should not be ignored that the ECJ in its ruling in Gofkid declined to adopt the interpretation 
proposed by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion, which was contrary to the ruling finally upheld. 
However, in its subsequent ruling in Case C-408/01, E.C.R. [2003],  Adidas – Salomon AG and 
Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd. the Court ruled again in the lines of Gofkid.  
However, in  Ralf Sieckman v. German Patent and Trademark Office case C-273/00, IIC 5, [2003] at 
par. 35, the Court reverts to the origin function rationale. 
125
  The Court‘s indecisiveness (leaving a ―window‖ of interpretation open and avoiding giving a 
clear answer) is characteristic in a number of cases including C-206/01Arsenal Football Club plc v. 
Matthew Reed, ECR [2003], Judgement of 12.11.2002, C-533/2006, O2 Holdings Limited, O2 (UK) 
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It was not until L‘ Oreal v. Bellure126 that the Court expressly and beyond any 
reservation stated that on an equal basis the origin and the other two functions, 
namely the guarantee and the advertising, are part of the European trade mark 
regime: ―These functions include not only the essential function of the trade mark, 
which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of the goods or services, but also its 
other functions, in particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services 
in question and those of communication, investment or advertising‖127.  
 
In Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA
128
 the Court confirmed that not only the 
advertising function, but more concretely the ―allure‖ and the ―prestigious image‖ 
which bestows on the trade mark ―an aura of luxury‖ can be damaged by a third 
party use. Using these non legal terms to describe the added value of a trade mark, 
points out the teleological approach followed by the Court, which uses elements 
from the everyday economic life (in which trade marks function) in order to interpret 
the law.  
 
B. e. Trade Mark Functions and the Consumer 
The primary and most widely accepted function of trade marks is the origin 
function. But why is it so important for the consumers to be  aware of the source of 
the product?   
 
The answer relates to the more general issue of the consumers‘ right to information. 
In consumers‘ society , individuals are able to choose products  from a wide range of 
similar products. Their choice is based on certain criteria, according to their needs 
and preferences. The main factors that influence their decisions are the price of 
products and their quality. However, for a rational choice to be made, enough 
information on the product‘s particularities must be made available to the consumer. 
                                                                                                                                         
Limited v. Hutchison 3G UK Limited, C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec [2007] ETMR 33, which shall all 
be analytically examined in Part III of the present thesis. 
126
  C-487/07 L‘ Oreal SA, Lancome parfums et beaute & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v. 
Bellure NV, Malaika Invstments Ltd. , Starion Ltd, Judgement of the Court of 18 June 2009. 
127
 Ibid, par. 58. Emphasis added. 
128
 Case C-59/08 Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, Vincent Gladel, SIL, [2009], par. 37. 
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As we have already stated previously, the information needed can  be transmitted 
through trade marks. 
 
To what extent is the above statement true? Do trade marks actually transmit 
information on the source and the quality of the product, thus contributing 
effectively to the choice of the consumer? According to W. R. Cornish, it is quite 
often the case that all a trade mark does is: ―...enable the purchaser to link goods or 
services to a range of personal expectations about quality which derive from 
previous dealings, recommendations of others, attractive advertising and so on‖129. 
Therefore, no objective criteria, based on information released by trade marks with 
regard to the qualities of the product, can be said to influence consumers‘ decisions. 
It can be argued that what appears to be a decisive factor with regard to consumers‘ 
choice in a modern economic context is the image of the company and many other 
relevant factors. However, the ―mirror‖ that depicts this image in a symbolic-
abstract way is the trade mark.  
B. f. Overall Observations 
What becomes obvious after the above mentioned definitions and analysis of the 
trade mark functions is that, all three of them are inherently connected with each 
other. Namely, the origin function entails the (not legally enforceable) obligation of 
the trade mark owner to show consistency in the product quality; and the guarantee 
of quality increases the good image of the firm that owns the trade mark. 
 
This does not mean that the three functions always appear in combination. Also it 
does not mean that all of them are mere facets of the origin function. However, a 
clear distinction between them is not possible. The problem that appears in that 
context is that, although these functions interact as the one being a pre-requisite for 
the other, they do not have the same recognition from the legislators or the courts.  
This legislative inconsistency has been one of the reasons that led to the adoption of 
the EC Regulation on the Community trade mark
130
.  
 
                                                 
129
  See W. R. Cornish, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 528. 
130
  Council Regulation No. 40/94, December 20, 1993, OJ L 11/1.  
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It would be interesting to mention here the suggestion made by A. Kamperman 
Sanders and Sp. Maniatis with regard to the introduction of a ―Consumer Trade 
Mark‖131. The authors focus on the fact that the three functions of trade marks 
should be regarded as a whole under the prism of consumer protection
132
. 
Respectively, trade mark, consumer protection and unfair competition laws should 
be further integrated. This would lead to a more effective protection not only of 
trade marks, trade mark owners and their competitors, but also of consumers
133
. 
However, this suggestion would not seem very useful. The relevant legal framework 
already exists and it would not make a difference if separate pieces of legislation 
were combined together, rather than exist individually.  
 
Whether in applying the existing trade mark law courts should aim at consumer 
protection or trade mark owners` protection primarily is the most critical question. 
The legislator has already promulgated  legal texts and it is up to the courts to 
support the interests of either the consumers or the trade mark owners. The ECJ has 
already provided some guidelines. It could be stated that all three functions are 
inexorably linked however law enforcement will very much depend on interests that 
one chooses to protect. Are the interests to be protected also linked together like the 
three functions or are they antagonistic and inconsistent with one another? This will 
be examined further in the respective chapter on trade mark infringement.  
C. AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SEMIOTICS  
 
A semiotic analysis would help  diminish the ambivalence of the attributed functions 
of trade marks. The exact content of these functions should be clear enough so as to 
enable a consistent and solid legislative framework on trade mark protection to be 
drawn.  
 
                                                 
131
  See A.K. Sanders and Sp. Maniatis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 51. See also Hannes Roesler, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 103, at 106 and in Greek legal doctrine Ch. Chrisanthis, ―Issues of Trade Mark Theory‖, DEE 
[2008], 944. 
132
  Quoting from their article (Ibid): ―It is clear that trade marks already serve as an instrument of 
consumer protection. This is achieved despite the fact that most of the principles of trade marks and 
unfair competition laws are based on the interest of the competing business concerns‖ at 409. 
133
  Ibid, at 412-413. 
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Every concept in order to be communicated to another person must have a denoting 
sign. Trade marks are signs.
134
 As such they are at the same time in and out of 
language. They contribute to the process of communication; yet they are taken out of 
their natural context. This is particularly so in the case of trade marks that are not 
invented words. They have a natural meaning but also an ―artificial‖ one. For 
example, the words Dove or Always in their trade mark form do not designate a bird 
or the infiniteness of time, but rather a soap and women products, respectively. This 
is one of the points that has raised objections on the part of linguists against the legal 
protection of trade mark rights. According to the most extreme position trade marks 
destroy language because they deprive it of its real meaning
135
. 
C. a. General framework 
Firstly, the nature of trade marks as signs () has to be established. According 
to F. De Saussure (1857-1913), a well known semiologist
136
, people use signs in the 
communicative process, according to the following model (the procedure that takes 
place is a twofold one): on the one hand, there is the signifier of the message 
(namely the sign/mark) and on the other hand, there is the signified (the information 
transmitted). In other words the signifier expresses the signified. Applying this 
model to trade marks, the mark itself has the role of the signifier and the product 
bearing the mark has the role of the signified
137
. Yet, this would be a very simplistic 
application.  
 
This model has actually been applied by Advocate General Cosmas in its opinion of 
5.5.1998 delivered on Windsurfing Chiemsee
138, where he stated that: ―[…] In all 
the above cases, the geographical term does not designate the geographical origin 
of goods, either because of its nature or because of the circumstances, and therefore 
legitimately may be used as a trade mark. That is so because the connection between 
the ―designator‖ (the name itself) and the ―designee‖ (the thing to which the name 
                                                 
134
 See, also, M. Ephart, ―Word Marks: Economic, Legal and Linguistic Entities‖, 19 International 
Journal for the semiotics of Law 257, [1996], from which quoted: ―A marks or sign is a semiotic 
entity. Its conditions must then be stated in semiotic terms‖ at 261.   
135
  See, among others, G. Hughes, ―Words in Time‖, Basil Blackwell, [1988]. 
136
  See, F. De Saussure, ―Course in General Linguistics‖, New York, trans., [1959]. 
137
  Such a deduction would be derived from the origin function, meant to identify and distinguish the 
products. 
138
 Joined cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee, [1999] ECR I-2779 ETMR, [1999], 
585. 
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refers) is arbitrary
139
, that is to say, so original and unexpected that it does identify 
the goods and distinguish them from equivalent goods made by other undertakings‖. 
 
A subsequent evolution of the semiotic theory
140
 introduced a triple relationship, 
which was said to be inherent in every sign. This triad includes the sign, the signifier 
and the signified
141
. The difficulty lies in distinguishing the sign from the signifier. 
The sign is the ―correlation that unites the signified with the signifier‖142. One 
should consider this analysis as a multiplicity of relations rather than the totality of 
forms. The signifier, used within a certain context and expressing a certain signified, 
is no longer a ―neutral‖ form. It becomes a sign, a symbol, an entity that conveys a 
certain message to the recipient. As another important semiologists, R. Barthes 
(1915-1980), explains: ―the signifier is empty, the sign is full, it is a meaning‖143. 
Therefore, the sign becomes such when it attracts a meaning. Trade marks are 
undoubtedly conveyors of messages and, therefore, can be characterised as signs. 
What is the meaning then, that they carry? Using simple terms, and taking as an 
example the linguistic sign (: words), one could define the signifier as being the 
written or acoustic image (which is mental); the signified as being the denoted 
message, the concept, the meaning of the word and the sign as being the word 
(written or spoken).  
 
However, in the modern era the importance of other signs has undoubtedly 
increased. Various cultural signs (such as clothes, colours, even attitudes) are used 
as symbols that convey a certain message. Trade marks are attributed with a 
multiplicity of identities. They are, first of all, linguistic (to the extent that one refers 
                                                 
139
  See par. 36 of the Opinion. Cosmas invoked at this point (see fn. 9 of his opinion) De Saussure‘ s 
Cours de linguistic generale, ed. T. de Mauro, Payot Paris, [1987], p.100 and pointed that this was in 
the sense that there is no causal link between the ―designator‖ and the ―designee‖, ECR [1999] I-
2779. 
140
  Namely, introduced by R. Barthes, in ―Mythologies‖, Palladin, [1973], (Trans. by A. Lovers) and 
especially the essay titled ―Myth Today.‖  
141
 The tripartite relationship was crystallised by R. Barthes: ―Let me restate that any semiology 
postulates a relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified...We must here be on our guard, 
for despite common parlance which simply says that the signifier expresses the signified, we are 
dealing, in any semiological system, not with two but with three different terms. For what we grasp is 
not at all one term after the other but the correlation which unites them: there are, therefore, the 
signifier, the signified, and the sign, which is the associative total of the first two terms.‖ Cited from : 
―Myth Today‖ in ―Mythologies‖  ibid. 
142
  Ibid. at 113. 
143
  Ibid. 
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to word-marks)
144
 or non linguistic signs (to the extent one refers to shapes as trade 
marks) but also economic and cultural ones. Jacob J stated in Philips in relation to a 
shape mark: ―What is a ―sign‖? […] I think a ―sign‖ is anything which can convey 
information. I appreciate that this is extremely wide, but I can see no reason to limit 
the meaning of the word [….]. Here, on my findings of fact the picture [of a 
Philishave triple headed shaver] does convey a message –as indeed even Remington 
contended. So, it is a ―sign‖ 145. Trade marks are economic signs because they form 
part of an enterprise‘s valuable assets. They are legal signs embodying property on 
an intangible right, and are therefore the subject of commercial transactions, 
exchanged for something else. Lastly, they are cultural signs because they release 
information about the economic, aesthetic or ideological status of the consumer who 
purchases them
146
.  
C. b. Application 
The theoretical basis adopted by   R. Barthes  will be examined. A submission  of 
trade mark function theory to this semiological system will be attempted. . 
 
The analysis is  based on his essay ―The Rhetoric of the Image‖147 which is a study 
on the advertising image. As already seen, a  trade mark has an inherent, advertising 
power. It can therefore, be analysed in terms of advertising and be regarded as an 
―advertising image.‖ However, a trade mark is not only an ―image‖ seen on product 
packages, but also an ―advertisement‖ printed on big sign-boards by the road or even 
in football fields. Actually, what needs to be distinguished is a) trade marks in the 
form of labels, found on  packaging of products; and b) trade marks as words used in 
written or spoken language in order to denote the product. In the second  category 
trade marks as images are also included. The difference between the  two cases lies 
in the form that the sign takes
148
. In the second  case, the function of the mark 
embodies all the signification found in the first  case - but  has also the function of 
                                                 
144
  As opposed to shapes, smells, sounds or other registrable trade marks. 
145
  Philips v. Remington [1998], ETMR 124, at 139.     
146
  See, for example, R. Higgins and P.H. Rubin, ―Counterfeit Goods‖, 29 The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 211, [1986], from which quoted: ―Many persons purchase branded goods for the purpose 
of demonstrating to others that they are consumers of the particular good. Names such as Calvin 
Klein and the logos such as the Izdo crocodile are displayed on the outside of clothes, and many 
consumers seem to value this display.‖ 
147
  From ―Image-Music-Text‖, trans. By St. Heath, Fontana, [1977]. 
148
  From the perspective of the advertising function the result is ultimately the same: convincing the 
consumer of buying the specific product. 
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denoting the product itself. In the first  case the product is present, visible and 
tangible. In the second  case the product is absent. Although the result is ultimately 
the same, trade marks are viewed as symbols namely in the  second  case. However, 
it should be stressed that the advertising power is promulgated in both cases equally, 
albeit under a different use. 
 
R. Barthes examines an advertisement that has the form of a photograph. It regards 
the pasta products bearing the trade mark ―Panzani.‖ The photograph depicts some 
basic ingredients, some packets of pasta and some tins of sauce of the same brand. 
Firstly, the author stresses on the fact that the mark appears very vividly when 
looking at the image. This implies the strong advertising effect of the label. Then he 
goes on  unravelling the messages emerging from the photograph: there is the 
linguistic message (all the words in the advertisement); the coded iconic message 
(the connotations derived from the larger sign system of society) and the non-coded 
iconic message (the denotations of the photograph). With this analysis in mind, 
some conclusions can be drawn about the semiotic facet of trade marks. 
C. c. Conclusions 
When looking at (or hearing)
149
 a trade mark, the recipient of the information (who 
under this perspective is always the consumer) receives and interprets a number of 
different messages. These could be: 
a.  the denoted message: the product.  
b.  the connoted message: the qualities of the product. 
c.  other connotations, emerging: i.    from his previous experience 
ii.  from his personal expectations and standards. 
iii.  from his personality  
As a first remark, one could put forward the (already mentioned) fact that the name 
of the proprietor of the sign does not come up in the process. This is because in the 
modern era,  consumers cannot and would not care about the person that actually 
owns the mark. The most important messages related to trade marks are the ones 
mentioned under (c). Their importance lies in their particularity. They could be 
                                                 
149
  Depending on whether the communicative process is written (e.g. the label of the product lying on 
the super market shelf) or oral (e.g. an advertisement on the radio). 
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effected in any other communicative process, but they have a different meaning in 
the context examined at present.  
 
The previous experience of the consumer is based on his personal previous use of 
the product; or on someone else‘s (such as a friend‘s) use of the product. This 
consumer can rely on his past experience only if the product qualities (and not 
―quality‖) has a stability throughout time. If the profile of the product changes 
frequently, the consumer cannot be based on his previous experience to make a 
choice. Therefore, the connotation mechanism described above does not even start to 
operate in his mind.  
 
The personal expectations and standards of the consumer establish the subjectivity 
of the criteria encouraging the choice he finally makes. It is actually not relevant 
whether the product is of high quality or not. The consumer might judge based 
solely on the aesthetic effect that the mark has on him, or on his personal low-
standard criteria. The final element that could affect the connotation created in the 
mind of the consumer, when encountering a trade mark, is his own personality. 
What is, in effect, included in - for example - his need to show off, or his instability 
with regard to the influences of current waves of the ―ins‖ and ―outs‖, namely of 
fashion. 
 
The above mentioned mechanism could help in forming a better understanding of 
trade mark functions, as well as trade mark infringement. The semiotic framework 
has been set and allusions to it will be made throughout the course of this thesis. 
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PART. II. REGISTRABILITY 
 
In this part the notion of ―trade mark‖ shall be examined. In particular, the definition 
given by the Directive, as interpreted by the ECJ, in relation to the definitions found 
in the UK and Greek legislations and case law shall be examined. Furthermore, the 
basic principles of registrability as formulated by ECJ case law in juxtaposition with 
the UK and Greek legislation and case law shall be analysed. Terms such as 
―descriptiveness‖ as opposed to ―distinctiveness‖ as registrability factors shall be 
clarified in view of the respective European and national legal frameworks. Finally 
certain conclusions shall be drawn as to the evolution of trade mark registrability 
regime at a European level and its effect on the national legal frameworks. 
 
A. WHAT IS A TRADE MARK? 
 
The definition of trade mark under the Directive and the UK and Greek law 
implementing the Directive shall be examined, as interpreted by the respective case 
law. The previous national regimes shall be examined in order to assess the impact of 
the Directive on national trade mark law and practice. 
 
A. a. Definition according to the Directive. 
According to Article 2 of the Directive
150
 ―a trade mark may consist of any sign 
capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of products or of their packaging, 
provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings‖151. The inclusion of the capacity to 
distinguish in the definition of trade mark lies on the origin function namely on the 
law‘ s aim to protect trade marks as indicators of origin152. 
 
The ECJ has confirmed that according to the Directive a trade mark may consist of a 
sign, provided that it is, first, represented graphically and, second, capable of 
distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
                                                 
150
  The definition is also followed by the Council Regulation on the Community Trade Mark. 
151
  Art. 2 of the Directive. 
152
 See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, [2003] Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 652. Antonopoulos, 
Industrial Property, [2005], Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 406. 
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undertakings
153
. Recently the ECJ rephrased this and confirmed that to be capable of 
constituting a trade mark, the ―subject matter‖ of any application must satisfy three 
criteria, namely a) to be a sign, b) to be capable to be represented graphically and c) to 
be capable of distinguishing the goods or services applied for
154
.  
 
It was in Libertel
155
 that the Court made for the first time the existence of a ―sign‖ an 
autonomous condition for capacity to constitute a trade mark under art. 2 of the 
Directive. But what is a ―sign‖? The Directive mentions signs that can  be represented 
by means of letters or written characters or by a picture, are two-dimensional or three-
dimensional, all of which can be perceived visually
156
. However, as  confirmed by the 
ECJ
157
, the above list is not exhaustive and article 2 of the Directive must be 
interpreted as meaning that a trade mark may also consist of a sign which is not in 
itself capable of being perceived visually, provided it can be represented 
graphically
158
.  
 
The UK Trade Marks Act 1994
159
 follows the text of the Directive closely and gives 
an analogous definition in Section 1 which provides that trade mark is ―any sign 
capable of being represented graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings‖. It includes ―words, 
designs, letters, numerals or the shape of goods or their packaging‖. This list is only 
indicative. The same is true for the Greek Trade Mark Legislation.  
                                                 
153
 C-321/03 ruling of 25.1.2007, Dyson Ltd. V. Registrar of Trade Marks, par. 27, Case C-273/00 
Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-11737, par. 39, C-299/99 Philips Electronics BV v. Remington Ltd., Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 113, par. 32. 
154
  Dyson, Ibid, par. 28. 
155
 C-104/2001 Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau IIC 35 56, par. 22 and 23 examined 
further below.  
156
 See Alison Firth, Ellen Gradley and Spyros Maniatis, ―Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, 
Functional Considerations and Consumer Perception‖, EIPR [2001], 86.  The authors correctly observe 
that ―[…] competition can be distorted when registration is sought for an apparently two dimensional 
mark which will be used to control the shape depicted‖ and mention as an example case Philips v. 
Remington (Op. Cit. Supra n. 113 at 129), where the parties considered the registration of a two-
dimensional picture as covering also the respective three dimensional sign. Jacob J approved this 
approach on the basis that ―it would be quite artificial to regard a straight picture of a thing, and the 
thing itself as significantly different under a law of trade marks which permits shapes to be registered‖. 
The above concerns were actually expressed in the ECJ ruling C-321/03 of 25.1.2007, Dyson Ltd. V. 
Registrar of Trade Marks, examined below. It should be noted that in the Community Trademark 
legislation it is necessary to indicate that a trade mark application is for a three dimensional sign 
otherwise it is considered as a figurative one.  
157
 See C – 281/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n. (Memex)  E.C.R. [2003], par. 35. 
158
  Ibid, par. 34, 35. 
159
  From now on: the U K TM Act 1994. 
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However, the two national Acts do not follow the same enumeration of what could be 
regarded as a sign capable of being registered as trade mark. Namely Art. 1 of the 
2239/ 1994 Trade Marks Act
160
 mentions ―in particular words, natural or legal 
entities‘ names, pseudonyms, logos, designs, letters, numbers, sounds, shape of goods 
or their packaging‖161. The Greek text is broader, to the extent that it refers explicitly 
to sounds
162
, as well as newspapers and journal titles
163
. This does not mean, of 
course, that the Greek notion of trade marks is also broader. The indication of specific 
signs is used as an example and is not considered as exhaustive in either of the two 
Acts, as their wording indicates. In the UK Trade Mark Act it is also stipulated that a 
trade mark ―may, in particular‖ consist of the above signs.  In both jurisdictions the 
Directive has broadened the notion of  trade mark compared to previous national 
legislation. For a sign to be eligible for registration, it must be perceptible to human 
senses. Before the Directive, this was interpreted in a narrow way so as to include 
only  visual signs in Greece and the UK . The philosophy of the Directive is that 
human reactions can be stimulated by other senses apart from sight as well
164
.  
 
A. b. Historical Definition under U. K. and Greek Law 
The 1938 UK Trade Marks Act definitions of ―mark‖ and ―use‖ ensured that only 
visual signs
165
 could be registered and that only visual use infringed. Section 68(2) 
required a mark to be capable of printed or visual representation. Soon after the 
introduction of the UK Trade Mark Act, trade mark applications reached the number 
of 5000 a month in the UK. This was a 50 per cent increase on what it was under the 
old Act
166
.  
 
                                                 
160
  From now on: Greek Trade Marks Act 1994. 
161
 Art. 1(2) Greek Trade Mark Act. 
162
  Art. 1(1) par. 2, Greek Trade Mark Act.  
163
  Ibid.  
164
  See, H. Burton, ―The U.K. Trade Marks Act: An Invitation to an Olfactory Occasion?‖, 8 EIPR 
378, [1995], at 378.  
165
  ―Mark‖ was defined by section 68(1) of the 1938 Act as including: ―... a device, brand, heading, 
label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral or any combination thereof‖. The examples 
mentioned were not exclusive. However, the section was interpreted by courts eiusdem generis as to 
require something that could be applied to or attached to goods. See, R. Annand and H. Norman, Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 45 at 56; also, A. Firth Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 15. As an example of a court‘s decision, 
See Re James‘s Trade Mark (1886) 33 Ch D 392, per Lindley LJ at p. 395.  
166
  See, P. Groves, ―UK Trade Mark Law: Recent Developments‖, BLR 167, [August/September 
1996], at 167. These included applications for three dimensional marks, colours, sounds, as well as the 
smell of Chanel No. 5 and the gesture of tapping one‘s nose twice. 
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Under the pre-existing legal framework in Greece, namely the 1998/39 Act, trade 
marks were defined as signs capable of identifying the economic (industrial, 
agricultural, or commercial) source or origin of the products.
167
 One would expect that 
since the only prerequisite set by the Act was the ability to distinguish the goods of 
the trade mark owner, any sign could be eligible for registration. However, signs were 
necessarily only visual. According to Professor Liakopoulos the reasons leading to 
this were not only normative but also, to a great extent, practical; namely, the 
difficulty of registering and graphically representing non visual signs, such as sounds 
or smells
168
.It should also be mentioned that service marks are now legally protected 
for the first time. Before the implementation of the Directive, marks could not be 
registered for services; only for goods
169
. 
 
A. c. Examining individual cases170  
 
A restricted survey of the relevant case law in both UK and Greece regarding specific 
trade mark ―sign concepts‖ will be presented briefly171. 
 
A. c. i. Colours  
It has generally been accepted by Greek courts and legal doctrine under the previous 
and  under the new law that the colours of a graphic representation of a trade mark are 
registrable. However a colour itself cannot be registered, as the number of colours is 
limited and acquiring an absolute right on them would lead to extreme monopolisation 
                                                 
167
 Article 1 of the 1998/39 Act. It is evident that the Greek Act accepted and recognised explicitly the 
origin function which was the only legally protected one.  
168
   See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 314, Antonopoulos Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, 407. This 
practical difficulty is also an issue under the Directive regime, however, the ECJ has provided the 
guidelines for registration of music as trade mark, as will be examined below. 
169
  Art.1 Act 1998/39. For an analysis on the Greek legal framework on service marks previously and 
at present  See Aik. Delouka, ―The New Trade Marks Act 2239/94‖, EEmpD, 23, [1995], at 25; also 
Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at  314. 
170
 For an analysis from the point of view of the CTM Regulation, see A. Bender and Ph. von Kapff, 
―Born to Be Free – The Community Trade Mark in Practice‖, IIC [2001], 625. 
171
 It should be noted that under Greek law, legal protection to all the signs mentioned below could, 
nonetheless, be offered under the relevant provisions of unfair competition law, by virtue of Art. 13 and 
14 of the 146/1914 Act on Unfair Competition. See also, MonPrTh (Thebes Court of First Instance)  
30/1994, Epitheorisis Emporikou Dikaiou (from now on: EEmpD) 119 [1995]; Areios Pagos (Supreme 
Court) 1009/1991 EEmpD 334 [1992];  Areios Pagos 1409/1980 EEmpD 451 [1981]; PrA  (Athens 
Court of First Instance) 4731/1980 EEmpD 509 [1980];  PrA 2269/1979 EEmpD, 316, [1979].  As a 
comment, it would be interesting to note that there is extended case law on get-up infringement, 
decided under unfair competition law provisions, as well. 
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resulting to restriction on competition
172
. It is true that the new law does not include  
colours in the list of registrable signs, however  the list is not exhaustive. Therefore 
even if a single colour would very rarely have the distinctive character required by 
law
173
, a combination of colours that is original  is  likely to fulfill this prerequisite. 
For example, the  Gucci trade mark  consisting of three horizontal lines, namely one 
green, one red and one green
174
 has been registered in Greece.   
 
UK courts  even before the entry into force of the Directive accepted that colours can 
be registered as trade marks. In Smith, Kline and French Laboratories (SKF) Ltd.‘ s 
Trade Mark Applications
175
 the House of Lords held that it was possible for the 
company to register the colour combination of their capsules as trade marks. 
However, the registrability of colour marks was always under the presupposition that 
these functioned as trade marks; meaning, that they were perceived by the public as 
distinguishing the applicant‘s goods or services to those of others176. Under the new 
law also these applications are treated with caution as it is believed that relatively few 
registrations would cover all the variety of colours and thereby restrict their 
competitors from using colours in trade
177
. In view of the above and by applying the 
―distinctiveness‖ test, striping for toothpaste was refused registration as it was found 
that it was devoid of distinctive character
178
.  
                                                 
172
 Areios Pagos 399/1989, EEmpD 41, 145, MonPrAth (Single Member First Instance Court of 
Athens) 8567/1988, EEmpD 39, 696, MonPrAth 12684/88 EEmpD39, 698, EfAth (Athens Court of 
Appeal) 13623/87 EEmpD 39, 699. It is interesting to note that this was exactly the view followed in 
the recent ECJ ruling in case Libertel Groep BV v Benelux Merkenbrau, Op. Cit. Supra n. 155. 
However, see also DPrAth (Administrative First Instance Court of Athens) 3964/98 EEmpD [1999], 
817, where it is submitted that colours are not registrable because of lack of distinctive character.  
173
 See also L. Kotsiris, ―Colour as distinctive element‖, Opinion,  Nomiko Vima 37, 718. 
174
 Trademark Administrative Committee (DES) ruling 855/87. Nik. Rokas, Opinion EEmpD, [1990], 
147. 
175
  [1984], RPC 329. 
176
  See R.  Annand and H. Norman, Op. Cit. Supra n.45, at 58-59. 
177
 See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 699. On this issue see also Maniatis, 
[2002], IPQ  121 at 149. 
178
 Colgate-Palmolive Co‘ s TM Appns RPC [2002], 519. 
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A. c. ii. Sounds
179
 and Smells (auditory and olfactory marks)
180
. 
In Greece sounds and smells could not be registered under the old law because they 
could not be easily represented graphically. Even though sounds can be registered as 
trade marks under the new Trade Mark Act
181
, olfactory signs cannot (according to 
the Trade Mark Office‘ s practice)182. However, in order for a sound to be registered 
as trade mark, apart from the problems of graphic representation, it should be 
established not only that the sound sign is original but also that it has the capacity of 
distinguishing the products of the trade mark owner. 
 
In the UK sounds and smells were not capable of registration under the 1938 Act. 
Under the new law, however, they can be registered if they can be graphically 
represented and have a distinguishing character. Therefore, it should in any case be 
established that smells or sounds have the function and the significance of trade 
marks
183
. This means that sounds inherent to the nature of a place (e.g. the noise of 
people in a central place) cannot be registered. According to British legal doctrine 
their lack of distinguishing ability of a certain product, together with the problem of 
graphically representing such marks impedes their registration.
184
 In John Lewis of 
Hungerford‘s Appln185 an application comprising of the words ―the smell, aroma, or 
essence of cinnamon‖ was found to lack precision because it was perceived in a 
subjective manner
186
. The Registry also rejected the use of an electronic sensory 
                                                 
179
  It would be worth noticing that in the United States, a definition wide enough to encompass scent 
marks has existed since 1946. However, it was not until 1990 that a registration for a fragrance was 
successful. See, Re Clarke, 17 USPQ 2d 1238 (TTAB 1990) (fragrance of plumeria blossoms for 
embroidery yarn).  
180
  There is no reason why taste should not (potentially) be included in this category. The OHIM Board 
of Appeal  delivered its decision concerning an application by Eli Lilly & Company for the registration 
of a gustatory mark (Taste of Artificial Strawberry Flavour) as a CTM for pharmaceuticals (Case R 
120/2001-August 4, 2003). The Board of Examiners argued that the description of the mark did not 
satisfy the criterion of graphic representation and that it could not serve as an indicator of origin. See, 
S. Midlemiss and C. Badger, ―Nipping Taste Marks in the Bud‖, [2004], EIPR, 152. 
181
 Theoretically, of course, because even though they are specifically mentioned in the Act the 
procedure for registering sound signs should be the object of decisions adopted by the Minister of 
Commerce, that have not yet been issued. 
182
 This is mainly due to practical reasons as olfactory signs cannot be recorded on the Trade Mark 
Registry books; see Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 340  and Antonopoulos, Industrial Property, 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at  407. 
183
  See R. Annand and H. Norman, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45  at 59; also, H. Burton, Op. Cit. Supra n. 164, 
at 381. 
184
   See A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 16. 
185
   ETMR, [2001], 1193. 
186
   See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 691. 
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analysis on the basis that people who were inspecting the Register could not 
understand it
187
. 
 
A. c. iii. Shape of Goods or their Packaging. 
Under the old Greek Trade Mark Law three dimensional signs were not allowed to be 
registered as trade marks. The shape of goods or their packaging was allowed to be 
registered as trade mark by virtue of Act 1998/39, however this provision did not stay 
in force for a long time and was changed by virtue of Act 3205/1955
188
. Under the  
law 2239/1994, shapes of goods or their packaging are allowed registration with the 
limitation stated in the provision regarding refusal of registration on absolute legal 
grounds. In a case regarding registration of the shape of a bottle, the court established 
that the shape of the bottle in question was original therefore registrable and also went 
on to establish that the mark was not descriptive of the products in question 
(beverages in class 32 of the classification of the Nice Agreement) for which 
registration was sought
189
. 
 
The most discussed cases of a registration regarding the shapes of objects or a 
distinctive container before the entry into force of the Directive in the UK were 
James
190
and Coca-Cola
191
. Both these applications for registration were refused under 
the respective statutes. However, both decisions have been overtaken by s.1 of 1994 
UK TM Act. The Coca-Cola bottle is now registered and so is the shape of the Jif 
lemon
192
. What impeded registration originally was lack of distinctiveness and the 
potential perpetual monopoly accorded to trade mark owners. Lord Templeman cited 
with approval  Lindley LJ in James and held in Coca-Cola: ―...the word ―mark‖ both 
in its normal meaning and in its statutory definition is apt to describe something 
                                                 
187  However, examples of sound marks are musical ―Jingles‖ and MGM‘s Lion‘s Roar for films, See 
A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 16 and R. Annand and H. Norman Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 59. 
188
 Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 340 and Antonopoulos, Industrial Property, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
63, at 406. 
189
  TrDPrAth (Three Member First Instance Administrative Court of Athens) 3694/1998 EEmpD 50, 
817. 
190
  [1886], 33 Ch D 392 (―dome blacklead‖). 
191
  [1986], 1 WLR 695. 
192
  See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 688. 
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which distinguishes goods rather then goods themselves. A bottle is a container not a 
mark.
193‖  
 
A. c. iv. Slogans.  
It is generally accepted by Greek legal doctrine and case law that slogans are 
registrable as trade marks
194
, so long as they have a distinctive character and are 
perceived by the consumers as indications of origin and not as merely  phrases or 
invitations to consume the product
195
. However the inclusion in the slogan of at least 
one word that could individually be registered as trade mark is generally required
196
.   
 
Under the  1938 UK TM Act, slogans were eligible for registration
197
; this is also the 
case  under the 1994 Act.  This is, of course, if they are capable of distinguishing the 
goods and therefore perform a trade mark function. The following two cases elucidate 
the position under the 1938 regime. In Have A Break TM
198
, registration was refused 
on the grounds that the words were being used to advertise a well-known Kit-Kat 
mark and not to differentiate the company‘s products. In other words, they lacked a 
distinctive character
199
. By way of contrast, the slogan I Can‘t Believe It‘s Yoghurt200 
                                                 
193
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 191, at 698. Emphasis Added. 
194
  The slogan ―ekastos sto eidos toy kai o Loumidis stous kafedes‖ (meaning that everyone is good at 
one‘s own trade and Loumidis –the name of the brand owner- in coffees) was registered as trade mark 
for coffees. See also MonPrAth EEmpD [1983], 144, by which it was ruled that the slogan ―freskos 
kafes ekastos  sto eidos toy‖ (meaning fresh coffee everyone at one‘s own trade) which was used by a 
third party on coffee, infringed the first mark because the last part of the slogan was partly identical to 
the first trade mark.  
195
 See Aik. Delouka, Chr. Chrysanthis, in Nik. Rokas ed. ―Trade Mark Law‖, [1996],  Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 63, at 47.  
196
 See Aik. Delouka, Chr. Chrysanthis, ibid. It is interesting to see this position in relation to the UK 
case Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Mars UK Ltd. EWHC [2002] 2533, where the UK High Court 
found that the phrase ―Have a Break‖ would ―[…] would be readily understood as an origin neutral 
invitation to consume a snack‖ and therefore could not be registered as trade mark. Central to the case 
was whether ―Have a Break‖ had acquired distinctiveness through its extensive use on the phrase 
―Have a break, Have a Kit-Kat‖. An ECJ ruling was issued on a referral made by the Court of Appeal 
regarding the question whether distinctiveness may be acquired ―following or in consequence of the 
use of that mark as part of or in conjunction with another mark‖ and answered in the affirmative (Case 
C -353/2004, Societe Produits  v. Mars UK Ltd., Judgement of  7.7.2005). 
197
  Consisting of words, they could be represented graphically. 
198
  [1993], RPC 217. 
199
  The advertising function of the word combination was not on its own enough to set the basis for a 
trade mark protection. It is an example to show that the advertising function cannot be regarded 
separately than the origin function. 
200
  [1992], RPC 533. 
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was allowed to be registered as a trade mark. It was to be used on the products on its 
own and the public would recognise it as the brand‘s name201.  
 
As a general comment it should be noted that the eligibility of shapes or three 
dimensional designs does not mean that signs which are the primary characteristics of 
the product or which describe the product they seek to be registered for can actually 
be registered
202
. This will be examined below in the context of absolute grounds of 
refusal for registration.  
 
As we have seen according to the national legislation under examination in order for a 
sign to enter the Register, it must  be capable of graphic representation
203
. Words, 
numerals, letters, devices, designs already have their graphical representation, so they 
do not pose any problems. Smells or tastes  could either be described in words or by 
their chemical formula, or even by reference to elements in the products that cause 
them. Sounds could be represented either by notes if they are music or by a sound 
recording. Finally, shapes or packaging of products could be represented by 
photographs or drawings
204
. 
 
B. REGISTRABILITY  
 
Apart from constituting a ―trade mark‖, a sign must fulfil other criteria as well in 
order to qualify for registration. These shall be examined within the European and the 
two example national legal frameworks, in order to assess the impact of  the Directive 
in the new trade mark law regime. 
                                                 
201
  One could object, however, to the registrability of a group of words that are used extensively in 
everyday life. Slogans including, for example, the brand name would be more acceptable to be 
registered as trade marks. Given that the relevant legal framework offers protection to an economic 
entity for the protection of economic growth and development, one could not help but wonder, how it 
could be possible (at a normative even level) for widely used phrases (: language) to be granted a 
perpetual legal monopoly. See G. Hughes, Op. Cit. Supra n. 135, in which the author rejects the 
monopoly granted over everyday words. Also, R. J. Coombe, ―Objects of Property and Subjects of 
Politics‖, 69 Texas Law Review, 1831, [1991]. The author‘ s argument is along the same lines: he 
suggests that an exchange of signs should be encouraged instead of impeded, as is the case with 
granting trade mark protection. An exchange of signs is the necessary underpinning of a democratic 
dialogue. However, see also the ECJ position in this as stated in the Baby Dry ruling that the purpose of 
the prohibition of  registration of purely distinctive signs or indications as trade marks is not to preclude 
the possibility of granting a monopoly of language to certain traders. 
202
  See, inter alia, Liakopoulos Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 344. 
203
  UK TM Act 1994 s. 1 and s. 3(1)(a); Greek Act 2239/94, Art. 1.  
204
  See R. Annand and H. Norman, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 63; also, A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 
21. 
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B.a. Basic Registrability Principles under ECJ case law  
The ECJ in its ruling in  Sieckmann
205
 ruled that a trade mark may indeed consist of a 
sign which is not in itself capable of being perceived visually, provided that it can be 
represented graphically
206
, particularly by means of images, lines or characters so that 
it can be precisely defined and visually represented
207
. The Court stressed that it is 
important on the one hand for the competent authorities to know with clarity and 
precision what the mark consists of, so that they are able to perform their duties of 
prior examination of registration applications and preservation of a precise trade mark 
Registrar
208
. On the other hand precision is necessary, in order for economic operators 
to know what their competitors‘ trade marks consist of, so that they know equally the 
limits of protection and the rights of third parties
209
. As the Court clarified the 
condition of graphic representation serves the purpose of avoiding any ambiguities 
and securing objectivity, in the process of identifying and protecting the sign
210
. In 
view of the above, the Court held that  the representation must be  clear, precise, self 
contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective
211
.  
 
However, when the Court was asked to determine how one could achieve the above in 
the case of an olfactory sign, the Court replied by stating how one does not achieve 
that and held: ―the requirements of graphic representation are not satisfied by a 
chemical formula, by a description in written words, by the deposit of an odour 
sample or by a combination of these elements‖212. In view of the above one wonders 
what other ways exist in order for the registrability criteria to be fulfilled.  In view of 
the above ruling, since the description by written words has been precluded, signs  
such as ―freshly cut grass‖ would no longer qualify for registration213. 
                                                 
205
 Case C-273/00, Ralf Sieckmann v. German Patent and Trademark Office IIC 5, [2003], 548. 
206
  Ibid, par. 45. 
207
 Ibid, par. 46. A sign could qualify even if it can not be perceived visually, however, it should, in one 
way or another, be represented in a visual way. The task of trade mark applicants seems analogous to 
the task of mathematicians to depict the world in numbers. 
208
 Ibid par. 50. 
209
 Ibid, par. 51. 
210
 Ibid, par. 54. 
211
 It is interesting to note that the Court based its ruling once more on the origin function rationale and 
stated that ―in order to fulfil its role as a registered trade mark a sign must always be perceived 
unambiguously and in the same way so that the mark is guaranteed as an indication of origin‖, See par. 
53 of the ruling. 
212
  In Sieckmann, Op. Cit. Supra n. 205, par. 72.  
213
 Senta Aromatic Appln, ETMR [1999]. The mark was registered as a Community Trade Mark for 
tennis balls. 
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In  Shield Mark 
214
, the case brought before the ECJ regarded the registrability,  of, 
inter alia, a) a musical stave with the first nine notes of the musical composition 
―Fuer Elise‖, by Ludwig van Beethoven, b) the first nine notes of the above musical 
composition, i.e. the melody described as such c) a sequence of musical notes E, D#, 
E, D#, E, B, D, C, A,  d) the denomination Kukelekuuu (an onomatopoeia suggesting 
in Dutch a cockcrow) and e) the indication that it is the cry of a cockcrow, as sound 
marks
215
.The ECJ ruled that sounds can be registered as trade marks
216
 even though 
they are not included in the list of Art.  2 of the Directive which is not exhaustive
217
. 
This however under the condition that they can be represented graphically 
218
. Also 
the Court repeated that in order for the requirement of graphic representation to be 
fulfilled this should be ―clear, precise, self contained, easily accessible, intelligible, 
durable and objective‖ in line with its ruling in Sieckmann219.  
 
Out of the  aforementioned types of representation the only one found to be in terms 
of the requirements was the displaying of musical notes on a stave divided into 
measures and, indicating, in particular, a clef, musical notes and rests, whose form 
indicates the relative value and, where necessary, accidentals
220
. The other types, 
namely description using written language, indication that it is the cry of an animal, 
simple onomatopoeia without anything more and simple sequence of musical notes 
were found to lack precision and clarity
221
. However, the Court did not answer  the 
question raised by the referral court whether sound recordings do qualify as being 
registered therefore leaving the most obvious means of sound representation with the 
uncertainty of whether they indeed constitute a clear and precise means of 
representation. 
                                                 
214
 27.11.2003 in case C – 281/01, Shield Mark BV v. Joost Kist h.o.d.n. (Memex)  E.C.R. [2003]. 
215
 Ibid, at par. 14-19. 
216
 Ibid at par. 37. 
217
 Ibid at par. 35. The Court noted, in par. 34, that Article 2 of  the Directive and the seventh recital of 
the Preamble thereto, citing a list of signs of which a trade mark may consist, did not mention signs 
which are not in themselves capable of being perceived visually; However, it did not expressly exclude 
them either.  The above are in line with the ECJ ruling in Sieckmann, Op. Cit. supra n. 205. 
218
 Ibid, par. 55. 
219
 Ibid par. 64. 
220
 Ibid, par. 64. Correctly so, the Court found that only a precise musical depiction, that when read or 
played, reproduces exactly the sound that the mark consists of, fulfils the rerpresentability criterion. 
After all, music has long been represented graphically and turned into sound when played by 
musicians. However, this for the moment, restricts sound marks to music marks. Other sounds, such as 
noises, natural sounds (e.g. the waves, the wind ) remain unregistrable.  
221
 Ibid. 
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With regard to colours the ECJ has confirmed in Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux - 
Merkenbureau
222
 that, even though a colour per se does not have an inherently 
distinctive character and consumers are not used to identifying goods on the basis of 
colours, such distinctiveness could be acquired through use on the basis of art. 3(3) of 
the Directive; distinctiveness without prior use would however normally be 
inconceivable save in exceptional circumstances and particular where the number of 
goods is very restricted and the market very specific
223
. It reaffirmed the Sieckmann 
test of clarity, precision, easy access, intelligibility, objectivity and long duration and 
went on to state once again that, in case of colour marks, the obvious representation 
means, namely reproduction on paper, cannot be considered as satisfactory
224
. 
 
Most importantly the Court stressed the public interest reasons for which refusal of 
registration may be necessary and stated that ―In assessing the potential 
distinctiveness of a given colour as a trade mark, regard must be had to the general 
interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for the other traders who 
offer for sale goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which 
registration is sought‖225.  
 
In Heidelberg Bauschemie
226
, the Court stated that colours or combinations of colours 
which are the subject of an application for registration as a trade mark, claimed in the 
abstract, without contours, and in shades which are named in words by reference to a 
colour sample and specified according to an internationally recognised colour 
classification system may constitute a trade mark for the purposes of Article 2 of the 
Directive where:  
– it has been established that, in the context in which they are used, those colours or 
combinations of colours in fact represent a sign, and  
                                                 
222
 Case C-104/01, ECR [2003], I –3793 regarding the trade mark application of the orange colour. 
223
 Ibid, par. 65, 66, 68. 
224
 The Court stated that on paper the color deteriorates and proposed as an alternative the use of 
internationally recognized identification codes. Ibid, par. 68. This would not appear to be very practical 
in case of colour combinations on a certain pattern (which would be more likely to be distinctive rather 
than a mere colour) such as the three stripe Gucci trade mark registered as aforementioned in Greece. 
225
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 222, par. 55. 
226
  C-49/2002 Heidelberger Bauchemie, [2004], ECR I 6129. 
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– the application for registration includes a systematic arrangement associating the 
colours concerned in a predetermined and uniform way
227
.  
 
B.b. Absolute Grounds for Refusal of Registration  
According to Article 3 (1)
228
 of the Directive the following cannot be registered or if 
registered are liable to be declared invalid: a) signs which cannot constitute a trade 
mark, b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character, c) trade marks 
which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to 
designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or 
the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service or other 
characteristics of the goods or service, d) trade marks which consist exclusively of 
signs or indications which have become customary in the current language or the bona 
fide and established practices of trade, e) signs which consist exclusively of the shape 
which results from the nature of the goods themselves, or the shape of goods which is 
necessary to obtain a technical result or the shape which gives substantial value to the 
goods, f) trade marks which are contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of 
morality, g) trade marks which are of such nature as to deceive the public, for instance 
as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or service h) trade marks 
which have not been authorised by the competent authorities and are to be refused or 
invalidated pursuant of Art. 6 of the Paris Convention‖. 
 
This Article has been implemented by s. 3 of the UK TM Act. According to this the 
following cannot be registered: a) signs which are not trade marks, b) trade marks 
which are devoid of distinctive character, c) trade marks which consist exclusively of 
signs or indications that are characteristic of the product, d) trade marks which consist 
exclusively of signs or indications which have become customary in usage, e) signs 
which consist exclusively of certain shapes, f) signs which are contrary to public 
policy or morality, g) trade marks which are likely to deceive, e) trade marks the use 
of which is contrary to law. This Article has been implemented by Art. 3 of Law 
                                                 
227
 Ibid, par. 42. 
228
 Some of the Articles of the Directive are very broadly drafted, therefore being open to interpretation. 
As an example, Article 3(1)(b) requires that marks devoid of a distinctive character will not be 
registered. In the UK three letter marks are not considered to be devoid of a distinctive character, 
whereas in Denmark such an objection is not raised. See, B. E Cookson, ―The Progress of European 
Harmonisation‖, 8 EIPR 462, [1997], at 463. 
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2239/1994 in Greece, using the exact wording of the Directive, with the addition of 
applications made on bad faith.  
 
The use of the terms ―capacity to distinguish‖ in Art. 2 of the Directive and 
―distinctive character‖ in Art. 3 (1) (b) of the Directive required some clarification. 
From the fact that both terms are used means that even though they emanate from the 
same conceptual basis, their meaning is not exactly the same. The difference between 
the two notions derives from the different language used (―capable of distinguishing‖ 
and ―distinctive character‖) denoting potentiality and actuality respectively and must 
be seen in relation to Art. 3(3) of the Directive which states that the grounds of refusal 
provided in Art.2 do not apply if, before the date of application for registration and 
following the use which has been made of it, the mark has acquired a distinctive 
character. The difference therefore lies on that the ―capacity to distinguish‖ may be 
acquired by use in the case that a mark is not inherently distinctive whereas the 
―distinctive character‖ either exists in a trade mark per se or it does not229.  
 
However, the Court did not make such  a distinction. According to ECJ the distinctive 
character of a trade mark means that the mark in question makes it possible to identify 
the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a 
particular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from those of other 
undertakings
230
. 
 
In Philips
231
 the ECJ concluded that art 3 (1) (a) of the Directive is intended 
essentially to exclude from registration signs which are not capable of being a trade 
mark, i.e. of being represented graphically and/or not capable of distinguishing the 
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings
232
. Therefore, 
                                                 
229
  Therefore Art 3(3) which shall be examined below should more correctly refer to the ―ability to 
distinguish‖ instead of ―distinctive character‘.  
230
 Case C-238/06, Develey Holding GmbH & Co. Beteiligungs KG v. OHIM, Judgement of 
25.10.2007, par. 79, Case C-24/05 Judgement of 22.6.2006 August Storck KG v. OHIM, [2006] ECR I-
5677, par. 23, Joined Cases C-473/01 and C-474/01 Procter and Gamble v OHIM  [2004] ECR I-5173, 
par. 32 and 33. 
231
  Case C-299/99 Philips Electronics BV v. Remington Ltd., Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 38. This was 
confirmed in C-321/03 ruling of 25.1.2007, Dyson Ltd. V. Registrar of Trade Marks, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
153, where it was stated that art. 3(1)(a) precludes the registration of signs which do not meet the 
conditions imposed by art. 2, the purpose of which is to define the types of sign of which a trade mark 
may consist (par. 25).  
232
  Ibid, at par. 37, 38. 
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as per this ECJ ruling, art. 3(1)(a) is merely a repetition of art. 2 of the Directive 
(which states that the signs of which a mark may consist are signs which may be 
represented graphically and may distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking 
of those of other undertakings). In Philips the ECJ found that there is no category of 
marks which is not excluded from registration under art. 3(1)(b), (c) and (d) which is 
none the less excluded from registration by art. 3(1)(a)
233
. Namely, if a mark is 
registrable under art. 3(1)(b), (c) and (d), it follows that it is registrable under 3(1)(a) 
as well. This poses the obvious question whether this applies vice versa. 
 
As suggested above there is a difference between signs which do not fulfil the 
conditions laid down in art. 2 of the Directive (repeated in art. 3(1)(a)) in that they are 
not capable of distinguishing the products of one undertaking from those of another 
and marks which do not meet the criteria mentioned in art. 3(1)(b),(c) and (d) of the 
Directive: the former can never be registered and the latter may be registered under 
art. 3(3) of the Directive, provided they have acquired a distinctive character through 
use
234
. Therefore, there may be a case where a mark is not excluded from registration 
under art. 3(1)(b), (c) or (d) in conjunction with art. 3(3), but it is excluded from 
registration under art. 3(1)(a).  This interpretation would also seem systematically 
correct, as the mere existence of art. 3(1)(a) would otherwise be deprived of any 
meaning.  
 
Following Philips, which stated practically that art. 3(1)(a) of the Directive does not 
have any autonomous meaning, the Court in Dyson
235
 stated that art. 2 of the 
Directive has to be examined (i.e. distinctive character to be established) before 
considering whether a mark should be refused registration under art. 3 (considering 
obviously par. 3(1)(a)-3(1)(h))
236
. The ECJ held that the application in question, i.e. 
all conceivable shapes of a transparent vacuum cleaner bin, was not a ―sign‖ within 
the meaning of that provision and therefore was not capable of constituting a trade 
mark
237
. This was held in light of the requirement set by art. 2 of the Directive to 
                                                 
233
 Ibid, at par. 40. 
234
 This argument was put forward by Remington in the proceedings, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par, 25. 
235
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 153. 
236
  Ibid, par. 25. 
237
 Ibid, par. 40. As the Commission contemplated, the application in question was not a sign because it 
related to a concept, irrespective of a shape, Ibid par. 29.  See also M. Walmsley ―Too Transparent? 
ECJ rules Dyson Cannot Register Transparent Collection Chamber as a Trade Mark‖, EIPR [2007], 
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prevent the abuse of trade mark law by those who seek to obtain an unfair competitive 
advantage
238
. The problem with the application was not therefore, as per the ECJ, that 
the shape of a transparent vacuum cleaner bin does not constitute a sign and 
consequently a trade mark, but that the application in question was not specific 
enough. Since there is no requirement by the Directive that a trade mark application 
be specific and precise, however a general and abstract application would create 
problems in the area of registration as well as protection of the mark (there would 
basically be no firm ground to perform the similarity test
239
) the Court stipulated that 
a) the actual subject matter of the application was ―all conceivable shapes of a 
transparent bin forming part of the external surface of a vacuum cleaner‖240 and b) 
that a) cannot be perceived visually and therefore is not a sign
241
. 
 
The Court had already stated that even if a sign is found to be registrable under art. 2 
of the Directive, it is still necessary to decide whether the sign satisfies the other 
requirements laid down in particular in Art. 3 of the Directive
242
.In its ruling in 
Linde
243
, the ECJ ruled that each of the various grounds of refusal of art. 3(1) (except 
obviously art. 3(1)(a) which as aforementioned the Court does not consider it as 
autonomous ground of refusal) of the Directive is independent of the others and calls 
                                                                                                                                            
298, E. Smith, ―Dyson and the Public Interest: An analysis of the Dyson Trade Mark case‖, EIPR  
[2007], 469.  
238
  Ibid, par. 34, see also Heidelberg Bauschemie, Op. Cit. Supra n. 226, par. 24. 
239
 The need for ―clarity‖ and ―precision‖ of trade mark applications was confirmed by the ECJ in 
Sieckmann, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 205, par. 50, 51. 
240
 Ibid, par. 20, even though this was not stated in the application itself. 
241
 Ibid, par. 36. ECJ‘s concern, in line with its concerns in Windsurfing Chiemsee, was that if the  mark 
was registered, the owner would be able to prevent its competitors from marketing vacuum cleaners 
having any kind of transparent collecting bin, regardless of its shape, ibid par. 38.  The Court held that 
―What consumers can identify visually is not so much the subject matter of the application as two of 
Dyson‘ s graphic representations as contained in the application. Those representations cannot be 
assimilated in the subject matter of the application, because, as pointed out by Dyson on a number of 
occasions, they are merely examples of it‖. What the Court said is interesting, because the mark was  
actually the following: ―the mark consists of a transparent bin of collection chamber forming part of the 
external surface of a vacuum cleaner as shown in the representation‖. The application clearly defined 
the mark as being what was depicted on the representation attached to the application. The fact that the 
subject matter was actually something else, as per the ECJ, namely all possible representations of such 
a bin, was a result of the proceedings and was not described as such on the application. The Court could 
have merely followed the rationale of Sieckmann, i.e. that the representation of the mark has to be 
―clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective‖ (Op. Cit. Supra n. 
205, par. 55) without reverting to the ―subject matter‖, a tool used in earlier ECJ case law (see case C-
16/74 Centrafarm v. Winthorp, E.C.R. 1183) to ―interpret‖ the community intellectual and industrial 
property law. The main principle would be the same. Marks that give a competitive advantage to the 
trade mark owner by granting a monopoly (and a perpetual one, as opposed to, for example, the one 
granted to designs) on an ambiguous sign should not be registered as such.   
242
 Heidelberg Bauschemie, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 226, par. 40. 
243
 Joined cases C-53/01 to C-55/01 Linde and Others, [2003], ECR I – 3161. 
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for separate examination
244
. In the same ruling it was held that for a mark to possess 
distinctive character within the meaning of art. 3(1)(b) of the Directive it must serve 
to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating 
from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from products of 
other undertakings
245
.  The Court continued by stating that a simple departure from 
the norm or customs of the sector is not sufficient to render inapplicable the ground 
for refusal given in the above article. In contrast, a trade mark which significantly 
departs from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential origin 
function
246
. This was confirmed by the Court in subsequent cases
247
. 
 
B.c. Registrability under UK law 
UK courts have ruled by looking at this from the reverse, namely what is ―lack of 
distinctive character‖ and ―lack of ability to distinguish‖ and have found that this 
distinction means that there are two sub-categories a) those signs which have never 
been capable of distinguishing the goods of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings, and b) those which once had the capacity to distinguish but have, 
through use, ceased to be capable of doing so
248
. According to Cornish and 
Llewellyn
249
 the three levels of distinctiveness, i.e.: a) ―for there to be a trade mark at 
all‖, b) ―under the undefined ―devoid of distinctiveness‖ objection‖ and c) ―in relation 
to the more specific ―descriptiveness‖ and ―customary usage‖ objections‖ many times 
overlap and it might be difficult to rely on the correct objection. As a general remark 
it should be noted that signs should be held to lack a ―capacity to distinguish‖ only in 
the simplest and most obvious cases
250
. Lack of capacity to distinguish as an element 
of the definition of trade marks should depict distinctiveness problems much more 
fundamental and thus more rarely occurring than ―devoid of a distinctive character‖ 
                                                 
244
 Ibid, par. 67. 
245
 Ibid, at par. 48. 
246
 Ibid, at par. 49. 
247
 See in particular, Develey Op. Cit. Supra n. 230, par. 81, case C-25/05 P, Storck KG v. OHIM, Op. 
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established as an absolute ground for refusal of registration of a sign which has 
already been found to constitute a trade mark
251
. 
 
It is difficult in most cases to differentiate between marks that are non distinctive and 
marks that are descriptive or of customary usage
252
. It has also been argued that as 
long as, for example a mark is descriptive, it is also devoid of distinctive character
253
. 
However, since the result (unregistrability) is the same when either of these notions is 
used the practical implications are not important if one basis is used instead of the 
other.  
 
In the UK the principle of a need for a mark to be ―freely used by all‖ is pertinent to 
the registrability test. Lord Parker stated that the right to register should ―largely 
depend on whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their business and 
without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark or some mark nearly 
resembling it, upon it or in connection with their own goods‖254. In those lines it was 
also stated that ―the power of a trade mark monopoly should not be granted where it 
would require honest men to look for a defense to an infringement action‖255. On the 
basis of these guidelines, the courts followed a strict approach as to what was 
considered as registrable.  
 
UK courts found that there are marks that could never be registered as trade marks 
even though they might acquire distinctiveness through use. This was, for example, 
the case of the trade mark ―York‖256, which was refused registration for containers on 
the ground that inter alia a geographical name is prima facie incapable of registration. 
The ―York‖ case was invoked in Advocate General Cosmas‘ ruling in Joined Cases C-
                                                 
251
 See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 689, also  Alison Firth, Ellen 
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Consumer Perception‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 156, at 86. However, it has been argued that there is only one 
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108/97 and 109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee
257
, as an example of the ―rigid tendency‖ 
which was followed before the entry into force of the Directive in the UK, the 
Scandinavian countries and Germany (under the name of Freihaltebedürfnis), as 
opposed to the ―flexible‖ tendency that was followed mainly in France, Italy and the 
Benelux countries
258
. Even though the above mentioned cases relate to geographical 
indications they apply also to descriptive indications in general. 
 
Some examples of word marks that have been refused registration in the UK are the 
following: ―Bonus Gold‖259 for financial investment services, ―Automatic Network 
Exchange‖ for certain business information, ―Coffeemix‖ for coffee and ―Cycling Is 
….‖ for clothes, footgear and headgear260. However, the mark ―E.S.B.‖ was found to 
be only indirectly descriptive and therefore registrable (in that the initials stand for 
―Extra Strong Beer‖) on the basis that some form of mental activity is required in 
order for someone to realize the descriptive reference
261
. 
 
B.d. Registrability under Greek law 
It has been suggested in Greek legal doctrine
262
 that the signs applied for registration 
are divided into five categories on the basis of their degree of distinctiveness: a)  
imaginary words (e.g. Polaroid, Xerox, Adidas) which enjoy a high level of 
distinctiveness and are always registrable, b) common words used in an unusual 
context (Black and White for alcoholic beverages, Red Bull for refreshments, Camel 
for cigarettes) which have a distinctive character when indeed the goods or services 
applied for are different to the connotation invoked by the mark and are also always 
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registrable, c)  laudatory signs (Polycopy for photocopy machines, New Look for 
cigarettes, Seventeen for teenage magazines), which provide indirect information on 
the goods or services applied for, based on a mental process of connotations, 
symbolisms, metaphors
263
 and which also have a distinctive character for that reason 
and are also therefore registrable, d)  descriptive marks which directly describe the 
goods or services applied for, or their characteristics, attributes, functions and 
therefore are not registrable, in view of the need for such words to stay free for use by 
all competitors and e) generic terms, which denote a category (kind) of goods or 
services, directly provide information on the goods applied for, have no distinctive 
character and are therefore non registrable
264
. 
 
Certain rules have been developed by Greek case law on the issue of registrability, in 
view also of the respective ECJ case law. However Greek courts (including the 
Trademark Administrative Committee which is not a court stricto sensu as it does not 
consist of judges, however is also producing case law) are not always following them.  
 
These basic rules are as follows: 
a) The issue of whether a mark is distinctive or descriptive is not estimated in 
abstracto but in relation to the goods or services applied for
265
. 
 
b) Words belonging to the common language are  considered registrable if they are 
used on products that are not denoted by the word  (e.g. ―Papagalos‖ meaning 
―parrot‖ for coffee; ―Bravo‖ also for coffee, ―Fantasia‖ for olive oil266, ―Thalassa‖, 
―Spa‖ for spa services267). 
 
c) The distinctive capacity of foreign language words is estimated on the basis of the 
average Greek consumer
268
. The following have been registered as trade marks:  
―Ligne Integrale d‘ Orlane‖ for perfumes269, ―Bubble Gum‖ for gums270, ―Rosso 
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Antico‖ for alcoholic beverages271. The following were rejected on the basis that they 
described the products in question: ―Servis‖ for machines272, ―Prisma‖273 for glasses 
and ―Frappuccino‖274 for coffee.  
 
d) Combination of foreign words that are unknown to the Greek consumer if as an 
overall impression are not descriptive are registrable as trade marks, for example 
―Aquafresh‖ for toothpaste275.  
 
Another issue is that of laudatory marks and whether they should be allowed to be 
registered as trade marks, if it is decided that they should be ―freely used by all‖. 
Examples of laudatory trade marks that have been registered in Greece are: ―Velvet 
De Luxe‖276 and ―Master Sound‖ 277. 
 
In Merz & Krell
278
 the ECJ adjudicating on a laudatory trade mark case, namely the 
word Bravo for writing implements,  clarified that a trade mark which consists only of 
signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of quality or 
incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by that mark is not excluded 
protection as such by virtue of such use
279
. However, to allow monopolisation of 
laudatory words such as Bravo, because they are not descriptive of the goods for 
which the mark is registered, would contradict the public interest principle, mentioned 
above. As the referring Court (Bundespatentgericht) had observed, it should have 
been sufficient for the word Bravo to be refused registration as a word mark that has 
become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established 
practices of the trade, and that it should not need to specifically describe the goods in 
question
280
. 
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The Greek case law has been contradictory. While Conseil d‘ Etat, invoking Merz and 
Krell has found
281
 that the word ―Reflex‖ should have been examined on whether it 
has become customary in the Greek language in relation to the goods applied for (not 
in general) by the trade mark, the same court in another ruling found the word 
―Police‖ to have become customary in the Greek language through its use on police 
cars, and was therefore found generic of the mark which covered goods applied for in 
class 3
282
. 
 
B.e. Overall Observations 
 
According to the traditional (rigid) theory
283
 developed by the European courts, which 
functions on the basis of avoiding the creation of a monopoly, an analytical approach 
is undertaken and each word in a trade mark word combination is regarded and 
examined separately. If any of the words is descriptive then the whole trade mark is 
considered to be descriptive
284
. According to the modern (flexible) theory also 
developed in the European courts, which functions on the basis of whether a mark is 
capable of indicating the origin of the goods, a synthetic approach is undertaken and 
the trade mark is regarded as a whole. It is not important if the partial elements of the 
trade mark are descriptive
285
.  
 
C. DESCRIPTIVENESS V. DISTINCTIVENESS 
These two notions are not always easy to distinguish, as shall be examined further 
below. Yet they are fundamentally different and have a totally different impact on the 
registrability of the mark. The European and national legal frameworks shall be 
examined below as to how they have dealt with the matter.  
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C.a. ECJ Rules for descriptiveness  
 
In-between these existing tendencies in Europe, the Directive provisions (but also the 
respective Regulation provisions) should be interpreted in a coherent manner so that 
harmonisation can be achieved. The task of the national trade mark offices and courts 
in the EU as well as OHIM is not easy. This is why inconsistencies have been noted 
with regard to the degree of flexibility shown towards trade mark registrability.  
 
The first characteristic example that could be mentioned is the CTM Baby Dry
286
 
case, where the initial finding of the European Court of First Instance
287
 (and of 
OHIM) was overturned by the respective ECJ ruling. The Baby Dry mark was refused 
registration for babies‘ diapers by the OHIM Examiner288 and the Board of Appeal of 
OHIM dismissed the appeal filed against the Examiner‘s decision289. On appeal the 
CFI found that the mark was purely descriptive since the words ―Baby Dry‖ conveyed 
to consumers the intended purpose of the goods in question (babies‘ diapers) and that 
it exhibited no additional feature to render the sign distinctive. On appeal the ECJ held 
that, while each of the two words in the combination may form part of expressions 
that are used in everyday speech to designate the function of babies‘ diapers, their 
―syntactically unusual juxtaposition‖ was not a familiar expression in the English 
language, either for designating babies‘ diapers or for describing their essential 
characteristics
290
. In line with this ruling the CFI  in Vitalite
291
 upheld an appeal that 
was filed against refusal of the mark for baby foods and for mineral and aerated 
waters, on the ground that even though ―Vitalite‖ could be read in French as Vitalité, 
it could not be regarded as being able to designate the intended purpose of the goods. 
In the Companyline
292
 case however, the ECJ dismissed the applicant‘s appeal against 
                                                 
286
 Case C-383/99 Procter & Gamble v. OHIM ECR 2001, 6251. See also comments by M. Perraki, 
EEmpD [2005], 134. 
287
 Henceforth: CFI. 
288
 Ibid, par. 5. 
289
 Ibid, par. 5. See, I. Kilbey, ―Baby –Dry: A Victory for the Ephemera of Advertising‖, [2002], EIPR, 
493, in which it is stated that if the applicant had applied for the mark ―Pampers Baby Dry‖ , which 
was the name under which Procter & Gamble marketed the product around Europe, instead of ―Baby 
Dry‖ it is possible that none of this controversy would have been raised. 
290
 Ibid. The ECJ went so far as stating that these two words are a ―lexical invention‖ (par. 44 of the 
ruling). 
291
 Sunrider v. OHIM, [2001], ETMR 605. Also the CFI in case T-140/00 Zapf Creation AG v. OHIM, 
judgement annulled a decision of OHIM not to register the mark ―New Born Baby‖ for dolls resembling 
new born babies and accessories for the said dolls.  
292
  DKV  Deutsche Krankenversicherung v. OHIM, Op. Cit. Supra n. 283. 
  
 67 
the CFI‘ s finding that coupling together without graphic or semantic modification 
two words that are customary in English – speaking countries did not confer on the 
sign a distinctive character. In the UltraPlus case
293
 regarding registration in respect 
of plastic ovenware for use  in microwave and conventional ovens, the CFI annulled 
the decision of the OHIM Examiner and the Board of Appeal who stated that the mark 
was not to be registered because consumers would perceive the word as making a 
claim relating to quality of the products rather than the commercial origin of the 
goods.  The CFI stated that the mark UltraPlus when taken as a whole, was not such 
that the relevant public would immediately and without further reflection make a 
definite and direct association between the goods in question and the mark, namely 
that the public would not perceive UltraPlus as descriptive in relation to ovenware
294
.  
 
In  Baby Dry the ECJ held that only those signs which might serve in normal usage to 
designate either directly or by reference to one of their essential characteristics, goods 
or services such as those in respect of which registration is sought, should be regarded 
as descriptive
295
. With regard to word marks consisting of word combinations, this 
should not be determined only in relation to each word taken separately but also in 
relation to the whole which they form
296
. The ECJ held also that any perceptible 
difference between the combination of words and the terms used in the common 
parlance to designate the goods or services or their essential characteristics is apt to 
confer distinctive character on the word combination
297
. With regard to Community 
trade marks effective throughout the EU as ―common parlance‖ mentioned above 
should be considered the language spoken by consumers of the country in the 
language of which the word mark is written
298
. 
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In Biomild 
299
 the Court clarified that it is not sufficient that each of the word mark‘s 
components may be found to be descriptive, the word itself must be found to be so
300
.  
As a general rule, the Court stated, the mere combination of descriptive elements, 
remains itself descriptive,  even if a neologism is created, unless unusual variations 
are introduced, in particular with regard to meaning or syntax
301
. The combination 
may not be descriptive if it creates an impression which is sufficiently far removed 
from that produced by the  words of which it consists, with the result that the word is 
more than the sum of its parts, e.g. when the combination is of an ―unusual‖ nature302. 
The second example that could be mentioned is the Doublemint
303
 case regarding 
again a Community Trade Mark. In this case again the initial finding of the Court of 
First Instance (but not of OHIM
304
) was overturned by ECJ. However, this time the 
ECJ followed the strict approach whereas the CFI followed the more flexible 
approach.  CFI allowed the mark Doublemint to be registered for chewing gum 
because it had two distinct meanings for the potential consumer: ―twice the usual 
amount of mint‖ and ―flavoured with two varieties of mint‖ and because for an 
average English speaking consumer would have a fanciful and vague meaning
305
. 
Therefore the CFI concluded at par. 30 of its judgement that the mark had an 
ambiguous and suggestive meaning and was open to various interpretations and did 
not enable the public concerned immediately and without further reflection to detect 
the description of a characteristic of the goods in question. However the ECJ affirmed 
that a sign must be refused registration if it at least one of its possible meanings 
designates a characteristic of the goods or services concerned.  
 
 
Furthermore, registration is not precluded under art. 3(1)(b) and (c) of the Directive if 
the national trade mark consists of terms borrowed from the language of another 
Member State in which it is devoid of distinctive character or descriptive of the goods 
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or services in respect of which registration is sought, unless the relevant parties in the 
Member State in which registration is sought are capable of identifying the meaning 
of the term
306
.  
 
This view was supported consistently by case law in Greece, stating that foreign terms 
are not considered to be descriptive unless consumers in Greece are able to identify 
their meaning, i.e. unless they have been incorporated in the Greek social life and 
language
307
. 
 
 
C.b. ECJ Rules for distinctiveness  
ECJ rules on distinctiveness derive from cases regarding Art. 2 and Art. 3(1)(b) of the 
Directive. As we have seen the Court has not made any distinction to the definition of 
the term as used in either of those provisions.  In Windsurfing Chiemsee
308
 the Court 
stated that the distinctive character  meant that the mark must serve to identify the 
products in respect of which registration is applied for, as originating from a particular 
undertaking and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings
309
. Therefore 
the first rule is that the absolute grounds of refusal should only apply with reference to 
the goods in respect of which registration is sought. Also in the above case it was 
stated that there should be a degree of forseeability in the application of the 
exclusion
310
.  
 
In its ruling in Lloyd the ECJ established another important rule, namely that the 
question of distinctiveness must be asked through the eyes of the average consumer 
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that is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect
 311
. The 
second rule therefore is that the descriptiveness test must be made in relation to the 
average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect
312
, taking into account the category of the goods or services in question 
and the circumstances in which they are marketed, as the average consumer‘s level of 
attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question
313
.  
 
Therefore, distinctive character must be assessed first by reference to the products 
applied for and second by reference to the perception of the relevant public
 314
.The 
criteria for assessing distinctiveness are: the market share held by the mark, how 
intensive, geographically spread and  long- standing the use of the mark has been, the 
amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark, the proportion of the 
relevant class of persons, who, because of the mark, identify goods as originating 
from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and 
industry or other trade and professional associations
315
. 
 
The above rules on the average consumer and on the assessment of descriptiveness 
have been applied by Greek courts, citing also the respective ECJ rulings
316
. Earlier 
case law takes into account the non experienced consumer
317
. 
 
In order to assess whether a or not a trade mark has any distinctive character the 
overall impression given by it must be considered
318
. This does not mean that one may 
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not first examine each of the individual features of the mark
319
. Furthermore, it is 
possible that because of linguistic, cultural, social and economic differences, a trade 
mark which is devoid of distinctive character in one Member State, is not so in 
another Member State
320
. 
 
The Court has also confirmed that there is no class of marks having a distinctive 
character by their nature or by use which is not capable of distinguishing goods or 
services within the meaning of art. 2 of the Directive
321
. 
 
The criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional marks 
consisting of the appearance of the product itself are no different than those applicable 
to other categories of trade mark
322
. None the less, for the purpose of applying those 
criteria the average consumer‘s perception is not necessarily the same in the case of a 
three dimensional mark consisting of the appearance of the product itself as it is in the 
case of a word figurative mark consisting of a sign which is independent of the 
appearance of the product it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of 
making assumptions as to the origin of the products on the basis of their shape or the 
shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element, and it may 
therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to such three – 
dimensional marks than in relation to a word or figurative mark
323
; however such 
marks must enable the average consumer to distinguish the product concerned from 
those of other undertakings without conducting an analytical or comparative 
examination and without paying particular attention
324
. The rather reserved attitude of 
the Court vis-à-vis three-dimensional marks contributes to the distinction between 
trade mark law and Community design protection
325
. 
                                                 
319
 See Develey Op. Cit. Supra n. 230 par. 82 and the case law cited. 
320
 Case C-421/04 Matratzen Concord AG v. Hukla Germany SA, Op. Cit. Supra n. 306, par. 25,  Case 
C-238/06 Develey, Op. Cit. Supra n. 230, par. 58. 
321
 Philips, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113 , par. 39. 
322
 See C-25/05 P, Judgement of 22.6.2006 August Storck KG v. OHIM, Op. Cit. Supra n. 230,  par. 26, 
C-457/01 P Henkel v OHIM, [2004] ECR I-5089, par. 38, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. OHIM, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 247, par. 27. See also Jenny Berquist and Duncan Curley, ―Shape Trade Marks and Fast –
Moving Consumer Goods‖, EIPR [2008], 17. 
323
 See Develey Op. Cit. Supra n. 230 par. 80, Storck ibid, par. 24 and 25. 
324
 See Mag Instrument v. OHIM Op. Cit. Supra n. 247, par. 32. C- 218/01, Judgement of 12.2.2004, 
Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent-und Markenamt, Op. Cit. Supra n. 247, par. 53. 
325
 See Schramm ―Der europaweite Schutz des Produkdesigns – Das Gemeinschaftsgeschmacksmuster 
und sein Verhaeltnis zur Gemeinschaftsmarke‖, Baden-Baden [2005], Goia ―Alicante and the 
Harmonisation of Intellectual Property Law in Europe: Trade Mark and Beyond‖, 41 CMLR [2004], 
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Lastly, it should be mentioned that the Court   in   ―Das Prinzip der 
Bequemlichkeit‖326 (The Prince of Comfort‖) ruled that while the general criteria for 
assessing distinctiveness are the same for the various categories of trade marks, 
differences in assessment might follow from different reception among the average 
consumers concerning different categories of marks
327
. However, the Court did not 
clarify under which circumstances the average consumer would tend to identify the 
goods with a certain origin from specific slogans
328
, but merely stated that it might be 
more difficult to establish distinctiveness for trade marks which are perceived by the 
relevant public as advertising slogans, since consumers are not in the habit of making 
origin assumptions on the basis of slogans
329
.  However, it is not appropriate to apply 
stricter rules on slogans than those applicable on other types of signs
330
. The Court 
suggested that slogans do not have a distinctive character if they are commonly used 
in business communications and, in particular, in advertising
331
. The Court concluded 
that merely a lack of imagination or of an element of originality is not sufficient to 
bring up an unregistrability objection
332
. 
 
C.c. The Underlying Rationale of the Directive provisions 
A different rationale lies behind each absolute ground provided in the Directive
333
. 
Some absolute grounds of protection aim at protecting the consumers‘ or competitors‘ 
interests which are seen in general as public interests. These are in particular, those 
provided in Art. 3 (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) of the Directive. Some others relate to the 
origin function of trade marks, namely Art. 3 (a) and (b). The interpretation of the 
above provisions is closely linked to the approach one takes with regard to the ―rigid‖ 
tendency and the ―flexible‖ tendency mentioned earlier. 
                                                                                                                                            
975, mentioned in Leistner ―Harmonisation of Intellectual Property Law in Europe: The European 
Court of Justice‘s Trade Mark Case Law: 2004-2007‖, CMLR [2008], 69.   
326
 Case C-64/02  OHIM v. Erpo Moebelwerk GmbH., [2004] ECR I-10031. 
327
 Ibid, par. 34. 
328
 See Matthias Leistner, Op. Cit. Supra n. 325, at 73. 
329
 Ibid, par. 35. 
330
 Ibid, par. 36. 
331
 Ibid, par. 37. 
332
 A position that has been criticised by legal doctrine, as having set the threshold of distinctiveness 
too low, by accepting that the expression ―Das Prinzip der Bequemlichkeit‖ (―The Comfort Principle‖) 
for household and other furniture is inherently distinctive, see Cornish and Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
45 at 697, fn 84. Sat.2. for satellite broadcasting was also found sufficiently distinctive, [2005] 
E.T.M.R. 20, ECJ. 
333
 See also Hannes Roesler, ―The Rationale for European Trade Mark Protection‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
103, at 100. 
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In its ruling in Windsurfing Chiemsee the ECJ stated that Art. 3 (1) ( c) of the 
Directive ―pursues an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs 
or indications relating to the categories of goods or services in respect of which 
registration is applied for may be freely used by all‖ 334.  However in its Baby Dry 
ruling the ECJ, following Advocate General Jacobs‘ opinion335, stated that the 
purpose of the prohibition of  registration of purely distinctive signs or indications as 
trade marks was not to preclude the possibility of granting a monopoly of language to 
certain traders, but to prevent registration of purely descriptive signs or indications as 
trade marks, which because they were no different from the usual way of designating 
the relevant goods or services or their characteristics could not fulfil the function of 
identifying the undertaking that markets them and were thus devoid of the distinctive 
character needed for that function
336
. The ECJ‘ s rationale in this case was very much 
orientated towards the origin function (flexible approach) by setting aside the public 
interest concerns
337
. 
 
                                                 
334
 Joined Cases C-108/97 and 109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee Productions –und Vetriebs GmbH v. 
Boots – und Segelzuehhor Walter Huber and Franz Attenberger,  Op. Cit. Supra n. 138, par. 25-27. 
See, A. Fox, ―Does the Trademark Harmonisation Directive Recognise a Public Interest in Keeping 
Non-Distinctive Signs Free of Use?‖, EIPR, [2002], 1. According to Advocate General Colomer, Art. 3 
(1) (e), does not have as its purpose the protection of the distinctive character of a trade mark. It reflects 
the legitimate concern to prevent individuals from resorting to trade mark protection in order to extend 
exclusive rights over technical developments further than the time protection that would be conferred 
under patent or design legislation, See Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, in Case Philips 
Electronics BV v. Remington Ltd., Case C-299/99, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113 , par. 31, 32, as well as the 
ECJ ruling on the same case, par. 77.   
335
 Advocate General Jacobs held that the Windsurfing Chiemsee ruling concerned geographical terms 
and its rationale should only apply to cases involving geographical signs and not other type of 
descriptive signs. He found that the Court of First Instance ―went too far in paragraph 23 of the 
judgement under appeal when it held that it was the intention of the legislature that signs of the kind 
described in Article 7(1)(c) should, by their very nature, be regarded as incapable of distinguishing the 
goods of one undertaking from those of another‖ (see par. 73 of the Opinion). He continued by stating 
that ― … it may be better to think of Article 7(1)(c) of the Trade Mark Regulation as intended not to 
prevent any monopolising of ordinary descriptive terms but rather to avoid the registration of 
descriptive brand names for which no protection could be available‖ (see par. 78).  However his 
statement is not adequately justified when based on the argument that geographic signs ―as a trade 
mark would occupy the ground much more completely than would that of a mark comprising 
descriptive elements‖. Indeed it is not sufficiently explained why signs designating geographic origin 
should be treated differently than all the other descriptive signs, such as those designating the quality or 
quantity or value, as all these fall within the concept of ―characteristics of goods or services‖ according 
to the reading of Art. 3 (1) (c ) of the Directive.  It is interesting to note that when the Opinion of the 
Advocate General was delivered the CFI had just issued its ruling on Doublemint. 
336
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 286 at par. 37. 
337
 It has been argued that the competitors‘ interests are safeguarded by the fair use defences of Art. 6 
of the Directive (which the ECJ considered in the Baby Dry case). See Tim Pfeiffer, ―Descriptive trade 
marks‖ Op. Cit. Supra n. 258, at. 377. 
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In Doublemint
338
 however the ECJ approached the ―unwanted monopoly‖ issue by 
confirming that it would be unacceptable to register Doublemint as a trade mark 
where its competitors would expect to use similar or identical wording in order to 
describe their goods and / or services. The ruling clearly sets aside the Court‘s original 
judgment in the Baby Dry case and narrows its scope by redefining the extent to 
which a descriptive sign may be registered. In his opinion in Doublemint Advocate 
General Jacobs confirmed that a descriptive term did not cease to be descriptive on 
the basis that it has more that one meaning in the industry. He continued by stating 
that the difference between Doublemint and Baby Dry was that Baby Dry had a 
structural and syntactical inversion of words whereas Doublemint conveyed a series of 
potentially descriptive meanings
339
. The ECJ held that a sign must be refused 
registration if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the 
goods or services concerned and in that, it was following the reasoning of the public 
interest rationale, stating that the descriptiveness provisions pursue an aim ―which is 
in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the 
characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be 
freely used by all‖340. Community case law has since Windsurfing Chiemsee 
repeatedly drawn attention to the need to apply the principle of availability, which is 
inherent in the general interest
341
, and has linked it to the above mentioned aim of 
ensuring that a mark or indication may continue to be freely used when it is decided 
whether it is eligible for registration
342
 expanding also that view to art. 3(1)(b) and 
(e)
343
. 
 
                                                 
338
  ECJ ruling of 12.10.2003, Case C-191/01, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) v. WM Wrigley Jr Company,  ECR, [2003]. 
339
  Of course Advocate General had to make a point on the difference of these cases in order to justify 
his totally reversed approach in each of these cases. 
340
  See par. 31 of the Judgement. In the rulings Koninklijke KPN v. Benelux Merkenbureau concerning 
the Postkantoor trade mark (Post Office in Dutch) for telecom and the Campina Malkunies BV v. 
Benelux Merkenbureau concerning the Biomild trade mark for food products the ECJ seems to follow 
the line of diversions from Baby Dry. 
341
  See Edward Smith, Op. Cit. Supra n. 237, at 471; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz 
Jarabo Colomer delivered on 16.1.2008 on case C-102/07 Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Marca 
Mode et al, par. 44, including an extensive analysis of the German Freihaltebedurfnis principle, which 
as aforementioned was introduced in the European trade mark law by the ECJ only partially, i.e. 
without the requirement that there is a current, verifiable and serious need (to keep free), see par. 33-40 
of the opinion.  
342
  See in addition to Windsurfing Chiemsee, Linde, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 243, Libertel Op. Cit. Supra n. 
155, par. 52, Henkel Op. Cit. Supra n. 247, par. 40 and 41. 
343
 Regarding art. 3(1)(b) see Henkel, Ibid, SAT1, Op. Cit. Supra n. 318, par. 26 and 27. Regarding art. 
3(1)(e) see Libertel, Ibid, Philips, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 113,  par. 80. 
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So far ECJ rulings have chosen between the two approaches and each time have 
followed one of them, as if the two approaches were  contradictory and the adoption 
of one would preclude the other
344
.  
 
However, it would be interesting to try to reconcile two approaches, namely the origin 
(flexible) and the public interest (strict) one. The two approaches could be used in a  
complementary to each other way: to  find that a word mark is ―unusual‖ and 
therefore non descriptive even though comprising common elements, does not mean 
that the public interest test is not applied. Indeed even if a trade mark consisting of, 
for example, two descriptive words in an unusual combination is registered, the owner 
of the mark shall not have a monopoly on each of the two words separately, but on the 
combination thereof. The trade mark owner shall not be able to stop any other trader 
from using the descriptive words forming part of his trade mark on the trader‘s 
goods
345
.  
 
C.d. Special conditions with regard to Shapes 
The fact that some absolute grounds of refusal are based on public interest protection 
which so often is opposed to the trade mark owner´ s interests might give rise to 
objections to the extent, for example, that a trade mark linked in the mind of 
consumers to a certain enterprise thereby is de facto distinctive and registrable but 
nonetheless not allowed registration for reasons of public interest
346
. In cases of 
conflict between the public interest and the trade mark owners‘ interests  the public 
interest should prevail. 
 
 However, the public interest does not in this sense mean the interest of consumers, 
but the interest of competitors. The interest of consumers would be satisfied only in an 
indirect way, i.e. through enhancement of competition.  The interest of consumers 
                                                 
344
  With regard to the public interest Freihaltebeduerfnis approach, it is clear that this applies in the 
context only of application procedure and no in cases of infringement, see Charles Gielen and Anne 
Marie Verschuur ―Adidas v Marca II: Undue Limitations of Trade Mark Owner‘s Rights by the 
European Court of Justice?‖ [2008] E.I.P.R., 254, at 256. 
345
  The CFI has combined the two approaches in its judgement in UltraPlus, Op. Cit. Supra n. 293. 
346
  In its explanatory memorandum to the proposal for the Directive the Commission states: ―the shape 
of goods will not be refused registration unless the fact of registration would make it possible for an 
undertaking to monopolise that shape to the detriment of its competitors and of consumers‖.  The ECJ 
stated the same rationale in Case C-299/99 Philips Electronics BV v. Remington Ltd., Op. Cit. Supra n. 
113.  
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would at a first level seem to be satisfied in this case with the origin (flexible) 
approach (like the interests of the trade mark owner), through their ability to identify 
the goods. 
 
It has been argued that, despite the structure of the Directive, in adjudicating cases on 
trade mark registrability, national courts could apply first the special provisions, e.g. 
when the case under examination involves a shape mark the court should apply first 
the test provided in national law implementing Art. 3 (1) (e) of the Directive and then 
if this allows registration the test of Article 3 (1) (b) of the Directive
347
.  Even though 
this might seem unorthodox in the sense that one has to begin by establishing that the 
sign in question is indeed a trade mark, before applying the absolute legal grounds or 
refusal of registration on this trade mark, this method could help minimise the 
possibility of conflict of interest between trade mark owners and their competitors.  
 
The Directive does not forbid the coexistence of parallel protection of trade marks and 
copyright, patent and industrial designs, if the provisions of each specific legislation 
are met. In its Preamble the Directive specifically states that the provisions of the 
Directive do not exclude the application to trade marks of other provisions of law.  
 
However, it could be to the detriment of the public interest, signs normally falling in 
the definition of designs or patents and thus enjoying a restrictive time period of 
protection to be registered as trade marks and thus becoming a ―perpetual monopoly‖. 
Trade mark protection under the Directive extends to areas that used to fall within the 
scope of unfair competition or passing off and not to areas that fall within the scope of 
patents or designs. One should always keep in mind that the rights granted to a trade 
mark are substantially different to the rights conferred by a patent or an industrial 
design. As per the existing trade mark law in Europe, trade mark would not give its 
                                                 
347
 See Alison Firth, Ellen Gradley and Spyros Maniatis, ―Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, 
Functional Considerations and Consumer Perception‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 156, at. 95. This however has 
not been followed by English courts. In Dualit Ltd.`s Trade Mark Application [1999], RPC 304 
(Trademark Registry), [1999] RPC 890 283 regarding the registration of a retro-toaster shape, the Court 
applied first the registrability test under s. 1(1) relating to the definition of trade mark and 3(1) relating 
to the distinctive character, before even considering s. 3(2) relating to grounds of refusal especially for 
shapes.  A similar approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in Philips v. Remington [1999] ETMR 
816 (CA) where the distinctive character of the mark was considered first before examining s. 3(2). For 
an analysis of the ECJ case law on shapes see also Bergquist Jenny and Curley Duncan, “Shape Trade 
Marks and Fast-Moving Consumer Goods”, [2008] EIPR 17. 
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owner the right to prevent a third party from any unauthorised use, such as a technical 
application. Therefore, the ―perpetual monopoly‖ of a trade mark should not be 
regarded as having the effect of a ―perpetual monopoly‖ of a patent or design.  
 
Attempts to circumvent legislation on patents and designs are therefore prohibited by 
virtue of Art. 3 (1) (e) of the Directive, namely s. 3 (2) of the UK TM Act and Art. 3 
of the Greek Trade Mark Act. It is submitted that these provisions contain a test that is 
similar to the rules of functionality developed by the US courts, namely a doctrine 
designed to prevent trade mark monopolies from being used to avoid the requirements 
of federal patent or copyright law and to ensure the rights of existing and potential 
competitors
348
. Under this doctrine the fact that consumers might recognise a certain 
sign as emanating from a certain enterprise would not be of any relevance so long as 
the shape to be registered as trade mark was functional
349
.   
 
C.e. Exceptions related to the absolute legal grounds for refusal 
Article 3(3) of the Directive adds a significant qualification to the rule laid down by 
Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (d) in that it provides that a sign may, through use, acquire a 
distinctive character, which it initially lacked and thus be registered as a trade mark
350
.  
 
It is therefore through the use made of it that a sign may acquire the distinctive 
character, which is a prerequisite for its registration, as the ECJ affirmed in its 
judgement in the Windsurfing Chiemsee
351
. In this case the trade mark owner is 
―rewarded‖ for having succeeded in ―transforming a bagatelle into an intangible 
property right‖ as AG Colomer put it352. The Court stated that the distinctive character 
acquired through use means that the mark must serve to identify the products in 
respect of which registration is applied for, as originating from a particular 
                                                 
348
 See Alison Firth, Ellen Gradley and Spyros Maniatis, ―Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, 
Functional Considerations and Consumer Perception‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 156, at. 95. 
349
 Ibid, See also Mc Carthy on Trademarks, 4
th
 ed. Par. 7:66 and 81, cited therein. 
350
 ―A Trade Mark shall not be refused registration […] if, before the date of application for registration 
and following the use which has been made on it, has acquired a distinctive character.” 
351
 Joined Cases C-108/97 and 109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee Productions –und Vetriebs GmbH v. 
Boots – und Segelzuehhor Walter Huber and Franz Attenberger,  Op. Cit. Supra n. 138, par. 52.  Of 
course the opposite might also occur: marks lose distinctiveness because of diminution of consumer 
demand, diminution of use, use of similar marks on similar or dissimilar products, see M. Th. Marinos, 
Trade Mark Law, Sakkoulas, Athens [2007],  at 94. 
352
 See Opinion of AG Colomer delivered on 16.1.2008 on case C-102/07, Op. Cit .Supra, n. 341,  par. 
56. 
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undertaking and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings
353
. The 
distinctive character of a mark, including that acquired through use must be assessed 
with reference to the goods in respect of which registration is sought
354
.  
 
Acquisition of distinctive character through use means that the relevant class of 
persons identifies the good or service as originating from a given undertaking, 
because of such use, i.e. use as a trade mark (not any use)
355
. The use of the mark for 
the purposes of identification by the relevant class of persons of the product or service 
originating from a certain undertaking is the test for application of art. 3(3) on 
acquired distinctiveness, i.e. the same as the test applied on inherent distinctiveness
356
. 
Such use, however, does not presuppose that the trade mark in question has been 
introduced to the public as a separate sign-it suffices that it is used as part of a 
registered trade mark or in combination with another mark
357
.  In Dyson
358
, the 
referring court (High Court of England and Wales) asked the ECJ whether a visual 
feature mark can acquire distinctiveness through use during the period of a de facto 
monopoly. However, the Court did not answer this question but delivered its ruling on 
the basis of art. 2 of the Directive (and not art. 3 which was invoked by the referring 
court). 
 
The ECJ also laid down the criteria to be used in assessing  (similarly to the 
distinctive character of the mark for the purposes of Art. 3 (1) (b)(c) or (d)) the 
acquired distinctiveness within the context of art. 3(3) of the Directive
359
. These 
criteria are: the market share held by the mark, how intensive, geographically spread 
and  long- standing use of the mark has been, the amount invested by the undertaking 
in promoting the mark, the proportion of the relevant class of persons, who, because 
of the mark, identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking; and 
                                                 
353
  Ibid  par. 46. This rule was repeated in the ECJ judgement of 4.10.2001 in the Bravo case (Case C-
517/199, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co v. OHIM, Op. Cit. Supra n. 278, at 442. 
354
  See Philips, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 113, par. 59. 
355
  Ibid, par. 26. See also case C-24/05 August Storck KG v. OHIM, Op. Cit. Supra n. 312 par. 61-62. 
356
  See Nestle Op. Cit. Supra, 196, par. 25. 
357
  Nestle,  Ibid,  par. 30. 
358
  Case C-321/03,  Judgment of 26.1.2007,  Dyson Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks par. 17 and 26.  
359
 Ibid, at par. 51. It should be noted that these elements are to an extent similar to those used in order 
to assess the reputation of a mark, namely the (significant) degree of distinctiveness. 
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statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional 
associations
360
. 
 
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Along these cases the ECJ has underlined that the crucial role and objective of trade 
marks, i.e. the essential function thereof, is to guarantee the identity of origin. The 
central concept of the average member of the relevant public, has not been adequately 
defined though
 361
. 
 
The absence of distinctiveness impedes a sign from being registered as a trade mark. 
This has been the case even before the harmonising effect of the Directive in both 
national legal frameworks under examination. Distinctiveness is closely linked to the 
origin function, which in the past was undoubtedly the only trade mark function 
enjoying absolute legal recognition. Similarly, under the new regime, non-distinctive 
signs are refused registration. Art. 3(1)(b) of the Greek Act 2239/94 and s. 3(1)(b) of 
the UK TM Act 1994 state that explicitly. In addition, all the relative grounds for 
refusal of registration are dictated by the same logic. When a sign does not inherently 
or subsequently have a strongly distinctive character it may not be allowed to register. 
 
A final remark to be made on the past Greek trade mark legislation regards the system 
of registration. The so-called ―formal‖ system required that the only way for legal 
rights to be conferred to trade marks, was by following the registration procedure and, 
therefore, abiding to the requested formalities
362
. This has now changed with the 
Directive
363
, as implemented in the Greek Law by Art. 3(3) of Act 2239/94. A sign 
can acquire the necessary trade mark function, i.e the necessary distinctiveness, by 
way of its use. In the UK, the rule that a sign can become distinctive through its use, 
that is by acquiring a secondary meaning (that of a trade mark), already existed as we 
have seen, before the entry into force of the Directive.  
 
                                                 
360
  Ibid, par, 49-51. See also Nestle Op. Cit. Supra n. 196, par. 31. 
361
  See also Leistner Op. Cit. Supra  n. 325, at 74. 
362
  Article 2 of the 1998/39 Act, setting the formalities for the registration. 
363
 Art. 3(3).  
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As already mentioned above, the Directive introduced a broad definition of trade 
marks. National legislation has implemented the Directive with the results just 
examined. However, as it has been shown there are some inherent doctrinal and 
practical obstacles to the broadening of the notion of trade marks.  
 
Trade marks grant a legal monopoly to their owners by attributing them an absolute 
right to use the mark. How wide should the scope of signs that can be monopolised 
be? The ECJ has provided some guidelines however the rules are not always clear and 
cohesive. In the group of registrability Directive provisions of trade marks the 
prevailing function is the origin function. In assessing the above, the ECJ has affirmed 
that both the customary use of trade marks as indicators of origin in the sector of 
industry concerned and the point of view of the average consumer must be taken into 
consideration
364
. However, it is submitted that apart from the function of a trade mark 
as indicator of origin the public interest should also be protected in the sense that 
these provisions (which are ex officio applied) are used as a filter for preventing the 
registration of signs that must remain available for everyone to use in trade. Also, 
within the notion of the public interest lies also the consumer protection against 
misleading, immoral or illegal marks.  This three fold framework which is highly 
subjective demands a very careful application based on clear and solid guidelines. The 
significance of a cohesive interpretation of these provisions of the Directive by the 
ECJ, the Court of First Instance as well as all the Community Trade Mark regulative 
authorities is fundamental to the creation of a truly harmonised trade mark law in 
Europe. It is evidently very important for reasons of legal certainty to have all 
European bodies in line with one another and with the national courts. It should be 
born in mind that the infringer of a CTM may bring a counterclaim for revocation of a 
CTM in infringement proceedings that take place before a national court and that this 
court may actually cancel the CTM with an effect on the whole Community (Art. 
96(5), 51, 7 of the Regulation). Therefore, it is important that all courts involved in 
this procedure, for example, follow the same guidelines. 
                                                 
364
 See Case C-324/1997, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v. Klijnsen Handel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 311. 
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PART. III. TRADE MARK USE 
After examining what is a trade mark and what are the criteria for its registration, it is 
important to see what is trade mark use and in particular what are the rights conferred 
to the trade mark owner or in the reverse what kind of unauthorised ―use‖  by a third 
party constitutes infringement of a trade mark. The functions of trade marks affect 
trade mark registrability as well as trade mark use and, of course, the scope of 
protection
365
. Trade mark use will be examined also to the extent that it serves as a 
restriction to the trade mark owner‘s rights, thereby securing the boundaries of the 
public interest rationale examined in the previous chapter. It is submitted that even 
marks that have been found to fulfil the origin function according to the ―flexible‖ test 
described above may also fulfil the public interest rationale of the ―stricter‖ test and 
be freely used by all as long as their use by third parties is not trade mark use.  
A. WHAT IS TRADE MARK USE? 
A.a. Trade Mark Use According to the Directive. 
As we shall examine below, unlike the Greek Trade Mark Law 2239/1994, neither the 
Directive nor the UK TM Act which implements the Directive in the UK refer to the 
need of trade mark use in  infringement proceedings. So the question is raised whether 
in the light of the Directive the only use prohibited is indeed trade mark use
366
.
 
 It is of 
course clear that use in the course of trade is an entirely different notion than trade 
mark use. Signs may be used by market factors in the course of their commercial 
activity for many purposes, e.g. descriptive, but not as trade marks.  
 
Article 5 (1) of the Directive provides: ―The registered trade mark shall confer on the 
proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third 
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade: (a) any sign which is 
identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered, and (b) any sign where because of its 
identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods 
or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of 
                                                 
365
 It should be noted that the definition of trade mark use is also important in the context of revocation 
provisions, namely the ground of revocation for non use. 
366
 See ―Trade Mark Use‖, J. Philips & Ilanah Simon eds. Oxford University Press, [2005].  
  
 82 
confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association 
between the sign and the trade mark‖. Furthermore Article 5(3)(a) of the Directive 
provides that the following may be prohibited (a) affixing the sign to the goods or to 
the packaging thereof and (b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or 
stocking them for these purposes.  
 
Art. 5(1) (a) of the Directive must be interpreted in the light of the trade mark 
functions protected in the framework of the European trade mark law. The ECJ has 
examined the issue whether art. 5(1) (a) of the Directive allows a trade mark owner to 
prohibit the use by a third party in the course of trade of a sign which is identical or 
similar to the registered trade mark for identical or similar goods or whether the right 
of the trade mark owner requires the existence of a specific legitimate interest of the 
trade mark owner in such a way that use could affect or does actually affect one or all 
of the trade mark functions
367
.  
 
Furthermore according to Art. 6 (1) of the Directive: ―The trade mark shall not entitle 
the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, (a) his own 
name or address, (b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of 
the service, or other characteristics of goods or services, (c) the trade mark where it is 
necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as 
accessories or other parts, provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters‖. 
 
A.b. Trade Mark Use Under UK Law 
UK Trade Mark Act s. 11(1) and (2) permits the use, provided it is in accordance with 
honest practices in industrial and commercial matters, of the following: a person‘s 
own name, indications of kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin, time of production or rendering, or other characteristics of the 
goods or services, the mark itself, where this is necessary to indicate the intended 
purpose of a product or service – in particular as accessories or spare parts.  
 
                                                 
367
  C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed,  ECR [2003], Judgement of 12.11.2002. 
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Under UK law it is required that infringement takes place in the ―course of trade ‖ by 
a ―sign‖ and it is no longer an explicit requirement that this use be ―as a trade 
mark‖368. However, courts even under the 1994 TM Act tend to confine infringement 
to trade mark uses of the mark because this is considered to be inherent to the notion 
of using a sign in the course of trade
369
. In Reed Executive v. Reed Business 
Information
370
, Pumphrey J held that there had to be use of the sign for business 
purposes, so as to indicate the trade origin of the goods or services. In the 
―Philishave‖ shape mark case the defendant, Remington, argued inter alia that their 
use in incorporating a similar shaving head in Remington products was not trade mark 
use but merely functional
371
. However, Aldous LJ in the same case in the Court of 
Appeal expressed the view that trade mark use was not essential on the basis that s. 9 
and 10 of the TM Act do not require an infringing use to be trade mark use and that s. 
11 c) contains a list of exceptions in which any use that is not ―trade mark use‖ 
falls
372
. In another case the Football Association tried to prevent a third party from 
putting cards of football players that bore T-shirts with the Football Association‘s 
logo, on the sweets the third party manufactured, but the court held that the cards were 
not used to indicate the sweets‘ manufacturer and were not used ―in relation to 
goods‖373.  
 
In the cases mentioned above the courts have shown a reluctance to prevent a third 
party from using a word or other sign which corresponds to another‘ s registered trade 
mark where potential damage does not appear very concrete. These rulings show that 
in UK case law it has been accepted that marks are to be protected for their value as 
                                                 
368
 There is no explicit exclusion either, see Paul Garland and Victoria Wilson, ―Trade Marks: What 
Constitutes Infringing Use?‖, EIPR, [2003], 373 at 374. The ambiguous reference to ―use‖ in both the 
Directive and the 1994 TM Act has led to much academic and judicial debate as to which interpretation 
–the narrow ―trade mark use‖ (use that indicates trade origin) or the wider ―any use‖ construction-is 
correct, see Kerly‘ s Law on Trade Marks and Trade Names [2001], par. 13 –13 and 13 –14. 
369
 See W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 742. 
370
 RPC [2003], 207, at par. 129. See also the Court of Appeal judgment in the Arsenal case ([E.W.C.A. 
Civ. 696, [2003] where it was held that ―use of the trade mark on goods such as scarves and hats, 
whether by Arsenal or others does not denote origin‖ par. 69.  
371
 Philips Electronics v. Remington  RPC [1998], 283 at 312. We do not have a court ruling on this 
since the point did not need to be decided– as we have seen the mark was held to be invalid therefore 
there was no need to examine trade mark use. Cf  the judge‘s earlier view that there was no requirement 
of use as a trade mark, British Sugar v. Robertson RPC [1996]  281 at 292-293.  
372
 Philips Electronics v. Remington  RPC [1999], 809, CA. It should be noted that certain uses may not 
be clearly infringing uses neither falling though in the statutory defenses.  
373
 Trebor Basset v. Football Association FSR [1997] 211. 
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indications of origin. However, it has been submitted that when marks have a 
reputation, use could encompass a non-trade mark use
374
. 
 
In the first Arsenal High Court Decision
375
 Laddie J held that the Arsenal signs used 
by the defendant were perceived as badges of support, loyalty or affiliation, therefore 
not used as trade marks
376
; he required clarification from the ECJ whether trade mark 
use is indeed a prerequisite for infringement under the Directive. In the second High 
Court decision, on return from the ECJ (the ruling of which shall be examined further 
below), Laddie J emphasised statements of the ECJ that certain uses of a trade mark, 
such as descriptive uses, are excluded from the scope of infringement provisions and 
concluded that since use made by the defendant was not trade mark use, there was no 
infringement
377
. Upon appeal, Aldous J found that the issue of trade mark use is 
irrelevant, and that what matters is whether the origin function of the mark is affected: 
―Unchecked use of the mark by a third party, which is not descriptive use, is likely to 
damage the function of the trade mark right because the registered trade mark can no 
longer guarantee origin, that being an essential function of a trade mark‖378. A 
subsequent Court of Appeal ruling repeated however that the alleged infringer has to 
be using the sign in a trade mark sense mentioning that ―It stands to reason that a 
Trade Marks Act would only be concerned to restrict the use of a mark  in a trade 
mark sense and should be construed accordingly‖379.  
 
It follows that a part of the English judiciary interpreted the ECJ ruling in Arsenal as 
broadening the scope of trade mark protection to non-trade mark uses, while another 
                                                 
374
  W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn, [2007] Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 745, even though the authors are 
confined to the example of use in a dictionary, which of course has to be considered in a special 
manner in view of the impact it would have on the characterisation of a mark as generic. 
375
 Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed [2001] ETMR 77. 
376
  It has been argued though that affiliation, support and loyalty is the aim of every brand (obviously 
related to the advertising function thereof), therefore inherent to the notion of ―trade mark use‖, see 
Rob Sumroy and Carina Badger, ―Infringing ―Use in the course of trade‖: trade mark use and the 
essential function of a trade mark‖, in Trade Mark Use, J. Philips & Illanah Simon ed., Oxford 
University Press [2005], 180. 
377
 Arsenal Football Club, plc v. Matthew Reed [2002], EWHC 2695 (Ch). 
378
 Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed [2003], EWCA Civ 696, par. 45. See also Rob Sumroy 
and Carina Badger, Op. Cit. Supra n. 376, who remark that ―With the notable exception of the Court of 
Appeal in Arsenal the English judiciary seems to be operating in the jurisprudence of the 1938 Act‖, at 
174. 
379
  R v. Johnston [2004] ETMR 2, citing Mothercare (UK) Limited v Penguin Books Ltd [1988] RPC 
113.  
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part interpreted it as reaffirming the stipulation of trade mark use by its emphasis on 
the essential function of a trade mark as guarantee of origin
380
. 
 
A.c. Trade Mark Use Under Greek Law. 
The Greek Trade Mark Act 2339/94 in Art. 20 par. 1 explicitly states that the use of a 
mark is allowed to third parties if effected in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial or commercial matters and if it does not constitute trade mark use
381
. The 
last prerequisite of non trade mark use (which as aforementioned does not exist in the 
Directive) is a remainder from the old Greek trade mark Law 1998/39 (Art. 18). The 
choice of the Greek legislator to leave it also in the wording of the new law was 
severely criticised by legal doctrine
382
. As per Greek legal doctrine despite their 
absolute character, trade mark rights are restricted by law from the point of view of 
their scope of protection
383. The trade mark owner‘s powers are defined by Greek 
trade mark law a) in an affirmative manner (which is also not included in the 
Directive) i.e. as an enumeration of what the trade mark owner can do, as per art. 18 
par. 1 of the Greek trade mark law, for example affixing the mark on his products, 
place it on the wrappings and the packaging of the products, on correspondence 
papers, price lists, announcements, advertisement etc., and b) in a negative manner i.e. 
as an enumeration of what he can forbid third parties from doing. In this last 
enumeration it is specifically stated that third parties are prohibited not from generally 
using his mark but from using it ―as a trade mark‖. It follows that use of a trade mark  
by an unauthorised third party which is not ―trade mark use‖ is according to Greek 
trade mark law, even prior to the Directive, allowed.  
 
Use of a sign ―as a trade mark‖ is considered by legal doctrine to be use in a way that 
would allow the average consumer to distinguish the goods of one undertaking from 
those of another
384
. Greek case law has ruled ad hoc whether there is ―trade mark 
                                                 
380
  See also Rob Sumroy and Carina Badger, Op. Cit. Supra n. 376 and Po Jen Yap, ―Making Sense of 
Trade Mark Use‖, EIPR [2007], 420.  
381
  Emphasis added. 
382
 See Nik. K. Rokas, ―Functional Amendments of Trade Mark Rights‖, [1997], EEmpD, 457. 
However, the ECJ case law has shown that the notion of trade mark use has indeed a place within 
European trade mark law. 
383
 See L. Kotsiris, ―Unfair Competition Law‖, Sakkoulas [2000], 300, A. Psarras, ―The Limitations of 
Trade Mark Rights‖, Dikaio Epixeiriseon kai Etairion (henceforth: DEE), [1996], 227, Liakopoulos,  
Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 336-337. 
384
 See, M. Th.  Marinos, in Nik. Rokas ed. Trade Mark Law, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63.  
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use‖, mainly on the basis of whether the average consumer is confused as to the origin 
of the products
385
. In MonPrAth 5632/2004
386
 the court found that the use of the 
words ―Coffee Time‖ which are a registered trade mark for coffee shops, in an 
advertising for coffee products sold under the trade mark ―Papagalos Loumidi‖, was 
not trade mark use, as a) the words were written  in Greek letters so as to stress the 
fact that the advertised product was Greek style coffee, b) there were other words that 
also stressed the fact that the coffee advertised was Greek style coffee and c) the 
words ―coffee time‖ is a widely used foreign phrase which was used in the specific 
advertising in a way that precluded any association with the plaintiff‘s trade mark. It 
is obvious from the above that the court mixed the descriptive use and confusion 
criteria and gave no valid explanation why the use of a similar trade mark in the 
advertisement of a competitor is not creating confusion. 
 
However it has also been submitted by case law (even though it has not yet been 
affirmed to a full extent
387
) that use by a third party of a trade mark for advertising 
purposes, namely without there existing a risk of confusion as to origin, does 
constitute ―trade mark use‖ because it affects a trade mark function, namely the 
advertising function
388
.  
 
Use of a mark in encyclopaedias, scientific works, in art or in the press does not 
constitute trade mark use and it is not relevant whether such use is made in order to 
make profit, by chance or on purpose
389
. It has been accepted that use of a trade mark 
as part of a company name constitutes trade mark use because, even though it 
identifies the company directly, it does also identify the goods indirectly
390
. However 
in a more recent case, the Court did not recognise trade mark use in the inclusion of 
the trade mark in the company name
391
. In another case brought before the Greek 
courts concerning use of the community trade mark PAGO in the company name of a 
                                                 
385
  See, inter alia, PolPrAth (Multi Member First Instance Court  of Athens) 14119/81, EEmpD 140, 
PolPrAth 460/96 EEmpD [1996], 404, Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) 335/1994 DEE, [1995], 49, 
MonPrAth 12346/1996, DEE [1997], 367, EfAth 4543/97 DEE, [1998], 149 Areios Pagos 330/2007, 
EEmpD [2007],426, M. Th. Marinos, Trade Mark Law, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 162.    
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  EEmpD [2004], 626.  
387
  See the case law mentioned in Marinos, Trade Mark Law, in Nik. Rokas ed., Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, 5 
art. 20, par. 13. 
388
  See, Nik. Rokas, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 264, MonPrAth 5632/2004, EEmpD [2004], 627.  
389
  See Marinos Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 229. 
390
  Ibid, 230, see also Areios Pagos 1131/1995 EEmpD [1996], 197. 
391
  EfAth 866/2004, EllDni 46, 592. 
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third party (and where on the products a wholly different mark was affixed) the court 
found that no facts were presented to indicate that such use constituted use of the 
mark for the distinction of ―products or services‖392. Mentioning the ECJ ruling of 
Celine
393
 the Greek court stated that the mere inclusion of the trade mark in the 
company name is made for purposes of distinguishing the business owner, the 
business itself, or a branch or outlet thereof and is therefore not use for the distinction 
of ―goods or services‖394. 
  
Whether there is trade mark use or not is estimated on an ad hoc basis
395
.  There is 
trade mark use when the sign appears on the goods in a manner that catches the 
consumer‘ s eye, e.g. in big letters396, but not if explanatory elements are added which 
make it clear that the goods do not originate from the senior mark owner
397
, if used in 
parody or as a decorative element
398
. In a recent decision concerning infringement of 
a three dimensional trade mark of a long cylindrical cigar shape for a certain type of 
chocolate candy, the Court found that use of exactly the same cylindrical shape (even 
though the word mark for distinguishing the goods was totally different) was use as a 
trade mark, and was not made for decorative purposes, since the consumer perceived 
it as an indication of origin
399
. It is irrelevant whether the user of the sign is aware of 
the prior registered trade mark, whether  such use is made on purpose or by accident, 
made with a view to profit or not
400
.    
 
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE DIRECTIVE  PROVISIONS 
As we have seen in Part I of the present thesis in the system of free movement of 
goods and services and effective competition within the EU, undertakings must be 
capable of attracting consumers through the quality of their goods or services, which 
                                                 
392
  MonPrAth 2528/2009,  DEE [2010], 170, with comments by H. Apostolopoulos. 
393
  See below under B.b. 
394
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 171. 
395
  EfAth 4068/1991 EEmpD [1992], 665. 
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 5632/2004 MPrAth EEmpD [2004], 626, Areios Pagos 335/1994 DEE [1995], 50, Areios Pagos 
702/1973 EEmpd [1974], 277. 
397
  EfAth 4068/1991 Op. Cit. Supra  n. 353, Rokas 154/155 in Marinos Op. Cit. Supra  n. 351, at 163.  
398
  Marinos Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at  163.  
399
  PolPrAth 585/2010, EEmpD [2010], 180 at 190. 
400
  Marinos Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 163, 164. See also M. Perraki, EEmpD [2003], 436, on the issue 
of whether trade mark use is a limit per se on the right of the trade mark owner, or must always be 
examined within art. 20 par. 1 of the Greek trade mark law. 
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is achieved by distinctive signs allowing them to be identified
401
. The ECJ has 
repeatedly upheld the view that the main trade mark function is the origin function in 
that trade marks are a guarantee of origin of the marked goods or services by enabling 
the consumer to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of 
another
402
. This is why the protection conferred on a trade mark is absolute in the case 
of identity between the mark and the goods. In view of the above it is asked whether 
the trade mark owner‘ s right should be reserved to cases in which a third party‘s use 
of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark or whether 
unauthorised use in general should be prohibited. Furthermore, if the first approach is 
upheld, is it enough that any of the functions of the trade mark be affected, or should 
in particular its essential, according to the ECJ, function of guaranteeing to consumers 
the origin of the goods be affected? The above questions have been answered by the 
ECJ case law examined below. 
 
B.a. ECJ case law on use and trade mark functions 
It seems from the wording of the Directive that the only requirement is that use is 
made in the course of trade
403
; however, it appears from the ECJ case law that it is 
only use that affects or might affect the functions of the registered mark that will be 
enjoined.  
 
In BMW
404
 the Court stated clearly that the scope of application of Article 5(1) of the 
Directive depends on whether the trade mark is used for the purpose of distinguishing 
the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking ―that is to say as a 
trade mark as such‖. As per the ECJ405, articles 5-7 of the Directive do not entitle the 
proprietor of a mark to prohibit a third party from using the mark for the purpose of 
informing the public that he carries out the repair and maintenance of goods covered 
by that trade mark and put on the market under the proprietor or with his consent, or 
                                                 
401
 See, inter alia, Case C-10/89 HAG GF [1990] ECR I-3711 par. 13 and Case C-517/99 Merz & Krell 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 278, par. 21. 
402
 Ibid at par. 48, also inter alia Case C-201/77 Hoffman La Roche [1978] ECR 1139 par. 7 and Case 
C-299/99 Philips Electronics BV v. Remington Ltd., Case C-299/99, Op. Cit. Supra 113, par. 30 
403
 National trade mark laws explicitly mentioning the trade mark use prerequisite, such as the Greek 
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404
 Case C-63/96 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v. Roland Karel 
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that he has specialised or is a specialist in the sale or the repair and maintenance of 
such goods, unless the mark is used in a way that may create to the public the 
impression that there is a commercial connection between the other undertaking and 
the trade mark proprietor and in particular the reseller‘s business is affiliated to the 
trade mark proprietor‘s distribution network or that there is a special relationship 
between the two undertakings
406
. As per the ECJ the use by a third party in the course 
of trade of a trade mark to distinguish the goods of the trade mark owner, could be 
found infringing if by that use the impression of the existence of a commercial 
connection between the trade mark owner and the third party was created. 
 
Along the same lines, the Court stated in Toshiba
407
 that where product numbers of an 
equipment manufacturer are, as such, distinguishing marks, their use in the catalogues 
of a competing supplier enables him to take unfair advantage of the reputation 
attached to those marks, only if the effect of the reference to them is to create, in the 
mind of the persons at whom the advertising is directed, an association between the 
manufacturer and the competing supplier, in that those persons associate the 
reputation of the manufacturer‘s products with the products of the supplier (taking 
into account the overall presentation of the advertising and the type of persons to 
whom it is addressed). 
 
The ECJ  considered in Hoelterhoff
408
  the use of the registered marks ―Spirit sun‖ and 
―Context Cut‖ by an alleged infringer in the course of oral sales negotiations to refer 
to a particular cut of gemstone. The Court on a reference form a German Court found 
that such use did not fall within the concept of use required for a finding of 
infringement under Art. 5 (1) of the Directive
409
. The Court is clear, whereby it states 
that the interests of the trade mark owner are not affected by a situation where the 
reference to the trade mark in the course of commercial negotiations for purely 
descriptive purposes, so that there can be no question that the trade mark is being used 
as a sign indicative of the undertaking of the origin, cannot be interpreted by the 
potential customer as indicating the origin of the product
410
; therefore use for merely 
                                                 
406
  Ibid, at par. 64. Emphasis added. 
407
  C-112/99, Toshiba Europe GmbH v Katun Germany GmbH, judgement of 25.10.2001, at par. 60. 
408
  Case C-2/00, Michael Hoelterhoff  v. Urlich Freiesleben, [2002] ECR I - 4187 at par. 16. 
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  Ibid.  
410
  Ibid, at par. 16 and 17. 
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descriptive purposes does not constitute infringement.  As per the ECJ art. 5(1) of the 
Directive is not even engaged if ―the reference to the trade mark cannot be interpreted 
by the potential customer as indicating the origin of the product‖411. 
 
In its ruling in Arsenal
412
, the ECJ repeated the requirement that infringing use should 
affect the origin function, but did not clearly state that trade mark use is a requirement 
for infringement, despite the fact that this was exactly the question asked by the 
referring court (High Court of England and Wales)
413
. The ECJ ruled on the basis of 
risk of confusion of Art. 5(1) (a) of the Directive and found that the use in question 
would create the impression of a material link between the goods and the trade mark 
proprietor
414
. Moreover as to the indication that the goods sold were not official 
Arsenal goods the Court stated that even on the assumption that such an indication 
could be relied on as defence against infringement, there would be a clear possibility 
that post sale consumers would see the Arsenal signs as indicating trade origin. The 
ECJ, within the limits of the questions asked by the referring court
415
, had either to 
affirm that use in question was not trade mark use, but that trade mark use is not  
required under the Directive in order to establish  infringement or that the use in 
question was indeed trade mark use and one that would create post sale confusion 
thereby infringing the mark. Instead the ECJ stated that the use is not infringing ―if 
                                                 
411
 Ibid. 
412
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 367.  
413
 The case concerned the unauthorised marketing of products bearing signs identical to the Arsenal 
registered trade marks (on the products but not on the merchandising tags – this in the opinion of 
Laddie J did not constitute ―use as a trade mark‖ on the part of Mr Reed). In Mr Reed' s shop there was 
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and the trade mark proprietor)? 2. If so, is the fact that the use in question would be perceived as a 
badge of support, loyalty or affiliation to the trade mark proprietor a sufficient connection?‖  Ibid.  
414
 Since Laddie J had already established there was no risk of confusion he considered that the ECJ 
had exceeded its jurisdiction under Art. 249 of the EU Treaty and did not follow its ruling (Arsenal 
Football Club Plc v. Matthew Reed [2003] 1 All ER 137). See Peter Dyberf and Mikael Skylv, ―Does 
Trade Mark Infringement Require that the Infringing Use be Trade Mark Use and if so, what is ―Trade 
Mark Use‖?‖, [2003], EIPR. The ECJ‘ s finding about post sale confusion is interesting and shall be 
examined further below.   
415
 The aim of the questions was exactly this: is trade mark use, even though this is not stated explicitly 
in the Directive, a requirement to establish infringement? 
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that use cannot affect [the proprietor‘s] own interests … having regard to [the trade 
marks] functions‖416. According to the ECJ the exercise of the proprietor‘s exclusive 
right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third party‘s use of the sign 
affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, ―in particular its essential 
function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods‖417. 
 
The ECJ also found that unauthorised use of a mark by a third party (which is not 
descriptive use) is likely to damage the function of a trade mark because the 
registration will no longer be able to guarantee origin. The use of the ―Arsenal‖ marks 
on the goods at issue was such as to create the impression that ―there is a material link 
in the course of trade between the goods concerned and the trade mark proprietor‖418. 
Lastly the Court held that the fact that a sign is perceived as a badge of affiliation, 
support or loyalty was immaterial. 
 
This essentially means that according to the ECJ, a third party using the mark would 
have no other defences than the ones mentioned in the relevant articles of the 
Directive, but could also put forward that the use made does not affect the origin 
function (which practically means that it is not trade mark use). If the ECJ wanted to 
extend the scope of protection to cases where no trade mark use is made, it would 
have explicitly stated that use affecting any trade mark function would be considered 
as infringement (not ―in particular‖ the origin function 419) or that trade mark use is 
not a prerequisite for infringement.  
 
Because the ECJ did not give a clear answer as to whether trade mark use is a 
requirement for infringement, the judgment was read in different ways. Laddie J in the 
UK thought that the ruling had to be interpreted as meaning that trade mark use (use 
indicating origin) is necessary in order to infringe a trade mark. In that context he 
found, as we have mentioned, that the use by Mr Reed as an embellishment was not 
trade mark use and gave judgment for Mr Reed. Further he found that the ECJ‘s 
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  Op. Cit. Supra,  n. 367, par. 54. 
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 Op. Cit. Supra, n. 367, par. 51, C-245/02 Anheuser Busch v. Budejovicky Budvar [2005] ETMR 27 
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  Op. Cit. Supra  n. 367, par. 56. 
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  B. Trimmer, in ―An Increasingly Uneasy Relationship: The English Courts and the European Court 
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conclusions that Mr Reed‘s use of marks was liable to jeopardize the guarantee of 
origin of the goods, was a finding of fact (beyond ECJ competence in the context of 
preliminary rulings) - contrary to his own previous finding and refused to abide with 
it
420
. Upon appeal Aldous J gave a different interpretation: it explained that the ECJ 
had concluded that the relevant consideration was not whether the use complained of 
was trade mark use or not, but whether it was likely to damage the trade mark; or as 
per the ECJ to affect the guarantee of origin which constitutes the essential function of 
the mark.  
 
Essentially the UK Court of Appeal was suggesting that any use could be infringing 
irrespective of whether it is trade mark use or not
421
. However, if one accepts that the 
damage to the mark occurs only when the origin function is affected, the result is the 
same as accepting that trade mark use (indicating origin) is a prerequisite for 
infringement. 
 
Advocate General Colomer‘ s Opinion in Arsenal is interesting. He stressed that trade 
marks not only function as indicators of origin but also of ―quality, reputation and 
even, in certain cases, a way of seeing life‖ and that trade marks may thus be used for 
advertising purposes ―in order to inform or persuade the consumer‖422. Therefore any 
use that would have or has en effect on any of those purposes is indeed a ―trade mark 
use‖423. According to Advocate General Colomer when the Directive states that 
protection is ―absolute‖ in the case of identity (as in the case considered) it means 
that, in the light of the aim of trade mark law, protection is afforded to the proprietor 
irrespective of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, because in such situations 
                                                 
420
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 414. 
421
 The confusion over whether trade mark use is a prerequisite still remains, see for example R v. 
Johnstone [2003], All ER 865 issued subsequent to the Court of Appeal in Arsenal, finding again that 
trade mark use is necessary Jennifer Bryant ―Arsenal v Reed, The End‖, 15.7.2003, 
www.twobirds.com, James Tumbridge ―Trade Marks: The Confusion of Use‖, EIPR [2004] 431, Ian 
Kilbey ―The Ironies of Arsenal v. Reed‖, EIPR [2004], 479, Illanah Simon ―Embellishment: Trade 
Mark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster?‖, [2006] EIPR 321, Po YenYap Op. Cit. Supra n. 380, at 
420. 
422
  Opinion of Advocate General par. 43. It should be noted however that this view is  not upheld by 
the  trade mark legal doctrine. See M. Perraki, EEmpD [2003], 436 comments on Arsenal. 
423
 Ibid. It should be noted that the Advocate General refers to a risk of confusion with regard to the 
quality and advertising function of the mark (referred to as ―misleading indication as to origin, 
provenance, quality or reputation‖ and ―confusion over quality and reputation‖ see par. 49, 50 and 54); 
however confusion as to quality and advertising per se is not upheld by trade mark theory and case law 
that has affirmed the existence of a risk of confusion only when there is confusion with regard to origin 
(which of course encapsulates the confusion as to quality).  
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there is a presumption that there is such likelihood
424
; and not on the contrary that 
protection is accorded to the trade mark owner erga omnes and in all 
circumstances
425
. In this light the Advocate General believes that trade marks having a 
reputation must be accorded ―absolute‖ protection, i.e. even where there is no 
likelihood of confusion
426. He affirms that the decisive factor ―is not the feelings 
which the consumer who buys the goods which the trade mark represents, or even the 
third party using it, harbour towards the registered proprietor but the fact that they are 
acquired because, by bearing the sign the goods identify the product with the trade 
mark-irrespective of what the consumer thinks about of the mark – or even, as the 
case may be of the proprietor‖427.  
 
The Court did not follow Advocate General‘s view on this. It stated that the proprietor 
could not prohibit the use of a sign identical to the trade mark for goods identical to 
those for which the mark is registered, if that could not affect his own interests as 
proprietor, having regard to its functions. The Court did not explicitly include in these 
functions any other function than the origin one
428
. 
 
                                                 
424
 See also Advocate General Jacobs‘ Opinion in LTJ Diffusion. 
425
 Par. 51. However, the Advocate General does not accept an absolute right that would be equal to 
that of a patent or copyright, by which exclusive use rights erga omnes and in any case, but which 
grants rights only against third parties who wish to profit from the mark‘s status and reputation (par. 
45). 
426
  Par. 33. Even though this will be examined below it would be worth noting that at the time the 
Advocate General delivered his opinion the ECJ had not yet issued its ruling in case C-292/00 Davidoff 
& Cie SA, Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid Ltd which states exactly this. Advocate General Jacobs in his 
opinion in Davidoff v. Gofkid stated that trade marks with a repute enjoy the same protection as other 
trade marks. Of course Advocate General Jacobs admits that there might be cases where a mark of 
repute is not protected in the case of use on similar products without a risk of confusion, but that these 
cases are very rare in practice and that the ECJ case law makes them even more rare by extending the 
scope of the risk of confusion (see par. 51 of his Opinion). In the Arsenal case Advocate General 
Colomer criticised this position saying that the more distinctive the mark the less the risk of confusion. 
He mentioned as an example that the use of the mark Coco-Colo for refreshments would not create a 
risk of confusion with the Coca-Cola mark and that in such a case the trade mark owner would not be 
protected at all  (par. 20). 
427
 Par. 57. This approach, which does not take regard of the consumer, resembles the rationale 
followed in certain US rulings on these issues, which we shall see below. However, this position was 
characterized as ―dangerous‖ especially in view of the ―strict‖ approach described above that focuses 
on the public interest, i.e. the consumer. See. Simon Miles, ―The EFU and Arsenal Cases:  The Use of 
Sporting Trade Marks in Merchandising‖, [2002] EIPR 543, at  548. 
428
 Par. 54. The Court stated that taking unfair advantage of the status and reputation of the mark 
constitutes an infringement of the origin function! (see par. 50). However, the ECJ judgement 
irrespective of the rationale it followed reached a conclusion that resolved the very important issue of 
merchandising by correctly attributing adequate protection to trade mark owners.  
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The ECJ held in Adidas
429
 that the fact that a sign is viewed as an embellishment by 
the relevant public is not, in itself, an obstacle to the protection of the mark where the 
degree of similarity is such that the relevant section of the public establishes a link 
between the sign and the mark. Even though no mention was made thereof, this 
finding was interpreted as being related to trade mark use. Some authors perceived it 
as meaning that the ECJ did not require trade mark use to be found for infringement to 
be established under art. 5(1)
430
. Some others argued that this finding meant that the 
ECJ‘ s concern remained whether the third party had been using the infringing sign to 
indicate where his goods emanated from, i.e. whether the use was trade mark use
431
. It 
is interesting that in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Adidas Salomon v. 
Fitnessworld of 10.7.2003, the issue was seen from the point of view of trade mark 
use and it was found, that ― [ …] if the relevant section of the public perceives a given 
sign as doing no more than embellishing goods, and in no way as identifying their 
origin, that sign cannot be regarded as used for the purposes of distinguishing those 
goods‖432.  
 
B.b. Further ECJ guidelines  
In its subsequent ruling in Anheuser Busch
433
, the ECJ was given another chance to 
clarify its standpoint on the issue of trade mark use. It stated that infringing use is 
such where ―[…] consumers targeted, including those who are confronted with the 
goods after they have left the third party‘s point of sale, are likely to interpret the sign, 
as it is used by the third party, as designating or tending to designate the undertaking 
from which the third party‘s goods originate‖434. It  follows that this time the ECJ 
opted for the consumers‘ approach and held that where the use is interpreted by them 
as being  for purposes other than to distinguish the goods concerned, such use is not 
infringing. As we have seen, the Court in BMW had stated this from the point of view 
of the third party and his intention when using the mark ([…] the mark is used for the 
purpose of distinguishing the goods […])435.  
                                                 
429
  Ibid.  Judgment of 23.10.2003, par. 39. 
430
 Justine Antill and Allan James, ―Registrability and the Scope of Monopoly: Current Trends‖, 
[2004], EIPR, 157, at 159.  
431
  Po Jen Yap, ―Essential Function of a Trade Mark: from BMW to O2‖, EIPR [2009], 81, at 85. 
432
 Case C-408/01, Adidas Salomon AG and Adidas  Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., ECR 
[2003], par 60 of the Opinion.  
433
 Case C-245/02 Anheuser Busch v. Budejovicky Budvar [2005] ETMR 27. 
434
 Ibid, par. 60. 
435
 Op. Cit. Supra  n. 404. 
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In Adam Opel
436
 the Court stated that use that affects or is liable to affect ―the 
functions of the trade mark‖ shall be enjoined. The Court stated that in the case 
concerned, where Autec had used an identical sign (the Opel car logo) on identical 
goods (toys consisting of scale models vehicles) to those of the registered mark and 
no defences applied, there would be  no infringement unless the functions of the mark 
were found to be affected
437
.  The Court following again the consumers‘ approach 
stated that ―If […] the referring court intended to emphasise that the relevant public 
does not perceive the sign identical to the Opel logo appearing on the scale marketed 
by Autec as an indication that those products come from Adam Opel or an 
undertaking economically linked to it, it would have to conclude that the use at issue 
in the main proceedings does not affect the essential function of the Opel as a trade 
mark registered for toys‖ 438.  It has been submitted that in the context of this case it 
was made clear that if a sign is not perceived as a badge of origin i.e. not acting as 
trade mark, the essential function cannot be affected, which has been said to indicate 
that Aldous J‘ s finding, in Arsenal mentioned above, that the origin function may be 
affected by dilution, even when the sign is not perceived as a badge of origin, is not 
problematic
439
. 
 
Lastly in Celine
440
 the Court repeated the need that the Court give a uniform 
interpretation to the term ‗use‘ of Art. 5(1) of the Directive and that, following ECJ 
case law (Arsenal, Anheuser-Busch and Adam Opel), the proprietor of a registered 
mark may prevent the use of a sign by a third party which is identical to his mark 
under Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive only if the following four conditions are 
satisfied: 
–        that use must be in the course of trade; 
                                                 
436
  Case C-48/05, Adam Opel v. Autec [2007] ETMR 33, par. 22 and 37. Emphasis added. 
437
 Ibid. See B. Trimmer, Op. Cit. Supra n. 419, [2007]. The author wonders whether that could mean 
that if harm to other functions is alleged then it is not necessary for a perception of the sign as a badge 
of origin to exist and answers negatively in view of the ECJ ruling in Celine (see below)  stating that 
use of a sign in relation to goods or services in the context of art. 5(1) and (2) is use for the purpose of 
distinguishing the goods or services in question, at 91 
438
  See Case C-48/05, Adam Opel Op. Cit. Supra n. 436, par. 23. 
439
  See B. Trimmer, Op. Cit Supra n. 419, at 90. 
440
  Case C-17/06 Celine Sarl v. Celine SA, par. 15 and 16.  
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–        it must be without the consent of the proprietor of the mark; 
–        it must be in respect of goods or services which are identical to those for which 
the mark is registered, and  
–        it must affect or be liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular 
its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods or 
services
441
. 
It is submitted that the wording used by the Court once more ―in particular its 
essential function of guaranteeing the origin‖ is indicative of the Court‘s 
indecisiveness. If the Court wanted to connect trade mark use equally
442
 to all three 
functions of trade marks, it should omit the words ―in particular […]‖. If it did not 
want to protect them, it should only refer to the origin function. This ambiguity once 
more found in an ECJ ruling, contributes greatly to the legal uncertainty existing at 
the moment in the European trade mark protection framework. Is trade mark use 
connected with the  origin function, or with all three functions? If it  is connected with 
all three functions is any trade mark use prohibited, except if it falls within any of the 
defences of art. 6 of the Directive? If so, then why would any issue of trade mark use 
be raised independently / before examining infringement? 
 
The Court stated in Celine that the use of a sign in relation to goods or services within 
the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2) is use for the purpose of distinguishing the goods 
or services in question
443
 and that ―there is use ‗in relation to goods‘ within the 
meaning of Article 5(1) of the directive where a third party affixes the sign on the 
goods
444
 or even where the sign is not affixed, but the third party uses it in such a way 
that a link is established between the sign and the goods marketed or the services 
provided by the third party
445. Combining the rationale of the notions of ―use  in 
relation to goods‖ and ―trade mark use‖ to use affecting the origin function, the Court 
                                                 
441
  Ibid, par. 16 (repeating BMW). 
442
  No other sort of connection could be applicable than an ―equal‖ one:  it would be impractical to 
define some  functions as to be examined more or less than others.  
443
  Ibid, par. 17. 
444
  Ibid, par. 21. 
445
  Ibid, par. 23. 
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stated that where the sign is used by the third party in relation to his goods or services 
in such a way that consumers are liable to interpret it as designating the origin of the 
goods or services in question, there is ―use in relation to goods‖. In such a case, the 
use of the sign is liable to imperil the essential function of the mark, i.e. the origin 
function
446
.  It follows from the above, that despite the criteria mentioned by the 
Court, and especially the fourth criterion with the ambiguous wording ―in particular‖, 
the only function examined in the context of use, was the origin function.  
 
The sufficiency of the existence of such a link was confirmed by the subsequent ECJ 
case law in Smirnoff Ice, accepting also that it is irrelevant whether the third party 
uses the sign to distinguish its own goods in the sense that it has title to these goods; 
what matters is that the third party assumes the powers that are granted the proprietor 
of the mark, i.e. the exclusive power to use the sign so as to distinguish goods and that 
such use was made without the authorisation of the proprietor
447
. This is interesting to 
the extent the Court conceived of a form of infringement related to the exercise of the 
powers of the proprietor by a third party and not to any impairment on the functions 
of the mark itself. This perspective is closer to the approach of the Greek trade mark 
law and case law to the notion of infringement seen as violation of the right of the 
trade mark owner to be the only one exercising the powers conferred to him as 
proprietor of the mark, as shall be examined in the respective chapter.  
 
The Court concluded in Celine
448
 that the unauthorised use by a third party of a sign 
which is identical to an earlier mark in connection with the marketing of goods which 
are identical to those in relation to which that mark was registered constitutes use 
which the proprietor of that mark is entitled to prevent in accordance with Article 
5(1)(a) of the Directive, where the use is in relation to goods in such a way as to affect 
or to be liable to affect the functions of the mark and in particular the  origin function. 
                                                 
446
  Ibid, par. 26. 
447
  C-62/08, UDV North America Inc. v. Brandtraders NV, par. 47, 48,  50 and 52. 
448
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 440. Bonita Trimmer characterises this ruling as ―problematic‖, in so far as it 
interprets art. 5(1) of the Directive as always requiring the offending sign/mark to be perceived as 
acting as a badge of origin, see ―Do trade mark have an image problem in the English courts?‖, [2009] 
E.I.P.R.,196. 
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The case concerned use of a trade mark in a company or trade name and found not to 
constitute ―use in relation to goods or services‖ by the Court449.  
 
It is interesting that Greek case law on that issue, namely use of a third party‘ s trade 
mark in a company name, is exactly the opposite: such use is considered to be an 
infringement
450
.  
 
The fourth criterion proposed by the ECJ in Celine, as per the above, was rephrased in 
the Court‘s ruling in O2 v. Hutchison451. The Court confirmed that the use of a third  
party must affect or be liable to affect only the essential, i.e. origin function, of a trade 
mark, by reason of a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public
452
. In this way, 
the Court affirmed that the examination of whether there is trade mark use in a 
particular case, overlaps with the examination of where there is likelihood of 
confusion.  
 
This is on the one hand of little help to the judicial application of infringement 
provisions of the Directive and on the other hand disregards the other two functions, 
which were mentioned in relation to trade mark use by the ECJ, as we have already 
seen, in Arsenal, Adam Opel and Celine.  
 
The ECJ further clarified that the notion of ―use‖ must be interpreted in infringement 
proceedings always in relation to the facts of the specific case, and not in abstracto
453
. 
In trade mark registration cases, as per the ECJ, this must be examined taking into 
account all future possible uses of the mark
454
. 
 
                                                 
449
 Ibid, par. 21. It has been correctly noted that the confirmation by the ECJ that a mere act of 
incorporation is not an infringement would encourage companies with names identical to the trade 
mark to infringe, believing that the presence of such companies suggests that the marks may not be 
enforced, see Tom Scourfield, ―A Tale of Two Celines‖, EIPR [2008], 71 at 74. 
450
 PPrRhodou (Multi Member First Instance Court of Rhodes) 48/2005 XrID [2006], 358, PolPrAth 
6366/2003 EEmpD [2004], 630, EfAth 4543/1997, DEE [1997] 149. 
451
 Judgement of 12.6.2008 in Case C-533/2006, O2 Holdings Limited, O2 (UK) Limited v. Hutchison 
3G UK Limited, which confirmed that trade mark use, even if not expressly stated in the Directive, is 
required before liability can be established, see Po Yen Yap ―Essential Function of a Trade Mark: from 
BMW to O2‖, [2009], E.I.P.R., 81, at 86. 
452
  Ibid, par. 57, emphasis added. 
453
  Ibid, par. 67. 
454
 Ibid, par. 66. How can trade mark use be included in the rationale of registration provisions is 
difficult to comprehend. Trade mark use is use that needs supposedly to be made by the third party in 
order to proceed with examining infringement.  
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The confusion and trade mark use tests are in this way identical. It follows from O2, 
that non trade mark use cannot actually constitute a defence on its own, as trade mark 
use occurs only when there is a risk of confusion.  
 
However, the point of having such problematic (of trade mark use) in national laws, 
as shall be examined below, is exactly to go one step before (or after) examining 
confusion. In the sense that if no trade mark use is found, there is no reason to proceed 
with examining confusion.  
 
The Court in O2 was before a comparative advertising case, which was considered by 
the national court, to constitute a defence under art. 6 1(b) of the Directive (use as 
indication of kind, quantity, quality, destination, value, geographic origin, time of 
production or other characteristics of the product). The Court did not state whether 
use in comparative advertising constitutes in general trade mark use or not, even 
though in all comparative advertising cases the mark is used in order to denote the 
products of the actual trade mark owner and not those of the third party whose 
products are advertised. Therefore, by applying Celine, the Court should have 
confirmed that in comparative advertising cases there is no trade mark use, as there is 
no harm of the origin function. Furthermore, it should have confirm that, by applying 
the ruling of the Court itself in O2, which stated that the origin function is affected 
through creation of confusion.  
 
If use by a competitor of a third party‘s trade mark to denote such party‘s goods 
constitutes trade mark use or not should be clear. Much more so in view of the fact 
that comparative advertising is allowed in the European legislative framework and 
regulated with specific legal provisions. In that sense, comparative advertising 
constitutes another ―defence‖ to trade mark infringement claims.  
  
 
One could note however that a comparative advertising case is a case where the use of 
the mark does not depend on the ad hoc facts. The mark is by definition used in the 
context of comparison to denote the goods of the actual trade mark owner. In such a 
case the origin function is not at issue. This is why, after all, comparative advertising 
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is allowed by law. Therefore, there could be a general finding of the ECJ that such use 
is in abstracto not trade mark use.  
 
It should be clear that when a third party mentions a trade mark in order to compare 
the products this mark distinguishes, to its own products, this does not constitute trade 
mark use, because the third party does not use the trade mark to distinguish its own 
goods, but those of the trade mark owner in order to compare them to its own products 
and not to sell its products with this particular mark. This is inherent to the function of 
―comparison‖. The issue of whether comparative advertising in a particular case is 
done in such a way as to infringe the provisions of the comparative advertising 
legislation and consequently trade mark legislation, is different
455
.  
 
Use in comparative advertising should not per se be considered as use affecting the 
origin function of the trade mark. However, it could infringe the mark by taking unfair 
advantage of its reputation, if for example the purpose of the comparative advertising 
is to ―steal‖ from the reputation of the compared trade mark, i.e. to attract the eyes of 
the consumers merely because mention is made in the advertisement of the 
competitor‘s famous mark.  
 
This would constitute infringement of the comparative advertising directive, namely 
Directive 84/450, which is prior to the Trade Mark Directive, but  it practically states 
that comparative advertising is permitted to the extent it does not constitute trade 
mark infringement as defined subsequently in the Trade Mark Directive, namely it 
does not, inter alia, create confusion, denigrate or take unfair advantage of the 
reputation of a trade mark
456
.   
 
However, the findings of the Court in this case were different. The Court stated for 
example that ―the advertiser seeks to distinguish his goods and services‖ with the 
                                                 
455
 The exact opposite view has also been suggested, namely that use in comparative advertising is 
considered as use falling within art. 5(1) or (2) of the Directive and subsequently to be examined 
whether it complies with comparative advertising legislation conditions, see Paul Reeskamp ―Is 
Comparative Advertising A Trade Mark Issue?‖, [2008], E.I.P.R. 130, at 137. Some others put forward 
that in a comparative advertising case the Trade Mark Directive should not even be considered, as only 
the comparative advertising directive is relevant, see Bonita Trimmer ―Comparative Advertising 
Trumps Trade Mark Rights: O2 Holdings Ltd. V. Hutchinson 3GUK Ltd.‖ [2008], E.I.P.R., 302, at 
304. 
456
 Art. 3a(1) ind. (d), (e) and (g) of the comparative advertising directive 84/450.  
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comparative advertisement
457
. The advertisement is therefore as per the Court 
functioning as a trade mark (sic), it has the ability to ―distinguish‖ the products 
advertised. This is apparently a misunderstanding as the advertisement is a means of 
promoting and advertising the products and not a means of distinguishing them. 
Further the Court states that use of a trade mark in comparative advertising for the 
purposes of identifying the goods or services offered by the competitor can be 
regarded as ―use for the advertiser‘s own goods and services‖ for the purposes of Art. 
5(1) and (2) of the Directive
458
. The reasoning behind this statement is not very 
convincing or complete and is primarily based on the previously mentioned wrong 
assessment of the Court. If advertising is a means of distinguishing products (sic) then 
comparative advertising can indeed be regarded as use of the competitor‘s trade mark 
on the advertiser‘s own goods459.  
 
It is interesting to note that in Greece the respective comparative advertising 
regulations have been included in law 2251/1994 on consumer protection. The need to 
protect consumers‘ interests (and not that of competitors or right holders) from 
misleading or confusing comparative advertising is therefore paramount
460
.   
 
While  the Court in Hoelterhoff gave a clear and helpful guidance to the issue of trade 
mark use, one that could be invoked and applied by national courts, in the last case the 
Court perplexed the issue of trade mark use. The question of creation of risk of 
confusion or detriment to the distinctive character  is, as we shall examine in the next 
paragraph, an entirely different step in the application of law than the finding of trade 
mark use.  
 
B.c. Methodological observations  
 
It should be noted that if any unauthorised use could be prohibited under trade mark 
law (to the extent falling outside any of the defences specifically mentioned in the 
                                                 
457
 Ibid, par. 35. 
458
 Ibid, par. 36.  
459
 Some commentators actually follow this reasoning, see for example Ilanah Simon Fhima ―Trade 
Mark Infringement in Comparative Advertising Situations: O2 v H3G‖, [2008], E.I.P.R. 420, at 425, 
where the author agrees that the mark is ―[…] being used ―in respect of‖ the advertiser‘s goods, as it 
was being used to promote them‖. 
460
 See also EfAth 2928/2004, EEmpD [2004], 632. 
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Directive), famous brand owners would have a lot to gain, as third parties who wished 
to use these marks would need to obtain a license from the trade mark owner, in order 
to be able to use the mark
461
. 
 
So, what is trade mark use after all, within the context of art. 5(1) of the Directive
462
? 
Should one define trade mark use from the perspective of the consumers and whether 
they see the sign as indicating origin, or from the perspective of the third party, and 
whether such third party uses the sign as an indicator of origin? Does it encompass 
use that damages the origin function of the senior mark or any of the functions? The 
ECJ answers to the above questions could have been clear and consistent, however, as 
it follows from the above, they are not as clear and the result is that different 
interpretations to the ECJ interpretations were given by national courts as well as legal 
doctrine
463
.  
 
It follows from the systematic position of the trade mark use prerequisite in the 
national legislations, where such a notion is explicitly included, that trade mark use is 
not an element of confusion, but a step before or after establishing confusion or 
dilution
464
.  
 
Greek Trade Mark Law expressly refers to trade mark use. However, it does not state 
that trade mark use is a prerequisite of infringement. The ―use as a trade mark‖ notion 
is included in the article on defences, namely Art. 20 (1) ind. 2 of Trade Mark Law. 
According to this provision any use falling within one of the defenses (use of own 
name, use as indication of kind, quality, quantity, destination, geographic origin, value 
                                                 
461
 See Rob Sumroy and Carina Badger, ―Infringing Use in the Course of Trade‖: Trade Mark Use and 
the Essential Function of a Trade Mark‖, in Trade Mark Use, Illanah Simon and Jeremy Philips eds., 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 366, at 163.   
462
 As we have seen, the words ―trade mark use‖ are mentioned in different articles of the Directive 
(albeit without a specific definition in any of them), e.g. with regard to acquired distinctiveness 
(whereby the definition of trade mark use was given by the ECJ in Nestle examined previously, namely 
use for the purpose of identification by the  relevant class of persons of the product or service as 
originating from a certain undertaking), scope of rights conferred by the trade mark and grounds for 
revocation. The meaning of trade mark use should be examined in each case separately (see, for 
example, Bojan Pertnar ―Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark Law, in J. Philips and I. Simon eds., Op. Cit. 
Supra, n. 366, at 11, at 18, Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 47. It has been also submitted though  
that the meaning of these terms is in all instances (apart from use by a third party as a reference) the 
same, i.e. use to indicate origin  (see J. Philips and I. Simon ―Conclusion: What use is use?‖ in ―Trade 
Mark Use‖ Op. Cit. Supra n. 366, at 344). 
463
 See, for example, the Arsenal rulings issued by UK courts; also Po YenYap Op. Cit. Supra, n. 421, 
at 351. 
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etc) must be in accordance with bona mores and must not be use as a trade mark. 
Trade mark use appears therefore, in Greek trade mark law, as a limitation of 
defenses. In the European case law that we have examined above, trade mark use was 
considered independently, as a defense per se, even though the facts of the cases did 
concern uses that allegedly did not constitute, by way of exception, trade mark 
infringement (e.g. use on toy cars, football club merchandise, as trade name or 
geographic origin)
465
. It appears that the notion of trade mark use is considered in the 
European context as applicable in a broader scale, not only on defenses, but on any 
allegedly non infringing use.   
 
In Greek legal doctrine trade mark use is considered to be the use in a way that the 
average non experienced consumer perceives it as being use to distinguish the goods 
or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, namely use to 
indicate trade origin
466
. Such use is not allowed – even in the context of a defense- if 
objectively there is risk of confusion
467
. Trade mark use should, therefore, 
systematically be examined only when a defense is put forward by the third party, 
namely after the test of confusion. Certain Greek courts, however, apply the trade 
mark use test before the test of confusion, accepting, for example, that the use of an 
indication of geographic origin (such as the word ―Budweiser‖) is allowed in a third 
party‘s sign, if it is combined with other principal distinctive elements, which would 
preclude the risk of confusion
468
. Marinos observes that even though trade mark use 
logically precedes the test of confusion, practically it is interconnected with it
469
.  
 
Clearly non trade mark use, is the use in encyclopaedias, statistical research, 
reportage, medical prescriptions, satirical newspapers etc.
470
 A non trade mark use 
                                                                                                                                            
464
  Even though dilution has never been mentioned in such cases by Greek courts. 
465
 In case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v. Putsch GmbH, XrID [2004], 260, the 
question referred to the ECJ by the national court was exactly that, namely  whether art. 6(1)(b) of the 
Directive is also applicable when a third party uses the indications referred to therein as a trade mark 
(par. 11). The Court basically replied that trade mark use is, as inferred from the wording of the 
Directive, in this context irrelevant (par. 24).  
466
  Antonopoulos, Industrial Property, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at  473, EfIoan (Ioannina Court of Appeal) 
101/92, EEmpD 44, 139. 
467
  Ibid, Psaras ―The limits of trade mark protection‖, DEE [1996], 235, Rokas, ―Trade Mark Law‖, 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at, 105. 
468
  See Areios Pagos 330/2007, EEmpD [2007], 425 at 426,  Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 164. 
469
  In Rokas  ed., Trade Mark Law, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 229. 
470
  Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, 474, citing Marinos, XrIdD [2004], 451. 
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may constitute however in Greek legal framework an unfair act falling within the 
ambit of Unfair Competition Law.  
 
The ECJ also seemed to confuse the systematic position of the trade mark use test and 
did not clearly distinguish it from the test on confusion
471
 - or dilution, as appears 
from Adam Opel
472
. The examination of trade mark use after establishing confusion 
or dilution would have as a result that a presupposed confusion can be rebutted
473
. 
 
One practical implication related to the above methodological approach, where 
infringement and trade mark use conditions are not clearly distinguished, can be 
encountered in cases of absolute protection, i.e. when there is identity of goods and 
identity of marks, whereby the risk of confusion is not examined, nor is the detriment 
to distinctive character. If, for example, one followed the approach that trade mark use 
is use that may cause confusion, then to apply the requirement of confusion in cases 
of absolute protection, in the context of  trade mark use test, would be contrary to the 
Directive, which does not require risk of confusion in these cases. If on the other 
hand, one was to make a distinction between risk of confusion and trade mark use, 
one should be able to invoke such a defence (that the use in question is not trade mark 
use) even in the cases of absolute protection. Furthermore, if confusion was to be 
considered as a requirement for trade mark use, such a defence could not be invoked 
in cases of infringement related to taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character 
of the trade mark.  
 
However, to adopt defences which depend on the type of infringement in question 
would not be methodologically correct and would pose difficulties in the coherent 
application of the law.  
 
B.d. Defences according to the Directive 
 
                                                 
471
 As already mentioned this is the case with Greek case law as well, whereby trade mark use is often 
in case law ―absorbed‖ by the risk of confusion, see Marinos Trade Mark Law, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, 
at 162. 
472
 Op. Cit. Supra n. 436, par. 30. See also M. Leistner, Op. Cit. Supra n. 325, at 85. 
473
 See Charles Gielen and Anne Marie Vershuur ―Adidas v Marca II: Undue Limitations of Trade 
Mark Owner‘s Rights by the European Court of Justice?‖ [2008], E.I.P.R. 254. 
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The other defences mentioned in Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive provide for certain 
exceptions whereby an infringing use is nonetheless permitted. As the Court stated
474
 
by thus limiting the effects of the exclusive rights of the trade mark owner, Article 6 
of the Directive seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade mark protection 
with those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide services in the common 
market in such a way that trade mark rights are able to fulfil their essential function in 
the system of undistorted competition. The result is that there is no infringement 
where the use is either descriptive of the user or of the product or service in question 
or in cases of a prior territorial right
475
.  
 
According to the ECJ, the requirement of availability, raised within the context of 
registrability as we have already seen, cannot be taken into account in the assessment 
of the scope of exclusive rights of the proprietor of a trade mark  and protection 
thereof, except in so far as the limitation of the effects of the trade mark defined in 
article 6(1)(b) of the Directive, referring to indications concerning the kind, quality, 
quantity, intended purpose, value, geographic origin, the time of production or other 
characteristics of the goods or services, applies
476
. The Court followed Advocate 
General‘s point in that the above provision gives expression to the requirement of 
availability
477
.  
 
The principle of availability within the context of limitation of protection of the trade 
mark as far as descriptive terms are concerned has been confirmed by Greek case law 
also, mentioning that the reason for this limitation is the need of certain indications to 
be freely used by competitors
478
. 
                                                 
474
  See Case C-228/03 Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland [2005] ECR I-2337, par. 29 and 
the case law cited, C-102/07 Adidas AG, Adidas Benelux BV v. Marca Mode CV, C&A Nederland CV, 
H&M Hennes & Mauritz Netherlands BV, Vendex KBB Nederland BV, Judgement of 10 April 2008, 
par. 45.  
475
  See A. Roughton, ―Permitted infringing use: the Scope of Defences to an Infringement Action‖, in 
J. Philips and I. Simon eds., Trade Mark Use, Op. Cit. Supra, p. 181. 
476
  Case C-102/07, Op. Cit. Supra n. 474, par. 49. 
477
  Ibid par. 46. See also Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz Jarabo Colomer of 16.1.2008, par. 80 and  
85. 
478
 Areios Pagos 330/2007 EEmpD [2007], 425. 
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In Dior
479
 the Court held that the reseller of goods must not act unfairly in relation to 
the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner, but must endeavour to prevent his 
advertising from affecting the value of the trade mark for further commercialisation of 
goods put on the market by him or with his consent and that the proprietor of a mark 
may not oppose the use of the trade mark, in a way customary in the reseller‘s sector 
of trade, for the purpose of bringing to the public‘s attention the further 
commercialisation of the trade-marked goods, unless it is established that such use 
seriously damages the reputation of the trade mark
480
. 
 
In Anheuser Busch
481
 it was found that the company name (trade name) of the 
defendant can be a name in the sense of art. 6(1)(a) of the Directive, stating that a 
person can use in trade its own name, regardless of any third party trade mark rights. 
In Greece, Trade Mark law expressly includes trade names in the article implementing 
art. 6(1)(a) of the Directive
482
. 
 
The ECJ held that the condition stated in Article 6(1) of the Directive that use be ‗in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters‘ is, in essence, 
an expression of the duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the 
trade-mark proprietor
483
. The criteria for estimating honest practices as per the ECJ 
are a) the extent to which the use of the third party‘s sign  is understood by the 
relevant public, or at least a significant section of that public, as indicating a link 
between the third party‘s goods or services and the trade-mark proprietor or a person 
authorised to use the trade mark,  b) the extent to which the third party ought to have 
been aware of that and c) whether the trade mark concerned enjoys a certain 
reputation in the Member State in which it is registered and its protection is sought, 
from which the third party might profit in marketing his goods or services
484
.  The 
third criterion is interesting to the extent it raises the issue of reputation in relation to 
                                                 
479
 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora [1997] ECR I-6013. 
480
 Ibid, at par. 45 and 48. 
481
 Anheuser Busch, Op. Cit. Supra n. 417, par. 77 seq. See also M. Leistner, Op. Cit. Supra n. 325, at 
87 stating that in Germany comparable provisions related to the defence of use of own name have been 
interpreted to mean that they only cover natural persons‘ names and not trade names of legal entities. 
482
  Art. 20 par. 1 of Greek Trade Mark Law.  
483
  Anheuser Busch, Op. Cit. Supra n. 417, par. 82.  
484
  Celine, Op. Cit. Supra n. 440, par. 34, Anheuser Busch Op. Cit. Supra, n. 417,  par. 83. 
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the member state where the mark is registered and protection is sought and not in any 
member state, thereby stating a specific reputation criterion to be applied within the 
context of  Art. 6(1) of the Directive. 
 
According to the ECJ, where there is an infringing use of a sign by a third party, 
Article 6(1)(a) of the Directive can operate as a bar to such use being prevented only 
if the use by the third party is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters
485
.  
 
In that regard, use of the trade mark will not comply with honest practices if it is done 
in such a manner that it may give the impression that there is a commercial connection 
between the third party and the trade mark owner
486
. Also such use may not affect the 
value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or 
repute
487
. 
 
In any case lawfulness of the use depends on whether that use is necessary to indicate 
the intended purpose of the product or any other information provided for in art. 6(1). 
That use must in practice be the only means of providing such information
488
. 
 
In Gerolsteiner Brunner
489
 the ECJ stated, within the context of article 6 of the 
Directive, that the sole criterion of application thereof is use in accordance with 
honest practices in business and trade. The issue of trade mark use or confusion is, 
therefore, not to be examined. This approach is, as we have seen above, different to 
the Greek regime, where the defences of article 6 of the Directive are subject not only 
to honest commercial practices but also to use as a trade mark. The provision of Art. 
20(1) 2
nd
 ind. of Greek Trade Mark Law 2239/1994, which is a remainder of the old 
                                                 
485
  Celine, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 440, par. 36. 
486
  See BMW Op. Cit. Supra n. 404, par. 51, Gillette Op. Cit. Supra n. 474, par. 42.  
487
  Ibid, par. 52 and 43 respectively. 
488
  See Gillette Op. Cit. Supra n. 474, par. 39, BMW Op. Cit. Supra  n. 404,  par. 60.  See also Leistner, 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 325,  at 89. 
489
  Case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v. Putsch GmbH, XrID [2004], 260, par.24, 
with comments by Marinos. 
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trade mark law, could therefore be found to be contrary to European law, namely art. 
6 of the Directive, as interpreted by the ECJ. So far, however, the Greek courts have 
not found for such a contradiction. 
 
With regard to art. 6(1) (c) the Court has stated that in order to assess compatibility 
with honest practice in this context, the following must be taken into account
490
: the 
use of the trade mark to inform about the intended purpose of a product or service is 
illegitimate if it does imply a commercial connection between the trade owner and a 
third party, if it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its 
distinctive character or reputation, if it entails the discrediting or denigration of the 
trade mark or where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of 
the product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner
491
.  
 
It follows from the above that while ECJ case law on ―use‖ of Article 5(1) of the 
Directive focuses on the origin function, case law on Article 6(1) focuses more on the 
advertising function of the marks.  
 
In Greece, apart from the defences mentioned in art. 20 (implementing art. 6 of the 
Directive), which explicitly include both natural persons‘ names and company names, 
law 2239/1994 contains an article (namely art. 5) which is a remainder from the old 
trade mark law before the entry into force of the Directive and is not provided for in 
the Directive. This article falls within the group of application provisions and states 
that when the trade mark consists of the name of the applicant and that name has 
already been registered as a trade mark for identical or similar goods a distinctive 
element must be added that would clearly distinguish the former from the latter.  
 
Namely this article attempts to balance the interests of the junior applicant who wants 
to register and use his own name and the interests of the senior trade mark owner 
                                                 
490
 See Gillette Op. Cit. Supra  n. 474, par. 49. 
491
 See also Leistner, Op. Cit. Supra n. 325, at 89 and BMW Op. Cit. Supra  n. 404. 
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which should be adequately protected. According to case law on this provision the 
junior mark is allowed to be registered only if it contains so many and such elements 
that clearly differentiate it from the senior mark, i.e. sets a stricter condition than for 
other marks
492
. It has, for example, been found that  ―Beer Karolos I. FIX‖ cannot be 
registered in view of prior trade marks containing the owner‘s surname ―Fix‖493.  
 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Where the registered marks ―Spirit Sun‖ and ―Context Cut‖ were used by the alleged 
infringer in the course of oral sales negotiations to refer to a particular cut of 
gemstone the ECJ ruled that such use did not fall within the concept of use required 
for a finding of infringement under art. 5(2) of  the Directive
494
. In Philishave
495
, the 
defendant, Remington argued that, when they incorporated a similar shaving head in 
their product, their use was functional and would not be understood as a trade mark. 
However the court did not rule on that issue. It appears also from the ECJ ruling in 
Arsenal
496
 that infringing use is only the one that affects one of the functions of trade 
mark and especially the origin function. Of course the extent within which the trade 
mark functions are defined, directly affects the characterization of a third party use as 
infringing or not. In the said ruling the ECJ stated that the exclusive right under 
Article 5(1)(a) ―was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect 
his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfill its 
functions. The exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a 
third party's use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, 
in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the 
goods.‖ 
 
                                                 
492
  Aik. Delouka and Chr. Chrysanthis, in Rokas ed. Trade Mark Law, Op. Cit. Supra 74 seq. 
493
  DEfAth 4404/2004, published in Nomos data base. 
494
  Hoelterhoff v. Freiesleben [2002], ECR I – 4187, par. 16. 
495
  Philips Electronics v. Remington [1998] RPC 283 at 312. However, in British Sugar v. Robertson 
[1996] RPC at 292-293 it was held that there was no requirement of use as a trade mark. 
496
  Arsenal Football Club Ltd. v. Matthew Reed, C - 206/2001 [2003], ETMR 227, at par. 51. Also, in 
the Court of Appeal ruling on the same case, [2003], EWCA Civ. 696  Aldous L.J. stated that ―use of 
the trade mark on goods such as scarves and hats, whether by Arsenal or others does not denote origin‖, 
at par. 69. See, M. Perraki, Op. Cit. Supra n. 400 [2003]. 
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Article 5(5) delineated further the limits imposed on the exercise of the right. A 
proprietor may not prohibit use of even an identical sign for identical goods "if that 
use cannot affect his own interests as proprietor of the mark, having regard to its 
functions‖. The signs were used in such a way "as to create the impression that there 
is a material link in the course of trade between the goods concerned and the trade 
mark proprietor". The guarantee that all goods bearing the same trade mark are 
"manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking [that] is 
responsible for their quality" would be impaired by activities such as Mr. Reed's. This 
type of use was "liable to jeopardise the guarantee of origin which constitutes the 
essential function of the mark" and constitutes a use which the trade mark proprietor 
should be entitled to prevent. 
 
In his Opinion in Adidas v. Fitnessworld
497
 Advocate General Jacobs argued that ―… 
[I]f the relevant section of the public perceives a given sign as doing no more than 
embellishing goods, and in no way as identifying their origin, that sign cannot be 
regarded as used for the purposes of distinguishing those goods‖. 
 
It is submitted that since according to the ECJ case law the advertising function is 
recognised
498, “trade mark use” should be use that affects or is likely to affect any of 
the three functions, either the origin, or the guarantee or the advertising function. In 
this way the legal framework would be consistent with the  ECJ case law and would 
render trade mark owners more effectively protected.  
 
The ECJ had the opportunity to clarify this, by giving concrete answers to the 
questions asked by the referring courts, however it opted to be ambiguous and  
perplex rather than clarify the Directive
499
. The Court has not given a clear answer as 
                                                 
497
  Adidas Salomon and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., Op. Cit. Supra n. 432,  
par.62.    
498
  See infra Part I. B. d. 
499
 A consequence of lack of clarity of ECJ rulings is the recurrence of questions by national courts on 
the same issues, see Trimmer, Op. Cit. Supra n. 419, [2007], at 90. Another example is the question 
referred by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in O2 v. Hutchinson [2006] RPC 29. The 
referring court asked the ECJ by virtue of a decision of 14.12.2006 whether infringement can be found 
even if the use made of a sign does not affect the origin function of the trade mark (namely whether 
detriment to the advertising function only is considered as infringement). Judging from the Advocate 
General Mengozzi‘s Opinion delivered on 31.1.2008, no clear answer was expected to be given in this 
case either. Since the case regarded misleading advertising the AG found that this case is not subject to 
the application of art. 5(1)(a) and (b), see par. 40 of the opinion. As we have seen above, despite the 
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to whether trade mark use is a prerequisite of infringement (asked by the referring 
court in Arsenal
500
).  
 
The obscurity and contradiction of the Court could be attributable to the fact that it 
aims to balance different tendencies of national trade mark laws (as formed prior to 
the entry into force of the Directive) existing in the Member States. Furthermore it 
seems that the Court has not yet decided what extent it wishes to give to the protection 
of trade mark owners. As we have seen, national case law has at times accepted that 
the mere use (any use)  of another‘s registered trade mark would constitute 
infringement
501
. However if the ECJ were to follow that, it would of course be 
consistent with the wording of the Directive
502
, but it would nullify the recognised by 
the ECJ need of competitors to be free to use certain marks
503
. 
 
Therefore it is submitted that trade mark use should be use that does indeed have an 
impact on one of the trade mark functions and not just any use, as in this way legal 
certainty would be undermined at a European level where already many different 
national approaches and traditions exist.  
 
It is interesting to note that the wide approach of use constituting infringement is to an 
extent followed by US case law, according to which protection is afforded on the 
mere basis that third parties would not be allowed to ―reap where they have not 
sawn‖504. Whereas conventional trade mark uses serve an identification function, 
promotional  or ornamental
505
 trademark uses respectively serve expressive and 
                                                                                                                                            
previous case law by which the origin function needed to be ―in particular‖ affected, the Court in O2 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 125, found that infringement can be found only of the origin function is affected (par. 
69).  
500
  It is characteristic that the referring court in the subsequent Adam Opel case considered it a fact that 
trade mark use is a prerequisite for infringement (in light of BMW, see par. 11 of the ECJ ruling in 
Adam Opel). The referring court‘s question was ―Does the use of a trade mark […] constitute use as a 
trade mark for the purposes of Art. 5(1)(a) […]?‖ Emphasis added. Whereas Aldous J in the English 
Court of Appeal considered as we have examined above  that such use is not necessary. 
501
 See n. 267 above. 
502
 See infra Part III. B. a.  
503
 See, infra Part II A.d. Furthermore, J. Davies stated that ―[…] the ECJ‘ s judgement in Arsenal 
succeeds only in illustrating the extent to which the protection of public interest is in danger of being 
marginalised within European trade mark law‖ in ―To Protect or Serve? European Trade Mark Law and 
the Decline of the Public Interest‖, [2003] EIPR 180.  
504
  See  Warner Bros Inc. v. Gat Toys Inc. 658F. 2d 76, 80 (2BD Circuit, 1981). 
505
 Promotional goods are those goods that consumer purchase to express allegiance to the owners of 
the trade marks that adorn the goods.  Ornamental goods are products that bear trademarks as designs, 
rather than as identifiers and consumers purchase them because the trade symbols are aesthetically 
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aesthetic functions. Should trade mark law recognise a monopoly in the ornamental 
and merchandising value of trade marks? It has been accepted that it is enough to 
prove that a third party aimed at exploiting the repute and commercial value of a trade 
mark, without examining the reasons why the consumer would buy the product (origin 
function). In several cases courts have supported protection against unauthorised 
promotional uses, leaving trademark owners with an exclusive right to market their 
goods
506
.  
 
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass‘n v. Dallas & Emblem Manufacturers Inc.507, the 
court held that the risk of confusion emanated from the fact that the third party copied 
the registered trade mark and sold his products bearing that mark, knowing that the 
public would identify these products with those of the trade mark owner. The fact that 
there was a sign indicating that the goods were not original was not enough to justify 
the use; the most important criterion was that the registered trade mark constituted the 
mechanism for the sale of the third party‘s products. The court also held it was 
important that the trade mark owner was responsible for the establishment of the mark 
in the market place and that the third party used the mark in order to sell the products 
to the consumers who would recognize in them the registered trade mark. The phrase 
that is repeatedly mentioned in this kind of cases is ―Only a prohibition of the 
unauthorized use will sufficiently remedy the wrong‖508.  
 
 
One wonders whether the notion of ―trade mark use‖ has any place in a legal 
framework introducing provisions on dilution. The answer should be yes, to the extent 
                                                                                                                                            
pleasing or fashionable not because they represent quality products.  See Veronica Cherniak, 
―Ornamental Use of Trademarks: The Judicial Development and Economic Implications of an 
Exclusive Merchandising Right‖, 69 Tulane Law Review 1311-1356, at 1313. It is interesting that the 
author states that courts apply an analysis to ornamental use cases which is similar to that employed in 
other infringement cases and they ―manipulate‖ key definitions such as ―likelihood of confusion‖ to 
produce outcomes consistent with their view on extended trade mark protection. This is apparently the 
method that the ECJ followed in the Arsenal case.  
506
  See, among others, National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc. 532 
F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982), National Football League Properties Inc. v. Consumer Enters. 327 
N.E. 2d 242 (III App. Ct. 1975), Indianapolis Clots. Inc, National Football League Properties Inc., and 
National Football League v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club LLP, James L. Sperow and 
Canadian Football League Court of Appeal   34 Fd 410, 94-278 (7
th
 Circuit 1994) and opposite 
Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F2d 1079, 1084-85 (5
th
 
Circuit 1982), see also Veronica Cherniak, Ibid. 
507
  510F2d 1004 (5
th
 Circuit), 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
508
  Ibid. 
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trade mark use is considered use for distinguishing goods or services and not for 
describing, explaining, informing or denoting any attributes of the mark or the goods/ 
services. 
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PART IV.   TRADITIONAL PROTECTION: CONFUSION 
 
In this part certain aspects of the legal framework of trade mark protection will be 
examined. In particular, the focus will be on the definition of ―confusion‖. Emanating 
from this term, we will analyse the issue of trade mark infringement within the 
context of the theoretical debate on trade mark functions. As it has previously been 
pointed out, the functions dictate the limits of legal protection.  
 
The national legislation frameworks of two European countries that have 
implemented the provisions of the Directive will be examined, namely one civil law 
(Greece)
509
 and one common law country (UK)
510
. Particular attention shall be given 
to the discrepancies of national trade mark laws after the harmonising effect of the 
Directive. The previous regimes of protection shall also be examined briefly in order 
to evaluate  the effectiveness and modernisation  introduced by the Directive. Also the 
interpretative guidelines given by the ECJ case law  shall be submitted. 
 
In order to confirm trade mark infringement, as per the European case law, which has 
been accepted also by the Greek case law, the following general conditions must be 
met: i) use of the identical or similar mark without the trade mark owner‘s consent, ii) 
use in the course of trade, i.e. in the framework of business activity in order to gain 
profit, iii) use in relation to ―goods or services‖, namely use on the products of the 
third party or use so that a connection is established between the mark and the goods 
in question (art. 18 par. 3 and 4 par. 1 of Greek Trade Mark Act/ art. 5 par. 1 of the 
Directive) and iv) use of the mark as trade mark, namely with the view of 
distinguishing the goods or services as emanating from a certain company (See C-
62/08 Smirnoff Ice par. 42, 44, 47, 49, C-17/06, Celine, par. 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 27, C-
                                                 
509
  In Greece, the first statute on trade marks was adopted in 1839. It was replaced by Act 1998/1939. 
Compliance with the provisions of the Directive was through promulgation in September 1994 of Act 
2239 on Trade Marks, which was entered into force on 31 October 1994.   
510
  In the UK  the text of the Directive was implemented by the Trade Marks Act 1994, entered into 
force on  31 October 1994; Trade Marks Act 1994 (Commencement ) Order 1994. It replaced the pre-
existing Trade Marks Act 1938. 
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48/05, Adam Opel par. 18-25, C-245/02 Anheuser Busch, par. 60, 64, C-206/01, par. 
40, 41, 51-54, C-2/00 Hoelterhoff, par. 17, C-63/97, BMW, par. 38)
511
. 
 
Following confirmation of the above mentioned general conditions, the specific 
conditions must be established, namely the inclusion of the facts of the case in one the 
of the infringement provisions of the Directive as incorporated into national law e.g. 
(art. 4 par. 1 a-c, in combination with art. 18 par. 3 of the Greek trade mark law 
2239/1994)
512
. 
A.  INFRINGEMENT PROVISIONS: DEFINING ―CONFUSION‖ 
 
The registration of a trade mark offers legal protection to the trade mark owner. The 
rights conveyed to him are of a positive as well as a negative nature. The former 
dictate that the trade mark owner has the right to use his mark (for example, to affix it 
on his products, or use it in advertising)
513
. The latter mean that the trade mark owner 
has the right to prevent everyone else from using his mark in the course of trade
514
. A 
typical infringing action would be when someone used another person‘s registered 
trade mark, or some confusingly similar sign, as a trade mark to indicate the source of  
his own goods. This would cause the mark to lose its ability to distinguish the goods 
of the legitimate owner; the legitimate owner to lose out customers; and the customers 
to lose their trust in the marks they see. All this amounts to an infringement with 
regard to the origin, and consequently, the guarantee function. However, an expansion 
of protection, including the advertising function will be considered further. The 
impact of the Directive in that respect will be examined, in relation to the framework 
of protection existing within national jurisdictions. It should be noted that European 
national legislative frameworks (before the harmonising effect of the Directive) 
                                                 
511
 For an analysis of the European case law on the matters of the Directive see Maniatis Sp. & Botis 
D., “Trade marks in Europe: a practical jurisprudence”, Sweet & Maxwell, London, [2009]. From the 
Greek case law see PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, at 181, MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 392, at 170. 
512
  Ibid, at 182 and 171 respectively.  
513
  See s. 9 UK TM Act, and Art. 17 of the Greek TM Act 2239/1994. 
514
  Ibid. It should be noted that this is a clear evidence that what is protected under trade mark 
legislation is merely the origin function. Whenever there is no danger of diminution of the mark‘s 
ability to distinguish the goods and their source, trade mark protection cannot be activated. 
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presented considerable differences with regard to the extent of the protection 
attributed to trade marks
515
. The Directive sought to bring some consistency.  
 
The focus of the present analysis will be solely upon two European jurisdictions: 
those of UK and Greece. These national legislations, as well as case law, will be 
examined respectively. Considerable mention will be held to the issue of Confusion 
and its prerequisite Similarity of Goods and Marks/Signs, as well as to the notion of 
Likelihood of Association
516
. Firstly, an examination of the legal framework of 
protection before the harmonising effect of the Directive will be made. This would be 
helpful for two reasons: on the one hand, it will facilitate the drawing of any 
conclusions with regard to the effect of the Directive on the issues under examination; 
on the other hand, it would be expected that the legal tradition and practice of the 
national jurisdiction will continue to influence the attributed protection. This would be 
either in the form of an interpretative tool for the new provisions, or as the grosso 
modo still applicable law. The analysis will begin with the issue of ―use in the course 
of trade‖ and will, afterwards, proceed to the notion of ―similarity‖ between marks 
and goods and ―confusion‖517. It should be noted that there is a direct correlation 
between the relative grounds of objection which a prior trade mark owner may bring 
against later applications to register and the scope of infringement. This is why case 
law regarding the relative grounds of protection shall be useful for interpreting the 
infringement provisions. 
                                                 
515
  According to Laddie J: ―Because of the very nature of the European Union legislation tends to be 
the product of compromise between different legal systems. The result is that sometimes we end up 
with legislation which includes provisions which seem to point in entirely inconcestent directions.‖ 
EIPR, [2003], 534. 
516
 Extended discussion has been raised on the issue of whether the terms used in the Directive actually 
depict the Benelux law and practice, one of the most ―advanced‖ systems of trade mark protection in 
Europe. This was more in relation to the notion of ―likelihood of association‖ (examined further) but 
also to the broadening of the notion of ―confusion‖ per se. See, for example, Gielen Ch., 
“Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe”, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44; Prescott P., “Has the Benelux 
Trade Mark Law Been Written Into the Directive?” 3 [1997] EIPR 99. The issue will be examined 
further below. 
517
 The issue of infringement by applying for or using a domain name shall not be examined in the 
present thesis. 
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A. a. The Respective Legal Frameworks  
A.a.i. The Directive 
The rights conferred on the trade mark owner determine the scope of trade mark 
infringement. Infringement in this sense is every action that appears to be the exercise 
of rights of a trade mark owner from a person who is not the trade mark owner. The 
relative Directive provision which cites the rights conferred to the trade mark owner is 
Art. 5 (1) stating that the registered trade mark confers its owner an absolute right. In 
exercising this right the trade mark owner may forbid a third party from using an 
identical sign for identical goods or services and a similar sign for similar goods or 
services provided there is risk of confusion of the public including the risk of 
association. The trade mark owner has the right, as per Art. 5(3) of the Directive, not 
to allow, in accordance with the prerequisites mentioned above, any third party, in 
particular, to: a) affix the mark on the products or their packaging, b) offer the goods 
for sale or trade or possess them for sale or offer the services under the mark c) import 
or export goods under the mark, d) use the mark on business written material and in 
advertising.  
 
Apart from the actual activity of the third party, another factor that is taken into 
account in order to establish infringement is the harm that is being impaired on the 
trade mark
518
. Art. 5(2) of the Directive permits Member States to provide for 
protection where a mark has a reputation within a Member State against use by third 
parties that takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character or 
the repute of the mark. Furthermore Art. 5(5) of the Directive allows Member States 
to provide for the protection of the trade mark owner against the use by third parties 
for purposes other than distinguishing the goods or services when such use being 
without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive 
character or the repute of the mark. As we shall see further below, both jurisdictions 
under examination have made use of the Directive‘ s permission and have provided 
for protection of the trade mark owner in the cases mentioned in this paragraph. 
 
                                                 
518
 See, W. R. Cornish and D. Llewellyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 737.  
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A.a.ii. The Greek TM Law 
The relevant provisions implementing Art. 5 of the Directive in Greece, is Art. 18 of 
the Greek TM Law 2239/1994, read in conjunction with Art. 4. According to Art. 18 
(1) ind. 1 of the Greek TM Law, the trade mark owner has an exclusive right on the 
trade mark. This in particular means, as per Art. 18 (1) ind. 2, that the trade mark 
confers its owner the right mainly to use the mark, affix it on the goods he produces, 
distinguish the respective services, place it on the wrappings and the packaging of the 
products, on his correspondence papers, on his price lists, announcements, any kind of 
advertisement as well as any other written material and use it on electronic or other 
means. According to par. 3 of Art. 18 of the Greek TM Law, the owner may forbid 
any third party to use in the course of trade signs which constitute a distortion 
(«παπαποίηζη») or imitation («απομίμηζη») of the trade mark in accordance with Art. 
4(1) of the Law. The notions of distortion and imitation, alien to the Directive, existed 
in the Greek TM Law which was in force before the entry into force of the Directive 
(L. 1998/1939) and have remained in the new TM Law
519
. Even though no mention is 
made in the law (either Law 1998/1939 or Law 2239/1994) as to the exact meaning of 
these two terms, case law has consistently defined their meaning, as shall be examined 
further below. Art. 18 (3) of the Greek TM Law makes reference to Art. 4(1) which 
states the relative grounds of refusal of a trade mark registration, as these are laid out 
in the Directive. The cases of registration refusal based on relative grounds as we have 
seen earlier are the same as the cases that constitute infringement. The Greek 
legislature chose not to repeat the provisions in the Article on infringement but merely 
indicate them by reference to the respective registration Article
520
.  
 
A.a.iii. The UK TM Act 
The relevant provisions of the UK TM Act are sections 10(1) and 10(2), 
implementing the requirements of the Directive as these were set out in Art. 5. The 
UK TM Act section 10(4) states a non exclusive list of the actions that amount to 
using a sign including affixing it to goods or their packaging, trading in goods (i.e. 
offering or exposing for sale, putting on the market or stocking them for these 
purposes) or supplying services under it, importing or exporting goods under it, using 
                                                 
519
  This issue will be examined further below. 
520
 Even though in the Directive there are analytical provisions for registration (Art. 4) and 
infringement (Art. 5) the latter actually repeating the former, obviously for reasons of clarity.  
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it on business papers (covering letters, invoices, orders
521
) or in advertising. The UK 
TM Act includes a use ―otherwise than by means of a graphic representation‖ and so 
in principle could include infringement of a trade mark through sound and smell. This 
kind of use is not included in the Directive (or the Regulation) but is a necessary 
counterpart of the registrability of such signs and their need of protection against 
illegal use by third parties
522
.  
 
A.b. Infringement Categories 
The cases of infringement as provided for in the above legal frameworks could be 
categorised in three groups. The first one includes cases where protection is absolute, 
namely afforded without examining whether there is likelihood of confusion of the 
public. The second group encompasses cases where protection is afforded only when 
risk of confusion is proved. The third category encompasses cases where these is no 
need to prove risk of confusion however other prerequisites must be fulfilled. These 
cases shall be examined analytically below. 
 
a. The first case of infringement regards use in the course of trade of a sign identical 
to the trade mark for identical goods or services to those covered by the trade mark 
specification (Art. 5 (1) of the Directive). 
 
The Directive states in the Preamble (Rec.10) that the protection conferred to the trade 
mark owner is absolute in the case of identity between the mark and the sign and the 
goods or services. This means that in such a case there exists an irrebbutable 
presumption of consumer confusion.
523
 
 
Even though this looks like a straightforward case in most occasions there may be 
problems arising from the assessment of the ―identical‖ marks and goods524. It should 
                                                 
521
  See W. R. Cornish and D. Llewellyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 739.  
522
  Ibid.  
523
  A different approach to that would entail the possibility that no confusion is likely to arise in case 
of identity of products and marks (this view is supported by Noteboom, ―Trade Mark Protection in the 
European Community for Product and Services in the Field of Information and Telecommunication 
Technologies‖, in Law of Information Technology in Europe, Deventer-Boston, 173, [1991]). This 
view, however, could not be supported on the basis of the Directive.  
524
  In British Sugar v. Robertson [1996] RPC 3281 at 293-294 Jacob J. refused to find a spread to be a 
―desert sauce or syrup‖ because it was occasionally use as such. See also Avnet v. Isoact [1998], FSR 
16., involving the mark ―Avnet‖ and the domain name ―avnet.co.uk‖, where the court found that the 
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be accepted that in applying the de minimis principle only the very minor differences 
should be disregarded (for example ―Thinkpad‖ and ―Think Pad‖ but not ―Origin‖ and 
―Origins‖525). Since in this case there is no need to prove likelihood of confusion, the 
identity of the marks and the goods or services in question must be absolute
526
. This 
has been affirmed by the ECJ that ruled that a sign is identical with the trade mark 
where it reproduces, without any modification or addition, all the elements 
constituting the trade mark or where, viewed as a whole, it contains differences so 
insignificant that they may go unnoticed by an average consumer
527
. 
 
b. the second type of infringement regards cases where there is only similarity and not 
identity between the goods or services and / or the sign and the trade mark, and the 
plaintiff must prove that a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public exists, 
including the likelihood of association (Article 5(1) of the Directive and s. 10(2) of 
the UK TM Act and Art 4(1)(b) in conjunction with 18 (3) of the Greek TM Law 
2239/1994). 
 
According to the Preamble of the Directive (10
th
 Recital), the similarity between 
goods or services, the similarity between the trade mark and the sign, the recognition 
of the mark on the market, and, lastly, the association with the sign  are all factors that 
should be taken into account by the judge before assessing likelihood of confusion. In 
addition, the judgement on the similarity of goods and marks is always to be made ad 
hoc, based on the facts of each case.  
 
However, likelihood of confusion should be established in the case where a similar 
sign is used in relation to similar goods. Likelihood of confusion is the test which is in 
this context applied by courts, in order to identify whether there is an infringement of 
the mark. The conjecture as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion comes 
                                                                                                                                            
latter mark did not infringe the former. See also Reed Executive v. Reed Business Information, [2003], 
RPC, 207, par. 111.  
525
 [1998] ETMR 642, BoA OHIM, [1995] FSR 280. This was confirmed by the Court on the basis of 
the fact that the consumer does not usually do a direct comparison of all the characteristics of the 
elements compared, so insignificant differences between the sign and the trade mark may go unnoticed 
by an average consumer, see  LTJ Diffusion v. Sadas LTJ Diffusion v. Sadas ECR [2003], I-02799, par. 
LIII. 
526
 ―[O]nly a strict interpretation appears to be consistent with the scheme, history and context of Art. 
4(1) (a) TM Directive on registrability and 5(1) on infringement […]‖ per A-G Jacobs in LTJ Diffusion 
v. Sadas [2003] FSR 1, at. Par. A 32, and the ECJ judgement of 20.3.2003. 
527
 LTJ Diffusion v. Sadas LTJ Diffusion v. Sadas, Οp., Cit. Supra n. 525. 
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mainly from a combination of two factors: a) a comparison of the marks with regard 
to visual, aural and conceptual similarity and b) a comparison of the goods or services 
in connection to which the marks are used. To assess the above, certain factors are 
taken into account which will be examined further within each separate national legal 
framework.  
 
The Court held that the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be 
appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relating to the circumstances of 
the case
528
. A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some 
interdependence between the relevant factors, namely the similarity between the 
marks and the goods or services. Therefore, a lesser degree of similarity between 
these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the 
marks and vice versa
529
 and a conflicting sign may be found to infringe, ―despite a 
lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services covered, where the marks are 
very similar and the earlier mark, in particular its reputation, is highly distinctive‖530. 
Equally, when the degree of similarity between the goods is bigger then likelihood of 
confusion may arise notwithstanding a lesser degree of similarity of the marks
531
. 
 
The Court held that it is important to analyse the visual, aural and conceptual 
similarity taking into account the overall impression but bearing in mind in particular 
the distinctive and dominant parts of the marks
532
. It is possible that the mere aural 
similarity between a mark and a sign used for identical or similar products may be 
sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion
533
. Also mere conceptual similarity 
―may give rise to a likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a particularly 
distinctive character, either per se or because of the reputation it enjoys with the 
public"‘534. 
 
                                                 
528
  Ibid, par. 16 and Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, case C – 251/95, ECR, [1997], 
06191 at par. 22. 
529
  Ibid, par. 17, citing also the Preamble of the Directive.  
530
  Ibid, par. 19. 
531
  Lloyd Shuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Kiljsen Handel BV, case C- 342/97, ECR [1999], 03819 at 
par 21.  
532
  See Lloyd Schuhfabrik, Ibid, par. 25. 
533
  Ibid, par. 28. 
534
  Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, case C – 251/95, ECR, [1997], I - 06191 at par. 24. 
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According to the Court‘ s case law the more distinctive the earlier mark the greater the 
risk of confusion
535
. Since protection of a trade mark depends, in accordance with Art. 
4(1)(b) of the Directive on there being a likelihood of confusion, marks with a highly 
distinctive character, either per se or because of the reputation they possess on the 
market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character
536
. In 
determining the distinctive character it is necessary, in view of the origin function of 
the trade marks to ―[…] make a global assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of 
the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming 
from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other 
undertakings
537‖.  
 
In assessing the distinctive character of a mark the following should be taken into 
account: whether it contains a descriptive element of the goods or services for which 
it has been registered or not; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-
standing use of the mark has been made in the past; the amount invested in promoting 
the mark; the proportion of the relevant persons who, because of the mark, identify 
goods as originating from a particular undertaking (that is market researches as to the 
likelihood of confusion); and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or 
other trade and professional associations regarding likelihood of confusion
538
. 
 
The Court did not lay down rules regarding the degree of similarity needed between 
one syllable word marks or the effect of any given level of public recognition of the 
earlier mark. The Court stated it was for the office or national court to consider 
whether there is a substantiated likelihood of confusion on the part of the average 
consumer
539
.  
 
                                                 
535
  Ibid, par. 24.  
536
  Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 18. 
537
  Lloyd Schuhfabrik , Op. Cit. Supra n. 531, at par. 28. 
538
  Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions und Vertriebs GmbH v. Boot und Segelzubehor Walter Huber 
and Franz Attenberger, joined  cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Op. Cit. Supra n. 138,  par. 51, General 
Motors Corporation v. Yplon SA, case C-375/97, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122, par. 27, Lloyd Shuhfabrik 
Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Kiljsen Handel BV, case C- 342/97, Op. Cit. Supra n. 531, par 23. The same 
criteria apply in order to establish the degree pf knowledge required for the application of art. 5(2) of 
the Directive, as will be examined further below. 
539
  Lloyd Shuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Kiljsen Handel BV, ibid,  par. 11, Gut Spingenheide I ecr 
[1998], 4657 and Windsurfing Chiemsee v. Huber, Op. Cit. Supra n. 138.   
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The average consumer is one who is ―reasonably well informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect‖540. However, the Court noted that it is not very often that 
someone makes a direct comparison, so imperfect recollection is important
541
, also 
taking into account that the average consumer‘s level of attention varies according to 
the category of goods or services
542
.  It is interesting to note that Greek case law even 
before the entry into force of the Directive remarked also that the comparison made 
by the consumer is usually based on a recollection procedure
543
. This is why 
similarities play a more important role than differences
544
. 
 
Evidence of similarity between the goods or services, remains essential. With regard 
to the similarity of goods, the Court stated that in assessing product similarity all the 
relevant factors relating to the goods or services must be taken into account, 
including, inter alia, their nature, their end users, their method of use and whether 
they are in competition with, or complement each other‖545.  
 
c. the third type of infringement concerns the case where a trade mark has a reputation 
and the use of the sign is made in relation to dissimilar goods or services, provided 
that the use of the sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the mark (Art. 5(2) of the Directive, Art. 4(1)(c) in 
conjunction with Art. 18 (3) of the Greek TM Law 2239/1994 and s. 10(3) of the UK 
TM Act). It should be noted that, as a result of Adidas  Salomon
546
 the UK TM Act 
1994 was amended to delete the dissimilar goods requirement from this type of 
infringement
547
, which will be closely examined in the following chapter. 
 
                                                 
540
  Lloyd Shuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Kiljsen Handel BV, Ibid, par 26. 
541
 ―[D]ue allowance must be made for the occasions where the person who sees the other use has only 
a general recollection of the normal and fair use of the proprietor of the trade mark […]‖ per Aldous J 
in Thomson Holidays v. Norwegian Cruise Line [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1828, at par. 60, following 
Lloyd Shuhfabrik Op.Cit. Supra and Canon [1999], RPC 117. 
542
  Lloyd Schuhfabrik Op. Cit. Supra n. 531, par. 26.  
543
  DDDS (former First Instance Court) 146/1986, EllDni 29, 795. 
544
  Ibid. See also Antonopoulos, Industrial Property, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 443. 
545
  Ibid, at par. 23. 
546
 [2004], E.T.M.R. 10, where the ECJ confirmed that Member States which have implemented the 
permission of the Directive for this kind of infringement, must give corresponding protection for 
identical and similar goods or services as for dissimilar. 
547
 By the Trade Marks (Proof of Use etc) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/946). 
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The infringed mark must have acquired reputation in the country of registration
548
. 
Such reputation need only to exist in part of the geographical area for which the 
registration is valid
549
. It should be noted that, as has been affirmed by the ECJ, this 
type of infringement arises not only where there is risk of confusion including 
association. It covers any use of another mark which can be characterised as affecting 
distinctive character or repute, not only so as to cause detriment to, but equally to take 
unfair advantage of that character or repute
550
.    
 
According to the ECJ the infringement referred to in Art. 5(2) of the Directive is the 
result of a certain degree of similarity between the mark and the sign, by virtue of 
which the relevant section of the public makes a connection between them even 
though it does not confuse them
551
. The existence of such a link must, just as with 
likelihood of confusion, be appreciated globally taking into account all factors 
relevant to the circumstances of the case
552
. It is sufficient for the degree of similarity 
between the mark with a reputation and the sign to have effect that the relevant 
section of the public establishes a link between the sign and the mark
553
. 
 
Within the context of the third category one could encompass the UK provision  
regarding the use of a mark to identify goods or services as those of the trade mark 
owner or a licensee, ―otherwise than in accordance with honest practices in industrial 
and commercial matters‖ when the use ―without due cause takes unfair advantage of, 
or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute‖ of the mark (s. 10(6) of the 
UK TM Act). It cannot be found as such in the Directive and has no parallel in the 
Regulation. The defense regarding the use of the mark without dishonesty etc to 
identify the goods of the trade mark owner or its licensee is important in view of the 
                                                 
548
 An analogous provision exists in the Regulation (Art. 8(5)) and requires that the mark has acquired 
reputation throughout the EU. 
549
 See General Motors v. Yplon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122. 
550
 See W. R. Cornish and D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at  718 and Davidoff 
& Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid Ltd., case C – 292/00, ECR [2003], I-389, par. 30. 
551
 Adidas Salomon and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., case C-408/01, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 432,  par. 28 and General Motors Corporation v. Yplon SA, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122, par. 23. 
552
 Adidas Salomon, Ibid, par. 31 and, in respect of likelihood of confusion, Sabel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
113, par. 22 and Marca Mode, Op. Cit. Supra n. 584, par. 40. 
553
  Therefore even if the public perceives a sign as an embellishment infringement is not precluded if 
the public establishes a link between the sign and the mark, see Adidas Salomon, ibid. 
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first type of infringement where no likelihood of confusion needs to be proved and is 
discussed in particular with regard to parallel import cases
554
.  
 
In all the above cases two more requirements must be met: a) that use be in the course 
of trade and b) that it be use as a trade mark. 
 
In the course of trade  
According to Art. 5 (a) ind. 2 of the Directive, the trade mark owner has the right to 
prevent any third party from using his mark without his consent in the course of trade. 
This provision has been implemented in the Greek TM Law in Art. 18(3) making the 
use in the course of trade a requirement for infringement.  
 
In Reed Executive v. Reed Business Information
555
 Pumphrey J. held that under both s. 
10(1) and 10(2) there had to be use of the sign for business purposes and so as to 
indicate the trade origin of the goods or services. On the facts of the case he found 
that use of the word ―Reed‖ in the phrase ―Reed Business Information‖ satisfied that 
requirement. 
 
The ECJ has held that use "with a view to [an] economic advantage" rather than use 
"as a private matter" constituted "use in the course of trade". 
 
Trade mark use
556
  
As we have seen, in the Directive there is no need to have ―trade mark use‖ in order 
for infringement to be established. As ―trade mark use‖ is considered the use of the 
allegedly infringing sign for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services
557
. Signs 
may be used in trade for descriptive purposes or for identification not concerned with 
origin to a number of cases. Such use is to a large extent exempted from being an 
                                                 
554
  In PAG v. Hawk – Woods, [2002], FSR 723, at par. 24, Pumfrey J commented that, if the subsection 
were construed so as to give a defence additional to those contained in s. 11 ―it could possibly be 
contented that the Directive has been incorrectly transpose into the UK law‖ and noted that if this is 
correct the sub-section should be interpreted in such a way as to provide no defences beyond those in s. 
11. 
555
  [2003], RPC 207, at par. 129. 
556
  This issue has been examined analytically in the previous chapter. 
557
 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Adidas Salomon and Adidas Benelux BV v. 
Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., Op. Cit. Supra n. 432,  par. 64. 
  
 126 
infringing one. Such provision exists in the UK TM Act (s. 11(2))
558
 and in the Greek 
TM Law (Art. 20 (1) ind. 1)
559
.  
 
A.c. Greek Jurisprudence 
It is interesting to note the interaction of competence between civil and administrative 
courts under Greek law. Trade mark law provisions regarding obtaining trade mark 
rights and protecting those rights against unauthorized use by third parties establishes 
a double competence: that of the Administrative Trademark Committee / the  
administrative courts and that of civil courts. Issues relating to granting, depriving, 
assigning or licensing of trade mark rights, fall within the exclusive competence of the 
Administrative Trademark Committee and the administrative courts. Issues relating to 
civil and penal protection fall within the exclusive competence of civil courts (see art. 
26 and 27 of Law 2239/1994). In order to grant protection to the trademark owner 
civil courts have to verify that trade mark rights have been lawfully acquired.  
 
However, issues such as the existence of likelihood of confusion, the generic 
character of a trade mark, the descriptiveness of a trade mark are issues that both civil 
and administrative courts deal with in trade mark cases. In order to avoid the issuance 
of conflicting rulings the Greek legislator provided (even under the previous Law 
namely art. 30 of Law 1998/1939) but also under the currently existing law that ―Civil 
courts do not have any competence where the Trademark Administrative Committee 
and the administrative courts are competent under the present law‖. And also that 
―Trademark Administrative Committee rulings not subject to appeal as well as 
irrevocable rulings of the administrative courts are obligatory for the civil courts and 
any other authority‖560.  
 
                                                 
558
  See Bravado Merchandising v. Mainstream Publishing [1996], FSR 208, where the use of the trade 
mark ―Wet, wet, wet‖ which was the name of a music group, in a book title, was found not to be a trade 
mark infringement.  
559
 The provision concerns the limitation of the rights of the trade mark owner it is stated that the use 
being made in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters and should not be 
trade mark use. Even though the provision is in the context of defences it is a contrario required in 
order to establish infringement.  
560
 Art. 32 of Law 2239/1994. See also MonPrAth Court 16591/1999 EEmpD 50, 816, I. Venieris, 
―Trade Mark protection before civil courts‖, DEE 2006, 585. 
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This means that civil courts do not have the power to rule not even as obiter dicta on 
issues relating to the granting, deregistering, assigning or licensing a trademark
561
. 
The civil courts cannot deny legal protection to the trademark owner on the basis that 
the trade mark for whatever reason should not have been accepted for registration. 
Civil courts are bound by the Trademark Administrative Committee irrevocable 
rulings accepting the mark as for the fulfillment of all prerequisites for its acceptance 
or the deregistration thereof
562
.  
 
It is interesting to note that according to Greek case law civil courts can prevent the 
use of a mark in cases where such use is proved to be illegal or unfair because the 
prevention of use does not eliminate the right of the trademark owner, the granting of 
which is within the exclusive competence of the Trademark Administrative 
Committee
563
. In the same context civil courts have ruled that there is a difference 
between risk of confusion at the moment of filing of a trademark application and risk 
of confusion during use of the mark
564
.   
 
By virtue of art. 32 of Law 2239/1994 it is possible for the trade mark owner to file a 
petition for interim measures against third parties at the stage following registration 
and until the legal deregistration of the mark. Art. 27 par. 3 of Law 2239/1994 
provides that the filing of a trade mark application by the third party does not prevent 
the issuance of interim measures against him. However the mere applicant of a trade 
mark does not have the right to protect the mark for which the application was filed 
since until the ruling accepting his mark becomes final the applicant does not have 
any trade mark rights.  
 
B. TYPOLOGY OF CONFUSION 
  
As we have seen in the first chapter of the present thesis, the ECJ case law has 
established that the essential function of the trade mark is to guarantee the identity of 
the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without 
                                                 
561
 See PolPrAth 2506/1995, EEmpD 46, 313, MonPrPiraeus (Piraeus First Instance Single Judge 
Court) 2106/1999 DEE 1999, 101.  
562
 Areios Pagos 1585/1991, EllDni 1993, 323, MonPrAth 8743/2003, EED 1, [2004], 273.   
563
  MonPrAth 7440/1999, EEmD 573, [2000]. 
564
  Ibid. 
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any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which 
have another origin. For the trade mark to be able to fulfill its essential role in the 
system of undistorted competition which the EC Treaty seeks to establish it must offer 
a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it, have originated under the control 
of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality
565
.  
According to the case law of the Court the risk that the public might believe that the 
goods or  services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, 
from economically linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion within 
the meaning of Art. 5(1)(b) of the Directive
566
. Accordingly the risk that the public 
believes that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or 
from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion within 
the meaning of Art. 4(1) (b) of the Directive
567
. The Court has also confirmed that 
there may be likelihood of confusion even where the public perceives that the goods 
or services have different places of production and by contrast that there can be no 
such likelihood where it does not appear that the public could believe that the goods 
or services come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from 
economically linked undertakings
568
. 
 
B.a. Types of confusion 
 
Different types of confusion exist that could be categorised as follows
569
:  
 
- direct confusion 
This is the most common type of confusion. Direct confusion is noted when there is a 
senior proprietor of a trade mark and a junior user of a confusingly similar mark. 
Consumers by mistake believe, when buying the respective good or service,  that the 
goods or services of the junior user originate from or are affiliated in some way to the 
goods or services of the senior proprietor.  
                                                 
565
  See inter alia Hag II, case C-10/89, [1990], ECR I-3711,  par. 14 and 13, Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n.  
113, par. 28. 
566
 Lloyd Shuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Kiljsen Handel BV, Op. Cit. Supra n. 531, par. 17, Sabel 
BV v. Puma, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113,  par. 16-18, Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 29. 
567
  See Sabel BV v. Puma, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113,  par. 1-18, Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113,  par. 29.  
568
  Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 30. 
569
  See Chr. Chrisanthis, ―Reflections on Likelihood of Confusion and Dilution in Trademark Law‖, 
Athens [2004], 23 and ―New forms of risk of confusion in trade mark law‖, EpsikED [2007], 359 and 
citations therein. 
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-  reverse confusion  
Reverse confusion is the opposite of direct confusion. In reverse confusion there is a 
senior user whose trade mark, although senior, has not acquired a strong distinctive 
character. There is also a junior user who uses a similar trademark, but enters the 
market so aggressively that through advertising and promotion achieves to make his 
junior mark well known. Consumers tend to believe that the junior user‘ s mark is 
prior to the senior user‘ s mark.  
 
- post sales confusion 
Confusion usually affects consumers at the point of sale and at the time of sale. 
However, confusion may affect other consumers as well at a later stage in time. Post 
sale confusion is the confusion of others than the purchaser. The purchaser may have 
or have not been confused at the time of the purchase. 
 
-  affiliation 
Sometimes two marks may not be so similar as to cause confusion; however, they 
may resemble one another in such a way that a consumer may reasonably believe that 
there is some form of affiliation between the trade mark owners.  
 
The above types of confusion shall be examined as to the extent they are considered 
as trade mark infringement by the legislative frameworks under examination. Reverse, 
post sales confusion and affiliation were first established by the US courts, in order to 
grant broader protection to the trademark owner, in cases where traditional (direct) 
confusion could not be established. We shall examine whether they are accepted by 
the Greek courts and the ECJ. However, affiliation in the USA has a broader sense 
than in most European countries. It may include ―sponsorship‖ of certain goods or 
approval, certification etc of such goods or services by a source different than the 
manufacturer
570
. 
 
B.b. ECJ (Similarity – Confusion) 
 
                                                 
570
  R. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of confusion and trademark law, Practicing Law Institute, [2001], par. 
1.4. B & D and 4.10.F. 
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According to consistent ECJ case-law, the perception of marks in the mind of the 
average consumer of the category of goods or services in question plays a decisive 
role in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion
571
. Therefore, in order to 
assess the degree of similarity between the marks concerned, it is necessary to 
determine the degree of visual, aural or conceptual similarity between them and, 
where appropriate, to evaluate the importance to be attached to those different 
elements, taking account of the category of goods or services in question and the 
circumstances in which they are marketed
572
. It is for the national court to determine 
such degree and, where appropriate, evaluate the importance to be attached to those 
different elements, taking into account the category of the goods or services and the 
circumstances in which they are marketed, the national court must determine the 
degree of visual, aural or conceptual similarity between them
573
. For the purpose of an 
overall assessment on the likelihood on confusion, the average consumer‘ s level of 
attention is taken into account and is likely to vary according to the category of goods 
or services in question
574
. 
 
A sign is identical with the trade mark where it reproduces, without any modification 
or addition, all the elements constituting the trade mark or where, viewed as a whole, 
it contains differences so insignificant that they may go unnoticed by an average 
consumer
575
. 
 
 
In case of such marks likelihood of confusion may arise from the conjunction of 
distinctiveness (part of the global appreciation) and confusion (the result of 
similarity). The reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming the 
existence of a likelihood of confusion simply because of the existence of a likelihood 
of association in the strict sense.  
 
                                                 
571
 See, inter alia, ECJ 22.6.1999, C – 342/97, Lloyd Schühfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen 
Habdel BV, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 531, C-361/04, Claude Ruiz-Picasso etc. v. OHIM and DaimlerChrysler 
AG,  par. 36. 
572
  Lloyd, Op. Cit. Supra n. 531, par. 26 
573
  Ibid, par. 27. 
574
  Ibid, par. 26 
575
  LTJ Diffusion, Op. Cit. Supra n. 525. 
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However, even where a mark is identical to another with a highly distinctive character 
it is still necessary to adduce evidence of similarity between the goods or services 
covered
576
. 
 
Where the goods or services are identical there may be a likelihood of confusion on 
the part of the public where the contested sign is composed by juxtaposing the 
company name of another party and a registered mark which has normal 
distinctiveness and which, without alone determining the overall impression conveyed 
by the composite sign, still has an independent distinctive role therein
577
.  
 
In Sabel/Puma
578
 the Court held that likelihood of confusion on the part of the public 
must be appreciated globally taking into account all factors relevant to the 
circumstances of the case. Furthermore it was stated that the overall appreciation of 
the marks is based on their distinctive and dominant components and not on the basis 
of descriptive, generic or commonly used elements that the marks may include 
because the "average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not 
proceed to analyse its various details
579
".  
 
The ECJ has accepted that ―association‖ is one form of confusion and not an 
independent concept
580
. Furthermore the ECJ stressed that it is for the trade mark 
office or national court to assess the likelihood of confusion on the basis of the global 
appreciation, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the 
case
581
. Furthermore the Court clarified that likelihood of confusion includes 
likelihood of association so that the latter is not to be understood as a separate legal 
concept
582
.  
 
                                                 
576
  Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 22. 
577
  C-120/2004,  Medion AG  v. Thomson multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH. 
578
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 22. 
579
  Ibid, Par. 23. 
580
 Ibid. The ECJ stated that the notion comes from the Regulation (Art. 81(1)(b)) and Directive (art. 
4(1)(b)) and not from the Benelux trade mark act.  
581
 Lloyd Schuhfabrik [1999] ETMR 690, examining the case of ―Lloyd‖ for shoes as opposed  to 
―Loints‖ also for shoes.  
582
 In par. 18 it is stated that "Likelihood of confusion . . ., which includes the likelihood of 
association[,]" within the scope of Article 4(1)(b) requires identity or similarity between the marks on 
the one hand and the products on the other. ―Likelihood of association‖ is not an alternative to 
―likelihood of confusion‖ but serves to define the scope of confusion. The same view was adopted by 
the ECJ in the Lloyd and Quattro. 
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Here it should be observed that the stronger the earlier mark‘ s distinctive character 
and reputation the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it
583
.  
Marks with a highly distinctive character, in particular because of their reputation, 
enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character
584
. In order to 
satisfy the requirement relating to reputation, a trademark must be known to a 
significant part of the public dealing with the goods or services in question. For the 
purposes of Article 5(2) the public amongst which the earlier mark must have 
acquired a reputation is the public concerned by the products or services covered by 
the trade mark
585
. 
 
In examining whether this condition is fulfilled, the national court must take into 
consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by 
the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size 
of investment made in promoting the mark
586
. The trade mark has a particularly 
distinctive character either per se or because of the reputation it enjoys in the 
public
587
. A sign which so closely corresponds to the mark as to give rise to the 
possibility being associated with that mark infringes the mark
588
.  
 
Territorially, the condition is fulfilled when the trade mark has a reputation in a 
substantial part of the territory of a member state; failing closer definition of 
requirements under Community law on this point a trade mark cannot be required to 
have a reputation throughout the territory of a member state
589
. 
 
When the condition as to the existence of reputation is fulfilled as regards both the 
public concerned and the territory in question a second condition laid down in art. 
                                                 
583
  General Motors, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122, par. 23. 
584
  ECJ  22.6.2000, C – 425/98,  Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV, ECR [2000], 
p. I – 04861 par. 41, Canon, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113,  par. 18. 
585
 Ibid. 
586
 See Lloyd and Windsurfing Chiemse Op. Cit. Supra n. 532 and 138,  respectively.  
587
  See C-425/98,  Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV, Op.  Cit. Supra n. 584, par. 
42. 
588
 Ibid. This is a very important ruling since not only does it confirm that even marks with a less 
distinctive character per se may be considered as having a particularly distinctive character through use 
(i.e. common words may become well known or even famous marks). This is not so in Greece as it 
shall be examined in the following paragraphs. It is further important because it confirms that there 
might be infringement even in cases where there is no risk of confusion but merely risk of association, 
under the conditions mentioned in the ruling. 
589
  General Motors v. Yplon, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 122. 
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5(2) of the Directive must then be examined i.e. the earlier trade mark must be 
detrimentally affected without due cause. 
 
According to Quattro
590
 the concept of likelihood of confusion must be strictly 
interpreted in order to avoid obstructing the free movement of goods, more than is 
necessary for the protection of marks. The specific subject – matter of trade mark 
rights consists in protecting the proprietor of the mark against the risk of confusion 
such as to allow third parties to take unlawful advantage of its reputation
591
. A 
trademark is considered to have gained acceptance in trade, if the mark is perceived 
by the public as an indication that the goods on which it is applied originate from a 
particular undertaking. This occurs only if the great majority of consumers have that 
impression. This degree of recognition must be higher than usual, if the symbol is one 
which ought to remain freely used by all, i.e. if the mark is a descriptive or a 
commonly used term.  
 
B.c. Tests for likelihood of confusion 
 
The classic test for identifying whether there is likelihood of confusion or not is the 
visual, aural and conceptual similarity test of marks which is appreciated always in 
view of the similarity of the goods or services upon which the marks are used. The 
degree of resemblance and the conclusion whether there is or not likelihood of 
confusion is made bearing into account the similarity of the goods or services. It had 
been argued in the early 60‘s that the aural impression was more important than the 
visual and conceptual impression, because the goods were marketed in a way that the 
verbal communication between the buyer and the seller played an important role. 
However, nowadays, this has changed to a large degree. For goods that are found in 
super markets or department stores the visual and conceptual impression play the 
most decisive role. It has to be noted that the three similarity criteria do not have to be 
concurrent. It is enough for one of them to be found and the similarity of marks is 
established
592
.  
 
                                                 
590
  ECJ 30.11.1993, C – 317/1999, Deutsche Renault AG v. AUDI AG., ECR [1993], p. I – 6227. 
591
 This was also held in Arsenal, Op. Cit. Supra n. 367, par. 50 and  LTJ Diffusion, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
525, par. 46. 
592
 This is the view taken also by the ECJ as stated in Lloyd, Op. Cit. Supra n. 531.  
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Similarity of the goods or services upon which the marks are used is also taken into 
consideration for deciding whether there is likelihood of confusion. Similarity as to 
products or services is examined in view of their respective nature and use and on the 
basis of the understanding of the average consumer. It is not necessary that the 
respective goods or services be directly competitive with one another. For example, 
yoghurt and milk are not directly competitive since they are not interchangeable; 
however, milk and yoghurt are deemed to be similar for the purposes of trade mark 
infringement because they closely relate to one another and it is probable that a 
consumer may be confused when buying one or the other product bearing similar 
marks with regard to their source of origin. Goods or services are usually found to be 
similar if they are addressed to the same prospective consumers. 
 
 
It is interesting to note that in the USA other factors are also taken into account when 
establishing similarity. These include: a) the degree of distinctiveness of the trade 
mark, b) the extent to which the goods or services are marketed through the same 
channels, c) where the goods are not competitive the likelihood that consumers would 
expect the trademark owner to expand its business activities, d) the length of time that 
the trade mark has been on the market, e) the degree of attention that the consumer 
pays when purchasing the products bearing the marks
593
. The Directive, as interpreted 
by the ECJ, introduced in the European union a multi factor test similar to that applied 
in the USA. However, these criteria do not replace the mark – product similarity test. 
They merely contribute in applying it de lege ferenda in any given case.  
 
Furthermore it is interesting to mention the criteria followed by US courts to assess 
the likelihood of confusion. These are: a) the strength of the earlier mark, b) the 
similarity between the two marks, c) the degree to which the allegedly infringing 
product competes with the goods distinguished by the earlier mark i.e. the degree of 
similarity of the goods, d) the alleged infringer‘s intent to confuse the public, e) the 
degree of care reasonably expected of potential consumers and f) evidence of actual 
confusion
594
. Some of these criteria are also mentioned in ECJ jurisprudence, such as 
                                                 
593
 These criteria emanate from the Restatement of Torts dated 1938 (par. 731) and the 1995 
Restatement of Torts (par. 20 – 23) 
594
 See Davis v. Walt Diesney Co. 430 F. 3d 901, 901 (8
th
 Cir. 2005), SquirtCo v. Seven – Up Co., 628 
F. 2
nd
 1086, 1091 (8
th
 Cir. 1990), Anheuser Busch Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, US District Court, E.D. 
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the strength of the earlier mark and the similarity of the marks and the goods at issue. 
However, in the European framework, the intent to confuse the public has not been 
mentioned as criterion. 
 
Actually as per the Greek case law this intent is of no legal importance, it is evaluated 
only in the framework of unfair competition, to the extent the unauthorised use of a 
third party‘s  mark constitutes unfair competition as well.  
 
The criterion related to the degree of competition between the goods distinguished by 
the marks at issue is interesting. Under European trade mark law, the degree of 
similarity of goods is not only a factor to be assessed when establishing confusion, but 
also a sine qua non element of risk of confusion. Under US case law confusion goes 
beyond similarity of products. US courts may examine whether there is actual 
consumer confusion regardless of the similarity or dissimilarity of products. It is  
possible that confusion as to origin occurs merely because of the similarity of marks.  
 
In Anheuser Busch
595
 the Court found that there was evidence of actual confusion 
based on a) a consumer survey and b) a computer word search on the internet, which 
showed not only the trade mark owner‘s mark but also the third party‘s mark when 
using the same search phrase. The products in the said case were not similar, nor was 
such similarity examined to establish confusion. To eliminate the criterion of 
similarity between the products in order to establish confusion appears to be a more 
sincere approach to trade mark protection. Instead of expanding dilution to cases of 
similar products, adequate protection could be enjoyed by the trade mark owner in 
courts by expanding confusion to non similar products
596
.  
 
With regard to the degree of care of potential consumers, as we have seen, the ECJ 
has suggested that the average consumer with an average degree of care is taken as 
basis for evaluation of risk of confusion in all cases. However, there are cases, e.g. 
when the mark is used for goods that target a specialised group of consumers, where 
                                                                                                                                            
Missouri, Eastern Division, [2008] WL 4619702 (E.D.Mo), Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute 
Diggity Dog LLC 507, F. 3d. 252, citing Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F. 2d. 1522, 1527 (4
th
 Cir. 
1984). 
595
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 417, par. 7 and 8. 
596
  This issue shall be further dealt with in the next chapter.  
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the potential well - informed consumer of the specific goods should be taken into 
account and not the average and not particularly informed consumer.  
 
Lastly, what is eminent in European trade mark jurisprudence is the evidence 
provided for the risk of confusion. Even though Greek courts, for example, 
theoretically should not require evidence of actual confusion, in practice plaintiffs do 
provide evidence of actual confusion to support their claims and based on such 
evidence the courts uphold the claims of risk of confusion.  
 
B. d. Greece (Similarity - Confusion) 
B. d. i.   Similarity  
 
Following the Directive the Greek TM Act 2239/94 requests that in case of identical 
signs, there is no need for likelihood of confusion to be established, because such is 
presumably existent.
597
 
 
Greek law presents a certain particularity. It embraces the concepts of similarity and 
confusion, but applies them within a different context. Legal texts before the Directive 
did not explicitly refer to likelihood of confusion. However, this prerequisite of trade 
mark protection (namely the existence of likelihood that consumers would be 
confused about the actual origin of the product) was introduced by courts‘ case law.598 
It emerged as a result of systematic interpretation of the relevant legal provisions, 
which incorporated the two concepts of ―imitation‖ and ―distortion,‖599 constituting 
the framework of trade mark protection.
600
 Even now, after the harmonising effect of 
the Directive, the provisions of the 1994 Greek TM Act regulating infringement do 
                                                 
597
  Art. 4 (1).  
598
 StE (Greek Conseil d‘Etat) 98/89 EEmpD 40, 302; StE 1383/89, Dioikitiki Dikaiosyni 2, 143; 
Areios Pagos (Supreme Court) 399/89 Elliniki Dikaiosyni 32,70; Areios Pagos 1210/90 Efimeris 
Ellinon Nomikon 588, [1991], Areios Pagos 1254/1994 DEE 1995, 389, Dioikitiko Efeteio Athinon 
(Administrative Court of Athens) 3407/2002 EEmpD [2003], 916, EfAth, 1505/2004, DEE [2004], 
1270 and Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 349 seq. 
599
  Free translation from the Greek: ―s‖ and ―s‖. 
600
  Act 1998/ 1939 Art. 3, 16, 24. 
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not mention anything about the ―likelihood of confusion‖;601 they only refer to the 
imitation and the distortion of the mark. The Official Report on the Greek Trade 
Marks Act 1994 omits any reference or clarification regarding the issues of confusion, 
distortion or imitation.  
 
The courts‘ interpretation of ―imitation,‖602 on the one hand, has given this notion a 
meaning analogous to that of ―similarity‖ of the signs, considered in combination with 
the similarity of goods and the distinguishing power of the mark. The courts‘ 
definition refers to: ―the particular, in relation to the other trade mark, representation 
or appearance of the sign, which, because of the visual or auditory impression that 
creates and independently from all particular resemblance or difference, is likely to 
cause confusion to the average consumer as to the origin of the product from a certain 
enterprise.‖ The notion of ―distortion‖603 on the other hand, is more akin to that of 
―identical‖ signs used on similar goods. Citing part of a court‘s decision, the 
definition of ―distortion‖ is: ―the total or partial copy or representation of another 
trade mark, so that the impression of the two being identical is created, either 
absolutely or as to their substantial or characteristic parts.‖604 It should be noted, 
however, that Greek courts have a tendency to interpret the two notions in a narrow 
manner 
605
. 
 
The similarity of goods is assessed, according to courts‘ case law, on the basis of their 
physical substance, their purpose of use, the way they are marketed, the places where 
they are sold and other relevant economic and technical circumstances.
606
 Another 
                                                 
601
 Art. 18 (3). The Article is entitled: ―Rights conferred by a trade mark‖, just like the respective article 
of the Directive; unlike the UK TM Act 1994, in which the relevant article is entitled: ―Infringement of 
Registered Trade Mark‖.   
602
  See  StE 2949/78, EEmpD [1979] at 314. One could mention the following cases of signs that were 
found as imitating trade marks: a. Uniroyal-Royal, b. Scotchbrite- Britemprait- Bright, c. Aspirin- 
Aspidorol, d. La Vache Qui Rit-La Vache. (mentioned in MPrAth (Athens Court of First Instance) 
2269/79, EEmpD, [1979], at 315). 
603
  StE 2487/84, EEmpD, [1985], StE 1000/84 EEmpD [1984], StE 2159/79, EEmpD [1980].  
604
  StE 2949/78, EEmpD [1979], at 314. 
605
 M. Th. Marinos, ―Likelihood of Association and the Framework of Protecting Distinctive 
Characteristics Under the New Law on Trade Marks and Act 146/1914 on Unfair Competition‖, 
Elliniki Dikaiosyni, 1219, [1995], at 1227. As an example it is mentioned that the courts found no 
imitation or distortion in the following cases Tasc-Tascam (StE 2557/1986, EEmpD, [1987], 130), 
Chivas-Regal Scot (StE 1962/1988, EEmpD, [1989], 118), Baby Bisco – Bisco Papadopoulou (StE 
909/2001 EEmpD [2002], 437), Smash – Smacks (StE2613/2002, EEmpD [2003], 914. 
606
 StE 2487/84, EEmpD [1985], at 353, DEfAth 2984/1991 EllDni, [1992], at 463, DEfAth 3407/2002 
EEmpD [2003], 916, Liakopoulos Op. Cit. Supra n. 63 at 350. 
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basic criterion according to legal doctrine and case law is whether they satisfy the 
same consumer needs and the consumers they target
607
. In any case, similarity is not 
restricted to the classification of registration. Products belonging to different 
classification might be found as similar, such as for example, shoes and clothes
608
 or 
dairy products and children‘s food609. Also, goods or services of the same 
classification may not be found similar: video appliances, video tapes etc are not 
similar to electric and electronic systems and to appliances for air conditioning 
control, even if they are classified in the same class
610
. 
 
Similarity of goods is necessary to find risk of confusion. If a similar mark is used on 
non similar goods then the trade mark is not protected because there is no risk of 
confusion
611
. The only exception is provided for ―famous marks‖. The Greek courts 
are still reluctant to acknowledge that the Directive as implemented by law 2239/1994 
protects the advertising function of marks, i.e. that there is infringement even where 
there is no risk of confusion but when the use of the new mark shall be detrimental to 
the distinctive character of the trade mark or shall give to the new applicant unfair 
advantage without due cause. In a significant part of Greek legal doctrine however 
and sporadic case law, it is clear that the protection should be also against the risk of 
exploitation of the fame of the earlier mark and the risk of diluting the mark. When 
the alleged infringing third party takes unfair advantage of the trade mark when by 
using the famous trade mark transfers to his own products, the good impression that 
consumers have for the products distinguished by the famous mark. Without any 
effort the infringing party has the results that the trade mark owner had to put money 
and effort for years to achieve
612
. The famous mark on the other hand loses its 
distinctive character, that is the ability to attract consumers, especially when the mark 
is used on dissimilar products. 
 
                                                 
607
 Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 442, StE 2812/1998 DEE [1999], 1269, StE 345/2001, StE 
234/1998, DEfAth 3945/2002 EEmpD [2002], 897. 
608
  DDDS 44/91 EllDni 33, 466.  
609
  StE 1385/1989 DiDik 2, 147. 
610
  DEfAth 2904/1987 DiDik 1, 116. 
611
  EfAth 7460/1999, DEE [2000], 156. 
612
 It is the so –called ―image transfer‖, Marinos, ―Risk of Confusion and filed of  protection of 
distinctive elements under the new trade mark law and law 146/1914 on unfair competition‖, EllDni 
[1995], 1225, Pampoukis, ―The famous mark‖, EpiskED [1999], 357, MonPrThes 12242/1994, EEmpD 
[1995], 316 (Polar/ Aqua Polar). 
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Under the pre existing law these two cases were dealt with the following ways: with 
regard to the filing procedure they were dealt with art. 3 par. 2 of law 1998/1939 on 
bad faith; with regard to infringement they were dealt with under art. 1 of law 
146/1914 on unfair competition. The application of the latter is not excluded even 
under law 2339/1994, as complementary to trade mark law provisions. 
 
It is another issue as well whether the protection of famous marks is granted also in 
cases where the products are similar. This was accepted by Greek courts directly
613
 
but also indirectly in the context of cases dealing with parallel import cases
614
.  
 
But what is a famous mark? Case law has created a number of criteria that have to be 
fulfilled in order for a mark to qualify as ―famous‖ and shall each time be considered 
for the assessment of the mark in question. All of the criteria examined  must exist 
cumulatively. These criteria are: 
1) Originality (usually found in made up words) 
2) Uniqueness (i.e. that there are no other goods or services marketed under the same 
mark
615
)  
3) Establishment in the market, even beyond the interested circle of consumers. 
4) Positive image that the consumers have for the mark in question. This normally 
depends on the quality of the products
616
, the age of the mark, the size of the 
company, the number of goods sold etc.
617
 
 
It should be noted that the only criterion the ECJ case law has set for a mark to be 
famous is to be recognised by a significant part of the market
618
. All the above criteria 
mentioned in the Greek case law and the fact that all of them have to be concurrent for 
a mark to be famous should be reconsidered in view of the ECJ case law. Greek courts 
should merely find that criterion 3 above is proved in order to grant the wider 
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  PolPrAth (Multi Member First Instance Court of Athens) 194/1997, EEmpD 1998, 389 (BODY 
LINE / NEW BODY). 
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  EfAth 6414/1996, EEmpD 1997, 109, MPA 16353/1999, EEmpD 1999, 148, EfPatr (Patras Court 
of Appeal) 1058/1998, DEE, 1999, 860. 
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  For example it was found that Apple is not a famous mark, since there are other products apart from 
computers with the same name on the Greek market, MonPrAth  9077/1992, EEmpD [1992], 660. 
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  PolPrAth 194/1997, Op. Cit. Supra n. 613, at  389. 
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  StE 2812/1998 EEmpD 51, 372, Selekos, comments on MonPrAth 31758/1995 EpiskED 1996, 188, 
MonPrAth  9485/2000, EEmpD [2000], 1094. 
618
  Case C-357/1997, EEmpD [2000], 180 General Motors v. Yplon. 
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protection of a famous mark. It should therefore be of no importance for example 
whether the mark is ―unique‖ or original. 
 
Greek legal doctrine makes a distinction between ―famous‖ and ―well-known‖ marks, 
however not the courts. It is argued by legal doctrine that the meaning of famous 
marks under the law 2239/1994 which is compatible with the meaning used in the 
Directive is much broader than the meaning of famous marks under the pre-existing 
law of 1998/1939
619
. Under the broader meaning implied by the fact that the 
community legislator wanted to protect the advertising function of marks, not only the 
famous ones, but of any well – known mark even at a local level. In other words to 
protect the advertising ability of marks that can be exploited by unauthorised third 
parties. However, this view is unfortunately not shared by the courts that insist on 
perceiving the meaning of famous mark in a very strict sense, as was the case even 
before the implementation of the Directive
620
. 
 
The similarity of marks is assessed on the basis of certain fundamental principles that 
have been formulated by case law coming from both civil courts judging on protection 
and administrative courts judging on creation, transfer or abolition of trade mark 
rights.  
 
These are as follows: 
1) the examination is effected under the prism of an auditory, visual and conceptual 
resemblance of marks.
621
 Auditory and visual resemblance must be found in order to 
confirm risk of confusion. However, it has been proposed that, even where there is no 
auditory or visual resemblance, a likelihood of confusion may still occur because of 
resemblance in meaning, as would be the case for example with the word mark 
―giant‖ and a logo depicting a giant622. 
 
                                                 
619
  N. Rokas, Industrial Property Law, Sakkoulas, Athens – Komotini, 126 seq. [2004], at 131. 
620
  See, for example, DES 5056/1998 EEmpD [1999], 398, MonPrAth 8066/2005, EEmpD [2005], 
140. 
621
  See, Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 350. 
622
  This was established in German theory (as the Motivschutz theory), and was also accepted by some  
Greek scholars, although no case law ever examined such a situation. See Baumbach-Hefermehl, 
―Warenzeichenrecht, 12th ed., Munchen, [1985].; also Althammer, ―Warenzeichenrecht‖, 3rd ed., 
Munchen, [1985] and Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 347.   
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In case of marks consisting only of logo the similarity test is based on visual 
impression. In case of word marks the auditory resemblance is of the utmost 
importance
623
. The main elements taken into account are: the number of syllables or 
words
624
, the order of the letters, their intonation and the similarity of the first and the 
last syllables, especially the last ones since they play an important role in perceiving 
words as similar, especially if the words have no meaning
625
.  
 
2) the overall impression is examined rather than the specific details, similarities or 
differences. Therefore there is no risk of confusion despite the existence of certain 
similarities and vice versa; even if there are differences the mark might still be 
confusingly similar because of the similarity of the overall impression It is well 
understood that the consumer does not usually have both signs in front of him side by 
side, but his choice is based on the recollection of a pasted memory
626
.  
 
However, it is interesting to note that case law is not always consistent with this 
principle. In fact there are rulings according to which even insignificant differences 
are enough for the exclusion of risk of confusion
627
. This tendency is extremely 
dangerous for the trade mark owners who lose the ability to protect their marks 
against infringement by third parties and for the registered trade marks which, as a 
result of their co-existence with many, slightly different other marks, lose their 
distinctive ability. The Community Trade Mark Office ruled that despite the similarity 
                                                 
623
 The marks KIT KAT / KIL KAT and COMPRIT/ COBRIT, LU/LUR  have been found confusingly 
similar  because of their aural similarity, cited in Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 441, fn 348. 
However, it was found that there is no such similarity between DOKO/ GO DOG, MARS / MARI, 
ALEDIN / ALEYDRIN, StE 711/1987 NoB 38, 883, StE 4314/1987 NoB 38, 883, StE 1640/1987 NoB 
38, 883, StE 3136/1987 NoB 38, 883, StE 1959/1989 DiDik 2, 390. 
624
 StE 2166/2001, found similarity between KENZO, KENDO and KERZO stating that they have the 
same number of syllables, StE 1248/1986 did not find similarity between VISTA and VISTARAMA 
stating that the latter has a bigger number of syllables with the addition of –RAMA. However, the same 
supreme court StE 1862/2001 found FLEERDENT and FREEDENT not to be similar (sic), whereas 
StE 4322/1983 and StE 2503/1984 found despite the different number of syllables similarity between 
PROSTIN and PROSTADIN and CORINDOLAN and CORDELAN respectively. As an example from 
one syllable marks StE 4153/1980 found that there is similarity between DW and logo and DOW. The 
Athens Court of Appeal found that the marks HERMES and ΕΡΜΗ΢ are similar, see EfAth 2461/2006,  
EEmpD [2006], 740, with comments by Prentoulis N.  
625
 V. Antonopoulos, ―Protecting composite distinctive elements – Field of protection of trade mark 
relative grounds –Deposition of a mark in bad faith (legal opinion‖, DEE [2003], 121. 
626
  PPTh 20600/1995 Gordon‘s / Lorsdon, PPA 9349/1997 Biscuits Miranda / Biscuits Marietta, which 
was subsequently not upheld (see next footnote), MonPrLamias 1080/2000 EEmpD [1996], 850, AP 
751/1995 Campari/Carmeni EEN 1996, 647.   
627
 StE 4508/1998 Robot Coupe/ Ρομποη EEmpD 1989, 301, StE 5441/1995 FA.CA. D‘ ORO/ 
MECAD OR, EEmpD [1996], 400, AP 1123/2002 Miranda/ Marietta, EEmpD [2002], 887. 
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of the word elements of composite marks, the risk of confusion might be excluded 
when the depictive elements are original and unusual and the consumers may keep 
those in memory
628
. 
 
In case of signs consisting of more than one word, or words and letters, it is possible 
that all words are equally distinctive; however usually there will be one dominant 
word that shall determine the overall impression
629
. The similarity test shall then be 
effected on the basis of this dominant word. It is possible that all words composing a 
trade mark have a weak distinctive character and could not on their own have been 
registered as trade marks. In these cases, where there is no dominant word, it should 
be the particularity in the way the words are combined that would determine the 
overall impression
630
. 
 
In case of signs consisting of word and logo, the word is critical and not the logo
631
. 
Significant in this respect is the Supreme Court case law according to which, even in 
cases of marks consisting of word and logo, where normally as per the above the word 
elements are the most important, risk of confusion is possible when the new mark 
reproduces the characteristic and recognisable by the consumers logo of the earlier 
mark
632
.  
 
3) the part of the sign consisting of descriptive elements is not taken into account if 
the remaining part has distinctive power
633
. Similarly, the overall impression is not 
                                                 
628
  R –457/2002 Korres and logo/Cordes, EEmpD [2003], 937. 
629
  Antonopoulos, Industrial Property, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 443, citing Liakopoulos Op. Cit. Supra 
at 350 seq. and Rokas, Op. Cit Supra n. 619,  at 101  seq.. 
630
 Therefore third parties would infringe the trade mark not if they used the same words but if they 
used the same combination of words in such a way that would create the same overall impression as the 
trade mark. According to the said author‘ s legal opinion the sign ―Pizza Mac‖ did not infringe the 
McDonald‘s registered trade mark ―McPizza‖, Ibid  at 123. 
631
 Areios Pagos 1241/1991, EEmpD 1992, 320. If the primary element of the mark is the colour, 
similarity is assessed on that  (AP 399/1989 Vitom Camping/ Πεηπογκάζ, EEmpD 1990, 145). 
632
  Areois Pagos 310/1990 Marlboro/ Μαξίμ, EEmpD 1990, 709, Areios Pagos 1009/1991 Campari / 
Amalfi EEmpD 1992, 148, Areios Pagos 1127/1994 Uncle Ben‘s Rice / Amor Rice EEmpD 1995, 310, 
see also PPA 6928/1990 Gordon Rouge/Deron, EEmpD 1991, 342, DDEA 5134/2001 EEmpD [2003], 
159. This could also be interpreted to the detriment of the trade mark owner where the size of letters 
combined with different logos can be found to exclude risk of confusion even if the words are similar, 
(Contra AP 1254/1994 Bacardi/ Bricanti Bianco, EEmpD 1995, 703). 
633
 Areios Pagos 751/1995 op.cit. supra, DPrAth 8725/1985 EEmpD [1985], 721, MonPrLamias 
(Single Member First Instance Court of Lamia) 1080/2000 Episk ED [2001], 256. According to 
MonPrThess 1253/1975 EED 1975, 140, issued under the pre existing law, it derives from art. 3 par. 1 
of law 1989/39 (currently art. 3 par. 1 of law 2239/1994) that there is a rule in trademark law according 
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altered if descriptive elements are added
634
. Marks that consist of distinctive elements 
are normally not effectively protected, since later marks with only slight differences 
cannot be found to be infringing them
635
. Foreign words with which the Greek 
consumers are not familiar are not considered as descriptive even if they are 
descriptive in the language of origin
636
.  
 
4) a very significant factor in the similarity test is the distinguishing ability of the 
earlier mark, its degree of ―notoriety‖637. Where a mark is well known, the notions of 
imitation or distortion  (in other words the legal protection) is quite broad, meaning 
that the new mark should have so many and so different elements to the earlier mark 
that it is absolutely clear that the two are different
638
. The reason is that the greater the 
distinctive power of a mark the easier it is for the consumer to call it on his 
memory
639
.  
 
However, most marks have an average distinctive power. The distance the 
competitors need to keep from them is ordinary. Weak marks have a small distinctive 
power and slight differences are enough for the exclusion of risk of confusion. 
Applicants of weak marks should be expecting and enduring that other competitors 
shall be allowed to use similar marks, thereby diminishing the distinguishing ability of 
the earlier mark
640
. Strong marks on the contrary (either by nature or by use
641
) enjoy 
                                                                                                                                            
to which every trade mark must have either per se or through its usage in trade a particularity or in 
other words the distinctive power that is necessary for its acceptance and protection as trade mark. This 
element of particularity could either be a) the words of which it consists (all or part of them), b) the 
original combination of those words, c) their original visual formation. This implies that the composite 
word mark might include words that could not on their own be registered as trade marks, because they 
lack distinctive character, are descriptive or generic and these elements should not be dominant visually 
or aurally in relation to the element that does have distinctive power. Therefore for protecting a 
composite mark one must first determine the distinctive element which according to the consumers and 
the business is the substantive part of the mark, through which the origin function is fulfilled and which 
is protected under trade mark law. 
634
 MonPrAth 12504/1999 EEmpD 50, 406. 
635
 MonPrAth 29625/1991, EEmpD [1994], 117. 
636
 According to DPrAth 5682/1986 EEmpD 1987, 311 the mark CHILDREN‘S VIDEO LIBRARY 
for video cassettes is not descriptive.  
637
  PolPrAth 194/1997, Op. Cit. Supra n. 613, at 388, Areios Pagos 1123/2002, ΕΕmpD 2002, 887, 
ΜonPrΑth 9198/2003 ΕΕD 2004, 423. This was the case even under the previous legal framework 
PDDS 375/59, EEmpD 1959. 
638
  See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 351. 
639
  See Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63,  at 442.  
640
  Antonopoulos,  Op. Cit Supra n. 625, [2003], at 129. 
641
  Use comprising of extended advertising and selling of the products. For example the COCA COLA 
trademark consisting of two descriptive and non-original words has through use acquired a strong 
distinctive character and therefore enjoys now a broad protection. This could also happen the other way 
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broader protection and slight differences are not enough, therefore the competitors 
must keep a bigger distance from them, in the sense that they must include clearly 
strong distinctive elements from the earlier mark in order not to cause confusion
642
. 
Directly related to this categorisation of marks is the ―Theory of Equal Distances‖ that 
shall be examined subsequently. 
 
B.d. ii. Confusion  
Confusion might be considered either in a narrow or in a broad sense. Under the first 
one, the consumer is likely to assume that the products carrying identical or similar 
signs emanate from the same enterprise. Under the second one, the consumer might be 
led to believe that the products come from different enterprises among which exists, 
however, a strong economic or other bond
643
. It is worth noting that often the second 
type of confusion is mistakenly considered to be the same as the risk of association
644
. 
As we can see, in both cases there is an impediment to the origin function. This causes 
a subsequent distortion of the guarantee function, as obviously the consumer will also 
be confused as to the characteristics of the product. The concept of confusion is 
inherently linked with these functions.  
 
The notion of reverse confusion has been mentioned in Greek legal doctrine however 
it has never been found by Greek courts. Cases where that notion could apply have 
been ruled on the basis of standard confusion and found that the earlier trade mark 
owner is not protected because there is no risk of confusion with the subsequent mark 
that has acquired a very strong distinctive character
645
. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
round. An inherently distinctive mark can lose its distinctive power if new competitors with similar 
marks appear on the market, even up to the point where the mark becomes generic (Antonooulos, 20 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 625, at 128]. The distinctiveness of a mark is subject to change depending on the use 
of the mark and the existence of other competitors‘ similar marks. 
642
 On the distinctions of marks according to their distinctive character and the implications on their 
protection see, among others, Pampoukis, EpiskED [1999], 326, Tsironis, comments on MonPrAth 
9077/1992, EEmpD 1992, 662, 665, Antonopoulos Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 442, MonPrAth 1802/1996, 
EEmpD 1998, 381, MonPrAth 9077/1992, 660. 
 
643
  See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 348; depicting the German influence, by Baumbach-
Hefermehl, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 348. 
644
  Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 440, Areios Pagos 399/1989 EEmpD [1990], 711, 
MonPrAth 2568/1984, EEmpD [1985], 538. 
645
 MonPrAth 10216/2001 EEmpD [2002], 161 with comments by A. Mikroulea and DEE [2002], 171 
with comments by Glavas. 
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The assessment of the existence of risk of confusion is effected by comparing the 
registered trade mark with the allegedly infringing sign, based on the similarity of 
goods and marks
646
, as already discussed. The assessment depends primarily on the 
judge and is effected on an ad hoc basis, although certain restrictions are set by the 
rules of the similarity tests examined above. Besides that, the Greek judge is allowed 
to base his assessment on the evidence brought to the court by the plaintiff and the 
defendant, on what is generally known, as well as on experts‘ opinions647. However, 
the common judiciary practice is largely based on subjective evaluations
648
. 
 
Furthermore the risk of confusion is estimated according to the following rules, 
created by case law, as were the rules on assessment of similarity examined above
649
: 
1) The existence of a risk of confusion is estimated objectively, meaning that the 
consent of the previous trade mark owner is not obligatory for the affirmation or not 
of existence of such risk
650
. 
2) It is not necessary to establish confusion. A mere risk thereof estimated objectively 
is sufficient. 
3) To establish risk of confusion the respective consumers are taken into account. 
When the products or services are addressed to specialised consumers then it is 
possible that there is no likelihood of confusion despite the similarity of the marks and 
the goods or services
651
.  
4) Together with the degree of notoriety another important factor for the assessment 
of risk of confusion is the degree of similarity of the goods. The more similar the 
goods the more intense and significant must the differences be between the marks in 
order to exclude risk of confusion
652
. 
                                                 
646
  There might be a case where, despite the similarity of marks and goods, the users of these products 
are so specialised that no risk of confusion arises. See, Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 350. 
647
  Art. 43 of Presidential Decree 341/38, in which certain provisions are also within the field of trade 
mark protection, EfAth 7208/1995 Chevignon/ Cevinion, EEmpD 1996, 402, see however PolPrTh 
20600/1995, EEmpD [1996], 850. 
648
 Even though public opinion polls are not accepted by courts as means of evidence a very important 
recent decision bases its assessment for the mark being famous on a poll, PolPrAth 1225/2006, EEmpD 
[2006], 467. 
649
 See, Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 505 seq., N. Rokas, Industrial Property Law, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 619, at 126 seq.. 
650
  DEfAth 2104/1989, DiDik 1, 1363. 
651
 Areios Pagos 1780/1999 EEmpD [2000], 804, MonPrAth 10126/2001 EEmpD [2002], 161 
regarding the marks THALIS / THALES that were found non confusingly similar because of the 
specialise consumers they addressed to (high technology instruments used in weapon manufacture).  
652
 This is a principle mainly supported by legal doctrine, see inter alia, Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 63, at 506, Marinos, ―Risk of Confusion and filed of protections of distinctive elements under the 
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5) The risk of confusion in the context of registration is assessed as at the time of the 
hearing before the Trademark Administrative Committee and not at the time of the 
filing of the trademark.  
6) The risk of confusion is dependant upon the distinctive power of the mark. 
Therefore, if the notoriety of the mark is significant then only slight differences 
between the marks shall not be enough. If, however, the mark is not used or is not 
used widely the difference between the marks should not be so significant
653
.  
 
According to the legal doctrine of ―Equal Distances‖ embraced in Greece, the 
trademark owner cannot require from his competitors to keep from his own mark a 
distance greater than the one he himself keeps from other marks, earlier or subsequent 
to his own
654
. Therefore the trademark owner that chose a mark not entirely different 
to earlier marks and succeeded to have it registered or that did not object to the co-
existence of his mark with other similar marks subsequent to his own (or both) cannot 
expect from a new trademark applicant to keep in relation to the trademark owner a 
bigger distance than that the owner himself kept from the older trademarks; this is the 
trade mark owner‘s ―punishment‖ because as a result of his behaviour the distinctive 
power of his mark has been reduced and the consumers became used to the 
coexistence of similar marks. This theory emanates from the German legal doctrine 
(―Abstandslehrer‖)655 and finds a legal basis on art. 281 of the Greek Civil Code and 
the venire contra factum proprium defence pertaining Greek civil law.  
                                                                                                                                            
new trade mark law and law 146/14 on unfair competition‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 612, at 1223, Kotsiris, 
―Inclusion of a mark in a sign. Negative and Positive scope of the right. Space limitations in trademark 
protection‖ (legal opinion) DEE 1997, 926, Chrisanthis, ―Risk of Confusion in distinctive elements‘ 
law‖, EpiskED [2003], 339. The Greek courts have not been willing to affirm it. In case DEfAth 
3401/1998, EEmpD [1999], the court found that there is no similarity and therefore risk of confusion 
between the marks WEST for cigarettes / WESTPOINT for smoke products. This ruling was severely 
criticised by legal doctrine, see Chisanthis comments in EEmpD [1999]. 
653
 However, Greek case law is not  very encouraging with regard to protection of famous  marks as we 
shall analytically see in Part V below. For example, in case MPA 9077/1992, EEmpD [1992], 660, 
before the new law 2239/1994 entered into force, it was found that the Apple trademark was not 
infringed by Apple mark for notepads, where both marks were even  combined with an apple logo. The 
court found that apple is a common word hence it cannot be protected as a famous mark. Also, the 
Greek Conseil d‘ Etat (StE) found that the Camel trademark is not a famous mark (sic) in 2812/2000, 
EEmpD [2000], 372 and ruled that the use of Camel mark for shoes was not infringing the Camel mark 
for cigarettes.  
654
 See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 107, Tsironis EEmpD [1992], 662, MonPrAth 9077/92, 
EEmpD [1992], 660, MonPrAth 1802/1996, EEmpD [1998] 381. 
655
 See Baumbach – Hefermehl, WZG par. 31, n. 147, as mentioned in Pampoukis (EEmpD 1971, 140-
141) legal opinion on the SINALCO COLA / COCA COLA case, raising the issue that there are so 
many COLA trademarks coexisting in the Greek market that one more shall not  infringe the rights of 
The Coca Cola Company owner of the mark Coca Cola. 
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Therefore it is argued that this might be legally raised in civil law cases as an 
objection by the infringing party, against a trade mark owner of a weak or weakened 
mark, where of course all facts of the case shall be considered. The First Instance 
Court of Athens found that the trade mark owner of the mark "Slim‖ for, inter alia, 
ice cream  could not oppose the use of the mark ―Cool and Slim‖ for ice creams, since 
the existence of other trade marks in the market including the word ―Slim‖ (Froza 
Slim, Fage Slim, Carnation Slim, Think Slim, Fast Slim) without confusion, deprived 
the claimant from asking the defendants to keep a bigger distance to the claimant‘s 
mark than the one the claimant kept from the other marks
656
. In this context also 
FREDDOCCINO was found not to be similar to FROCCINO because of many co - 
existing trade marks incorporating FREDDO- and –CCINO657. However the signs 
ΣΡΟPI COLA and  YANCA COLA were rejected as confusingly similar to the trade 
mark COCA COLA
658
. 
 
However, it is doubtful whether this principle has any legal facet within the 
framework of administrative proceedings pertaining to granting and abolishing trade 
mark rights. Despite that, administrative courts‘ rulings even though they do not 
explicitly state so, also apply this theory (i.e. not only civil courts)
659
. Therefore apart 
from assessing similarity of marks and similarity of goods, the administrative courts 
also assess the fact that other similar marks exist in the trade mark registry (as 
mentioned, either earlier or subsequent to the trade mark considered). If such marks 
are found to exist, then the application of the new mark shall be accepted with only 
slight differences, so that the trademark registry keeps a fair  treatment to all 
applicants.  
 
B.d.iii.Conclusions 
Comparing the EU rules on similarity and confusion with those of the Greek courts 
the following observations could be made:  
 
                                                 
656
  MonPrAth 1802/1996, EEmpD [1998] 381, at. 383. 
657
 Trademark Administrative Committee 7062/2006 (unreported). 
658
  StE 1571/1971 and DDDS 943/1971. 
659
  See footnotes 644 and 645. 
  
 148 
The basic principles are similar. These include for example the fact that the similarity 
test is based on overall impression, the affirmation that the more intense the notoriety 
the more the mark is protected, the fact that descriptive elements do not play an 
important role in the overall impression, that it may be the case that only one element 
prevails, the fact that  mere aural similarity could be enough, or even mere conceptual 
similarity, the fact that the average consumer is taken into account, and that the degree 
of similarity of the goods affects the degree of similarity of the marks that must exist 
in order to affirm confusion.  
 
However, unlike the ECJ in Thomson/Thomson Life
660
, a Greek court has found that 
including a non inherently distinctive but well known trade mark in a sign composed 
of that trade mark and the third party‘s trade mark, does not constitute trade mark 
infringement
661
. 
  
There is however a difference with regard to the notion of ―famous mark‖. According 
to ECJ, for a mark to be famous it is sufficient that it is famous in the respective circle 
of consumers. In order to assess that, the intensity, duration and place of use of the 
mark, the size of investment are taken into account. Whereas, according to the Greek 
case law, in order for a mark to be considered as famous it has to fulfill all five criteria 
including the originality and uniqueness of the mark, analysed above
662
. According to 
art. 4 par. 1 c of  law 2239/1994 and the respective case law, in order for a famous 
mark to be protected in cases of non confusion the goods must be dissimilar, unlike 
what has been established by the ECJ. However, recent Greek case law seems to be 
moving to this direction, namely recognising that protection to famous marks in the 
context of taking unfair advantage of its distinctive  character must be held also to 
cases where the goods or services are similar
663
. 
 
                                                 
660
  C-120/2004 Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH Op. Cit. Supra n. 
577 . 
661
 MonPrAth 8066/2005, EEmpD [2005], 141 (SILHOUETTE/MEDISANA SILHOUETTE). 
662
 The issue of  compatibility of such an approach to community law as interpreted by the ECJ is 
questionable, see also M. Kosmopoulos, comments in  MonPr Ath 8066/2005, EEmpD [2005], 148. 
663
 PolPrAth 194/1997, EEmpD [1998], 389 (BODY LINE / NEW BODY), which found that there was 
taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the earlier mark by a senior mark used for similar 
services. Also EfAth 6414/1996, EEmpD 1997, 109, MonPrAth 16353/1999, EEmpD [1999], 148, 
which mixes however trade mark law with unfair competition law, EfPatr 1058/1998, DEE, 1999, 860. 
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It follows that the basic principles are common. This was the case also for case law 
previous to the harmonisation introduced with the Directive. The Greek notions of 
―imitation‖ and ―distortion‖ are narrower than the overall ―likelihood of confusion‖ 
introduced by the Directive. In effect, (as this was already mentioned above) before 
the Directive, the notion of ―likelihood of confusion‖ did not even exist in the Greek 
legislation as such (unlike most of the European countries, including the UK). In the 
new Act 2239/94, the provision regarding registration refers to ―confusion‖664, while 
the provision regarding infringement refers to ―imitation‖ and ―distortion‖665. The 
substantial result of this is not contrary to the requests of the Directive
666
. However, it 
seems in a way peculiar that the Greek legislative body has maintained the notions 
developed in the past, and has embodied them in the new Act. A possible explanation 
would be that this was made for the courts to be able to allude to familiar concepts 
and adjust more easily to the new regime. It would, however, be more simple, purely 
from a systematic point of view, to follow the text of the Directive and avoid the use 
of old terms found only in Greek legislative practice
667
. 
 
B.e. UK (Similarity-Confusion) 
B.e. i.  Similarity 
In the UK law where goods are identical and the allegedly infringing sign is identical 
to the registered trade mark, no likelihood of confusion needs to be established, as this 
is considered to exist de iure
668
. The category of infringement in case of use of an 
identical or similar sign on similar goods is introduced in the UK law for the first 
time. Under the 1938 TM Act
669
 (and previously), the plaintiff could not ask for 
protection in respect of goods or services for which the mark was not registered
670
. It 
                                                 
664
  Art. 4 of the Greek TM Act 2239/94. 
665
  Art. 18 of the Greek TM Act 2239/94. 
666
 As already stressed, the latter provisions (infringement) should be read in conjunction with the 
former (registration). 
667
  This is a typical example of a national legal regime, trying to remain loyal to the results led out 
before the introduction of the Directive. The fear that the European integrative process, might impair a 
loss of the legal identity or national particularity is the one dictating such a reservation expressed also 
in the new Greek Trade Marks Act. 
668
  S. 10 (1) of TM Act 1994, following the Directive and in parallel with the Greek Law 2239/1994. 
669
  Sections 4 (1).  
670
  See Jay v. Ladler (1888) 40 Ch. D. 649, 6 RCP. 136. Also, Hart v. Colley (1890), 44 Ch. D. 193; 7 
RCP 93. As a consequence, the  mark should be registered under a number of specification of goods or 
services. With the purpose that this would cover not only everything for which the mark was to be 
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was necessary for the defendant‘s goods or services to be of the same description.671. 
Infringement now extends beyond the registered specification, therefore there is no 
need that the goods or services be in the same class
672
. It is sufficient that the products 
are ―similar‖673.  
 
The restriction of infringement only to goods for which the mark was registered posed 
considerable problems to its owner, and in particular, did not avail him with adequate 
legal protection. The belief that no harm is done if a sign is used on products that are 
not under the same registration as the original mark, depicts an obsolete conviction. It 
disregards the diffusion of information by way of advertising, the mass media and 
telecommunications. The marks are not any more locally restricted. They are inclined 
and encouraged to acquire an intense distinctive character that would help their 
proprietors attract customers. This is precisely their acknowledged value as 
advertising tools
674
. If the possibility that a similar sign used on similar products
675
 
existed, the mark would be much less likely to maintain the desirable individuality 
and intense distinctive character. Therefore, the introduction after the implementation 
of the Directive of the broader protection should be welcomed by UK jurisprudence as 
a necessary adjustment to current requirements. 
 
What are the criteria that an English judge should, hereinafter, consider in order to 
assess the similarity of goods? In the British Sugar case
676
, decided under the 1994 
TM Act, Jacob J cited several factors that should be taken into account. These are: a. 
The respective use of the goods or services, b. The respective users of the goods or 
services, c. The physical nature of the goods or acts of service, d. Whether goods are 
found together in self-service stores (the supermarket-shelf test), and e. The 
                                                                                                                                            
used; but also all such that the proprietor would object to the use of a similar sign by others. See T. A. 
Blanco and R. White, ―Kerly‘ s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names‖, 12th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, [1986], at 270. 
671
  It would be worth mentioning that this was also the case in the USA. See, American Steel 
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 US 372, 380, [1926], where the Supreme Court supports the doctrine that 
that the same trade mark may be used on different classes of goods: ―there is no property in a trade 
mark apart from the business or trade in connection with which it is employed‖. As cited in  Schechter, 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 5, at 339.  
672
  Gromax v. Don and Low [1999], RPC 367. 
673
  S. 10 (2) of TM Act 1994. 
674
  The issue was examined in a previous part of this thesis. 
675
  Although not of the same registration. 
676
  British Sugar plc v. James Robertson and sons, 1996], R.P.C. 281. 
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competitive relation between them
677
. Evidently, after the examination of the Greek 
framework, these criteria are quite similar to the ones used in the past (and still), by 
continental courts. 
 
English courts held that the question whether goods or services were ―similar‖ was a 
distinct issue, which had to be considered before examining the issue of similarity of 
the marks. This made the issue of examination of the similarity of goods an objective 
issue, independent of the similarity of the marks. However, in view of the ECJ case 
law, this seems to be the wrong approach
678
. The ECJ held that in affirming confusion 
the reputation of the mark must also be taken into account and stated that ―marks with 
a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the reputation they possess 
on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive 
character‖679. However, this does not mean that risk of confusion should not be 
established. As the Court stated ―even where a mark is identical to another with a 
highly distinctive character, it is still necessary to adduce evidence of similarity 
between the goods and services covered
680
. 
 
With regard to the similarity of marks, the judgement that is made is intensely 
subjective, regardless of any test employed. Not even the degree of resemblance 
sufficient to cause confusion can be clearly defined. The tests employed and the 
results to which they lead will not be examined at present in detail
681
. Suffice to say 
that
682
: a. the mark is always examined as a whole
683
,  b. what is to be regarded is the 
                                                 
677
 Whether similarity of goods should be a criterion of confusion has been questioned. See Griffiths 
[2001], IPQ 326 ―[…] dividing the levels [of protection] on the basis of whether or not the products in 
question are similar sets a limit on each level which appears unrelated to the kind of damage in 
question. These limits can therefore appear arbitrary and unfair in some circumstances and this has led 
to pressure to relax them, resulting in a blurring of the apparent boundary between (s. 10(2) and 10(3)], 
at 332. This has been a serious issue dealt with also by the ECJ in Marca Mode v. Adidas [2000], 
ETMR 561 at 578 and Davidoff v. Gofkid [2003] ETMR 534. 
678
 See Cornish and Lllewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45,  at 744.  
679
  Canon Kabushiki  Kaisha v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc., Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, par. 132.  In this 
case the UK government considered that similarity between goods and services must be assessed 
objectively and independently and no account should be taken of the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark or in particular of its reputation (par. 14). 
680
  Ibid,  par. 133. 
681
 For a thorough analysis under 1938 UK TM Act, see T. A. Blanco and R. White, ―Kerly‘ s Law of 
Trade Marks and Trade Names‖, 12th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, [1986], at 438 sec. 
682
  Ibid. 
683
 As an example, the dicta of Farwell J in Bailey could be mentioned: ―I do not think it is right to take 
a part of the word and compare it with a part of the other word-one word must be considered as a whole 
and compared with the other word as a whole‖, (1935) RCP 136. 
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idea of the mark left on the mind of the consumer
684
,  c. the judge should not merely 
look at marks side by side but also contrast the general recollection of the trade to 
mark to the allegedly infringing sign
685
. 
 
The test of comparison in order to assess the probability of infringement (because of 
confusion), applied by English Courts could be summarised in the following dicta by 
Parker J involving the comparison of two words: ―You must take the two words. You 
must judge them, both by their look and by their sound. You must consider the goods 
to which they are to be applied. You must consider the nature and kind of the 
consumer who would be likely to buy those goods. In fact you must further consider 
what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade 
mark for the goods of the respective owners of the mark.‖686 
 
B.e. ii. Confusion  
The only case where consumer confusion is likely to arise is when the goods on which 
trade marks are used are identical or similar. Confusion suggests that the consumer is 
under a mistaken belief or uncertainty about the origin of the products or about its 
characteristics
687
. The basic factors of the confusion test are as follows: the 
comparison of marks interacts with the comparison of goods to produce likelihood of 
confusion. This is always assessed in relation to the public that is likely to buy or use 
the goods or services. Finally, in assessing confusion the distinctiveness of the mark 
plays an important role
688
.  
 
In a case resulting to an interlocutory decision, the learned judge concluded that there 
was no likelihood of confusion of the trade mark Baywatch with the allegedly 
infringing sign Babewatch
689
. According to the judge, there was no similarity between 
the mark and the sign, on the one hand; nor was there similarity between the goods: 
                                                 
684
  Based on the fact that marks are remembered by general impressions rather than by specific details. 
See De Cordova  v. Orr-Ewing (1951) 68 RPC 103 at 106 (P.C.). 
685
  See, for example, Sandow (1914) 31 RPC 196. 
686
  Pianotist (1906) 23 RPC 774 at 777. 
687
  See, A. K. Sanders, ―Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act‖, 2 
EIPR 67, [1995], at 69. 
688
  See A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 75; also case St Dupont v. El Du Pont du Nemours & Co., 
[2002] EWHC 2455, The Times, November 28, 2002, Neuberger J., Current Law Digest, January 2003, 
119. 
689
  The Baywatch Production Company v. Home Video Channel Ltd., [1997], FSR 22. 
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video tapes featuring an entertaining series and television programmes with an adult 
content. This conclusion had been criticised
690
, as it run against the assessments made 
under the test proposed by Jacob J in British Sugar. It is evident that the two signs 
were similar, as well as  the goods on which they were used. 
 
However, the Directive has complicated the confusion test. By stating in Art. 5(1)(b) 
that the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association, a possible 
alteration of the meaning of confusion was introduced
691
. In the UK law, this 
provision has been implemented in s. 10(2) of the 1994 TM Act
692
. 
C.   LIKELIHOOD OF ASSOCIATION 
 
The Directive introduced the new
693
 notion of likelihood of association
694
 - a notion 
which has been extremely puzzling. This was, on the one hand, due to the fact that the 
term was unknown to most of the European trade mark legislations
695
. On the other 
hand, the wording of the relevant provision is in itself quite ambiguous. Does 
association have the same meaning as in the Benelux trade mark law, in which it was 
initially incorporated?
696
 Or is it a notion included in that of confusion, therefore 
emanating from the origin function and bringing no substantial change to the already 
existing framework of protection in most European countries?
 697
 The wording of the 
Directive art. 5(1)(b)  points to the latter conclusion. As this is not a mandatory 
provision, the wording of national laws is not as important as the interpretation of the 
                                                 
690
  See, R. Black, ―Baywatch: Sour Grapes or Justice?‖, 2 EIPR 39, [1997]. 
691
  This provision is included literally in many of the amended trademark laws of the Member States. 
An interesting comment was made by M. Elmslie, in ―The New UK Trade Marks Bill‖, 3 EIPR 119, 
[1994], at 121: ―They (the provisions concerning infringement) were lifted practically verbatim from 
the Directive, no doubt out of caution-no-one is quite sure what they mean, so any rephrasing could 
easily mean redefinition‖. See A. Kur, ―Harmonisation of the Trademark Laws in Europe-An 
Overview‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 40 at 20.  
692
 In the Greek law respectively this was implemented by Art. 5 of the Greek TM Act 2239/94. 
693
  This notion was established in the Benelux Trade Mark Law (Art. 13A), but was virtually out of the 
scope of legal protection of most of the other European countries. 
694
  Art. 5(1)(b). 
695
 Except for the Benelux Trade Mark Law, and, in particular, Art. 13A, where the notion of likelihood 
of confusion is not even mentioned . 
696
 Namely a notion distinct to risk of confusion, trying to cover within the context  of trade mark law 
the protection held in the UK through passing off and in other continental countries through unfair 
competition law, see Cornish and Llewelyn Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 749.  
697
 See, for example, A. K. Sanders, ―Some Frequently Asked Questions About the 1994 UK Trade 
Marks Act‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 687; P. Harris, ―UK Trade Mark Law: Are You Confused?‖, 12 EIPR 
601, [1995];  Ch. Gielen, ―Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in  Europe: The First Trade Mark 
Harmonisation Directive of the European Council‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44. 
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meaning of the Directive itself, which will be decisive for the correct understanding of 
the scope of protection granted by Art. 5(1)(b)
698
. The ECJ jurisprudence which shall 
be examined further in this chapter is therefore decisive. 
C. a. The Benelux Definition 
What does likelihood of association mean? Firstly, the notion will be examined in the 
context of Benelux law, in which it was originally established. Under the Benelux 
Trade Mark Law, it means, in simple words, a ―calling into mind‖ 699. It refers to a 
situation where the consumer sees or hears a sign, and the registered mark comes into 
his mind. Should this be likely to happen, infringement is established. In this case the 
consumer might (or might not) be quite clear on what the origin or the source of the 
products is. It could be that, in essence, what is affected is merely the connotation 
sequence of images in his mind. If association occurs there is  infringement, if not 
there is no infringement. The risk of confusion is not examined at all. 
 
Let us examine closely, then, the case where the source of origin is clear to the 
consumer. As we have already seen under the trade mark functions theory, what trade 
marks denote primarily and what is also protected by trade mark law primarily is the 
origin function. In the case so far considered, the consumer perfectly receives the 
denoted message, which is an indication of the source of the product. The sign which 
is likely to bring to his mind the registered trade mark does not affect this result and 
does not impede the origin function. How is this extended protection justified? The 
answer to this question lies in the advertising theory. If this is recognised and 
protected by law, then trade mark infringement is established also in cases where the 
consumer is not confused with regard to the origin of the product. 
 
In a leading decision
700
, the Benelux Court of Justice decided that there is similarity 
between a sign and a mark (amounting to infringement) when, taking into account the 
particular circumstances of the case, such as the distinctive power of the mark, the 
                                                 
698
  See A. Kur, Op. Cit. Supra n. 40, at 21. 
699
  Namely, Art. 13A of the Benelux Trade Marks Act, before the Directive. According to that, the 
proprietor of  a trade mark could oppose all use of this trade mark or a similar sign for the same or 
similar goods or services as those for which he registered his mark. See Ch. Gielen, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
44, at 266. The Benelux Trade Mark Act did not refer to confusion but merely to similarity. It was the 
Benelux case law that formed the two distinct notions of confusion and association, each sufficient to 
give rise to liability, see Cornish and Llewelyn Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 748. 
700
  Decision of 20 May 1983, case A 82/5, Union v. Union Soleure. 
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mark and the sign, each looked as a whole and in correlation, show such an auditory, 
visual or other resemblance that by this resemblance alone associations between the 
sign and the mark are evoked
701
. As one can see, by the implementation of the 
Benelux Trade Mark law, the similarity test proves to be fundamental in an 
infringement assessment; while the likelihood of confusion is not even considered. 
However, the notion of association being broader, it means that if a risk of confusion 
is established, the risk of association is given (argumentum de majoris ad minus)
702
. 
 
Another example could also help in drawing some conclusions. The Benelux Supreme 
Court had to consider a case involving the famous trade mark Monopoly
703
. This was 
in connection with a game which showed some similarity with the game Monopoly, 
but was totally anti-capitalistic. The  trade mark Anti-Monopoly was used. One could 
argue that in this case there was no risk of confusion because Anti-Monopoly is the 
reverse of Monopoly. However, on the basis of the Benelux likelihood of association 
concept, the simple fact that the public when seeing or hearing Anti-Monopoly would 
think of Monopoly is sufficient to result in trade mark infringement
704
. One could 
argue, however, that the public is highly likely to be confused as to the origin of the 
products
705
.  
 
The Benelux Act did not mention ―likelihood of confusion‖ at all. It exclusively 
referred to the likelihood of association. The judge only estimated the association not 
as a notion related to confusion, but as a completely separate one (even though 
confusion as to origin could indeed occur). Therefore, the justification of the extended 
protection lies precisely in the different approach taken by Benelux law towards the 
normative basis of trade mark protection. The advertising function is therein 
acknowledged as equally requiring protection as the origin and the guarantee 
functions. The provision covers any infringement of this function - the origin function 
will be protected anyway, since it proposes a much narrower framework of protection. 
                                                 
701
  Emphasis Added. See, Ch. Gielen, ―Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First Trade 
Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Council‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44, at 266. 
702
  Ibid, at 267.  
703
  See Cornish and Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45,  at 751. 
704
  See Ch. Gielen, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44, at 266. 
705
 This was indeed the case in the Dutch proceedings of the case, where the court found on the 
evidence that a significant portion of the public would be confused between the two. See Edor v. 
General Mills Fun, [1978], Ned. Jur. 83. 
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The question that arises, thereof, is the following: if there is similarity between the 
signs and similarity between the goods, how could it be possible that the consumer is 
not confused? What are the parameters that would in one case cause the consumer to 
be confused and in another case not be, when encountering similar signs on similar 
goods? Is it merely the intensity of similarity that makes the difference? Or are there 
other factors, as well, to be considered, such as the reputation of the trade mark? It 
would seem logical to support that actually, all three factors need to be taken into 
account: similarity of goods, similarity of marks, recognition of the trade mark on the 
market. But if this is the case then how is art. 5(1)(b) different to  art. 5(2) of the same 
article of the Directive on dilution, which shall be examined below.  
 
The Directive presents a systematic inconsistency at this point. It does not make sense 
to incorporate in the Directive the ―likelihood of association‖ (art. 5(1)(b)) and a 
separate provision on dilution (art. 5(2)), because they both tackle the same issue, i.e. 
infringement in cases where no confusion needs to be proved (and not cases where 
confusion does not exists, because in some cases of dilution, there is also a risk of 
confusion, as shall be analysed further below in the next Part). When the ECJ realised 
that, it tried to rectify the legislators‘ inconsistency by stating that ―association‖ is  
merely a sub-set of confusion
706
. This way it restricted the scope of application of art. 
5(2)(b) of the Directive to cases of confusion – thereby leaving the cases of dilution to 
be dealt with under art. 5(2) only. Presumably the ECJ wanted at the time to restrict 
also the application of dilution to non similar products (as set out in art. 5(2)). In any 
case ―association‖ is clearly disassociated, thanks to the ECJ ruling mentioned above, 
from dilution at a European level. Its existence in the wording of the Directive is of no 
legal importance and use in the implementation of art. 5(1)(b) totally absent. 
 
C. b.  Some Considerations 
As a general remark, one could raise the question to what extent the association 
(under its Benelux meaning) of a sign with the mark is detrimental to the proprietor, 
the mark itself or the consumers. On the one hand, there is no impact on the origin or 
                                                 
706
  See Sabel v. Puma, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113. 
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guarantee functions, so long as there is no confusion as to the source of the product. 
As we have already noted, association  does not preclude, nor does it require the risk 
of confusion. On the other hand, as far as the advertising function is concerned, one 
could argue that not only is the association with the mark not detrimental, but it is 
rather beneficial. When the consumer recalls to mind the registered trade mark or 
when encountering another sign, this could be presumed to result in an enhancement 
of the mark‘s imprinting power (through its repetitive encounter with the consumer).  
 
Let us consider the case where an advertising board merely depicts the image of the 
registered trade mark (the mark itself suffices to advertise the product). Along the 
same lines, one could argue that the sign (alleged to be infringing) actually plays the 
role of the advertising board. In an indirect way, the sign ―winds up‖ the advertising 
function of the mark. Advertising does not entail only slogans and TV spots. It may 
have the form of just a photograph or even the image of the trade mark
707
. To the 
extent that this is so well-known, as to be brought clearly to the mind of the consumer 
when seeing or hearing a similar sign, one could argue that this association is actually 
part of the advertising process.  
 
However, the use of similar marks on similar products, when this results to 
association between the two, is considered to infringe the advertising function. As 
analysed above, trade marks have the ability to individualise the product and should 
be able to maintain a strong distinctive power. Even though it is doubtful whether the 
likelihood of association is actually diminishing this function, it is under no dispute 
that no one should be allowed to take unfair advantage of the mark‘s reputation. This 
issue is not dealt with by art. 5(1) of the Directive which applies only in the case of 
use of similar signs on similar products. It is only mentioned in the case of use on 
dissimilar products in art. 5(2) of the Directive. However, as we shall see further 
below it was suggested by ECJ case law subsequent to Sabel/Puma that this parameter 
should also be considered in the cases under Art. 5(2).  
C. c.  Interpreting the Directive 
It would appear that the attempt to combine the notions of ―confusion‖ and 
―association‖, as perceived under the Benelux approach, would lead to a dead end. 
                                                 
707
  Just like the Panzani advertisement mentioned infra in Part I, p. 33. 
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The provision of the Directive has been vague on this issue. If one was to follow the 
so-called ―European‖ interpretation route708 (namely that association can occur in 
cases where there is no likelihood of confusion), the protection given to trade marks 
would be quite broad. Indeed some legal scholars supported this version and believed 
that the notion of association is used as a notion broader than that of confusion
709
. 
They suggested that the Benelux law ―has been written to the Directive‖710. 
 
If one accepts such an interpretation, an indisputable mistake of semantics
711
 reveals 
itself in the text of the Directive: a logically wider concept - likelihood of association - 
is mentioned as a sub-category of the narrower concept - likelihood of confusion.
712
  
From a legal point of view, as well, there is a systematic inconsistency. Association 
(in that sense) is neither a sub- nor a supra- category of confusion. It is a different 
concept altogether. Association has nothing to do with an indication of origin or 
source. It has to do with the connotations procedure, set by the increased advertising 
power of certain signs
713
.  
 
The opposite view
714
 supports that association could be taken as a direct replacement 
of confusion; infringement would occur whenever the consumer associates similar 
goods that carry the same or similar marks as to their source. This would mean that 
the scope of the Directive provision would be limited to the source doctrine. 
Therefore, the inclusion of the words ―likelihood of association‖ would be empty of 
an autonomous meaning and would neither broaden nor restrict the scope of 
                                                 
708
  See, P. J. Groves, ―UK Trade Mark Law: Recent Developments‖, BLR 167, August/September, 
[1997], at 167. 
709
  See, characteristically, A. K. Sanders, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 687; also, Ch. Gielen, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44; 
A. Kur, Op. Cit. Supra n. 40; P. Harris, Op. Cit. Supra n. 697. The Greek legal scholars seem to ally 
with this option , as well. See, Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351. 
710
  Borrowing the title from an article by P. Prescott, ―Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law Been Written 
Into the Directive?‖, Op. Cit. Supra [1997]  n. 516. 
711
  See, among others, R. Lewin, ―The New Trade Marks Law-A Godsend for Trade Mark Owners or a 
Goldmine for the Lawyers?‖, 3 EIPR 91, [1994]; A. Kur, Op. Cit. Supra n. 40. 
712
  See A. Kur, Op. Cit. Supra n. 40.  
713
 According to Benelux law association is the result of similarity (accordingly, similarity is the 
prerequisite of association). The same procedure is applied in the confusion test. But the normative 
basis is different and should not  allow any common lines to be drawn. 
714
  See, mainly, W. R. Cornish and David Llewelyn Op. Cit. Supra n. 45 at 747; also, P. Prescott, 
―Think Before You Waga Finger‖, 6 EIPR 317, [1996]. It could also be characteristically mentioned 
that P. Prescott commented on  s. 10 (2) of the 1994 UK TM Act without even alluding to the 
likelihood of association (obviously due to his belief that the Directive has nothing new to add to the 
pre-existing practice of the British Courts). See, P. Prescott, ―Analysis: Infringement of Registered 
Trade Marks: Always a Hypothetical Comparison?‖, 1 I.P.Q. 121, [1997]. 
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protection. It is not methodologically correct, however,  to cite in the text of legal 
provisions unnecessary words. 
 
Some of the Member States‘ Courts had the chance, before the ECJ ruling on Sabel, to 
express their standing, on this ambiguous issue. In the Benelux countries, for 
example, the Always/Regina case (Regina v. Procter and Gamble, Court of Appeal 
Brussels, 27 May 1993, IER 1993, 112) supported that the likelihood of association 
should not be restricted to the origin function. However, such an approach was more 
than expected from a Benelux court. In the UK there had been three important trade 
mark decisions: Origins Natural Resources Inc. v. Origin Clothing Ltd
715
; Wagamama 
Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants Plc,
716
 and British Sugar Plc. v. James Robertson and 
Sons Ltd.
717
 Namely in the Wagamama decision, Laddie J expressed his  support to 
the latter interpretative solution. It is interesting to notice the reluctance of the British 
judge to give a substantial meaning to the wording of the Directive and therefore 
advance the legal practice of the past to new pathways
718
.  
 
The ECJ in Sabel took the second position and confirmed that ―association‖ is one 
form of confusion and not an independent concept
719
. 
 
It should be mentioned that most of the Member States (including the UK) have 
implemented Art. 5(2) in their national legislation, even though this was not a 
mandatory provision
720
. The Minutes of the drafting of the Directive reveal that it was 
indeed the intention of the authors to incorporate the Benelux practice in a uniform 
                                                 
715
  [1995], F.S.R. 280 
716
 [1995], F.S.R. 713. For further comments, See, inter alia, A. K. Sanders, ―The Wagamama 
Decision. Back to the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law‖ EIPR, 3-5, [1996]; also, by the same author, 
―The Return to Wagamama‖, EIPR 521, [1996]; P. Harris, Op. Cit. Supra n. 697; P. Prescott, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 714. 
717
  [1996], R.P.C. 281. For a further analysis, See, for example, H. Hurdle, ―Jacob J Treats Us All‖, 5 
EIPR 299, [1996]. 
718
  The arguments brought forward in the case supported both routes. However, a detailed analysis will 
not be effected in this thesis. Suffice to say that the final outcome of the case raised no objections: it is 
true that Wagamama and Rajamama‘s both used for restaurants are very likely to amount to consumer 
confusion. However, the persistence of the judge not to make an effective interpretation of the notion of 
association has resulted to extended criticism. (See Op. Cit. Supra, nn. 714 and 716). It is doubtful, 
though, whether the judge would be justified in proceeding to the notion of association, if confusion 
had been established. 
719
 Sabel v. Puma [1998], RPC 199. The ECJ stated that the notion comes from the Regulation (Art. 
81(1)(b)) and Directive (art. 4(1)(b)) and not from the Benelux trade mark act.  
720
  See, A. Kur Op. Cit. Supra, n. 40; also, B. E. Cookson, Op. Cit. Supra n. 228. 
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trade mark protection framework
721
. However, this was not without the juxtaposition 
of objections by delegates of certain Member States. This issue however has been 
answered by the ECJ in Sabel in a manner that nullified any meaning of inclusion of 
this word in the Directive.  
 
Subsequent to Sabel, the Court invoked the notion of creation of a ―link‖722 as basis 
for infringement in the context of art. 5(2) and 4(4)(a) of the Directive, namely in the 
context of the dilution provisions: in Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux v. 
Fitnessworld
723
 the Court stated that it is sufficient for the application of art. 5(2) of 
the Directive to find that a certain degree of similarity exists, that has the effect that 
the relevant public makes a connection, establishes a ―link‖ between the sign and the 
mark, even if not confusing them
 724
. 
 
In Intel
725
 the Court stated again that in the context of art. 5(2) and 4(4)(a) of the 
Directive there is infringement when the relevant public establishes a link between the 
mark and the sign
726
. The fact that the later mark calls the earlier mark with a 
reputation to mind is ―tantamount‖, the Court ruled, to the existence of such a link727, 
i.e. such ―link‖ could be argued to be actually a ―likelihood of association‖.  The 
existence of such a link is in any case found when confusion is established, but it may 
also be found when confusion is not established
728
. However, the existence of such a 
link does not mean automatically that there is infringement, the holder still needs to 
prove detriment to the distinctive character or the repute of the mark
729
.  
 
Since art. 5(2) of the Directive is, following Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux v. 
Fitnessworld, applicable also to similar goods and services, it could be argued that the 
―association‖ notion of the Benelux trade mark law did find its way into the European 
trade mark law, albeit not through the confusion provisions of the Directive, where it 
                                                 
721
  See, among others, Ch. Gielen, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44. 
722
  For further analysis, see infra Part V, D.b below.  
723
  Case  C-408/2001,  Op. Cit. Supra n. 432, E.C.R. [2003]. 
724
 Ibid, par. 29. See also, in relation to Article 5(2) of the Directive, General Motors, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
122, par. 23; Adidas and Adidas Benelux, Op. Cit. Supra n. 723, par. 41. 
725
  Case  C-252/2007,  Intel Corporation Inc. v. CPM UK Ltd., judgement of  27.11.2008. 
726
  Ibid, par. 66. 
727
  Ibid, par. 60. 
728
  Ibid, par. 57. See also Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux v. Fitnessworld, Op. Cit. Supra n. 723. 
729
  Ibid, par. 71. 
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grammatically belongs, but through the dilution provisions, namely art. 5(2) of the 
Directive.  
 
Jacob L.J. in the UK is of the opinion that the ―link‖ required by the ECJ when 
infringement under 5(2) of the Directive is claimed, always requires more than a mere 
bringing into mind of the mark; it requires a mistaken belief of ―trade connection‖730. 
This view, which obviously refers to confusion as to trade origin, is however not in 
line with the above mentioned ECJ case law, which expressly does not require 
confusion to be established under art. 5(2). 
 
C.d. The case in Greece 
According to the wording of the Greek Trade Mark law the risk of confusion includes 
the risk of association of the two marks (Art. 4 par. 1 ind. b of Law 2239/1994).  
 
As per the Greek legal doctrine, the risk of association refers to the case where despite 
the fact that the two marks when compared do not create a risk of confusion, they give 
the impression that the goods or services distinguished come from the same company 
or from different, however cooperating companies
731
. The risk of association covers 
therefore the indirect risk of confusion and the risk of confusion in a broad sense, 
notions that were developed by the German case law and were partially accepted by 
Greek case law under the regime before the implementation of the Directive. Indirect 
risk of confusion is created when the consumers have the wrong impression that the 
owner of the marks is one entity and that the marks are part of the same series or that 
the later mark is a later version of the earlier mark. Direct risk of confusion is found 
when the consumers believe that the marks originate from the same entity. Risk of 
confusion in a broad sense is when the consumer believes that there are financial or 
other type of connections between the two entities. It follows from the above that this 
definition of risk of association is exactly the definition of risk of confusion.  
 
The Greek legal doctrine agrees with the standpoint of the ECJ in Sabel, that the mere 
connotational coming into mind, does not constitute infringement in the case of non 
                                                 
730
  Jacob L.J. noting his opinion in Intel Corporation Inc. v. CPM UK Ltd., [2007], EXCA Civ 431. 
731
 N. Rokas, Industrial Property, Op. Cit. Supra n. 619, at 129, Areios Pagos 1009/1991, EEmpD 
1992, 148. 
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famous marks, as it is  inherent to any comparison resulting from similarity of the 
marks; however, not every memory awaking is actionable, but only that related to 
famous marks
732
. The Greek Supreme Court confirmed that the connotational risk of 
confusion (―κίνδςνορ ζςνειπμικήρ ζύγσςζηρ‖) should be examined in any case where 
the protection of a famous mark is sought
733
. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmed that the Court of Appeal should have found the 
existence of connotational risk of confusion (as part of the risk of confusion, 
according to the Court, but in reality as a separate ground for protection, in the sense 
that mere establishment of a link should suffice, for finding infringement). It further 
stated that the Court of Appeal should have examined the granting of protection to the 
famous trade mark, even in the absence of risk of confusion, which was its finding of 
fact
734
. Following this ruling, in case of a famous mark, the risk of association should 
suffice for protection to be granted.  
 
Even though the risk of association was included in the confusion provisions of the 
Directive (art. 4(4)(a) and art. 5(2)), it seems that it was perceived by the ECJ and 
Greek courts as actionable only in cases of famous marks. This is logical, since, for 
any association to be evoked, the earlier mark must be well-known. Even though the 
association notion was inserted in the confusion provisions of the Directive and 
subsequently ―removed‖ therefrom by the ECJ, the notion of association has found its 
way in the European trade mark law, through the dilution provisions. These shall be 
examined in the following Part V. 
 
                                                 
732
  See Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 351, at 176. 
733
  Areios Pagos 1030/2008 DEE [2009], 188, PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399. See also 
comments on Areios Pagos 1030/2008, by Ch. Koliatsi, EEmpD [2008], 891. 
734
 Areios Pagos 1030/2008,  Ibid. 
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PART V.  DILUTION: SOLUTION OR MERELY A DELUSION ? 
 
The touchstone of trade mark protection is, as already seen, likelihood of confusion as 
to the source of the product. We are now about to examine the case where trade mark 
infringement might occur without the consumer being confused, namely the theory of 
trade mark dilution. After its incorporation in many state laws in the USA, where the 
theory of dilution originated from in the beginning of the previous century, a federal 
statute on dilution was promulgated. The theory of dilution is one of the most 
ambiguous in trade mark law. It has gained warm supporters, but has also received 
severe criticism. It has been accused of vagueness, inconsistency and absence of legal 
basis. This controversial doctrine will be of primary interest in the course of this 
chapter and suggestions will be made for a new perspective of the theory. It is 
submitted, however, that despite these inconsistencies the solutions proposed by the 
dilution theory should be embraced, albeit on a new basis. The discussion will draw 
on the framework of trade mark functions, as well as the semiotic analysis undertaken 
in Part I. It is submitted that the three trade mark functions are inexorably linked with 
each other and the only way to perceive any infringing act, including dilution, is by 
considering this triad as a whole. Trying to focus on the infringing use against one 
specific function would nullify the other two functions. 
 
The US legislation and the influence of US legal doctrine and case law on the 
European law shall be examined. How is dilution dealt with by the Directive? One of 
the most important articles of the Directive is the one that introduces the possibility of 
infringement in case of use of identical or similar marks on non-competing goods
735
. 
The European legal framework and European Courts‘ (ECJ, CFI) case law shall be 
analysed, in order to assess the contribution of the dilution theory and legislation to 
the protection of trade marks and in particular famous marks. 
 
The dilution theory in national frameworks will be analysed, as this is encapsulated in 
Section 10(3) of the UK TM Act 1994 and Article 18(3) and 4(1)(c) of the Greek TM 
Act. It will be argued that the dilution theory leads to an absolute protection of the 
stronger marks, while leaving the weaker ones with a comparatively lesser extent of 
                                                 
735
  Art. 5 EC Directive. 
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protection. A new tentative theory of dilution will be promulgated, emanating from 
the new context of trade mark protection introduced by the Directive. In the absence 
of a clearer understanding of the psychological and logical mechanisms of dilution, 
the underlying theoretical problems will continue to need further clarification in order 
to facilitate the application of dilution laws. 
 
A.  WHAT IS DILUTION? 
 
The notion of dilution was introduced in 1927 in a seminal article written by Fr. 
Schechter
736
 and it proposes the extension of trade mark protection beyond the 
traditional scope of the origin and guarantee functions. A great amount of literature 
has been written on this issue by USA scholars
737
, which is characterised as one of the 
most ambiguous and controversial doctrines of trade mark law
738
. This is due partly to 
the fact that there is no unanimity as to what the doctrine actually encompasses and 
what ―dilution‖ really means; and partly to the objections raised as to the usefulness 
or legal justification of the doctrine.  
 
 
The essence of dilution is as Judge Posner has explained: ―A trademark seeks to 
economize on information costs by providing a compact, memorable and 
unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The economy is less when, because 
the trademark has other associations, a person seeing it must think for a moment 
before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service
739‖.  
                                                 
736
  Frank Schechter, Op. Cit. Supra n. 4. 
737
 See, among others, B. W. Pattishall, ―The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity 
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects‖, 67 TMR 607, 610, [1977]; also, ―Dawning acceptance of the 
Dilution Rational for Trade-Mark-Trade Identity‖, 74 TMR 289, [1984]; J. Moskin, ―Dilution or 
Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection‖, 83 TMR 122, [1993]; W. Derenberg, ―The 
Problem of Trade-Mark Dilution and the Anti- Dilution Statutes‖, 44 California Law Review 439, 
[1956]; H. Shire, ―Dilution Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative 
to the Law of Infringement?‖ 77 TMR 273, [1987], Swann, 92 TMR 1345, [2002].  
738
  ―Schechter‘s bones are still rattling, loudly‖ (sic), J. Gilson, ―A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It 
Time?‖, 83 TMR 108 at 112-116, [1993].  
739
 Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992).   
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A. a. Background 
Before we proceed with the analysis of the actual content of dilution theory, it would 
be helpful to refer to the context within which Schechter‘s  article was written. In 
1927, when the article was written, the prevailing system of legal protection of trade 
marks was based on consumer confusion by use of a sign identical or similar to the 
registered mark on identical or similar goods. The courts had no authority whatsoever 
to enjoin legal protection in any other case falling outside the scope of legal 
provisions. In other words, courts were not able to offer protection to a trade mark 
owner against unauthorised use on similar goods when there was no likelihood of 
confusion; nor were they able to protect  as against the use of identical or similar signs 
on non-competing goods, whether there existed a likelihood of confusion or not. 
 
What Schechter noticed and objected to, was the inadequacy of trade mark protection 
in respect to the above mentioned cases. The specific mischief the author sought to 
remedy was the narrow focus of classic trade mark law. This limited recovery to cases 
where a direct competitor actually diverted trade by causing consumers to believe that 
its goods originated from the same source as the plaintiff‘s; or that there was 
economic or other association existing between them. Schechter postulated that this 
was inadmissible (to use his own words, a depiction of ―obsolete conceptions‖)740 to 
the extent that trade mark functions no longer exclusively referred to origin and 
guarantee. For him, trade marks were not mere symbols of goodwill, but rather ―the 
most effective agent for the creation of goodwill, imprinting upon the public mind an 
anonymous and impersonal guarantee of satisfaction, creating desire for further 
satisfactions‖741.  In essence, Schechter promulgated that the primary function worthy 
of legal protection was the advertising function of the trade mark
742
. As a 
consequence, the real injury resulting from the use of identical
743
 marks on non 
                                                 
740
  See, Schechter, Op. Cit. Supra n. 4, at 338. 
741
  Ibid. Emphasis added. 
742
  See, H. Carty, ―Dilution and Passing Off‖, 112 LQR 632, [1996], at 643. 
743
  It should be noted that in his article, Schechter only made reference to use of identical signs, not 
similar. This is an issue that should be clarified. Namely, to what extent do only similar signs harm the 
registered trade mark when used on dissimilar goods.   
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competing goods was the ―gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and 
hold upon the public mind.‖744 This phrase epitomises the dilution theory.  
 
A. b.  Quest For A Definition 
What did Schechter actually mean by these words? A clarification given by him at a 
later stage suggested that the ―whittling away‖ means the gradual diminution of the 
mark‘s distinctive character because of its unauthorised use on non competing 
goods.
745
 A trade mark is an effective ―silent salesman‖746 stimulating sales by 
creating goodwill and assuring buyers that all goods bearing the mark are of the same 
quality. Therefore, its ability to attract customers through its intense distinctive 
character is worth protecting. This however, could lead to the danger of extending the 
protection merely on the basis of the mark‘s reputation in the market. ―The mark 
actually sells the goods. And, self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark, the more 
effective is its selling power.‖747 This seems to be an unfair treatment and inadequate 
protection of the weaker marks. An acceptable justification is needed for such a 
discriminative result. Moreover, no coherent standard exists on the ―degree‖ of 
distinctiveness that a mark should have in order to acquire more extended 
protection
748
. How this issue is dealt with by the ECJ and the Greek courts shall be 
analysed subsequently. 
 
One definition of dilution that appears to be simple and logically consistent is given 
by B. Pattishall: ―Dilution results when use of a mark by others generates awareness 
that the mark no longer signifies anything unique, singular or particular, but instead 
                                                 
744
  Schechter, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 4, at 342. 
745
  Testifying before a Congressional committee in 1932, Schechter explained that : ―if you allow Rolls 
Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 
years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more. That is the point.‖ See, J. Wollf, ―Non-
Competing Goods in Trade Mark Law‖, 37 Colum L Rev 582, [1937].  
746
 Schechter, ―Fog and Fiction in Trade -Mark Protection‖, 36 Col L Rev 60, [1936], at 64.  
747
 Schechter, [1927], Op. Cit. Supra n. 4, at 342. 
748
 In the USA there have been numerous cases where arguably weak or non-distinctive marks have 
been thought by the courts to merit protection against dilution.  See, for example, Roadway Express, 
Inc. v. Roadway Motor Plazas, Inc. 17 USPQ2d 1131 (NDNY 1990) (ROADWAY); Zeller v. La Hood 
627 F Supp 811, 8 USPQ 1028, 1032 (cd I11 1985) Dawn v. Sterling Drug Inc. 167 USPQ 721 
(TOWER OF BABBLE). 
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may (or does) denominate several varying items from varying sources‖749. This 
definition however is not entirely satisfactory since it does not consider at all the 
remoteness or relatedness of the two parties‘ trademark usage750.  
 
Professor Callmann makes another proposition, defining dilution as opposed to the 
notion of confusion. He explains that ―confusion creates an immediate injury, while 
dilution is a cancer which, if allowed to spread, will slowly but inevitably destroy the 
advertising value of the mark.‖751 This is possibly an overstatement, but describes 
vividly the harmful result of dilution as viewed from the perspective of one of the 
doctrine‘s warmest supporters. In any case, where protection against confusion aims 
primarily or at least in parallel to the protection of public interest i.e. the interests of 
consumers, protection against dilution is strictly individual-economic centred: all it 
aims at, is  protecting the  trade mark owner and the trade mark
752
.   
A. c. Dilution Categories 
The prevailing classification of possible cases of trade mark dilution consists of either 
the ―blurring of the product identification‖ or ―tarnishment‖. This categorisation 
emanated from USA judicial practice. According to that, ―blurring‖ is the whittling 
away of the established trade mark‘s selling power753. This is the ―traditional case of 
―dilution‖ in which the uniqueness of a trademark may be impaired as a result of 
trademark use by others of the same mark on totally unrelated goods‖754. Classic 
examples of diluting cases might include: Buick aspirin tablets, Kodak pianos, Dupont 
shoes and Schlitz varnish.  
 
The other case of dilution is ―tarnishment‖. This would, generally, arise when a mark 
is linked to products of an inferior quality, or when a mark is portrayed in an 
unwholesome or unsavoury context likely to invoke negative thoughts about the 
owner‘s product755.  In such situations it is the reputation and commercial value of the 
                                                 
749
  Pattishall, [1984], Op. Cit. Supra n. 737, at 308. However, even such a strong supporter of the 
dilution theory, admitted that the dilution theory is ―bewilderingly intangible‖ in ―Dilution: Trademark 
Infringement or Will-O‘- the Wisp‖, 7 Harv L Rev 520, [1964], at 125. 
750
  See J. Moskin, [1993[, Op. Cit. Supra n. 737, at 134. 
751
  R. Callman, ―Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies‖, L. Altman 4th ed. [1983], at 34. 
752
 See also B. Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766, [2006] at 1146. 
753
  See R. Litowitz and D. Rettew, Op. Cit. Supra n. 769. 
754
  Tony Martino, ―Trademark Dilution‖, Crarendon Press, Oxford, [1996] 1. 
755
  Ibid.  
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mark that are affected and not its distinctive function
756
. The former can diminish 
where the public attributes the undesirable characteristics of the defendant‘s goods to 
the plaintiff‘s goods. Examples of tarnishment dilution include, for example, a poster 
reading ―Enjoy Cocaine‖ in a script and colour identical to that of Coca Cola757. 
 
Apart from the general categories, some other cases of trade mark dilution  can also 
be drawn. Parody is a special case of the use of a trade mark that falls within the 
context of tarnishment, but should not be restricted since it is protected under the 
freedom of speech
758
. Notwithstanding the above, as such the parody would seem to 
reinforce the reputation or distinctiveness of the mark, rather than dilute it. The 
success of the parody depends on the public continuing to associate the mark with the 
original owner. However, the line between parody and tarnishment may sometimes be 
difficult to draw, as in the Coca Cola case itself.  
 
The last category that is going to be considered is the case of ―generification.‖759 This 
occurs when the mark becomes descriptive of the product itself, thereby destroying 
the worth of the mark. The mark‘s distinctiveness is diminished, and consequently so 
is its market value. Characteristic examples can be mentioned: ―Aspirin‖760, 
―Linoleum‖761, ―Thermos‖762 and ―Shredded Wheat.‖763 This could be envisaged as 
the ―death‖ of the trade mark, resulting from the loss of the mark‘s source-related 
associative significance
764. Generification is the ―ultimate dilution‖ and it is probably 
                                                 
756
  Along these lines an analogy can be drawn. The case of tarnishment and the respective interest of 
the trade mark owner to prevent such a use is analogous to the interest of the copyright owner to protect 
his moral right of integrity (See further Cornish Op. Cit. Supra n. 42). The right to object to derogatory 
treatment is similar to the right of the trade mark owner to seek protection against use resulting to 
tarnishment. This is supported also by the fact that a typical case of derogatory treatment is parody, 
which is encompassed in the notion of tarnishment as well.  
757
  346 F Supp 1183; 175 USPQ 56 (EDNY 1972). 
758
  See, the detailed study of E. Gredley and Sp. Maniatis, ―Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part Two: 
Trade Mark Parodies‖, 8 EIPR 412, [1997]. Under the 2006 Anti – Dilution Revision Act parody was 
explicitly excluded. 
759
  See, in general, L. Holmqvist, ―Degeneration of Trade Marks‖, The Publishing Company of the 
Swedish Federation of Jurists and Social Scientists. 
760
  Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F 505 (SDNY 1921). 
761
  Linoleum Mfg Co. v. Nairn, [1978] 7 Ch D 834. 
762
  King -Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Industries Inc., 312 F2d 577, 138 USPQ 349 (CA 2 1963). 
763
  Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 US 111, [1938]. 
764
 However it has been argued that the destruction of those mark was the result of successful marketing 
and not of unauthorised used by third parties on dissimilar products, see Moskin 154 TMW 34 [2003] 
at 37. He further notes that ―[I]f dilution were truly the ―inevitable‖ result of unauthorised third-party 
use of similar marks, there should be some ready concrete examples from the history of trade mark law 
or marketing generally‖. 
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the main reason for existence of anti dilution provisions. It could not, of course, be 
considered as an infringement since it is the result of the use by common people and 
by unauthorised third parties for commercial purposes. This is why it is important for 
the trade mark owner to take judicial action against third parties that make 
unauthorised use of its mark and for an effective legal framework to exist in that 
respect. If no anti dilution provisions exist (or they exist but are not applied properly), 
and the trade mark owner cannot do anything judicially to stop such use, then one lost 
court case opens the door for use by more third parties. A vicious circle then opens 
and the result is ―generification‖. 
 
A.d. The USA Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
Despite the fact that the doctrine was encompassed primarily in American trade mark 
theory and legislation
765
, almost no legal
766
 provision legally defined this notion. 
Therefore, no officially accepted statutory or case law definition existed. The only 
exception to that are the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, which create a federal cause of action for trade mark 
dilution
767
. The definition given in the 1995 Act was not particularly helpful
768
. The 
                                                 
765
 In the USA twenty five states have statutes that purport to recognise a right against trademark 
dilution (the earliest dating to 1947, Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, par. 7a, [1947], Mass Acts 300, 
repealed by 1973 Acts, ch. 897 par. 2 replaced by 1975 Mass Gen Laws, ch. 110B par. 12 Wes Supp 
697). 
766
  See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4
th
 ed. 2004), ch. 24, pt.2, Micheletti and 
Dorfman, 92 TMR 1345, [2002], Barton Beebe, ―A defense of the New Antidilution Federal Law‖, 
Fordhal Intell. Prop. Media and Ent. L. J., [2006], 1143. However, the courts in general do not grant 
relief for dilution without the concurrent finding of likelihood of confusion under a traditional 
infringement analysis. See, J. Moskin, Op. Cit. Supra n. 737, at 122. It would be worth noting however, 
that the first USA decision to extend trade mark infringement beyond competing goods to different but 
related goods was  Aunt Jemina Mills Co. v. Rigney and Co., 247 F 407 (2d Cir 1917). 
767
  Even before the adoption of the federal Anti- Dilution Act, there were many state laws in the USA 
that provided protection against dilution. Given the fact that the doctrine was introduced firstly in the 
USA (Schechter‘ s article was first published in Harvard Law Review) the discussion on dilution 
proliferated in the USA and there was also legislation adopted there. It should be noted however that 
Schechter himself was arguing on the background of a German decision (Landesgericht, Elberfeld, 25 
Juristiche Wochenschrift 502; XXV Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 264, 11 September 1925. The 
owner of the trademark Odol for mouthwash obtained cancellation of the same mark used in relation to 
steel railroad ties (1924, 25 Juristiche Wochenschrift 502). See, T. Martino, Op. Cit. Supra n. 754, at, n. 
1. Some commentators have suggested that the doctrine originated in England with the decisions in 
Eastman Photographic Materials Co. Ltd. V. John Griffiths Cycle Corporation Ltd [1898], 15 RPC 105 
(―Kodak‖) and Walter v. Ashton, [1902]. These were two very important passing off cases but the 
courts were merely proscribing the harm of dilution under a traditional likelihood of confusion 
rationale. See, B. Pattishall, ―Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademarks-Trade 
Identity Protection‖, Op. Cit. Supra n.  737, at 289. 
768
 Cornish interestingly points out that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act solved only one problem, 
that of cyber squatters who register domain names embodying famous trademarks with a view to 
selling them to the trademark owners. This is because the dilution liability does not require likelihood 
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Act merely defined dilution as ―the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services‖769. However the 2006 Revision Act 
provided clearer definitions and made a distinction between Dilution by Blurring and 
Dilution by Tarnishment. The former is defined as ―association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark‖770 and the latter as ―association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation 
of the famous mark‖ 771.  
 
It has been argued that these two categories do not cover the dilution by impairment 
of uniqueness, which is what Schechter meant to refer to by dilution
772
. Indeed, in the 
early stages of the drafting of the Act, a form of antidilution protection based on 
―uniqueness‖ was proposed and rejected773.  
                                                                                                                                            
of confusion, therefore, one cannot put forward as a defence that the domain name is not for given 
goods or services, Cornish and Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 753. See also for similar result in 
England British Telecommunications v. One in a Million, [1999], FSR 1, CA. 
769
  See, R. Littowitz and D. Rettew, ―What is ―Dilution‖ Under the New US Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act?‖, 11 EIPR 618, [1996]. The Act did not provide for the protection of ―well-known‖ 
marks (as opposed to ―famous marks‖). Moskin, (154 TW 34, [2003]) points out that‖[a]lthough 
metaphors and analogies make abundantly clear what the dilution theory aims to remedy, even the 
State law precedents show that proving the theory in any given instance is daunting. The actual law 
Congress drafted is more opaque still‖.    
770
  The idea underlying the concept of blurring is that the defendant‘s use of a mark similar or identical 
to the plaintiff‘s mark will ―blur‖ the link between the plaintiff‘s mark and the goods or services to 
which the plaintiff‘s mark is traditionally attached. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 
894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (―The distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer brings to 
mind the senior user alone‖), Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, ―What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn From Trademark Law‖, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 [2006], where they write: ―Blurring 
takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which consumers can associate with the mark owner 
without any necessary context, and applies it to unrelated products—say, Exxon pianos or Exxon 
carpets. Even if the consumer understands that these different Exxons are unrelated, the proliferation 
of Exxon-marked products may make it more difficult for consumers to figure out which company is 
responsible for any particular product. (Quick: What does Delta sell?)‖. See also David J. Franklyn, 
―Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in 
American Trademark Law‖, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 129 [2004] (―This blurring occurs because 
consumers no longer associate the famous mark with only one line of goods or only one source of 
goods.‖); Michael Pulos, ―A Semiotic Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark‖, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 833, 839 [2006].   
771
 Section 2. Tarnishment was for the first time expressly included as form of dilution. It was not 
mentioned by Schechter.  
772
 See William G. Barber, ―A ―Rational‖ Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The Three 
Hallmarks of True Trademark Dilution‖, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 43–44 (2005); Barton Beebe, ―The 
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law‖, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 681–82 [2004].   
773
 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12-13 
[2005] (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association). See also id. 
at 22–23 (testimony of William G. Barber on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association).   
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It follows from the definition of dilution by blurring that ―association‖ is an element 
inherent to dilution. This could mean that for the judge to find that a junior mark 
“blurs” a senior mark, the judge must find that the junior mark is causing consumers 
to “think for a moment” before recognizing that the senior mark refers to the goods of 
the senior mark’s owner774. A merely formal analysis of the similarity of the marks is 
insufficient. The judge must evaluate the effect of the junior mark on the perceptions 
of actual consumers and must in the process take into account such factors as the 
degree of distinctiveness of the senior mark and the sophistication of the relevant 
consumer population
775
.  
 
According to this view, certain very strong marks are not simply a means of 
identifying and advertising source. In a new age of mass production, they are also a 
means of endowing the goods to which they were attached with the characteristic of 
uniqueness, a characteristic for which consumers would pay a premium. As per B. 
Beebe commenting on how simple the application of anti-dilution provisions should 
be as opposed to confusion provisions: ―The beauty of Schechter‘s original 
conception of antidilution protection was that it was relatively easy to put into 
practice. Uniqueness is an absolute concept. A mark is either unique or it is not. If a 
senior mark is unique in the marketplace and a junior mark appears that is identical to 
it, then the junior mark will destroy the senior mark‘s uniqueness. Thus, the test for 
dilution was an essentially formal one. The judge need only consider the identity or 
close similarity of the parties‘ marks. If they were identical or closely similar, then the 
loss of uniqueness could be presumed
776
. Where the consumer confusion test was a 
messy and unpredictable empirical analysis centered on the consumer, the trademark 
dilution test was simple and relatively predictable centered on the trade mark‖777.  
                                                 
774
  See B. Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 766 [2006], 1149. 
775
  Ibid. 
776
 With regard to the presumptions problematic within the European context see also further below. 
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to have appreciated this aspect of antidilution protection in 
their formulation of the factors that courts in their respective circuits should consider in finding 
dilution. See, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(considering similarity of the parties‘ marks and the ―renown‖ of the senior mark in finding a 
likelihood of dilution); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (―[O]nly mark similarity and, possibly, degree of ‗renown‘ of 
the senior mark would appear to have trustworthy relevance under the federal Act.‖)   
777
 Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766, [2006], 1146. See also below on the applicability issues raised within 
the European context. 
  
 172 
 
According to the 2006 Revision Act, in determining whether a mark is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the 
following
778
: 
(i) The degree of similarity  between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. 
The marks must be “identical” or “nearly identical” or “substantially similar”779. 
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark. Dilution 
results to the impairment of such distinctive character. A mark that notwithstanding its 
fame does not have any distinctive character (even though in such a case it would be 
hard not to acknowledge at least acquired distinctiveness
780) is lacking “the very 
attribute that the antidilution statute seeks to protect”781. As per consistent case law 
incorporated in the Act, the degree of distinctiveness of the senior mark has a 
considerable bearing on the question whether a junior use will have a diluting 
effect
782
. The more distinctive the mark, the more likely such distinctive character to 
be impaired. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially 
exclusive use of the mark. The owner of the famous mark should take all necessary 
steps to prosecute unauthorized use of his mark, through cease and desist letters, 
judicial action, trademark oppositions etc. in order to confirm that the use of its mark 
is not “exclusive” but “substantially exclusive”783. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. The higher the level of consumer 
recognition, the more likely dilution to be found. 
                                                 
778
  These factors mainly depict pre existing case law. 
779
  V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Victor Moseley and Cathy Moseley, [2008] 558 F. D.I.a. Supp. 2d. 734, 
citing Nike Inc. v. Nikepal International Inc. [2007], WL 2782030 (E.D. Cal. 2007),  United States 
Court of Appeal 4
th
 Circuit in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC. Victoria D. N. 
Dauernheim, Woofies LLC d.b.a Woofie‘s Pet Boutique, 507, F. 3d. 252, [2007], par. 17. It is 
interesting to note that in the European context it is argued that the degree of similarity in dilution cases 
must not be the same as the degree of similarity required for establishing confusion. A lesser degree of 
similarity should be enough. See further below. 
780
 See also the same view by ECJ, in Intel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 725,  par. 73. 
781
  V Secret, Op. Cit. Supra n. 779, at D.I.b, citing Nabisco, 191 F. 3d, 215-116. 
782
 Ibid. 
783
 Ibid, citing Nikepal [2007] WL 2782030 at 7, citing L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil Inv., 192 F. 3d. 
1349, 1352 (Fed. C. 1999). 
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(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with 
the famous mark. Such intention is inferred when the degree of similarity is such, that 
coincidence is excluded
784
. 
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. 
Even though actual dilution need not be proved under the 2006 Act, any evidence of 
actual association in the minds of consumers is taken into account for establishing  the 
likelihood of dilution. Then evidence of likelihood of dilution, namely of an impact on 
the strength of the famous mark, should also be submitted
785
. 
 
As we shall see further below some of these criteria are used also in European trade 
mark law. 
 
The Revision Act particularly states that the owner of a famous mark has judicial 
recourse rights regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury
786
. It is required however, that the mark is 
famous and distinctive, either inherently or through acquired distinctiveness and that 
the third party is using the infringing sign in commerce
787
. 
 
The 2006 Revision Act contains also the definition of famous mark, as one that is 
widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining 
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider 
all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic 
reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, (ii) The amount, volume, and 
geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark, iii) The extent 
of actual recognition of the mark
788
. As we shall see further, these criteria are similar 
to the criteria used by European courts. 
 
Any fair use is excluded by the above mentioned provisions. In the European context, 
as we shall see, acting unfairly is one of the conditions to be met for establishing 
                                                 
784
 Ibid, D.I.e. The Greek case law takes this position as well, when examining ―bad faith‖ in trade 
mark infringement. See further below.  
785
  Ibid, D.I.f. 
786
  Section 2 of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act. 
787
  Ibid. 
788
  Ibid. 
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infringement. Even though the construction is different the rationale is the same in 
both regimes.  
 
B.  DILUTION REVISITED 
The dilution doctrine is not as straightforward as traditional trade mark protection in 
the framework of confusion and has gone through many evolution stages until its 
legislative crystallisation, as we have seen in the previous chapter. In the present 
chapter we shall propose that some inconsistencies exist in the heart of this doctrine 
and shall examine some difficulties that arise in its application. Since European law is 
inspired by the USA legal doctrine and case law, especially in the framework of 
dilution, we shall examine how these problems have been dealt with in the USA, by 
legal doctrine and case law. The position of the European Court of Justice and 
national courts in Europe shall be examined, in view of the above, in the following 
chapters.   
B. a. Inherent Reservations 
Several objections could arise with regard to the scope of this theory and the 
requirements necessary for its application. In addition, several inconsistencies may 
also be noted
789
.  Firstly, the relationship between confusion
790
 and dilution is a vague 
one. Is it not contradictory for a plaintiff to invoke confusion as well as dilution 
claims in parallel? Does the claim on dilution not presuppose that there is no 
confusion and vice versa? Even though matters seem to be clear on this issue, in 
Greece, for example, where invoking both legal bases in parallel would constitute the 
action contradictory and therefore not precise enough and dismissible, the situation is 
                                                 
789
  See, for example,  J. Swann and Th. Davis, ―Dilution, an Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand 
Equity as Protectible Property, the New/Old Paradigm‖, 84 TMR 267, [1994]; Mc Carthy ―Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition‖, 4th ed., [2005]. Cornish points out that ―dilution‖ either seen in the context 
of unfair competition or trade mark law, should only be prevented in cases where there is really 
sufficient cause for interfering with ―the freedom of all traders to promote their goods as best they can‖ 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 712. 
790
  Dilution‘s ―older cousin‖ according to T. Martino, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 754, at 3. 
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not the same in the USA
791
. As we shall examine further below, the ECJ recently took 
a similar position
792
.  
 
It could be argued that the unauthorised use of a famous mark on dissimilar products 
gives rise to risk of confusion
793
. In Anheuser Busch Inc. v. VIP Products LLC
794
, 
where the plaintiff was invoking both federal trademark infringement and dilution 
claims, the court found that the plaintiff had proved actual confusion of the consumers 
even though the products at issue were dissimilar
795
.  
 
Furthermore, the wording of  Section 2 of the 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
stating that in order to find dilution, there is no need to provide proof of confusion, 
could be interpreted as meaning that even though it is possible for confusion to occur 
in cases of dilution, there is no need to provide such evidence in order to establish a 
claim on dilution
796
. 
 
Indeed, it is not necessarily true that in case of a sign being used on dissimilar goods, 
there is no confusion on the part of the consumer, or in other words that the sources of 
the goods (although different) are not somehow associated
797
. This suggestion would 
appear to accord no less protection than the doctrine of dilution. Professor McCarthy 
focuses on the problem from the perspective of psychological assumptions that are 
                                                 
791
  See, for example, United States Court of Appeal 4
th
 Circuit in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute 
Diggity Dog, LLC. Victoria D. N. Dauernheim, Woofies LLC d.b.a Woofie‘s Pet Boutique, 507, F. 3d. 
252, [2007], US District Court E.D. Missouri in Anheuser Busch Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, [2008], WL 
4619702, (E.D. Mo.). 
792
  In case C-252/07,  Intel Corporation Inc. v. CPM UK Ltd., judgement of  27.11.2008,  par. 57. 
793
 Some commentators have been since long supporting such a proposition. See J. Wolff, ―Non-
Competing Goods in Trademark Law‖, 37 Colum. Law Rev 582, [1937], at 584; also, F. Gordon Battle 
Jr, ―Trade Reputation-Unfair Competition-Dilution of Trade Marks‖, North Carolina L Rev 105, 
[1957], at 108. One could mention the Polaroid case where the court did find a likelihood of confusion 
in the use of the mark Polaraid for refrigerators. (Polaroid Corp. V. Polaraid Inc., 319 F2d 830, 138 
USPQ 265 (CA 7 1983). In this case the marks were extremely similar, the goods were totally 
dissimilar and the mark requiring protection was a very famous one. However, the court granted 
protection under trade mark law based on the traditional test of confusion and not on the dilution 
doctrine. 
794
  Op. Cit. Supra  n. 791. 
795
  Ibid, par. 6 and 8. 
796
 See Louis Vuitton, Op. Cit. Supra n. 791, at. F, stating ―On the actual confusion factor, it is well 
established that no actual confusion is required to prove a case of trademark infringement, although the 
presence of actual confusion can be persuasive evidence relating to a likelihood of confusion‖, citing 
also, Care First, 434, F. 3d at 268. 
797
 As we have seen, in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Dilution By Blurring is defined as ―an 
association‖ of the marks arising from the infringing use. This is similar to the view prevailing in the 
European courts as well, as we shall see further below. 
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thought to support the dilution theory: ―The dilution concept presumes that 
defendant‘s use of the mark does not cause such a strong mental connection that 
confusion is likely. On the other hand, if a reasonable buyer is not at all likely to think 
of the senior user‘s trademark in his or her own mind, even subtly or similarly, then 
there can be no dilution.‖798 This suggestion reveals the importance of the mental 
processes of consumers and other relevant users, which play an important role in the 
justification and evaluation of the dilution theory.  
 
B. b.  Applicability issues 
On the other hand, difficulties in the application of the doctrine, in particular with 
regard to proof, come forward. As Professor McCarthy put it: ―Judges and attorneys 
are unclear as to exactly what dilution is and how to prove it. Consistency and 
predictability are hard to find‖799.  
 
The most important issue with regard to the application of the doctrine of dilution by 
blurring is the difficulty of finding evidence to support the notion that the distinctive 
and marketing power of the mark has diminished or is likely to diminish in the minds 
of the consumers
800. As the courts have found though ―Any difficulties of proof that 
may be entailed in demonstrating actual dilution are not an acceptable reason for 
dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation‖801. 
 
This had lead some USA courts to impose that some showing of likelihood of 
confusion be made despite the literal language of virtually all the statutes clearly 
dispensing with this element of proof
802
. 
 
                                                 
798
  Th. McCarthy, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766, at 24-109. Emphasis omitted. 
799
  See ―Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law compared‖ 94 TMR [2004], 1167. 
800
 It has been proposed thereof that the weakening of good will should be measured only by 
behavioural studies instead of direct proof See, J. Moskin, Op. Cit. Supra n. 737 [1993], at 138. We 
shall further see how this issue has been dealt with in the European context. 
801
 V Secret V Secret Catalogue Inc, v. Victor Moseley and Cathy Moseley, [2003] Court of Appeals 
259 F. 3d 464, p. 15, stating also ―There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the 
VICTORIA‘S SECRET mark‘s capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria‘s 
Secret stores or advertised in its catalogues. The officer who saw the ad directed his offense entirely at 
petitioners, not respondents. And respondents‘ expert said nothing about the impact of petitioners‘ 
name on the strength of respondents‘ mark‖. 
802
  See, J. Moskin, Op. Cit. Supra n. 737, where examples from case law are mentioned: Mushroom 
Makers Inc. v. R. G.  Barry Corp., 580 F2d 44, 49, 199 USPQ 65, 69 (CA 2 1978); Substral America, 
Inc. v. Gillette Interim Subsidiary Inc. 210 USPQ 148,155 (SDNY 1980); King Research Inc. v. 
Shulton Inc, 324 F Supp 631, 639, 169 USPQ 396, 402 (SDNY 1971).  
  
 177 
It is interesting to note that in a  2003 Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue
803
, the Court read the language of anti-dilution Section 43(c) of the Trade 
Mark Act, as in force at the time,  to require that the plaintiff show evidence of actual 
dilution, rather than of a mere likelihood of dilution, in order to be granted relief 
under the section. The Court acknowledged that requiring evidence of actual dilution 
may entail ―difficulties of proof,‖ but explained that on the language of the statute, it 
could not do otherwise. To make things easier, the Court stated that ―[i]t may well be . 
. . that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if 
actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—the obvious 
case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.‖ This passage has become 
notorious in American trademark law
804
. Other courts have read the passage to mean 
that when the parties‘ marks are identical, then the only additional evidence that is 
necessary to show dilution is circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence (the so-called 
―identity-plus interpretation‖)805. Some courts have read the passage to mean that 
when the parties‘ marks are identical, then direct evidence of dilution is unnecessary 
because the identity of the marks is itself sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
dilution
806
.  
 
This controversial issue of whether anti-dilution laws should be applied and protection 
granted before dilution actually occurred was resolved in the USA with the 2006 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, which provided that ―[ …] the owner of a famous 
mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be 
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner‘s 
mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that 
is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, 
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or 
                                                 
803
  537 U.S. 413 (2003)   
804
  B. Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 766, [2006], at 1150. 
805
 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied by Savin 
Eng‘rs, P.C. v. Savin Corp., 126 S. Ct. 116 (2005), GMC v. Autovation Techs., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 
764 (E.D. Mich. 2004), Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 
2003).     
806
 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
24, 2003), rev‘d by Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004), Cf. Lee Middleton 
Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2004).     
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of economic injury‖807. In view of the above, trade mark owners would not need to 
produce evidence of actual dilution any more
808
.  
 
Even if it is accepted that no actual dilution should be proved, the issue of how to 
prove the likelihood of impairment on the distinctive character of the famous mark 
still remains. It is de lege ferenda correct to provide that in order for the mark to be 
adequately protected, it would be enough to establish only potential and not actual 
dilution, as is the case also with regard to confusion. But still, the difficulty of 
providing proof of a future event (which is also the case in the framework of 
confusion) is not easy to overcome. This is the reason why in the framework of 
confusion when evidence is  produced, this is usually proof of actual confusion (e.g. 
witnesses stating that they  mistakenly bought the third party‘s product because of the 
confusion that was created, or even surveys confirming that by reference of the third 
party‘s mark the trade mark owner‘s mark is mistakenly understood). The need to 
prove potential and not actual confusion is not in practice so much more helpful to the 
trade mark owner.  
 
The same is true in the framework of dilution, where the question remains: how does 
one prove the possibility that the distinctive character of the mark is impaired? As we 
have seen, ―distinctiveness‖ refers to the public‘s recognition that the famous mark 
identifies a single source of the product using the famous mark
 809
. 
 
It had been accepted in USA case law that ―Where the marks at issue are not identical, 
the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user‘s mark with a famous 
mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution‖810 and that ―A mere similarity 
in the marks -  even a close similarity – will not suffice to establish per se evidence of 
                                                 
807
  Section 2 of the Act. Emphasis added. 
808
 See V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Victor Moseley and Cathy Moseley, [2008] 558 F. Supp. 2d. 734. 
This was a requirement of US case law before the Revision Act, see V Secret Catalogue Inc, v. Victor 
Moseley and Cathy Moseley, [2003] Court of Appeals 259 F. 3d 464, Everest Capital Ltd. V. Everest 
Funds Mgmt., LLC 393, F. 3d 755, 763. Interestingly, such proof of actual dilution was required even 
after such enactment, see US District Court E.D. Missouri in Anheuser Busch Inc. v. VIP Products 
LLC, [2008], Op. Cit. Supra n. 791. 
809
  See also Louis Vuitton, Op. Cit. Supra n. 791, par. 11. 
810
  See Everest Capital,  Ibid quoting Moseley v. Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 [2003]. 
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dilution‖811. Similarity is a sine qua non element to dilution: marks that are not so 
similar as to be likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark, can not be 
found infringing
812
. Similarity is not enough though to establish dilution. On the 
contrary, evidence must be provided that the consumers form (or, under the literary 
interpretation of the new Act, are likely to form) a different impression of the famous 
mark because of the association between the two marks. Evidence that the consumers 
make the mental association of the two marks is not enough, as this association does 
not necessarily cause dilution, i.e. the change of the consumers‘ impression of the 
famous mark, the impairment of such mark‘s distinctive character813. The same is true 
for dilution by tarnishment. The plaintiff would need to prove that because of the use 
of the third party‘s mark the reputation of his  own mark is harmed814. It is not 
sufficient to prove that the third party‘s mark is ―insulting‖ and that the consumers 
mentally associate the two marks. One would need to prove that the famous mark‘ s 
reputation has (or is likely to) been harmed because of such association
815
. 
 
 
Characteristic of the difficulty still existing, under the 2006 Revision Act, in applying 
the dilution doctrine is the court‘s ruling in V Secret Catalogue stating that there was 
no evidence of dilution by blurring because it was proved that consumers made an 
association of the junior with the later mark, but did not think that the goods 
distinguished under the later mark emanate from the owner of the junior mark
816
; a 
statement which clearly identifies dilution by blurring with confusion. 
 
Furthermore, in the same ruling the court found that there was dilution by 
tarnishment, because of the great degree of similarity between the marks, the mental 
association between the two marks and ―the offended reaction‖ of a consumer when 
he saw the infringing trade mark and warned the trade mark owner that its mark is 
associated with an establishment selling items in derogation of the owner‘s good 
                                                 
811
  See Anheuser Busch, Op. Cit. Supra n. 791, quoting Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391, F. 3d., 439, 
453 (2
nd
. Circuit 2004). 
812
  See Louis Vuitton, Op. Cit. Supra n. 791, par. 17. The court basically ruled that the degree of 
similarity between the marks did not suffice to give rise to confusion or dilution.  
813
  Ibid, par. 11. 
814
  Ibid. 
815
  Ibid. 
816
   Op. Cit. Supra n. 801, para g. 
  
 180 
name (such as intimate lingeries and adult videos); a statement which clearly 
identifies dilution by tarnishment with the offended emotions of  one consumer. Could 
trade mark law be so subjective?
817
 
 
The conclusion that is drawn from this ruling, along with the other rulings mentioned 
in the present thesis that were decided under the 2006 Revision Act
818
, is that even 
though clear guidelines were legislatively given to the courts for applying the dilution 
doctrine in a coherent manner, in cases where the facts were similar (use of similar 
marks on dissimilar products of a derogatory nature) the court rulings were not 
coherent. Still no conclusion exists as to how potential or actual lessening of the 
capacity to distinguish can be proved and what it actually means (does it mean that 
confusion is created, for example, as the court stated in V Secret?). Therefore, the 
reservations described above still remain and create obstacles to the effective 
application of the dilution doctrine.   
 
It follows from the above, that the evolution of the dilution doctrine through 
legislation and case law in the USA has not reached the point where any unauthorised 
use of a famous mark by a third party could be found infringing. 
 
Furthermore, there are other jurisprudential problems as well. To the extent that the 
process of dilution is a gradual one, at what point along the succession of downward 
infringing uses should the dilution remedy be called to rescue? Is the mark diluted by 
just one unauthorised user or by a proliferation of them? If dilutionary harm may be 
said to occur only when several unrelated businesses adopt another‘s distinctive mark, 
to whom does liability fasten?
819
 
 
 Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether the dilution theory applies only to non 
competitive situations or also to the use of certain marks on related and unrelated 
goods
820
.  
                                                 
817
  In Louis Vuitton and Anheuser Busch the third party products were as well of a much ―lower‖ 
image of the trade mark owner‘ s products and still no tarnishment was found, i.e. no evidence of harm 
on the reputation of the famous mark, Op. Cit. Supra n. 791. 
818
   V Secret, Louis Vuitton and Anheuser Busch, Op. Cit. Supra, n.n. 779 and 791 respectively.  
819
  See, T. Martino, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 754,  at 17. 
820
  Ibid, at 26-27. Also, J. Moskin, Op. Cit. Supra n. 737, at 126. This issue was resolved in the context 
of the European Directive as we have already seen by ECJ case law. 
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Lastly, one could argue that unauthorised use of only similar and not identical signs is 
not detrimental to the mark, since this does not cause confusion and does not diminish 
its distinctive power either
821
. 
 
B. c.  An Objection 
One significant objection to be raised is the following: when Schechter argued that the 
gradual ―whittling away‖ of the distinctive power of the mark would result if the mark 
was used on several goods other than those for which it was originally registered he 
did not consider one parameter: the extended use of the mark will not necessarily 
acquire significant public consciousness. It would be difficult to conceive a situation 
where all the subsequent marks are well known and thus impede on the uniqueness of 
the original mark. It is highly unlikely that Rolls Royce candy will be so famous as to 
cause people when hearing Rolls Royce to be likely to think of the candy instead of 
the car. In a word, it is not necessary that the existence of the second mark detracts 
from the selling power of the first mark
822
. 
 
B. d.  Overall Evaluation 
An allusion was made to the issue of whether and to what extent such use is 
detrimental to the mark in the previous chapter, while examining the likelihood of 
confusion and association. It is suggested at present that the use of a strong mark on 
non related goods could even be of benefit to the trade mark owner, as a form of free 
advertising. This would not be the case if confusion was likely to arise. In such a case 
there would be harm to the origin and guarantee functions. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of some empirical proof as to the causal relation between the unauthorised 
use of a sign and its effect on the registered trade mark, it could actually be argued 
that a third party‘s (even unauthorised) use may fortify the mark. This is made more 
evident if one considers the theoretical case where a not particularly famous mark is 
used without authorisation within the context of a famous one. For example, if an 
                                                 
821
 Ibid. Also, Howard J. Shire, ―Dilution Versus Deception-Are State Anti-Dilution Laws an 
Appropriate Alternative to the Law of Infringement?‖, 77 TMR 273, [1987], at 276. This was the 
argument put forward by the defendant in Louis Vuitton. The argument was not upheld (not even  
commented) by the court, but it is worth mentioning that in this case no confusion or dilution was 
found. Op. Cit. Supra 791, par. 14. See also Hornel Foods, 73, F. 3d at 506, stating that a successful 
parody ―tends to increase public identification‖ of the mark with its source‖. 
822
  See also, H. Carty, Op. Cit. Supra n. 742, at 656.  
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unknown mark is placed in an advertisement of a famous brand. This would not be 
detrimental to the first (original albeit unknown) mark; it would adversely increase its 
notoriety and add to its distinctiveness
823
. 
 
The issue of lack of authorisation of such a use, which could enjoin certain remedy, 
could be dealt with under the provisions of unfair competition law, passing off, or 
other legal bases. It is not necessary, however, that trade mark protection be raised, to 
the extent that no function (not even the advertising one, as already mentioned) is 
infringed. Support to this proposal could be drawn from US case law. In Bi-Rite 
Enterprises Inc. v. Button Master, the court stated: ―To the contrary, it seems that 
defendants‘ use only operates to strengthen plaintiff‘s marks. Thus, although 
defendants are clearly capitalising on the popular appeal, plaintiffs have built on 
their names or likeness, plaintiffs have failed to allege, let alone demonstrate, that 
such use will weaken the appeal of their names and thereby provide basis for relief 
under par. 368-d (New York Antidilution Statute)‖ 824.  
C.  FAMOUS MARKS 
It is generally accepted that some trademarks, especially those that are well-known, 
possess a particular value. This means that their reputation could easily become the 
object of unfair impairment and exploitation. Such an infringing use was pursued in 
practically all legal systems if certain preconditions were fulfilled. The means 
employed were either passing off in common law jurisdictions, or civil law and unfair 
competition law in most of the other European countries (as we have already seen).  
 
Why should there be such a differentiation between famous and commonplace marks 
that do not have a wide reputation
825
? It is submitted that the process of protecting the 
                                                 
823
  In the case of Hessels v. Muelhens, President of the Court of Justice The Hague 11 December 1991, 
BIE 1992, 49 (Sabatini) a little known shoe manufacturer marketing its shoes under the name Sabatini 
managed to convince the court that damage was likely when Gabriela Sabatini launched her range of 
perfumes and cosmetics. The plaintiff successfully argued that likelihood of association was especially 
strong because of Gabriela Sabatini‘s fame and that his mark would therefore easily be diluted. The 
likelihood of damage was therefore considerable. The plaintiff‘s reputation  was considered to be 
sufficient on the basis that the mark had been on the market for a considerable time and had a strong 
distinctive character. 
824
  F Supp 555, 217 ISPQ 910 (SDNY 1983). 
825
  One could contrast this with the basic principle of Copyright law that the work of the author is 
protected regardless of its quality and aesthetic value. The analogy of course should be drawn with 
caution since the Copyright and Trade Mark Rights are not to be treated under the same basis. 
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former marks to such an extent could lead to an alteration of the whole profile of trade 
mark law. It is beyond doubt that every trade mark owner tries to establish his mark in 
the market place in order to be able to compete effectively with the other brand 
owners. He is expected to invest in advertising and diffuse his mark, by employing 
marketing and other techniques. However, this is an optional process and it should 
remain as such. 
 
By granting extended protection to famous marks (either in the form of a 
consideration that is taken into account by the courts when deciding on confusion/ 
association; or in the form of a provisional requirement used as a basis for protection 
in cases of dilution) the risk of depriving non-reputed marks of adequate legal 
protection is increased
826
. One could object that the different treatment of marks 
depending on their repute is justified by the fact that the marks are in essence 
different. If one considers that one producer has pursued considerable creative and 
financial expense on promoting his brand and the other one has done nothing towards 
that respect, the two cases should be treated differently by law. However, this would 
entail an overall re-evaluation of trade mark theory that would distinguish between 
famous and non famous trade marks. Even the definition of trade marks and their 
registrability would be reconsidered
827
.  
 
However, the most significant problem with the framework of protection of famous 
marks is the difficulty of objectively assessing the degree of notoriety that sets the 
basis of differentiation
828. One person‘s well known mark may be another‘s unknown 
one. The definition of the target group, on the basis of which the assessment of a 
mark‘s reputation is made, plays a definite role. Should the famous mark be known 
only to a certain social group, among the purchasers of the dissimilar products (of the 
original and of the infringing mark) or world-wide? A characteristic decision under 
                                                 
826
  The fact that the mark‘s intense distinctive character and repute is taken into account in every case 
of infringement (except for one: namely when identical marks are used on identical products) should 
lead to speculations on the future of trade mark law. It is still possible that this will evolutionarily 
comprise the protection of only highly reputed marks. 
827
  For example by introducing a registration system based on use and under the condition that the 
mark reaches a certain degree of repute. 
828
  The issue of the context in which the reputation of a certain mark is to be assessed is analogous to 
the issue of determining the relevant market when assessing a possible abuse of a firm‘s dominant 
position under EC Competition Law  (Art. 86 of the EC Treaty). See, R. Whish, EC Competition law, 
Op. Cit. Supra n. 35. The affirmation of a firm‘s dominance, just like the affirmation of a mark‘s 
extended reputation, creates the prerequisite underpinnings for the relevant provisions to be applied. 
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the USA courts submitted that Lexis was not a sufficiently strong mark to merit 
protection over dilution
829
. However, Lexis is a very well known mark amongst 
lawyers and denotes a very useful and effective legal data base, used by a large 
number of lawyers all around the world
830
.  
 
It has been made evident that strong marks are the subject of protection of the dilution 
theory, due to their thoroughly distinctive character which increases their advertising 
value. However, it is debatable whether well-known or successful marks actually need 
the extra help of dilution protection
831
. Rather, compared to the weaker ones, they 
already have the advertising power and market strength to maintain their commercial 
success. It will be shown what the justification of the protection of famous marks 
should be. Such a protection is an issue of policy. The detrimental effect on the rights 
of the mark‘s owner is opposed to the increase of the dominance that he already has in 
the market place. Competition and consumer protection arguments could be raised in 
favour of either sides (establishment or not of the extended dilution protection). On 
the one hand, competition is increased when the consumer has the opportunity to 
make a choice based on qualitative criteria emanating from adequate information as to 
availability as well as qualities of products. On the other hand, competition is 
restricted when monopoly rights are conferred; regardless of whether this is a result of 
legal protection of intellectual property or not. The focus, therefore, of trade mark 
protection beyond the origin function  should be more on the psychological function 
of marks and their role in contemporary societies.  
 
The increased importance of advertising is indisputable
832
. Advertising on the one 
hand contributes to the information of consumers, thereby encouraging effective 
                                                 
829
  See, Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales Inc., rvd 875 F2d, 1026, 10 USPQ 2d , [1961], 
(CA 1989). 
830
  Contrast the Steinway and Sons v. Robert Demars and Friends 210 USPQ 954 (CD Cal. 1981) in 
which the unauthorised use of the ―Steinway‖ mark was prohibited on the defendant‘s clip-on beer can 
handles, since it was originally used in respect of the plaintiff‘s pianos known for their good quality. 
One would not expect consumers that have no musical anxieties to be familiar with the Steinway mark; 
this mark is nonetheless very famous in the circle of piano-players around the world. The ECJ view on 
this issue is, as we shall see further below, that a mark suffices to be well known among the circle of 
consumers affected. 
831
 It is again a different issue whether certain behaviour should be condemned by a legal system, such 
as the use of unfair means to establish oneself in the market place.  
832
  See in general, Brown, Op. Cit. Supra n. 76; also, A. Psarra, ―The Commercial Exploitation of 
Fame of People or Intellectual  Works‖, EEmp D 344, [1993], Chr. Crisanthis, ―Free competition, 
origin function and risk of confusion in trade mark law‖, EpiskEmpD 33, [2007].   
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competition. On the other hand, it can be used to manipulate the consumers and 
persuade them to buy a specific product. This would lead the consumer to make a 
choice based entirely on the wrong criteria. Normally he would be expected to make a 
choice after considering, primarily, the cost and the quality of the product. 
Nonetheless, advertising could nullify this process and carry the consumer into a 
subconscious process of consuming without thinking. While cost and quality do not 
have any impact whatsoever, factors such as prestige and fashion trends become the 
decisive parameters of the consumer‘s choice833. In such a case it is evident that the 
origin and the guarantee functions of trade marks are not activated. Trade mark 
function is merely advertising. On this rational basis lies the proposed extended 
protection conferred under dilution laws.  
 
An American commentator has noted that: ―It is the ―persona‖ of a trade mark which 
makes people want to identify themselves with it, such as by wearing T-shirts and 
displaying bumper stickers and posters bearing the mark‖834. In the USA a Right of 
Publicity is recognised as protecting the commercial magnetism or publicity values 
embodied in the identity of a person.
835
 It has been suggested that an analogous right 
should also be introduced in relation to trade marks
836
 justifying their protection as 
autonomous valuable assets. 
                                                 
833
  The impact that such an irrational choice process is evident. As Brown has noted: ―[i]mmoderate 
regard for entrenched brand-name interests can freeze the pattern of industries...‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 76 
at 1165. 
834
  See E. Winner, ―Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protection for a Trademark‘s ―Persona‖‖, 
71 TMR 193, [1981]. 
835
  Although the right of publicity was initially an off-shoot from the right to privacy, the courts and 
commentators came in general to recognise the right of publicity as a property right. See in general on 
the Right to Publicity, E. Winner, ibid; also, M. Nimmer, “The Right of Publicity”, 203 Law And 
Contemporary Problems, S. Murumba, “Commercial Exploitation of Personality”, The Law Book 
Company Ltd., [1986]; Ch. Kruger, “Right of Privacy, Right of Personality and Commercial 
Advertising”, 13 IIC 183, [1982]. 
836
  See, F. W. Mostert, ―The Parasitic Use of the Commercial Magnetism of a Trade Mark on Non 
Competing goods‖, 11 EIPR 342, [1986]. The author distinguishes between the traditional advertising 
function and the proposed by him ―merchandising‖ function of trade marks that protects the mark as 
commercial magnet: ―A trade mark can only perform an advertising function in respect of the specific 
product to which it is attached. A trade mark acts as an advertising device when it calls to mind a 
specific product and generates a favourable association about the desirability of that product. A 
traditional legal interest of trade mark can also not perform the source-identifying, distinguishing and 
quality functions (of which the advertising function is a close complement) by itself and independent of 
the product. A trade by itself cannot identify and distinguish anything; it also cannot indicate a constant 
and equal level of quality in vacuo. It can only perform these functions in direct relation to a specific 
product on which it is used. When a trade mark functions as a commercial magnet, it has the effect of 
drawing the public to the product as an attraction by itself by reason of its inherent popularity and 
fame.‖ The ―merchandising‖ function was also proposed by N. Wilkof, ―Trade Mark Licensing‖, 
London, Sweet and Maxwell, [1995], at 2-31.  It is what Cornish notes as ―[…] a second, 
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It has been proposed that the advertising function could be construed not only as the 
ability of the mark to attract consumers due to the extended advertising of the mark 
itself (a function which is consequently inherent only to famous marks) but also as the 
ability of the mark to act as a communication tool between the trade mark owner and 
the consumers to the extent the mark embodies a system of values or life style with 
which the consumer could align (a function inherent to a mark with a certain 
―character‖ albeit not necessarily a famous one)837. This approach has been 
recognised by the ECJ in Copad v. Christian Dior, namely the fact that some trade 
marks posses an ―allure‖, ―prestigious image‖ and ―aura‖ worth protecting through 
trade mark law
838
.  
D. DILUTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT    
 
Looking at the development of dilution in Europe, before the entry into force of the 
Directive, one could notice that there has been an increased concern towards that 
respect by several national courts
839
. The most renowned cases came not only from 
Benelux, but also from German and French courts. These decisions incorporated the 
first elements of dilution theory in Europe. It would therefore be worth mentioning 
decisions such as Rolls-Royce,
840
 Dimple,
841
 Rolex
842
 and Champagne
843
. All of these 
                                                                                                                                            
―differentiation‖, or ―identification‖ (or ―communication‖)  function, which is something more 
elusive, something as much concerned with the feelings and subconscious appreciations of consumers 
as with the rational evaluation of information‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 590. 
837
  Chrisanthis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 43  [2007], at 56. 
838
 C-59/08, Op. Cit. Supra n. 128, par. 37. See also Colomer A-G stating in his Opinion in Arsenal, 
par. 46-47, [2003] ETMR 19 that a trade mark ―[…] acquires a life of its own, making a statement 
about quality, reputation and even, in certain cases, a way of seeing life. The messages it sends out are, 
moreover, autonomous. A distinctive sign can indicate at the same time trade origin, the reputation of 
its proprietor and the quality of the goods it represents, but there is nothing to prevent a consumer, 
unaware of who manufactures the goods or provides the services which bear the trade mark, from 
acquiring them because he perceives the mark as an emblem of prestige or a guarantee of quality‖. It is 
what Griffiths stated as the ―psychological hold‖ on consumers that gives the mark a selling power 
above the one of  the underlying good will, [2001], I.P.Q. 326 at 329. 
839
  See also the Greek courts decisions that follow. 
840
  Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH, GRUR 247, [1983]. 
841
  Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH, GRUR 550, [1985]. 
842
  Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH, GRUR 876, [1985]. However, protection was 
denied in the following decision: Camel Tours, Federal Supreme Court, (Bundesgerichtshof) BGH, 
GRUR, 711, [1987]. For a more detailed study of German case law on dilution, See: A. Kur, 
―Borderline Cases of Trade Mark Protection-A Study in German Trade Mark Law in the Eve of 
Amendment‖, 4IIC 485, [1992]; critical comment by the same author, ―Restrictions Under trade Mark 
Law as Flanking Manoeuvres to Support Advertising Bans-Convention Law Aspects‖, 23 IIC 31, 
[1992]; also, G. Schricker, ―Protection of Famous Trademarks Against Dilution in Germany‖, 11 IIC 
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introduced the protection against parasitic participation in the commercial magnetism 
of other parties‘ trade marks and esteem products for the promotion of their articles. 
These decisions promulgated the protection of the interest in the commercialisation of 
a trade mark beyond the scope of the similarity of goods (Dimple) and of the prestige 
and image of products (Rolls-Royce and Rolex).  
 
Article 5(2) of the Directive introduced the optional provision of extension of 
infringement to use of an identical or similar sign in relation to dissimilar goods.
844
 
The conditions for such protection are, as we have already seen previously: a. The 
registered trade mark has a reputation in the Member State, b. The use of the sign is 
without due cause, c. The use of the sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark. Likelihood of 
confusion is not a condition for protection. This provision was at the time 
implemented in all European Union countries
845
.  In order to draw some conclusions 
on how the issue of dilution is handled by the European legislation and jurisprudence, 
examples of the UK and Greece are going to be examined in comparison with the ECJ 
jurisprudence. The question that will be answered in this context is whether, and if so 
in what form, the doctrine of dilution had been encased in the European Trade Mark 
law. Let us begin with examining the aforementioned conditions more closely
846
. 
 
It is interesting that the European Court of Justice seemed for a long time reluctant to 
use the word dilution and even more averse to refer to the theoretical, historical and 
logical foundations of the dilution concept. The Court mentioned in Adidas-Salomon 
                                                                                                                                            
166, [1980]; J. Pagenberg, ―Trade Mark rights at a Discount-Is Trade Mark Law Still Effective?‖, 19 
IIC 638, [1988]; G. Wurtenberger, ―Rolex v. Tchibo; Dimple and Rolls Royce. Recent Decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court on the Exploitation of Reputation‖, case comment, 8 EIPR 239, [1987]; G. W. 
Seelig, ―Protecting Famous Marks in Germany‖, 5 EIPR 158, [1989]. 
843
 In a German Supreme Court Case it was found that to advertise IBM Aptiva computers using the 
slogan ―Get Champagne, Pay for Sparkling Water‖ was unfair competition (33 IIC 991 [2002]) as was 
in France for Yves St Laurent to use ―Champagne‖ for scent  (EIPR D-74 [1994]), See Cornish and 
Llewelyn Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 753. 
844
 The text of Art. 5(2) reads as follows: ―Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall 
be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course  of trade any sign 
which is identical with, or similar to, the trademark in relation to goods or services which are not 
similar to those for which the trademark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member 
State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark‖. The CTM includes a similar provision in art. 
9(1)( c). 
845
  See, W.R. Cornish, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 711. 
846
 As W.R. Cornish points out correctly the different words used –unfair advantage or detriment, 
distinctive character or repute – give a broad impact as they should not be read as co-terminous, Ibid. 
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AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd.
847
 referring to the arguments of the Commission, that 
the Directive concerns protection against a likelihood of dilution of or detriment to the 
mark‘ s reputation. Earlier, in 1998, the ECJ used the word ―dilution‖ when it stated 
that an accused mark which calls to mind a senior trademark could result in a dilution 
of the image linked to the senior mark
848
. Advocate  General Jacobs in his opinions 
systematically avoided the word ―dilution‖. Only in 2003 in Adidas did AG Jacobs 
attempt to define what dilution means and got into its history and purpose: he defined 
dilution as detriment to the distinctive character of a trademark and divided it in the 
two classic categories used in the United States, namely blurring and tarnishment; AG 
Jacobs also blended in the concept of free riding, using the example of ROLLS 
ROYCE whiskey 
849
. 
 
For the first time in Intel
850
 the Court itself attempted a definition of dilution within 
the European context, stating that ―detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark‖ is actually ―dilution‖, ―whittling away‖ or ―blurring‖, in particular, as per the 
ECJ, when the earlier mark, which used to arouse immediate association with the 
goods and services for which it is registered, is no longer capable of doing so
 851
. It 
should be noted that the Court refers to association of the mark with the goods or 
services for which it is registered not association of these goods with their trade 
origin.  
D. a. Reputation
852
 
Considering in the light of the general scheme and purpose of the Directive the 
requirement in art. 5(2) that the trade mark have a reputation, the Court has stated that 
                                                 
847
 [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 14, para. 37. 
848
  Sabel  BV v. Puma AG, Op. Cit. Supra n. 113, para. 15. 
 
849
 Opinion on Adidas Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd (C-408/01) 
[2004], F.S.R. 21. 
850
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 16.  
851
  Ibid, par. 29, stating ―As regards, in particular, detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark, also referred to as ‗dilution‘, ‗whittling away‘ or ‗blurring‘, such detriment is caused when that 
mark‘s ability to identify the goods or services for which it is registered and used as coming from the 
proprietor of that mark is weakened, since use of the later mark leads to dispersion of the identity and 
hold upon the public mind of the earlier mark. That is notably the case when the earlier mark, which 
used to arouse immediate association with the goods and services for which it is registered, is no 
longer capable of doing so‖. The tautology here is evident, as the ECJ confuses the notions of 
―dilution‖ and ―dilution by blurring‖. Along the same lines followed the ECJ ruling in L‘ Oreal citing 
this paragraph of Intel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 126, par. 38-41. 
852
  For a detailed study of the subtle differentiation in the notoriety of a mark See M. Blakeney, ―Well-
Known Marks‖, 11 EIPR 481, [1994], also in German law A. Kur ―Well-Known Marks, Highly 
Renowned Marks and Marks Having a (High) Reputation- What‘ s It All About?‖, 23 IIC 484, [1992].   
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it is only where there is a sufficient degree of knowledge of the mark, that the public, 
when confronted  with the sign may possibly make a connection between the sign and 
the mark and that the mark may subsequently be damaged
853
. It seems obvious that 
the use of a sign cannot have such an effect unless the sign brings the mark in some 
way to the mind of the relevant public, i.e. that the mark is already recognisable and 
known to that public. 
 
As we have already examined in the context of likelihood of confusion, it is generally 
accepted that the protection of registered marks with a reputation extends to a wider 
range of similar goods and services than marks which have not been extensively used 
and therefore have no reputation. However, one consequence of this is that 
oppositions to applications for registration are brought by the holder of a senior mark 
registered for different goods. Of course the trade mark Registries (to the extent 
assigned to effect a search prior to registration) cannot filter applications for possible 
dilution. The senior trade mark holder should initiate such proceedings as soon as he 
becomes aware of the filing of the application. This would indeed impose further 
burden to the registries (to the extent they deal with oppositions in the registration 
process) and the courts. However, if the result is a better protection of the trade mark 
owner and a better function of the market, this burden is justifiable.  
 
The ECJ gave the definition of ―famous‖ marks in the context of the Directive stating 
that ―the degree of knowledge required must be considered to be reached when the 
earlier mark is known by a significant part of the public concerned by the products or 
services covered by that mark‖ 854. As we have seen, the mark must be known by a 
"significant part" of the ―public concerned‖, i.e. either the general public or a more 
specialized public if goods and services are produced by a specialized trader. 
Furthermore, with regard to Community Trade Marks it is sufficient to have a 
reputation in a substantial part of one member state
855
.  
 
 
                                                 
853
 Case C-375/99, General Motors Corporation v. Yplon S.A, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122, par. 23. 
854
  In its ruling in General Motors, Op. Cit. Supra n. 122, par. 26. See also C-301/2007, PAGO 
International GmbH v. Tirolmilich registrierte Genossenschaft mbH, par. 17-19. 
855
  Ibid, General Motors, par. 28. 
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The ECJ specifically refused to define what is a significant part and refused to adopt a 
rule that there must be knowledge by a majority or, indeed, any given percentage of 
the public as being required.  
 
However, the Court did list five examples of factors to be considered: (1) the market 
share occupied by goods or services sold under the mark; (2) the intensity of use of 
the mark; (3) the geographic extent of use of  the mark; (4) the duration of use of the 
mark; and (5) the amount of investment in promoting and advertising the mark, while 
accepting that all relevant facts of the case must be balanced, before determining if a 
given mark qualifies as having the reputation required by the Directive
 856
. 
 
Of course, all of the above five examples are merely circumstantial evidence of the 
scope of usage of the mark, not direct evidence of the state of mind or knowledge of 
the relevant public. Direct evidence would appear most often accessible through 
survey evidence, which is commonly used in common law jurisdictions, in 
determining if a mark qualifies as famous. However, in other jurisdictions, such as 
Greece, as we shall see further, such surveys have long been refused as evidence.  
 
The Court clarified that the relevant public for ascertaining whether a mark has 
reputation is either the public at large or  a more specialized public, for example 
traders in a specific sector
857
. 
 
This purely quantitative (and not qualitative) criterion should suffice to establish a 
famous mark, but not to grant increased protection thereto. For this, the conditions 
mentioned below must also be met. 
 
                                                 
856
 Ibid, General Motors, par. 27, PAGO par. 25. See also ECJ ruling in case C-108, 109/97 of 
4.5.1999 Windsurfing Chiemsee, par. 49-51:  courts "must take into consideration all the relevant facts 
of the case, and in particular the market share held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical 
extent and duration of its use, and the size of investment made . . . in promoting [the mark]". As we 
have already examined the 2006 Revision Act the following factors could be taken into account: (i) The 
duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, (ii) The amount, 
volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark, iii) The extent of 
actual recognition of the mark
856
. These are almost identical to the ECJ criteria, apart from the third one 
which could be considered to result from the other criteria. 
857
  Op. Cit. Supra  n.n. 122 and 854 respectively, General Motors, par. 24 and  PAGO, par. 22 
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D.b. Similarity of marks  
As aforementioned, art. 5(2) applies in cases where the infringing mark is ―identical 
with, or similar to‖ the trade mark. The question is whether similarity in the context of 
art. 5(2) should be interpreted in the same way as similarity in the context of art. 5(1) 
of the Directive. The answer should be negative, as the rationale of protection in these 
two cases is different. In case of art. 5(1) of the Directive, the aim is to grant 
protection against risk of confusion, whereas in case of art. 5(2) the aim is to protect 
against unfair advantage of, or detriment to, the distinctive character or the repute of 
the trade  mark
858
. For this reason, and taking into account the repute of the mark, the 
Court has ruled that the degree of similarity sufficient to grant protection under art. 
5(2) is that having the effect ―that the relevant section of the public establishes a link 
between the sign and the mark‖859. Therefore similarity is also a prerequisite, however 
the degree of similarity required is different.   
 
Notwithstanding that, Advocate General Jacobs pointed out that the tools for 
assessing such similarity are exactly the same as those employed in order to assess 
similarity in a case under 5(1), namely assessment of the aural, visual and conceptual 
similarity
860
. Of course this poses the problem how all the other rules developed by 
the ECJ case law concerning confusion (e.g. that the stronger the distinctive character 
of the mark, the greater the difference must be of the later sign) apply in the context of 
art. 5(2), where a strong distinctive character is always required
861
.  
 
It is highly probable that national courts will not be able to make (in practical terms) 
the distinction between similarity that leads to risk of confusion and similarity that 
does not necessarily lead to confusion. The national courts in Greece, for example, as 
we shall further examine in more detail, already have a difficulty in implementing the 
                                                 
858
  See also ECJ ruling in case C-425/98 Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV, Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 584, par. 34 and 36. 
859
 ECJ ruling in case Adidas Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd. , Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 432, par. 31. 
860
  In his exact words ―indeed it is difficult to see on what other basis similarity could be assessed‖, 
par. 43. 
861
  In C-408/01 Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessworld, Op. Cit. Supra n. 432, the ECJ stated, that the 
existence of such a link must, just like a likelihood of confusion in the context of Article 5(1)(b) of the 
Directive, be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the 
case. CFI in case T-47/06, applied General Motors by analogy and  ruled that the stronger the earlier 
mark‘s distinctive character and reputation the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused 
to it within the meaning of art. 8(5)of the Regulation, par. 57. Of course what that suggestion 
practically means, i.e. that increased repute makes it ―easier‖ to establish detriment, is not evident.  
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above mentioned rule regarding the correlation between distinctive character and 
confusion, namely that the greater the distinctiveness, the less similarity needed for 
affirming confusion. Given that, one could be expecting that national courts will not 
always be able to make the distinction between similarity under national provisions 
implementing art. 5(2) of the Directive and those implementing art. 5(1) of the 
Directive. 
 
This would amount (at a national level) to a practical suspension of protection 
conferred (or at least sought to be conferred as per ECJ case law) under art. 5(2), as 
such cases shall actually turn into art. 5(1) cases (at least where products are identical 
or similar). 
 
It should be mentioned though that in the Greek Adidas case
862
 the Supreme Court 
stated that the Athens Court of Appeal was wrong in finding that there was no 
confusion because of the fact that despite some similarities the differences were such 
(number of stripes and the imprinting of the word ―Strike‖ and ―Adidas‖ respectively) 
that precluded confusion. The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeal was 
wrong in finding that there was no ―confusion through the creation of a link‖ and 
thereby ―apomimisi‖ (imitation)863 when it had found that the claimants‘ mark was a 
famous one and that certain similarities did exist
864
.  
 
It is interesting that according to the ECJ the relevant public to be taken each time in 
consideration, for the establishment of a link, varies according to the type of injury 
(dilution) alleged by the trade mark owner; in case of unfair advantage, for example, 
the relative consumers are the ones (reasonably observant and circumspect) of the 
later mark
865
. One cannot help but notice the multiple distinctions and categorisations 
that the ECJ is making: different categories of the public are mentioned in order to 
establish confusion, to establish fame, to establish the link etc. 
 
                                                 
862
  Areios Pagos 1038/2008, DEE 2 [2009], 186. 
863
  See infra Part IV. 
864
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 862, at 188. 
865
  C-320/07 P Antarctica Srl v. OHIM and the Nasdaq Stock Market Inc., judgement of 12.3.2009, 
par. 46 and 48 and Intel Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 36. As per the ECJ this is so because what is 
prohibited is the drawing of benefit by the owner of the later mark (Intel par. 36, Nasdaq par. 48). 
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 From the application of similarity criteria to find the existence of a link, it could be 
inferred that when protection is sought under both articles 5(1) and  5(2) or the 
equivalent in national or Community Trademark legislation, if the court finds that no 
similarity giving rise to likelihood of confusion exists, then the next step would be to 
investigate whether there is a possibility that the public links the mark and the sign
866
.  
 
The ECJ clarified in Intel,  when such a link exists and it confirmed that this occurs 
when the later mark brings the earlier mark to the mind of the public or when the 
public makes a connection between the conflicting marks
867
. This definition coincides 
with the Benelux definition of ―association‖ examined in Part IV above and the 
problematic remains, in cases where there is a link, whether this under confusion or 
under dilution provisions. Furthermore, as per the ECJ such a link exists necessarily in 
the cases of confusion
868
.  
 
The existence of a link must, as per the ECJ, be assessed globally taking into account 
all the relevant factors of the case, i.e. a) the degree of similarity between the 
conflicting marks, b) the nature of the goods or services for which the conflicting 
marks were registered, including the degree of closeness or dissimilarity between 
those goods or services and the relevant section of the public, c) the strength of the 
earlier mark‘s reputation, d) the degree of the earlier mark‘s distinctive character, 
whether inherent or acquired,  and e) the existence of the likelihood of confusion on 
the part of the public
869
.  
 
It follows that the ECJ uses the same criteria to establish the ―link‖ as to establish 
―confusion‖870, except that in order to establish the ―link‖ the existence of confusion 
                                                 
866
 As Illanah Simon observes, what is meant by the existence of a link is not clear.  Is it enough that 
the consumers are caused to bring the earlier mark into mind when they see the later sign, or do they 
need to also change their perception of the earlier mark as a result of viewing the later mark? 
―Embellishment: Trade Mark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster?‖, EIPR [2006], 325. It should 
further be kept in mind, that this link is different from the ―association‖ (i.e. sub-category of confusion) 
of art. 5(1) of the Directive. It follows from the above that the notion of the existence of a link is not 
clear and therefore this notion cannot be easily followed by national courts.  
867
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 48 and 52, adjudicating on Art. 4(4)(a) of the Directive on relative 
grounds of refusal, mirroring art. 5(2) of the Directive.  
868
  Ibid, par. 57. If it exists in cases of confusion then it should not be described as a mere ―coming into 
mind‖, as this does not constitute confusion as per the previous ECJ case law, in particular Sabel, Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 113.  
869
  Intel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 41, 42, C-320/07 P Op. Cit. Supra n. 865, par. 45.  
870
  See infra Part IV. 
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is also a factor to be considered (sic). It is obvious that to examine any possible risk of 
confusion as a criterion to establish infringement in the context of a provision which 
does not require confusion is methodologically incoherent. It is also impressive that 
the same criteria are applied to find confusion as to find dilution (on this basis, inter 
alia, the relationship between confusion-dilution and the author‘s  conclusions thereof 
shall be examined in paragraph F. ―Epitomising Dilution‖ below).  
 
The ECJ approach brings to mind the USA dilution doctrine and in particular that 
related to dilution by blurring. However, since the ECJ jurisprudence has not so far 
been in line with the USA case law, namely to consider dilution and confusion so 
closely linked together, the above mentioned approach of the ECJ seems to be out of 
context.  With its ruling in Sabel, as we mentioned above, the Court clarified that 
confusion and dilution are two totally distinct notions and that association is merely a 
facet of confusion. By incorporating the notion of a ―link‖ in the dilution framework, 
this distinction becomes not so clear any more. 
 
The ECJ lastly has ruled that the fact that a sign is viewed as an embellishment does 
not preclude in itself the application of Article 5(2) where the degree of similarity is 
such as to establish a link between the sign and the mark (and vice versa, if it is 
viewed as an embellishment it does not necessarily establish a link with the trade 
mark)
871. If the ―relevant section of the public views the sign purely as an 
embellishment, it necessarily does not establish any link with a registered mark. That 
therefore means that the degree of similarity between the sign and the mark is not 
sufficient for such a link to be established‖872.  
 
D. c. Dissimilar/Similar Goods 
The wording of art. 5(2) of the Directive restricts its scope of application only to cases 
where the goods identified by the later sign are dissimilar to those of the earlier mark. 
However, the ECJ ruled that art. 5(2) ―cannot be given an interpretation which would 
lead to [well-known] marks [. . .] having less protection where a sign is used for 
                                                 
871
  Case C-408/01, Op. Cit. Supra n. 432,  par. 39. 
872
  Case C-408/01, Ibid, par. 40. Interestingly, the Court did not approach the matter from a ―trade 
mark use‖ point of view. Advocate General Jacobs in its Opinion suggested that since embellishment is 
not a trade mark use, then art. 5(2) cannot apply, given that trade mark use is a precondition for the 
application of that article as well.   
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identical or similar goods or services than where a sign is used for non-similar goods 
or services‖873. Therefore, Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of the Directive are to be 
interpreted as entitling the Member States to provide specific protection for well-
known registered trade marks in cases where a later mark or sign, which is identical 
with or similar to the registered mark, is intended to be used for goods or services 
identical with or similar to those covered by the registered mark. In Adidas-Salomon 
and Adidas Benelux v. Fitnessworld
874
 the Court confirmed that if a Member State,  
transposes Article 5(2) of the Directive, it must grant protection which is at least as 
extensive for identical or similar goods or services as for non-similar goods or 
services. It is therefore obligatory for those member states to provide for protection 
under 5(2) in case of similar goods or services.  
 
This has been accepted recently in Greece, as well, by a Supreme Court ruling 
followed by subsequent lower court rulings, stating that the respective national 
provisions (art. 4 par. 1 ind. C and 26 par. 1 ind. B of the Greek Trade Mark Law) 
must be interpreted broadly in a teleological way, in view of the ECJ case law, namely 
its ruling in the Adidas case C-408/2001
875
, so as to include the application of such 
provisions to cases where the goods are similar. In the UK a change in law was 
introduced in order to comply with these ECJ guidelines. 
 
Interestingly, this extension of protection to similar goods and services was seen by 
US scholars as a ―misunderstanding‖. Mc Carthy explains: ―Reserving the 
extraordinary protection of an anti-dilution law to cases of non similar goods or 
services (as the Directive explicitly states) does not give less protection to strong 
marks with a reputation … If the mark is so strong as to have a reputation, then in 
cases of competitive or similar goods or services that mark should have no difficulty 
                                                 
873
 Case C-292/00 Davidoff & Cie SA and Zino Davidoff SA v. Gofkid SA, ruling of  9.1.2003. The 
Advocate General Jacobs gave however an opposite Opinion, stating that sufficient protection is 
provided to the trade mark owner of a mark with repute, even by making a literal interpretation of the 
article, in view of the provisions of art 5(1) as these have been interpreted by ECJ case law forming a 
concrete and without gaps legal protection environment (apart from an ―insignificant‖ number of cases, 
that would remain unprotected). In the same opinion, AG Jacobs stated that it is not justified by the 
scheme of the Directive for a trade mark owner to be able to prevent a third party from using or 
registering a sign or mark bearing no similarity to his own, in respect of similar goods. 
874
  Case  C-408/2001, Op. Cit. Supra n. 432, par. 20. 
875
 Areios Pagos, 1030/2008 A Division, DEE [2009], 186, at 187, PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 399, at 181, MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 170. The last two cases mention also C-
310/07 PAGO, par. 17-19, C-487/2007, L‘ Oreal, par. 35, C-102/2007, Adidas II, par. 37 and C-
292/2000 Davidoff II, par. 24 seq. 
  
 196 
prevailing under the traditional confusion-based rule of law. There should be no need 
to switch gears and invoke the extraordinary remedy of an anti-dilution law. It is 
astonishing that the ECJ should read the word ―not‖ out of the Directive based on the 
spurious reasoning that the literal wording gives less protection to strong marks with a 
reputation. The Court is stretching the Directive beyond the concept of what dilution 
means and why anti-dilution laws were created‖876.  
 
It would not be easy though under the European application of the confusion test to 
find confusion in cases where the marks and the goods at issue are similar, but still 
because of the strong distinctiveness of the senior mark, no risk of confusion is 
created. As the ECJ stated in Sabel, there is no distinct protection held for cases where 
mere ―association‖ arises, between similar marks used on similar products. Namely, 
there is no protection if no confusion can be found. It is not enough that an average 
consumer might be attracted to the junior mark goods because of some loose, non-
confusing association with the senior mark
877
. Therefore, as the ECJ correctly pointed 
out in Adidas, the famous marks, if no such extension of the scope of application of 
art. 5(2) and 4(4)(a) of the Directive was made, would remain unprotected in case of 
―dilution‖ occurring by use of similar marks on similar products, because the scope of 
―confusion‖ was already narrowly defined by the Court leaving such cases out of its 
scope. It  is obvious from the above that the interpretation and application problems 
that arise in the European context, lie in the positioning of the words ―risk of 
association‖ within the confusion provisions of the Directive, i.e. in the systematic 
drafting of the Directive by the European legislator.  
 
D. d. Without Due Cause 
The due cause criterion that should be established by the infringer as a defence can be 
described as a need to use the mark so that it would be unreasonable to require the 
alleged infringer to stop that use. This allows the court to consider exemptions on the 
basis of the defendant‘s own rights or trade names and also offers the possibility of 
weighing the interests of the parties concerned, such as prior use. Despite the fact that 
cause is a general  exoneration,  its scope depends on the nature of the interests 
connected to the content of the monopoly right in the trade mark. Comparative 
                                                 
876
  McCarthy, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766.  
877
  See also Cornish and Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 751. 
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advertising, for example, would constitute due cause use for similar goods, because 
these forms of use contain both public and private interest aspects
878
.   
 
On the other hand, the ―without due cause‖ criterion could be viewed not as a defense 
but as a prerequisite for further proceeding with the application of the respective 
provision.  In this context the without due cause requirement must first be found not 
to apply before one proceeds to examining any unfair advantage taken by the alleged 
infringer. If the defendant may prove that there is due cause for using the earlier mark 
then any further examination of the applicability of the respective provisions is not 
necessary.  Similarly, of no due cause may be established for the use by the defendant, 
then infringement should be found without any need for examination of the other 
requirements (unfair advantage etc).  
 
D. e. In the Course of Trade 
Use in the course of trade has been described as use in the course of business or 
professional enterprise or any other non-private activity intended to produce economic 
benefit. This use in commerce requirement (found also in art. 5(1) and 5(5) of the 
Directive) has been interpreted by the ECJ as use ―in the context of commercial 
activity with a view to economic advantage and not a private matter‖879.  Such use 
was already examined previously in the present thesis. 
 
D. f. Unfair Advantage or Detriment to the Distinctive Character or Repute 
These prerequisites allude to the harm made on the advertising function of the mark 
and are analogous to the categories of dilution developed in the USA as mentioned 
above. It is sufficient that only one of those three types of injury exists (detriment to 
the distinctive character of the earlier mark, detriment to the repute of that mark, 
unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark), as the 
Court confirmed in Intel and L‘ Oreal880.  
                                                 
878
 See A. K. Sanders, ―Some Frequently Asked Questions About the 1994 UK TM Act‖, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 687, at 71 and ECJ ruling of 12.6.2008 on Case-533/06 O2 Holdings Ltd., O2 (UK) Ltd. V. 
Hutchison 3G UK Ltd. Op. Cit. Supra n. 125.  
879
 Case C-206/01, Arsenal v. Reed Op. Cit. Supra n. 367. See also J. Philips, ―Trade Mark Law. A 
Practical Anatomy‖ [2003], 7.38, A. Tsoutsanis ―The Biggest Mistake of the European Trade Mark 
Directive and Why the Benelux is Wrong Again: Between the European Constitution and European 
Conscience‖, EIPR [2006], 74. 
880
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 28 and subsequently confirmed in L‘ Oreal, Op. Cit. Supra n. 126, par. 
42. 
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Since the first steps in recognising the dilution dimensions in the Directive along the 
lines of the US doctrine were made by the CIF, it would be interesting to follow the 
CFI case law on these points and see how these led to the issuance of the ECJ case 
law (namely Intel and L‘ Oreal) clearly incorporating the dilution theory in the 
European context.  
 
The detriment to the distinctive character lies parallel to pure dilution, namely the 
blurring of the distinctive character of the mark
881
. The CFI had ruled (without 
justifying its finding) that the risk of dilution appears, in principle, to be lower if the 
earlier mark consists of a term which is very common and frequently used
882
.  It is not 
clear, however, why a mark like Coca Cola consisting of two very common words 
would run a lower risk of dilution if competitors used, for example, the same mark on 
clothes. Similarly, the detriment to the repute of the mark is parallel to tarnishment, 
namely the harmful impact of undesirable connotations on the repute of the mark
883
.  
 
The CFI had ruled that the risk of that detriment can occur also where the goods or 
services of the later mark have a characteristic or quality which may have a negative 
influence on the image of an earlier mark with a reputation
884
. Would that include also 
quality or characteristics which are not bad but which are different than those of the 
earlier famous mark (in case dilution occurs in use on similar goods)? It should also 
be noted that, since under the Directive the owner of a mark (much more so, the 
applicant), is not required to use the mark before application or even after registration 
and for a period of five years, the criterion of goods or services being of bad quality is 
not very helpful
885. Lastly, it is evident that the ―unfair advantage‖ borrows from the 
content of unfair competition law. As per the CFI this occurs in cases where there is 
an attempt to trade upon the fame of the earlier mark‘s reputation, in the sense that the 
marketing of the third party‘s goods is made easier because of the association with the 
earlier mark with reputation
886
. 
                                                 
881
 Case T-215/03 SIGLA SA v. OHIM, ruling of CFI issued on 22.3.2007, par.37.  
882
  Ibid par. 38. 
883
  Ibid par. 39.   
884
  Ibid. 
885
 This is not the case in the USA though, from where these CFI statements were probably inspired, 
without, however, being properly filtered so as to be adjusted to the European legal reality. 
886
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 40. 
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Detriment to the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark according to the 
CFI ―is usually established where the use of the mark applied for would have the 
effect that the earlier mark is no longer capable of arousing immediate association 
with the goods for which it is registered
887
 and used and detriment to the repute is 
usually established where the goods for which the mark applied for is use to appeal to 
the public‘s senses in such a way that the earlier mark‘ s power of attraction is 
diminished‖888. It is evident that the CFI was inspired by Advocate General Jacobs‘s 
Opinion in Adidas, in which it was stated that there are in principle four types of use 
which may be caught under art. 5(2) of the Directive: use which takes unfair 
advantage of the mark‘ s distinctive character, use which takes advantage of its repute, 
use which is detrimental to the mark‘s distinctive character and use which is 
detrimental to its repute
889
. 
 
The ECJ confirmed in Intel
890
 that such detriment is caused when the mark‘s ability to 
identify the goods or services for which it is registered is weakened and this is the 
case mainly when the earlier mark, which used to arouse immediate association with 
the goods and services for which it is registered, is no longer capable of doing so. 
Such injury must be assessed by reference to average consumers of the goods or 
services for which the later mark is requester, which are reasonably well informed, 
observant and circumspect
891
. 
 
The CFI had also defined the concept of taking unfair advantage of the distinctive 
character or the repute of the earlier mark as one that ―must be intended to encompass 
instances where there is clear exploitation and free-riding on the coattails of a famous 
mark or an attempt to trade upon its reputation‖892. What is meant by ―clear 
                                                 
887
  As we have seen this definition was adopted also by the ECJ in its subsequent ruling in Intel. 
888
 Case T-67/04, Spa Monopole compagnie fermiere de Spa SA/NV  v. OHIM, ruling of CFI of 
25.5.2005, par. 43 and 46, Case T-47/06 Antarctica Srl v. OHIM and the Nasdaq Stock Market Inc., 
ruling of CFI 10.5.2007, ECR [2007] II- 00042, par. 54, 55. 
889
  Opinion of AG Jacobs on C-408/01 Adidas Salomon v. Fitnessword, delivered on 10.7.2003, ECR- 
12540, par. 36.  
890
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 29. 
891
  Ibid, par. 36. See also C-320/07, Antarctica Srl v. OHIM and the Nasdaq Stock Market Inc., ruling 
of 12.3.2009. 
892
 Case T-47/06, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 55, Case T-215/03 Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 40, Case T-
67/04, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 51, taking up Advocate General Jacobs‘ Opinion in Adidas Salomon. 
AG Jacobs stated that the concepts of taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of 
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exploitation‖ (at some instances referred to also as ―manifest exploitation‖) of a mark 
and ―free-riding on the coattails of a famous mark‖ was not however clear893.  
 
Further, if a case of clear exploitation falls within the concept of unfair advantage, a 
case of non clear exploitation falls outside the concept of it? What are the borders? 
Apparently what the CFI was trying to denote is the ―exploitation‖ and the 
infringement of the advertising function of the mark. However, using vague and non 
standardised legal terms (such as the ones mentioned above) without defining them 
creates ambiguities. In any case, it is clear from the above mentioned case law that the 
detriment in the reputation or the distinctive character is distinct from the unfair 
advantage or detriment caused to the earlier mark because of confusion
894
. The CFI  
stated that the association with the positive characteristics of the mark is what consists 
the taking unfair advantage of the mark
895
, thus manifesting the difficulty in drawing 
the lines between confusion and dilution
896
.  
 
As per the CFI, if the later mark does not ―appear at first sight‖ to be capable of 
giving rise to one of the three risks mentioned above
897
, then the trade mark owner 
must provide evidence of the detriment or the unfair advantage.  
 
How does one prove however, this unfair advantage (the definition of which is, as 
stated above, not even totally clear) or the detriment
898
? As Moskin put it: ―The 
                                                                                                                                            
the mark in contrast must be intended to encompass ‗instances where there is clear exploitation and 
free-riding on the coattails of a famous mark or an attempt to trade upon its reputation‖, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 889,  par. 39 
893
 See, Advocate General Jacobs citing in his Opinion of 10.7.2003 in Adidas F.W. Mostert, Famous 
and Well-Known Marks (1997), p. 62 and the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well Known Marks adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and the General Assembly of WIPO (1999), whereby in the Note in art. 4 (iii) which 
refers to use of a mark which ―would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character of the well-
known mark‖, comments that ―the use in question would, for example, amount to a free ride on the 
goodwill of the well-known mark‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 889, par. 39 and fn 18. 
894
 T –251/03 Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 69. 
895
 Would that mean that in cases of detriment to the repute and the distinctive character such 
association is not necessary? 
896
 Namely, the establishment of a link between the marks without confusing them, T-251/03, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 881,  par. 41 and 72. See also C-408/01 Adidas Salomon Op. Cit. Supra n. 432, par. 27. 
897
 In which cases, presumably, no further proof would need to be submitted, T-215/03, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 881, par. 48.  See also further below. 
898
 According to AG Jacobs, par. 43 of the Opinion in General Motors, the precise method of adducing 
such proof is a matter of national rules of evidence and procedure, the same as in the case of 
establishing likelihood of confusion. This is true. However, if the notions of unfair advantage and 
detriment are not clearly interpreted by the European court, there is little that national legislation and 
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difficulty with dilution . . . is that although the broad conceptual outlines of the theory 
are readily understood, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove in any given case that a 
mark has been diluted, or even to know how to go about assembling such proof‖899.  
 
It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to prove that the distinctive character of a mark 
runs a risk of being affected by the use of another mark: one would need to prove a) 
that there is a risk of whittling away, tarnishment or unfair advantage, b) that this risk 
would be the causal result of the use of the later sign
900. The ―whittling away‖ is a 
slow process and courts deal with it at its early stage since judicial recourse at a later 
stage would not be of any use to the trademark owner. The trade mark would have by 
then become generic. On the other hand, the only evidence that could be produced at 
that early stage would most probably relate to the risk of confusion between the two 
marks. However dilution should provide protection where the confusion criterion is 
not met. The onus of proof with regard to the whittling away, tarnishment or unfair 
advantage of the distinctive character or the repute, appears in that context to be a 
parameter that could practically nullify protection against dilution
901
.  
 
In General Motors Corp. v. Yplon S.A.
902
, Advocate  General Jacobs stated that 
Article 5(2) does not refer to a mere risk or likelihood ―. . . . [T]he  taking of unfair 
advantage or the suffering of detriment must be properly substantiated, that is to say, 
properly established to the satisfaction of the national court: the national court must 
be satisfied by evidence of  detriment or of unfair advantage […]‖. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
courts can do. It is the duty of ECJ to provide guidelines of what exactly should be proved, so that the 
provisions can be applied in a way that serves their purpose of existence. 
899
 J. Moskin, ―Victoria‘s Big Secret: Wither Dilution under the Federal Dilution Act?, 93 TMR 842, 
843 [2003]. 
900
 According to Illanah Simon this causal link results from the fact that the consumers make a 
connection between the two marks, Op. Cit. Supra n. 866, 323. So presumably it would suffice for 
evidence of this ―connection‖ to be produced. See the opposite view on that of USA courts, mentioned 
above. 
901
 An interesting suggestion is proposed by M. Walmsley: even when no reduction of sales or actual 
damage is caused to the trade mark owner, the trade mark owner would suffice to prove  that 
consumers only buy the goods of  the third party because they are sold by reference to the famous 
marks and that the latter achieved their sales only by taking unfair advantage of the famous mark, see 
―Trade Mark Dilution: Court of Appeal Waters Down Trade Mark Owner‘s Rights‖ [2008], E.I.P.R. 
109, at 108. The author states that there should be some kind of ―punishment‖ of ―piggy bagging‖ even 
when the trade mark owner cannot show that the reputation of its trade mark or the sales of its products 
were commercially affected.  
902
   Op. Cit. Supra n. 122,  par. 43.  
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The CFI however found that there must not be proof of actual and present harm (how 
could there be one, the later mark is often merely applied for and not used). However, 
there must be proof "of a future risk, which is not hypothetical, of unfair advantage or 
detriment‖903. This was confirmed subsequently by the ECJ in Intel, requiring the 
trade mark owner to prove actual and present injury to its mark, or a serious 
likelihood that such an injury will occur in the future
904
. 
 
It is not in these cases self-evident either, how one would prove a future risk. 
However in practice, through settled national case law, the plaintiff knows what 
evidence to submit before courts. At the end, in most cases, the most important 
criterion is the court‘s subjective view on whether there is any likelihood of dilution 
or not. It is worth noting Schechter‘s point: ―Any theory of trade-mark protection 
which . . . does not focus the protective function of the court upon the good-will of the 
owner of the trade-mark, inevitably renders such owner dependent for protection, not 
so much upon the normal agencies for the creation of good-will, such as the 
excellence of his product and the appeal of his advertising, as upon the judicial 
estimate of the state of the public mind. This psychological element is in any event at 
best an uncertain factor, and ―the so-called ordinary purchaser changes his mental 
qualities with every judge.‖905.  
 
The CFI noted that the evidence should be ―prima facie‖. What is ―prima facie‖ 
evidence? Such a conclusion of future risk ―may be established, in particular, on the 
basis of logical deductions resulting from an analysis of the probabilities and by 
taking account of the usual practices in the relevant commercial sector, as well as 
other circumstances of the case‖906. These criteria are in practice not very helpful 
because of their ambiguity-unless they just mean that the only evidence to be 
                                                 
903
  T-67/04, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 40, CFI ruling on case T-477/04 Aktieselskabet af. 21 
November 2001 v. OHIM – TDK Kabushiki Kaisha [2007], par. 48. The CFI had also stated that one 
would need to produce evidence  of an association of the later mark with the positive qualities of the 
identical earlier mark which could give rise to manifest exploitation. 
904
  Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 71. 
905
 Frank Schechter, ―The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade Marks‖, 166 [1925].   
906
  T-47/06, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 54. According to CFI ruling in T-215/03, Op. Cit. Supra n. 
881, one would need to produce evidence  of an association of the later mark with the positive qualities 
of the identical earlier mark which could give rise to manifest exploitation or free riding. However, this 
association (as to the guarantee and not the origin function) would fall within the legislative framework 
relating to protection against trademark confusion. 
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produced is logical deductions, i.e. no evidence. This follows also from the findings of 
the CFI itself in the above case
907
.  
 
Furthermore, the CFI conclusion that since there is no competition between the goods 
or services there is no detriment to the repute of the mark is also problematic, in view 
of the whole notion of dilution theory, examined in detail above. Again with regard to 
the detriment on the distinctive character of the mark it is indeed hard to produce 
evidence showing that the trade mark is for example less recognisable by consumers 
because of the use of the later mark. This issue is similar to the problems arising with 
regard to damage calculation in cases of trade mark infringement. In the European 
context this issue was solved with the promulgation of the enforcement directive
908
, in 
which a plasmatic calculation of damages was introduced in art. 13.1.b., as the best 
way to overcome the impossibility of calculating (and subsequently proving) damages 
from third party unauthorised use. Perhaps a plasmatic ―calculation‖ of detriment to 
distinctive character should also be introduced in the European legislation. 
 
Interestingly, the CFI had ruled that it is possible in some cases that the probability of 
a future, non-hypothetical risk of detriment to or unfair advantage is so obvious that 
no other proof needs to be put forward
909. How one mark could ―at first sight‖ give 
rise to one of the three types of risk, while another mark could not is not clarified in 
the ruling.  
                                                 
907
  CFI found that ―[…] the applicant does not put forward any evidence to support the conclusion that 
there is a risk of detriment to the distinctive character of the mark SPA by the use of the mark SPA-
FINDERS. It infers from that link that there is detriment to the distinctive character. As the applicant 
acknowledged at the hearing, the existence of such a link is not sufficient to demonstrate the risk of 
detriment to the distinctive character […] ‖ ―In the present case, the applicant has not adduced any 
evidence, during the proceedings before the departments of OHIM or even before the Court, to 
establish that registration of the mark SPA-FINDERS would be likely to be detrimental to the repute of 
the mark SPA. In that regard, as OHIM rightly points out, there is no ―antagonism‖ between the goods 
and services covered by the marks SPA and SPA FINDERS which might be detrimental to the repute of 
SPA mineral waters. Similarly, the Court notes that it is unlikely that the mark SPA-FINDERS will 
tarnish the image of the SPA mark‖ T-67/04 Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 44 and 48. It is interesting, that 
CFI uses words that are common in US case law and doctrine, such as ― free riding‖, ―whittling away‖ 
and ―tarnishment‖. Since those notions though are not established in the EU case law or legislation, the 
court should have provided a definition. 
908
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. It should be mentioned that the provisions of this directive  
have not yet been implemented into Greek trade mark law. National courts have started however to 
accept application  of the Directive provisions and by analogy the respective provisions of national law 
implementing in Copyright law n. 2121/1993 the enforcement directive; see case law mentioned Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 392 and 399.  
909
  T-215/03 Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 48. 
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The CFI in a subsequent ruling amplified the meaning of dilution and stated that an 
unfair advantage is taken or detriment caused when ―operators purposely choose signs 
identical or similar to a reputed mark for use in a different field, in order to divert for 
their own benefit part of the investments made by the earlier right holder‖910. The 
court even gave some indications of such conduct: the degree of similarity of the 
signs, the degree of reputation of the earlier mark, the degree of connection between 
the goods or services and actually applied the tools of the confusion test (higher 
degree of similarity of the marks and higher degree of distinctiveness of the earlier 
mark –lower degree of products‘ connection)911.  
 
The CFI in this case proposed a very interesting reversal of onus of proof: it stated 
that the junior mark applicant must prove that there was ―due cause‖ for choosing that 
particular sign
912
. This is of course extremely and substantially helpful to the 
trademark owner. If there is indeed no misappropriation and therefore no illegal 
behaviour, then the one to prove it, should be the one who knows if there was any 
such purpose: the junior mark applicant. Otherwise, what the senior mark holder is 
asked to prove, is as already stated, impossible
913
.   
 
One could infer that the CFI alludes to very famous marks and implies that in their 
case no further evidence needs to be submitted. However, this is also not 
uncontestable. As it has been correctly argued: ―No one can seriously suggest that the 
typicality of the trademark FORD has been significantly diminished by the 
coexistence in the American marketplace of a modeling agency—or of millions of 
people, for that matter—with the same name‖914. 
 
Does one need to prove the risks or not? In most jurisdictions the rules of what needs 
to be proved are very clear. Such an interpretation given by the CFI (i.e. that proof 
may or may not be put forward for facts applicable to the same legal provision) would 
                                                 
910
  Emphasis added. T-47/06, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888, par. 24. 
911
  Ibid. The court found that the junior applicant would not have to spend any money on advertising to 
draw the attention of the public to its goods. 
912
  Ibid, par. 27. 
913
 Interestingly, the legal basis of dilution appears then  not much different than the legal basis of bad 
faith. 
914
 B. Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766 [2006], 1150. 
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go beyond the court‘s competence and would affect national civil or administrative 
procedure laws. It is characteristic of the confusion created by the interpretation and 
application of  art. 5(2) of the Directive (and of the similar art. 8(5) of the Regulation) 
that so many vague terms are incorporated in the above mentioned case law, so many 
sub-categories of marks and so many hypothetical circumstances that need to be 
fulfilled.  
 
The ECJ clarified that in order to benefit from the protection introduced by art. 4(4) of 
the Directive, one would need to prove that the use of the later mark would take unfair 
advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character of or the repute of the 
earlier mark
915
.  In line with the above mentioned case law of the CIF, the ECJ 
confirmed that the trade mark owner is not required to prove actual and present injury, 
but merely a serious risk thereof
916
. But only when such injury or risk of injury is 
proved, is it for the holder of the later mark to establish that there is due cause for 
such use
917
. The reversal of the onus of proof, seems therefore, not to be a possibility 
for ECJ.  
 
Along  theses lines, for example, the CFI in Nasdaq
918
 confirmed first that the marks 
at issue were similar, that the senior mark had reputation in an important sub-section 
of the general public
919
, that there was a possibility of detriment because of the 
inherently distinctive character of the mark, the interest shown by a large part of the 
general public and the mark‘s omnipresence920, before it examined whether there was 
―due cause‖ for such detriment. The claim put forward by the defendant that the use 
was made in good faith because the mark Nasdaq it used stood for the initials of 
―Nuovi Articoli Sprotivi di Alta Qualita‖ did not convince the CFI which found that 
the link established enables the transfer of the Nasdaq Stock Exchange modern image 
to the sports equipment of the defendant and that was implicitly recognised by the 
defendant
921
.  
                                                 
915
  Intel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 37. 
916
  Ibid, par. 38. 
917
  Ibid, par. 39. 
918
 T- 47/06, Op. Cit. Supra n. 888. The ruling was subsequently upheld by the ECJ, in C-320/07, Op. 
Cit. Supra, par. 55. 
919
  Ibid, par. 16 and 17. 
920
 Ibid, par. 18. The CFI applied the criteria for establishing a ―link‖, except for the criterion relating to 
existence of likelihood of confusion, which is in any case contradictory. 
921
  Ibid, par. 19. 
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But what does this proof of detriment consist of? The ECJ attempted to give some 
guidelines. The proof that the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the 
distinctive character of the mark requires evidence of a change or a serious likelihood 
of change ―in the economic behaviour of the average consumer‖ of the goods or 
services for which the earlier mark was registered, as a consequence of the use of the 
later mark
922
. How is this change meant? Would any change be acceptable evidence? 
Would the increase as well as the decrease of the products sales constitute in that 
context adequate proof? A clarification on how the detriment to the distinctive 
character and causal link is proved was needed to be given by the ECJ. But is the 
―change in the economic behaviour‖ indeed a clarification? Not to mention that the 
ECJ did not state that such change need to be demonstrated vis-à-vis the products in 
question (this is teleologically inferred). In an economic crisis, where consumers 
manifest a change in their total economic behaviour, one would expect that in 
applying the ECJ guideline, a trademark owner would have much difficulty in 
establishing that the change in the economic behaviour of the consumers, i.e. a 
diminishing of consumption of the goods in question, was a result of the use of a 
subsequent mark (sic).  
 
A shift from the products distinguished by the earlier mark to the products 
distinguished by the later mark (which is hardly possible to prove anyway) is not what 
the Court meant by ―change in the economic behaviour‖. The ECJ stated that it is 
immaterial for the assessment of the above, whether or not the proprietor of the later 
mark ―draws real commercial benefit from the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark‖923. However, the problem of establishing a causal link between the appearance 
of the later mark and the diminuition of consumption of the goods of the earlier mark, 
still remains. It also remains as a ―problem‖ the fact that very rarely is there a 
diminution in the consumption of the goods in question (of the earlier mark). 
 
Until now, in the national courts of Greece, if a mark was proved to be a famous one, 
then the detriment and the unfair advantage (even in the form of unfair competition) 
did not need to be further proved. These were considered as an outcome of the use of 
                                                 
922
   Intel, Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 77. 
923
   Ibid, par. 78. 
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the infringing mark. Now a clear distinction is made. The senior famous mark holder 
is in a worse position than before.  
 
It appears however, that the ECJ decided to make a dynamic statement with regard to 
the dilution regime in Europe. In L‘ Oreal v. Bellure924 the Court clarified that the 
three separate types of infringement falling within art. 5(2) of the Directive are a) 
detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark which as per Intel includes, as 
we have seen, ―dilution‖, ―whittling away‖ or ―blurring‖ i.e. when the mark is no 
longer able to arise immediate connotation with the goods or services for which it is 
registered, b) detriment to the repute of the mark, which is caused when the goods or 
services for which the sign is used may be perceived by the third party in such a way 
that the trade mark‘s power of attraction is reduced, in particular when those goods 
possess a characteristic or quality which is liable to have a negative impact on the 
image of the mark
925
 and c) unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute 
of the mark, also referred to as ―paracitation‖ or ―free-riding‖, which relates not to the 
detriment caused to the mark but to the advantage taken by the third party; it covers 
cases where, by reason of a transfer of image of the mark or of the characteristics 
which it protects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, even though 
there is no confusion or detriment to the mark or the proprietor, there is ―clear 
exploitation on the coattails of the mark with a reputation‖926. 
 
This last category takes as starting point the third party and the advantage that it 
enjoys from the association created with the earlier mark. And exactly because the 
central standpoint is not the mark and its functions, but the third party and the unfair 
advantage it takes, this category falls completely outside the European trade mark law 
as known so far, and as so far established by the ECJ case law. Either one of those 
suffices for trade mark infringement to be established
927
.  
 
This very clear and precise ruling ―organizes‖, one could say, the ECJ and CFI case 
law on dilution so far and tries to overcome the problems resulting from the 
                                                 
924
  C-487/07 L‘ Oreal SA, Lancome parfums et beaute & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v. 
Bellure NV, Malaika Invstments Ltd. , Starion Ltd, Judgement of the Court of 18 June 2009. 
925
  Ibid, par. 40. 
926
  Emphasis added. Ibid, par. 41. 
927
  Ibid, par. 42. 
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ambiguities and inconsistencies presented at times. It clarifies the three distinct cases 
of dilution covered by art. 5(2) of the Directive. And taking European trademark anti-
dilution law one step forward, it explains that the third type of dilution (the ―free-
riding‖) is all about the benefit that the third party gains from using the sign; not about 
the harm that the mark itself or the trade mark owner suffer. Even if there is no harm, 
as per the ECJ, there might still be infringement. This is very important in view of the 
difficulties analysed above in proving the harm to the trademark or the trademark 
owner.  
 
The Court states ―[…] an advantage taken by a third party of the distinctive character 
or the repute of the mark may be unfair, even if the use of the identical or similar sign 
is not detrimental either to the distinctive character or to the repute of the mark, or, 
more generally, to its proprietor‖928. This unfairness is what the Directive also wants 
to eliminate from the harmonized European trade mark regime. It is true that the 
―unfairness‖ is not directly related to any specific trade mark function, as these have 
been accepted so far by the ECJ, however it could be argued that it is related to all 
three functions seen as a whole and to the essence of what a trade mark is. This does 
not mean that actually the functions of the trade mark are not impaired–by any 
unauthorized third party use, the trade mark loses some of its ―uniqueness‖ and all 
three function could be, more or less, at the end impaired. But this is a fact practically 
impossible to prove. Therefore, by turning the focus on the gain of the third party 
from such unauthorized use, the identity of the mark can be effectively safeguarded.  
 
In order to assess whether such unfair advantage exists, a global assessment, as per 
the ECJ, needs to be effected, taking into account all the relevant factors of the case, 
such as the strength of the trade mark‘s reputation and the degree of distinctive 
character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks and the nature and 
degree of proximity of the goods and services concerned
929
. The fact that there is a 
likelihood of dilution or tarnishment must also be taken into account (and not 
likelihood of confusion, as the ECJ unfortunately ruled in Intel, as we have seen 
above)
930
.  
                                                 
928
  Ibid, par. 43. 
929
  Ibid, par. 44. 
930
  Ibid, par. 45. 
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A solution suggested in the present thesis is the reversal of the onus of proof, so that 
infringement is deemed to have taken place, unless the infringer proves that the use 
was made with due cause; even when there is no harm on the origin function, no risk 
of confusion or association, no loss of revenues of the trade mark owner, but the 
infringer obviously (as inferred from the similarity, even in a non striking manner, of  
the mark he uses, to the earlier mark) takes a ―free ride‖ on the earlier mark, that 
allows him with much less effort and expenses to establish his own product in the 
market
931
. This is why, such an unfair advantage must be deemed to exist, unless the 
third party manages to prove otherwise. It must be deemed that the third party uses the 
sign intentionally in order to create an association in the minds of the consumers, so 
that consumers are encountered with something familiar when they see it, which 
would enable him to effectively market the goods and save much in establishing an 
image of his own mark from scratch. Or, as the ECJ put it, which would enable him to 
successfully market the goods or services ―without paying any financial 
compensation‖, by exploiting ―the marketing effort extended by the trade mark owner 
in order to create and maintain the mark‘s image‖932. 
 
E. EXAMINING NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
E. a. The Benelux Paradigm 
 
The Directive has allegedly been influenced by Benelux Trade Mark law, as already 
mentioned in Part IV of this thesis. Benelux law was one of the most modern Trade 
Mark laws in Europe
933
. Professor Gielen
934
 points out that this was largely due to the 
                                                 
931
  See also the Advocate General‘ s Mengozzi Opinion of 10.2.2009 on L‘ Oreal (C-487/2007), which 
was followed by the ECJ in C-487/07, par. 49 and 50. See also the OHIM Board of Appeal decision on 
Mango Sport System Srl Socio Unico Mangone Antonio Vincenzo v Diknah Sl stating ―As to unfair 
advantage … it is taken when another undertaking exploits the … repute of the earlier mark to the 
benefit of its own efforts. In that situation that undertaking effectively uses the renowned mark as a 
vehicle for generating consumer interest in its own products. The advantage of the third party arises in 
the substantial saving on investment in promotion and publicity for its own goods, since it is able to 
―free ride‖ in that already undertaken by the earlier reputed mark. It is unfair since the reward for the 
costs of promoting, maintaining and enhancing a particular trade mark should belong to the owner of 
the earlier trade mark in question‖. [2005] E.T.M.R. 5 at [19].  
932
 Ibid, par. 50 
933
 Art. 5(2) of the Directive depicted not only the Benelux Trade Mark legal tradition but also the 
manner in which other European countries such as Germany, France and Greece afforded protection to 
trade mark owners against this type of infringement under unfair competition law rules. In the Benelux, 
law on unfair competition conferred only limited protection to trade mark owners, see W.R. Cornish 
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inspiration of companies like Unilever, Philips and Akzo, ―owners of many thousands 
of consumer brands‖.935 It is true however that under Benelux law protection for use 
on dissimilar products also exists for trade marks which are not reputed; although the 
owners of stronger marks have a greater chance of successfully arguing for their 
case.
936
 The prerequisites of the Directive for a detriment to the distinctive character 
or the repute of the trade mark, would certainly fall under the scope of Benelux trade 
mark law infringement. 
 
A famous case of the Dutch court involved the Claeryn/Klarein marks.
937
 These two 
have the same pronunciation in the Dutch language. However, the one was used for a 
famous gin  and the other for a liquid cleanser. The court decided that in order for 
prejudice of the mark to be established it is not necessary that the distinctive power of 
the mark is affected; nor that the there is a risk of confusion. It suffices that there is a 
detrimental effect on the capacity of the trade mark to stimulate the consumer‘s desire 
to buy the goods bearing that mark. As Professor Gielen aptly remarked: ―It is not 
funny to drink a good glass of Dutch gin while thinking of a cleaning agent at the 
same time".
938
  
 
However, it should be noted that although the case is decided on the basis of dilution 
resulting from use on a dissimilar product, Professor Gielen‘s comment brings 
forward the notion of association (the coming into mind).
939
 So long as the consumer 
―thinks‖ of the original mark when he encounters the infringing sign, or vice versa, 
there is association  under the Benelux interpretation. This is characteristic because 
Benelux trade mark law does not recognise the notion of confusion - only that of 
association.
940
. The use on dissimilar goods does not per se eliminate the possibility 
that the consumer will associate the two marks. On the contrary, in the case of famous 
                                                                                                                                            
Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 712. Cornish posed the question whether such protection was necessary to be 
included in national legislation in Member States where this protection was covered by unfair 
competition law. 
934
  Professor Ch. Gielen, renown academic of the Benelux, has participated in the drafting of the 
Directive. 
935
  Ch. Gielen, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44, at 246. 
936
  The issue of reputation will be dealt with later on. 
937
  Benelux Court Decision of 1 March 1975, NJ 1975, 472. 
938
   See, Op. Cit. Supra n. 44 at 267. 
939
 This is so, of course, if one accepts  the wide definition of the term “association” as this has been 
used under the Benelux law. This issue will be discussed later on. 
940
  See Part IV above. 
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marks it is even more likely that such an association will be realised. Therefore it is 
submitted that the Benelux law encapsulated the doctrine of dilution in the notion of 
association.  
 
Further examples of infringing use on dissimilar products under Benelux law include 
Apple (for computers) v. Apple (for services in the advertising sector)
941
; Marlboro 
(for tobacco products) v. Marlboro Men‘s Line (for cosmetic products)942 and 
Davidoff (for tobacco products, wines and liquors and several other products) v. 
Davidoff (as name of a bar).
943
 
 
E. b.  The Case of the UK 
 
Under the 1994 UK  TM Act, the use of a similar sign in relation to dissimilar goods 
or services will be an infringement of a registered trade mark where that use is, inter 
alia, ―detrimental to...the repute‖ of the registered mark.944 Confusion is not 
mentioned in the relevant section; instead the plaintiff must show that its mark has 
reputation in the UK and that the defendant‘s use of an identical or similar sign is 
without due cause. This last term is not defined in the Act. However, it is more likely 
that it refers to a commercial necessity
945
. In the cases which have focused on section 
10(3), it is apparent that UK judges are reluctant to find detriment in the absence of 
likelihood of confusion.
946
  
 
It is also a matter of speculation what type of marks the UK courts protect against 
dilution under section 10(3) of the UK TM Act. The White Paper ―Reform of Trade 
Marks Law‖ spoke of marks which have acquired a ―wide reputation‖ and referred to 
the practice of using ―familiar‖ marks to decorate T-shirts (par. 3.17). Some 
propositions would, for example, include the acquaintance with and valuation of the 
product by the public; the market share of the product; or, lastly, whether the trade 
                                                 
941
  Court of Appeals, Amsterdam, 8 March 1984. 
942
  Commercial Court, Brussels, 6 October 1988. 
943
  Commercial Court, Antwerp 1 June 1989.   
944
  Section 10(3) 1994 UK TM Act. 
945
   e. g: in the context of comparative advertising. See, A. K. Sanders, [1995], Op. Cit. Supra n. 687. 
946
   e.g.: BASF plc. v. CEP (UK) plc [1996], 19 IPD 19030; Baywatch Productions v. The Home Video 
Channel , Op. Cit. Supra n. 689.  
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mark proprietor has taken action to add value to the mark, in order to acquire a 
reputation.
947
  
 
Whether sections 10(2) and 10(3) taken together introduce a fully-fledged dilution 
rationale into UK law is open to question.
948
 It can be ascertained however that 
dilution as defined in the US Federal Trademark Act may occur regardless of the 
existence of confusion or competition. If such a doctrine is now part of UK law, the 
interpretation of ―likelihood of association‖ in section 10(2) must be appropriately 
wide. 
 
The fact that the UK has implemented Art. 5(2) of the Directive creates ambiguity in 
the area of trade mark law. Some British commentators suggested that the dilution 
doctrine brings significant obstacles in the arena of competition and makes it difficult 
for new- coming producers to register their products with a ―safe‖ mark (i. e: that 
would not be held liable for infringing another registered mark)
949
. Courts seem to be 
in accord with this conviction. The Wagamama
950
 decision did not make the 
breakthrough that the dilution supporters were hoping for
951
. This decision was given 
in a case where similar marks
952
(Wagamama and Rajamama‘s) were used on similar 
goods. However, the court expanded for the first time on a general evaluation of the 
dilution approach to the Directive only to eventually reject it. In another case, namely 
BASF plc. v. CEP (UK) plc,
953
 the court stated that there was no evidence of the 
defendant having taken or threatening to take unfair advantage of the plaintiff‘ s 
registered trade mark in the absence of relevant confusion. The same was held in the 
Baywatch
954
 and Intel
955
 cases. The reluctancy of the English courts to grant 
                                                 
947
  See,  A. K. Sanders, ―Some Frequently Asked Questions About the UK Trade Marks Act‖, Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 687,  at 74. 
948
  See, for example, E. Gredley and Sp. Maniatis, Op. Cit. Supra 241 at 420; also, A. K. Sanders, Op. 
Cit. Supra n. 716 in an exchange of opinions with P. Prescott, Op. Cit. Supra n. 714. 
949
  See P. Prescott, Ibid,  at 318. Also, Cornish and Llewelyn, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45. 
950
  Wagamama Ltd. V. City Centre Restaurants plc.(UK) Ltd, [1995], FSR 713. A very important 
decision, since it was the first one to examine the issue of infringement under the new UK TM Act 
951
  We have already examined this issue in the context of confusion, in part IV infra. 
952
  See, A. K. Sanders, ―The Return to Wagamama‖, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 716, at 521. The commentator 
was clearly rejecting the rational followed by the court, although he did not find any objections as to 
the final outcome of the decision. 
953
  [1996], 19(4) IPD 19030. 
954
  The Baywatch Production Company v. Home Video Channel Ltd, Op. Cit. Supra n. 689. 
955
  Intel Corp Inc v CPM United Kingdom Ltd [2007], EWCA Civ 431, CA. 
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protection to merely the advertising function has been criticised by commentators
956
. 
The relationship between consumer confusion and the detrimental effect on the 
plaintiff‘s mark will be examined later957.  
 
It is submitted that decisions on passing off could give guidelines for the legal 
framework of protection in dilution cases
958
. The tort of passing off however, will not 
be considered in the present thesis. Suffice to say that because it protects the 
businesses goodwill
959
, it is akin to the attempt of extending trade mark protection to 
include the advertising function. Moreover, it has been submitted that passing off 
cases seem to promulgate dilution claims
960
. The Lego case
961
 can be mentioned as a 
characteristic example. There the plaintiffs, the famous toy building bricks company, 
successfully prevented the defendants using the trade name ―Lego‖ for their garden 
equipment (even though it had been legitimately used for many years by them abroad) 
on the basis of lost licensing opportunities, loss of expansion potential and loss of 
control of reputation. These claims could indeed be dilution claims ―in disguise.‖962  
 
E.c. The Case of Greece 
 
In Greece there was no legal protection of the advertising function per se before the 
Directive on the harmonisation of trade mark law was introduced. This function was 
protectable only indirectly under the Greek TM Act (Emergency Act No. 
                                                 
956
  See, for example, Bonita Trimmer, Op. Cit. Supra n. 448 [2009]. 
957
  See, for example, A. K. Sanders, Op. Cit. Supra n. 687; also, A. Firth, Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 78;  
Annand and Norman Op. Cit. Supra n. 45, at 156. 
958
  See, Bonita Trimmer Op. Cit. Supra n. 448, at 198 and H. Carty, Op. Cit. Supra n. 742,  in which 
he claims that an incorporation of the dilution rational in the tort of passing off, will undermine the 
rational of the tort by shifting the focus away from consumer protection and misrepresentation towards 
protection of trade values per se. The author argues that recent passing off cases (namely from 1981 
onwards) seem to accept dilution as a head of damage.  
959
 The classic definition of goodwill is contained in Lord Macnaghten‘s speech in CIR v. Muller and 
Co.‘s Margarine Ltd, [1901] AC 217, at 223, as ―the benefit and advantage of the good name, 
reputation and connection of a business.‖ 
960
  Note also that in New Zealand, in Levi Strauss and Co. v. Kimbyr Investments Ltd, [1994], 1 NZLR 
332, the court accepted that there were three types of damage for passing off: diversion; damage to 
reputation; and dilution. The Court of Appeal in this case accepted ―that in some cases it is legitimate to 
infer damage from a tendency to impair distinctiveness‖ citing the Lego decision as an example, at p. 
37. 
961
  Lego System A/S v. Lego M. Lemelstrich Ltd, [1983], FSR 155. 
962
  See, H. Carty, Op. Cit. Supra n. 742, at 642. 
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1998/1939)
963
. However, an increasing discussion on introducing the possibility of an 
autonomous legal protection had taken place long before the implementation of the 
Directive
964
. The development of the dilution theory in the USA and the relative 
legislative fragments that were presented in the European context (in particular the 
aforementioned German courts‘ decisions, as well as Benelux Trade Mark 
Legislation) gave the incentive. Other legal bases, outside the scope of Trade Mark 
Law were used, in cases where there could be no protection given within the existing 
provisions requiring distortion or imitation and use of the mark on similar goods (see 
above in the second part of the present thesis). These bases included unfair 
competition law and civil law provisions. However, the attitude towards granting legal 
protection outside trade mark law was quite reserved. There was always the fear that 
the preconditions of protection for trade marks would be nullified and the legislative 
choice prejudiced
965
. In particular, it was submitted that protection against use of the 
mark on dissimilar goods would contradict the ―relativity principle‖966. In that context 
legal scholars, as well as courts, proposed and applied extended legal protection, only 
under specific prerequisites and circumstances. The principal condition of extended 
protection was  the mark to be famous
967
. 
 
However,  no coherent view on what a famous mark was could be said to exist in 
Greece (as in the UK or the USA, shown earlier). For example, it was held that the 
mark «Apple» used for computer hardware, was not famous 968. It was submitted that 
the mark could not be considered as famous because: a. it was not original since it was 
inspired by a natural object (the apple); b. it was not unique, as the same mark 
(especially the design of an apple) was registered for many other dissimilar goods as 
                                                 
963
  This was the existing legal framework before the implementation of the Directive. 
964
  See Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 138. 
965
  Ibid; also, M. Minoudis, “Well-Known Trade Marks. A Greek Perspective”, NoV [1995], at 150. 
966
  This principle pertained Greek trade mark law in toto. An important facet of this principle is the fact 
that the use of an identical or similar mark on dissimilar goods was not prohibited. Accordingly, the use 
of a similar mark on a similar product was not prohibited unless there is enough evidence of likelihood 
of consumer confusion. It follows from the above that the focus of trade mark protection under the 
relativity principle  was held towards balancing consumer interests and effective competition. The 
interests of the trade mark owner seemed less important in comparison and this was much less so (even 
non existing) for the inherent value of the trade mark per se. For a description of this principle, see 
inter alia, MonPrAth  9077/1992, EEmpD 660, [1992], at 661. 
967
 See N. Rokas, ―Exploitation and Protection of Advertising Value‖, EEmpD 1, [1999], K. 
Pampoukis, ―The Famous Trade Mark as a new Notion in Trade Mark Law‖, EpiskEmpD 347, [1999], 
Antonopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 400, M. Kosmopoulos, ―Famous Mark‖, EEmpD [2006], 144, 
Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351. 
968
  MonPrAth 9077/1992, Op. Cit. Supra n. 966. 
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well. The fact that the brand «Apple» is well-known world wide for computer 
hardware of high quality was not even considered by the court.  
 
The Greek Supreme Court has also found that the mark “Camel” for cigarettes was 
not a famous one
969
. 
 
The  legal bases for the protection of famous marks under Greek law were: 
  
i. Article 3(2) of the Greek Trade Mark Act. 
Greek trade mark courts often cited Art. 3(2) of the previous Greek TM Act 
(promulgating good faith) as a basis for the protection of famous marks against 
dilution
970
. In a number of decisions the courts granted protection over and above the 
context of related goods. Most of them required that a likelihood of confusion of the 
public was created
971
. However, in a case decided in 1984, regarding the registration 
of the mark ―Mercedes‖ for roses, the court granted protection without taking any 
regard to the likelihood of confusion. Instead, the main issue was whether the 
distinctive character and marketing power of the famous mark were likely to suffer 
damage
972
. 
 
 ii. Article 1 of the Greek Act Against Unfair Competition
973
  
This legal basis is analogous to the protection given in Common Law jurisdictions 
against passing off. Under unfair competition law a famous mark could be protected 
against exploitation of its good reputation and dilution of its distinctive and marketing 
power from products in different branches. The claim was actually based on 
opposition to bona mores and good faith. This was established in particular when the 
third party used the mark in order to promote its own products to the detriment of the 
                                                 
969
  StE 2812/98 EEmpD [2000], 372, with comments by Chr. Chrysanthis. 
970
 Art 3(2) reads: “A mark the registration of which violates good faith, will not be accepted for 
registration». Along these lines Art. 15(1)(h) of the Greek TM Act also provided that the a registered 
mark could be revoked on application of any party with a legal interest in the mark, as well as any 
industry or trade association, «if among other reasons the application for registration of the mark was 
made in bad faith”. Emphasis Added. 
971
  See, for example, Omega (for ball point pens), StE 1102/1960, EEmpD 224, [1960]; Claus (for 
shirts) Court of Trade Mark Appeals Decision 254/1959, EEmpD 323, [1959]; Bacardi (for clothes) 
MonPrAth 19410/1991, EEmpD 647, [1992].  This is interesting because if the goods are not similar 
then no confusion is normally created.  
972
  See A. Sinanioti, ―The Protection of Famous Marks in Greece‖, 18 EIPR 214, [1987]. 
973
  Unfair Competition Law  146/1914. 
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goods of the original trade mark owner. However, this legal basis was severely 
criticised in Greek literature with the argument that competitive trade did not arise in 
the absence of a similarity of goods, and hence the Act against Unfair Competition  
was inapposite.
974
  
 
It would be worth mentioning that Unfair Competition law was a significant tool 
against parasitic exploitation of a mark‘s good reputation in other European Countries 
as well. The German Courts‘ decision (examined below) did not require particularly 
strict conditions for the granting of protection. The fact that the mark was famous 
sufficed for the establishment of a (broadly understood) competitive relationship.
975
 
The act of exploitation of another mark‘s repute was an infringement in itself. 
 
Several Greek decisions were also drawn along these lines
976. In the ―Bravo‖ case, the 
court prohibited the use of the mark ―Bravo‖ (a very famous Greek coffee brand) for 
use on bicycles. The protection was given under the aforementioned Unfair 
Competition Law provision (Art.1), despite the fact that no convincing argument as to 
the existence of competition between the goods was put forward. The court‘s focus 
was merely on the fact that the mark was well-known and that the defendant was 
trying to exploit its reputation
977
. After the implementation of the Directive, art. 1 of 
law 146/1914 remains a complementary legal basis for protection of famous marks
978
.   
 
 iii. Other Possible Legal Bases
979
 
                                                 
974
  See, among others, Pelekanos, “The Famous Mark: Function, Protection, Policy”, EEmpD 438, 
[1985]; Alexandridou, “The Protection of Trademarks Beyond the Area of Related Goods”, in the 
publication of honour of K. Rokas, 421 et sec, [1985], Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at 140. 
975
  See, among others, G. Wurtenberger, Op. Cit. Supra, n. 842, at 240. In this article the author 
explains the notion of Competitive Individuality established under German trade mark case law (e.g.: 
Rolex, mentioned above). Following from this notion, goods which have no features significant for 
competition are competitively neutral and can therefore not even substantiate the unfairness of an act of 
imitation.  
976
  MonPrAth  12209/1981, EEmpD 134, [1982]. 
977
  The inadequacy of the arguments justifying the claim based on unfair competition was also evident 
in MonPrAth 8032/1984, EEmpD 493, [1984], regarding the registration of the mark “Marlboro” on 
cassettes and records. 
978
  N. Rokas, Op. Cit. Supra n. 619, at 131, PolPrAth 1225/06, EEmpD [2006], 469, MonPrAth 
4982/2000 EEmpD [2001], 354, MonPrAth 9485/2000 EEmpD [2000], 1094. Contra  Marinos, ―Trade 
Mark Law‖, Op. Cit. Supra n. 351, at 324. 
979
 See, N. Rokas “Trade Mark Law”, Sakkoulas, Athens, [1978], at 226; also Alexandridou Op. Cit. 
Supra, n. 974, at 437, with case law references. 
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A further possibility of protection in the case of use of a famous mark on dissimilar 
products included certain provisions of the Civil Code. Article 281 prohibits any use 
against bona mores and could apply in conjunction with Articles 914 and 919 of the 
Greek Civil Code governing tort
980
. Moreover, when a famous mark alluded not only 
to the origin of a product from a particular business, but also encompassed the 
commercial concept of the corporation as a whole, it enjoyed concurrent protection as 
a corporate trade name in terms of Art. 58 and 59 of the Greek Civil Code,
981
 as well 
as Art. 13(1) of the Greek Act on Unfair Competition. Protection under the latter 
provision does not require a competitive relationship or a similarity of goods. It is 
sufficient for the granting of protection that the plaintiff establishes the existence of a 
risk of confusion.  
 
E.d. Is Greece in harmony with the European anti-dilution trademark case law?  
 
The conditions for providing extended trade mark protection are also under Greek 
trade mark law the following: 
 
a) that the mark is a famous mark in Greece
982
 
 
This follows from the territoriality principle. However, it is exceptionally accepted 
that a mark may have acquired fame abroad and be well known in Greece even though 
still not used in Greece
983
. Whether a mark is famous or not is a matter of fact and is 
proved through a number of ―indirect‖ means of proof, such as advertising expenses, 
affidavits of brand or market experts, advertising material, market share etc.   
 
                                                 
980
 PolPrAth (District Court of Athens) 19/1982, EEmpD 506, [1983]. See, also, A. Sinanioti, “The 
Protection of Famous Marks in Greece”, 18 IIC 214, [1987], at 217. 
981
  Establishing the protection of the right to one’s name against any infringing (illegal) use of his 
name by third parties. This legal  base was also accepted in German theory. The German Civil Code 
incorporates a similar provision for the protection of names including trade names (BGB German Civil 
Code Art.12). This protection was of course denied when a mark and not a name was involved. See, 
Shcricker, Op. Cit. Supra n. 842, at 168. An analogy could be drawn between this right and the 
publicity right under the USA legislation. This will be discussed later on. 
982
 StE 3669/77, StE 726/2005, EEmpD [2006], 463, PolPrAth 1225/2006, EEmpD [2006], 466, EfAth 
4008/2006, DEE [2007], 183, PolPrAth 194/1997, Op. Cit. Supra n. 613, at 391. 
983
 StE 678/79, StE 3085/81, StE 2812/1998 EEmpD [2000], 377 with remarks by Ch. Chrisanthis. It 
should also be noted that according to C-357/97 Op. Cit. Supra n. 122 (General Motors) it is sufficient 
that the mark is recognisable in a specific part of a member-state and it is not necessary that it is 
recognisable in the whole community. In view of the above, even if a mark is famous in another 
member state, this should be sufficient for it to be considered as a ―famous mark‖ even in Greece.   
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However, merely the wide commercialisation in many countries of the products 
distinguished by the trade mark was found by the Conseil d‘ Etat not to be sufficient 
criterion of the notoriety of the mark
984
. 
 
As we have examined before in the present thesis, the Greek case law set a number of 
criteria for a mark to qualify as famous (originality, uniqueness, special and positive 
appreciation by the consumers
985
). After C-375/97 (General Motors) however, where 
it was stated that for a mark to be famous it suffices that it is known by a significant 
part of consumers, and  after Intel, where it was stated that the famous mark does not 
need to have any uniqueness (par. 72), these qualitative and quantitative criteria 
should be considered as contrary to European law. There have been instances in 
Greek case law where trade marks that by general knowledge are famous marks were 
not recognised as such because they lacked the characteristic of originality or 
uniqueness (e.g. the mark Apple for computers, or Camel for cigarettes mentioned 
above), because of lack of uniqueness or originaltiy. Many brands however that are 
famous indeed lack uniqueness or originality (e.g. 501 for blue-jeans, 4711 for 
perfumes, even Coca Cola). As per the most recent case law, the factors to be taken 
into account for such an assessment are inter alia the market share, the intensity, the 
geographical coverage, the amount of investment undertaken by the trade mark 
owner, but  not the increased degree of establishment in the market, as such 
establishment is given if the mark is famous and not the individuality or originality of 
the mark
986
. 
 
b) use of the mark in the course of trade.  
 
c) identity or similarity of the trade mark with a junior sign. 
 
In a recent case the Supreme Court stated in its obiter dicta that a ―certain degree‖ of 
similarity must exist for the ―dilution‖ provision to apply, not such though that would 
amount to creation of confusion, but one which would make it possible for the 
                                                 
984
 StE 2812/1998, EEmpD [2000], 372, with comments by Ch. Chrisanthis. The Court for this reason 
found that the fact that Camel cigarettes were widely sold in many countries, this did not suffice for 
ascertaining that Camel is a famous mark. Some recent cases of lower courts seem to move however 
from this position, as shall be analysed below.  
985
 For the exact meaning of these criteria and extensive analysis, see above.  
986
  MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 392, at 172. 
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consumers to establish a connotation link with the senior mark 
987
. Interestingly the 
Court connected the degree of similarity of the marks with the risk of confusion and 
confirmed that only a certain degree of similarity is required, even though in 
adjudicating the facts of the case it did not specifically state that the degree of 
similarity is less than the one required to establish risk of confusion. 
 
In any case, the protection is relative, because it is not granted always but only if use 
is made ―without due cause‖. 
 
According to Greek legal doctrine and case law, it is not enough that the mark is a 
famous one for extended protection to be granted
988
. The cases in which protection is 
granted are the cases where the junior mark takes  without due cause unfair advantage 
of the repute or the distinctive character of the famous mark or is detrimental to 
those
989
. 
 
 It has been found that taking unfair advantage of a mark includes the case where the 
connection between the two marks results to the transfer of the increased recognition 
by consumers of the mark and its good image, on goods or services that are 
distinguished by another sign, with the result that the junior mark holder takes 
advantage of the strong advertising power of the earlier mark (―image transfer‖)990.  
 
As to the detriment to the distinctive character of the mark it has been found that it 
occurs, when by the use of the similar sign the basic function of the mark is infringed, 
that is the origin function, with the risk that the mark becomes generic
991
.  
 
                                                 
987
  Areios Pagos 1030/2008, Op. Cit. Supra n. 733, at 186. 
988
  See Kosmopoulos, comments in MonPrAth 8066/2005, EEmpD [2006], 150. See also PolPrAth 
194/1997 Op. Cit. Supra n. 613, at 391. 
989
  It has been argued that the vague legal term of lack of due cause provides a balance to the interests 
of the trade mark owner, the infringer and society (i.e. freedom of expression, press, art or freedom of 
circulation of goods, M. Th. Marinos Op. Cit. Supra [2007], n. 351, at 196. 
990
  Areios Pagos 1030/2008, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 733 at 187, Marinos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 612 [1995] at 
1225, Pampoukis, Op. Cit. Supra n. 612 [1999], at 357. Similar wording was used by CFI ―[…] risk 
that the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the 
goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier 
by that association with the earlier mark with a reputation‖, T-215/2003, Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 40. 
991
  Kosmopoulos [2006], Op. Cit. Supra  n. 966,  at 150, Selekos, comments in MonPrAth 31785/1995 
EpiskED [1996] 180 (BRAVO/ BRAVA), see also Areios Pagos 1030/2008 Op. Cit. Supra n.733. 
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As to the detriment to the repute of the mark it has been found that it usually occurs 
when the junior mark distinguishes products that are of lesser quality or when the 
famous mark is ridiculed (to the extent of course it is used as trade mark)
992
. 
 
Greek case law is not clear as to what exactly the scope of extended protection of 
famous marks is. It has been described as encompassing the following two cases: a) 
cases where by use of the junior mark there is a whittling away of the distinctive 
power of the senior mark or b) cases where the junior sign user manages to survive 
competitively due to the use of the famous mark, thereby enjoying a  competitive 
(unfair) advantage without due cause, i.e. without giving anything in return
993
. What 
existed until now was mostly obiter dicta and no actual extended protection had been 
granted beyond the risk of confusion, meaning that courts found that there was risk of 
confusion and unfair advantage and detriment to the distinctive character at the same 
time
994
.  
 
However, the following conclusions can be drawn in relation also to the European 
Courts‘ rulings mentioned above: a) no distinction is made between harm to the repute 
and harm to the distinctive character of the mark, b) a certain part of Greek case law 
considers unfair advantage and detriment to the distinctive character and repute of the 
mark as two distinct but coinciding cases of infringement, in the sense that when a 
third party is using the famous mark, not only does he take unfair advantage, but also 
the  mark is harmed because of such use and c) the harm caused to the repute and the 
distinctive character of the mark does not need to be further proved, as this follows as 
a ―sine qua non‖ element of the wide usage of the mark by third parties.  
                                                 
992
 There are cases even under the previous law: MonPrAth 8032/1984 EEmpD [1984], 493 
(Marlboro/Malaka). 
993
  MonPrAth 4982/2000, EEmpD [2001], 355 regarding use of the Olympic symbol and trade mark 
―Athens 2004‖ as the name of a mutual fund. The court found that there was risk of confusion. 
PolPrAth 1225/06 EEmpD [2006] 468. In this case it was found that even though the word elements of 
the two marks were totally different, there was trade mark infringement because the product get ups 
were confusingly similar. In Greece the concept of ―parasitic competition‖ exists also as a form of 
unfair competition and it is submitted that the ―unfair advantage‖ covers these cases. In MonPrAth 
2034/2006, DEE [2007] 310, it was stated that the deliberate behaviour of the third party substantially 
weakens the possibility of commercial exploitation of the trade mark, as the wide and unauthorised 
usage deprives them of their uniqueness and their distinctiveness with an ―obvious‖ serious financial 
and ethical damage of the trade mark owner.  
994
  See, for example, PolPrAth 194/1997 (Bodyline/New Body) EEmpD [1998], 394. This case is 
interesting also because it states that the unfair advantage and detriment from the use of the above 
marks in similar services follow mainly from the way the advertising of the two marks was similar. The 
court found also that the risk of confusion was another means of achieving unfair advantage. 
  
 221 
 
Another interesting particularity (obviously relating to the fact that protection of  
famous marks was provided under the pre-existing trade mark law regime via ―good 
faith‖ provisions) is that Greek courts have found that there is confusion even in cases 
where the goods or services are not similar
995
. And that, mainly in earlier cases, the 
taking unfair advantage of was considered as a state of mind (the purpose of the 
infringer) and not as a fact to be proven
996
. This is very much in line with the 
approach the ECJ took in L‘ Oreal where it put in the center of the interpretation the 
infringer and what the infringer sought to achieve (par. 50). 
 
In other cases the courts found that risk of detriment to the repute of the mark, 
encompassed only one case, i.e. where the junior mark‘s products are of lesser quality 
and undermine the good name and reputation of the senior mark
997
. 
 
However, it is not quite established yet that Greek trade mark law actually protects 
also the advertising function, i.e. protection even in cases where there is no risk of 
confusion
998
. Some case law exists in favour of such protection
999
 and, in particular, 
parallel import cases where the right of the trade mark owner was recognised as 
                                                 
995
  MonPrAth 4982/2000, EEmpD [2001], 355 
996
  PolPrAth 194/1997, Op. Cit. Supra n. 613, at  394. 
997
  EfAth 3746/2001 DEE [2001], 853. 
998
  See obiter dictum in EfAth 4008/2006 DEE [2007], 185,and comments by L. Lefakis. See however, 
MonPrTh 12242/1994, EEmpD [1995], 316 (Polar/Aquapolar) decided under the pre-existing trade 
mark law, where the court stated that when the similarity to an earlier mark is made with the aim to 
exploit another trader‘s fame, i.e. with the aim to compete unfairly and in a way that is contrary to bona 
mores, then, the trade mark owner is protected, even if there is no risk of confusion (unfair competition 
law provisions are applicable). 
999
  MonPrAth 8150/91 EEmpD [1992],  with opposite comment of Tzouganatos, PolPrAth 194/1997 
EEmpD [1998], 389, where it was explicitly stated that a famous mark enjoys greater protection 
because of the advertising function it has and that the broad protection is justified by the investment of 
the trade mark owner towards the fortification of the mark‘ s image. See also MonPrAth 1653/99, 
EEmpD [1999], 813, EfAth 866/2004 EllDni [2005], 596, StE 2812/1998 EEmpD [2000], 372, 
MonPrAth 4982/2000 EEmpD [2001], 354, EfAth 3746/2001 DEE [2001], 853, PolPrAth 4304/2005. 
See also, Minoudis, ―Contracts of exclusivity or choice‖, DEE [1997], 669, Soufleros, ―Parallel trade 
and trade mark rights under Directive 89/104/EC‖ EEmpD [1999], 431, Pampoukis, ―The Famous 
Mark as a new notion of trade mark law‖ EpiskED [1999], 347, Liakopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra n. 63, at  
331. See however contra, DES 5056/1998 EEmpD [1999], 398 (Valentino), DES 5568/2000 Asterix-
Asterikios, which is the Greek translation of Asterix, (not published) where it was stated that since the 
products were different there was no risk of confusion and no unfair advantage or detriment to the 
distinctive character of the mark Asterix, M. Th. Marinos, ―Unfair Competition‖  [2002] 550, EllDni 
41, 1445 ind. III under MonPrAth 4982/2000 according to whom ―the existence of fame […] 
contributes to overcoming the dissimilarity of products but not of the risk of confusion as a basic 
parameter that defines the scope of protection of every distinctive element‖. Of course the position that 
risk of confusion needs to be established even in these cases is contrary to European law. 
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granting him the right against the parallel importer, who creates the false impression 
that belongs to the network of the trade mark owner
1000
. 
 
The fact that famous marks are granted extended protection even in cases of similar 
products has also been accepted by at least one Greek court ruling
1001
. 
 
The criteria introduced by Greek case law to indicate a famous mark, relate to the 
criteria used for conferring the special protection to famous marks according to the 
CFI and ECJ
1002
. However, there is an important discrepancy. The originality and the 
uniqueness of the mark are as per the ECJ  elements used for the evaluation of a 
possible harm on the distinctive character, e.g. the more common the mark is, the 
more improbable is that detriment is caused to its distinctive character
1003
.  The Greek 
courts however refuse a priori, as we have seen above, to recognise as famous marks, 
those marks that are not unique and original per se. The positive view of the 
consumers also could be a criterion used for evaluating the unfair advantage of the 
mark or the detriment to the repute
1004
.  
 
It follows from the above that whereas in Community case law it is relatively easy for 
a mark to qualify as ―famous‖ (since it suffices to be known by a significant part of 
consumers), it is hard for its owner to prove that a third party is taking unfair 
advantage of it, or that detriment is caused to its repute or distinctive character; in 
                                                 
1000
 See MonPrAth 12209/93 (Mercedes) EEmpD [1992], 313, EfAth 6414/96 EEmpD [1997], 113, 
MPA 16353/99 (Fiat) EEmpD [1999], 148, EPatr 1058/98, DEE [1999], 860. See in particular, 
“BMW” case, PolPrAth 9364/1994, EEmpD 495, [1995]; “Mercedes II” case, PolPrAth 8393/1995, 
EEmpD 497, [1995]. Both these decisions refer to distribution agreements with regard to famous 
brands. Although the cases were not considering the use of a mark on dissimilar products, it would be 
worth mentioning that the courts emphasised the fact that the advertising function is protected. Any 
exploitation of it amounts to a trade mark infringement. An important remark that should be made 
regards the fact that the courts in both cases made explicit reference to the “high standard” of the 
products in issue.  This brings into mind the positive qualities referred to in the CFI case T-251/03,  Op. 
Cit. Supra  n. 881, with which association must be made in order for infringement to be established. 
1001
  Namely the Supreme Court ruling on an Adidas case (proceedings brought before Greek courts by 
Adidas  relating to the use of a four stripe logo with the word “Strike” on sport shoes by a third party), 
Areios Pagos 1030/2008, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 733. 
1002
  It should be noted that each one of these criteria separately must be proven by the trade mark 
owner who claims to have a famous mark.  
1003
  T-251/03 Op. Cit. Supra  n. 881, par. 62, Intel Op. Cit. Supra n. 792, par. 74. In Intel the Court 
states explicitly that even if an earlier mark does not have an inherent uniqueness (is not e.g. an 
imaginary word) the use of the later mark could weaken the distinctive character of the earlier mark 
(par. 73). 
1004
  Kosmopoulos, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 966 [2006], at 151. However, such an approach might be 
problematic to the extent it restricts the protection that the legislator and ECJ case law aimed to grant to 
famous marks.  
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Greek case law the opposite occurs: it is hard to establish that the mark is famous
1005
, 
however, once you do, namely once you prove that all the case law conditions are met 
(enhanced public awareness, uniqueness, originality, positive appreciation by the 
consumers), it follows that the unfair advantage or detriment criterion, is 
automatically met (this is why, as we have seen, Greek rulings do not extend beyond 
the fulfillment of the latter condition)
1006
.  
 
This position must not be confused with the CFI position that in certain cases the 
unfair advantage and the detriment are so obvious that no evidence needs to be 
submitted
1007
. The CFI position concerns certain cases of famous marks, whereas the 
Greek case law concerns all cases of extended trade mark protection, as in order to 
enjoy such protection, the mark must be well-known, unique and original.  
 
In view of the above, one wonders whether the approach of the Greek and the 
Community courts to famous marks‘ protection is only dogmatically different and that 
when applying the law, the result is the same. However, the answer should be 
negative. A very significant aspect in applying such strict criteria for the mark to be 
found famous in Greece, is that the similarity test of the marks is also affected. As per  
established Community case law examined in Part IV of the present thesis, the 
stronger the distinctive character of the mark, the easier it is to find similarity between 
the marks and grant protection against infringement. Also, ―uniqueness‖ cannot be a 
criterion to limit protection against an infringer, as this infringer would himself be 
part of that lack of ―uniqueness‖, through use of the senior mark1008.  
 
                                                 
1005
  This position is similar with the US position: a famous mark is normally one that is a household 
mark, i.e. one known by the general public, one that is even more well known than the Paris 
Convention Article 6 bis notorious mark. 
1006
  Cf. the 2006 US Anti dilution Revision Act where the definition of famousness now restricts very  
much the scope of application of the law. As we have seen at the beginning of this part, marks need to 
be ―widely recognized‖ by the ―general consuming public‖ of the entire country. As we have also seen 
the criteria mentioned in the law for characterizing the mark as famous, are the amount of sales and the 
amount of advertising made of the mark. However, there is no criterion of inherent distinctiveness. 
1007
  See T-215/2003, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 881,  par. 48 
1008
  Note however, that in US legal doctrine loss of  uniqueness is not the same as blurring: ―While two 
identical marks coexisting in the same marketplace will by definition negate each other‘s uniqueness, 
they need not blur each other, i.e., they need not increase consumer search costs or otherwise require 
consumers to ―think for a moment‖ before recognizing the respective sources‖, see B. Beebe Op. Cit. 
Supra n. 766, [2006] at 1150.  
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Therefore, the application of strict criteria at the stage even of determining whether a 
mark is famous or not, affects not only dilution but also confusion protection and 
results to an equalization of famous marks with ―common‖ marks protection, a result 
which is totally contra European legislation and case law.  
 
The acknowledgement and recognition of the advertising function impaired by the 
Directive was welcomed by Greek courts and legal experts. The Greek TM Act 
2239/1994 has implemented Art. 5(2) of the Directive in Art. 18(3) which is to be 
read in conjunction with Art. 4(1) of the same Act. The expansion of trade mark 
protection on dissimilar goods should be  considered as an indisputable step forward 
for the Greek trade mark law. Some Greek decisions have already dealt with the 
advertising function (although not with the issue of dilution itself). This does not 
mean, of course, that the acceptance of the advertising function could be found in all 
Greek courts decisions. A large part of the Supreme Court’s decisions refused in the 
past to acknowledge any other function besides the origin function
1009
. 
 
It is characteristic that no established Greek translation of the word ―dilution‖ existed 
in Greek legal doctrine and case law. The most interesting element that can be found 
in these decisions is the shift in the wording: in the past the importance of the 
protection of famous marks and allusions to the advertising function were often made 
in courts‘ decisions.1010  
 
However, even in cases where the advertising function is validated by Greek courts, 
no express statement of what this function actually protects is yet made by them
1011
. 
Furthermore, a conclusion that can easily be drawn, after the above analysis, is that 
neither Greek case law nor theory had so far embraced a categorisation of dilution. 
Most of the existing literature is restricted to the issue of the protection of famous 
marks without examining the doctrinal basis in respect to that protection
1012
.  
 
                                                 
1009
  See, A. Psarras, “The Restrictions of Trade Mark Protection”, 3 Deltion Ellinon Nomikon 227, 
[1996]. 
1010
  See above mentioned case law, Op. Cit. Supra n.n.  999, 1000. 
1011
 By contrast, the CFI  ruling T-251/2003, where the court explicitly stated that ―the mark has an 
inherent economic value which is independent of and separate from that of the goods and services for 
which it is registered‖ Op. Cit. Supra n. 881, par. 35. 
1012
  Namely under what rational should the advertising function be protected. 
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However, Greek courts have started to mention mainly in their obiter dicta, the ECJ 
case law on dilution and the protection of trade marks against dilution, which in Greek 
was translated as ―κίνδςνορ ςπόζκατηρ‖1013. The following wording has been used to 
describe the dilution categories: «εξαζθένηζη», «απίσναζη» to indicate the whittling 
away, «αμαύπυζη», «απαξίυζη» to indicate the blurring and tarnishment1014. 
 
In a recent ruling, a Greek court applied the above mentioned ECJ case law on 
dilution  and found that because of the similarity of the marks at issue, the similarity 
of the products and the intense distinctive character of the earlier mark, it is certain 
that the average consumer, coming into contact with the later product shall bring into 
his mind as a connotation, the earlier famous mark; that by this act the defendant 
sought to take advantage of the attraction, the repute and the prestige of the earlier 
mark and exploit it, without paying anything for that and without himself making any 
effort to that respect, an effort that the plaintiff made in order to build and establish 
the fame of his mark. The court found that no parallel detriment to the distinctive 
character or the repute of the mark existed, however that did not hinder the court to 
assert infringement by the mere finding of the unfair advantage
1015
. It is indeed an 
exceptional ruling to the extent it fully applies the ECJ case law in finding that the 
mark is famous and that infringement in the form of dilution has occurred. 
     
The specific points of this recent case law in Greece accepting the main aspects of 
community case law on dilution, invoking in the obiter dicta the relevant ECJ rulings, 
are as follows: 
 
 Application of dilution provisions not only on dissimilar but also on similar 
goods 
The respective national provisions must be interpreted in a teleological way, in view 
of the ECJ case law, so as to allow application of the dilution provisions on similar 
goods as well
1016
. 
 
                                                 
1013
  See Areios Pagos, 1030/2008, Op. Cit. Supra  n. 733.  
1014
  PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 339, at 183, 184. 
1015
  PolPrAth 585/2010, ibid, comments by N.Rokas, EEmpD [2010], 180 at 191. 
1016
  Areios Pagos 1030/2008 A Division, DEE [2009], 186, at 187, PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra 
n. 399, at 181, MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 171. 
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 Legal relationship between confusion and dilution 
Protection may be sought under both articles 5(1) and  5(2) of the Directive or the 
equivalent in national or Community Trademark legislation. The two legal bases shall 
both be included in the same legal document (law suit, interim measures petition etc), 
in a way that if the first one is dismissed, and the court finds that no similarity giving 
rise to likelihood of confusion exists, then the next legal base shall be examined, 
namely whether there is a possibility that the public links the mark and the sign, in the 
context of  the dilution provisions
1017
. 
 
 Sufficient similarity for creating a link 
The marks at issue need not be as similar as to cause confusion. Mere creation of a 
link suffices for finding infringement through dilution
1018
. 
 
 Three distinct types of dilution infringement 
There are three distinct types of dilution and it is sufficient that only one of them is 
found to exist in the case at issue. These are a) detriment to the repute of the mark, b) 
detriment to the distinctive character of the mark and c)  unfair advantage of the 
distinctive character or the repute of the mark, all three interpreted as per the 
definitions given by the ECJ
1019
.  
 
 Need to prove actual or possible dilution 
The trade mark owner needs to prove either present actual infringement through 
dilution of the famous mark or the serious likelihood of such infringement occurring 
in the future
1020
.  
 
 Definition of famous mark 
                                                 
1017
  MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 172. 
1018
  Areios Pagos 1030/2008 Op. Cit. Supra n. 733 at 187, PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, 
at 181, MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 171. 
1019
  PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, at 185. 
1020
  PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, at 184. 
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Famous mark is the one that is sufficiently known by the relevant public namely by a 
substantial part thereof. The factors taken into account for such an assessment are 
inter alia the market share, the intensity, the geographical coverage, the amount of 
investment undertaken by the trade mark owner
1021
. 
 
 Relevant consumer for finding of famous mark 
The relevant consumers would be either the consumers in the broad sense or the 
specialized consumers, depending on to whom the trade marked products at issue are 
directed, without any specific percentage thereof being a prerequisite
1022
. 
 
 Relevant consumer for finding infringement of famous mark 
This depends on the type of dilution infringement at issue. In case of detriment to the 
distinctive character or the repute of the mark, the relevant consumer is the average 
consumer who is reasonably informed and circumspect to whom the earlier trade 
mark products are addressed.  In case of unfair advantage of the earlier mark‘s 
distinctive character or repute, the relevant consumer is the average consumer who is 
reasonably informed and circumspect to whom the later trade mark products are 
addressed
1023
.  
 
It remains to  be seen whether such consistency with the ECJ case law shall be 
followed by other Greek court rulings, especially of the Conseil d‘ Etat and the 
Supreme Court which until now have been reluctant to abstain from the traditional 
case law and follow the ECJ guidelines.  
 
E.f. Concluding Remarks 
 
What does detriment to the distinctive character actually entail?
1024
 How is the 
advertising function of the mark affected and, respectively, its role as a stimulant of 
the purchasing desire of the specific product through dilution infringement?  The most 
                                                 
1021
  MonPrAth 2528/2009, Op. Cit. Supra n. 392, at 172. 
1022
  Ibid and PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, at 186. 
1023
  PolPrAth 585/2010, Op. Cit. Supra n. 399, at 186. 
1024
  This issue is directly linked with the rational basis of trade marks which has already been 
examined. The perspective that one adopts as to the legal nature of trade marks and their functions is 
decisive in that respect.  
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probable answer would promulgate that the consumer is likely to be discouraged from 
a future purchase of the product on which the original mark is used. The requirement 
of ―detriment‖ should therefore be read likewise. However, such a proposition would 
seem rather extreme. It cannot be supported that the consumer is in reality expected to 
react in this manner
1025
.  
 
If a famous brand name, particularly an inherently distinctive one, were to appear on 
nearly any product, regardless of its nature, would it be likely that consumers would 
assume that that product originated from the same company responsible for all the 
other products bearing the brand name? If not, would the trade mark owner (or the 
trade mark) suffer any economic or other loss because of such use?  
 
A distinction should be made here. Trade mark law grants protection to the trade mark 
owner, in cases of confusion, even if no damages are suffered. However, under the  
dilution regime that we have examined, it appears that damages (likely to be) suffered 
is indeed a prerequisite for protection (taking unfair advantage etc). If no damages are 
suffered, then protection cannot be granted under any other legal provisions, as for 
example, unfair competition, either. This means that the confusion protection is 
inherently linked to the origin trade mark function, the harm on which is 
automatically protectable; whereas the harm on the advertising function needs to be 
further accompanied by damages, in order to be protectable. This ―discriminating‖ 
legislative handling of the two functions is not justified, but indicates that even for the 
legislators the two functions were not equal. 
 
Another question that arises is the following: Are strong marks really most fragile 
than the weak marks? It has been argued that the very marks which are so famous as 
to deserve anti-blurring protection are essentially immune to blurring on account of 
                                                 
1025
 However, as Advocate General Jacobs observes ―The essence of dilution in this classic sense is that 
the blurring of the distinctiveness of the mark means that it is no longer capable of arousing immediate 
association with the goods for which it is registered and used‖, par. 37 of the Opinion in Adidas, par. 
39 of the Opinion in Sabel. In its ruling of 10.5.2007 in case T-47/2006, Antarctica Srl v. OHIM, the 
CFI found that ―Taking account of the fact that the financial and stock market listing services supplied 
by the intervener under its trade name NASDAQ and therefore the trade mark NASDAQ itself 
undeniably present a certain image of modernity, that link enables the transfer of that image to sports 
equipment and, in particular, to the high tech composite materials which would be marketed by the 
applicant under the mark applied for, which the applicant appears to recognise implicitly by stating 
that the word ―nasdaq‖ is descriptive of its main activities‖, par. 60.  
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their overriding fame. In 2000, Morrin and Jacoby reported the results of a study they 
designed to assess the accuracy and speed of subjects‘ memory retrieval of brand 
information after subjects were exposed to potentially brand-diluting marks. One of 
their findings is quite striking: ―It appears that very strong brands are immune to 
dilution because their memory connections are so strong that it is difficult for 
consumers to alter them or create new ones with the same brand name.‖1026 
 
It has also been argued that the marks which are so famous as to deserve anti-blurring 
protection already receive the same scope of protection from confusion-based 
protection
1027
. Since the scope of confusion based protection expands with the 
strength of the mark, famous brands should enjoy an extraordinarily broad scope of 
protection. Thus, for the famous marks, anti-blurring protection would be 
unnecessary
1028
. However, the wording of the Directive (and the national legislations 
we have examined) does not extend such protection across all product categories. A 
prerequisite of confusion protection is identity or similarity of goods or services. 
Should the wording of confusion provisions change so as to include use on dissimilar 
goods
1029
? Should such protection be granted under bad faith provisions
1030
? 
 
The issue of misappropriation or ―free-riding‖ comes also into play.  The argument is 
that when a court enjoins a third party from using a variation of a famous brand, the 
court seeks to prevent not so much the blurring, as the misappropriation of the   
―selling power‖ of the famous brand. Thus, though the infringer‘ s use may itself 
cause little or even no harm to the brand name, still, he is reaping where he has not 
sown and should be prevented from doing so
1031
.  
 
The antidilution article of the Directive explicitly prohibits conduct that ―takes unfair 
advantage of . . . the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark‖. However, 
                                                 
1026
 Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive 
Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL. & MARKETING 265 [2000].   
1027
  Beebe, Op. Cit. Supra n. 766, [2006] at 1161.  
1028
  The attitude of Greek courts is characteristic; as we have seen some courts have found both 
confusion and dilution provisions applicable on the same case. 
1029
  The ECJ already expanded the wording of art. 5(2) to similar goods. It could respectively expand 
the  application of 5(1) to non similar goods!  
1030
  The subjective elements that need to be proved in these cases (i.e. the purpose of the junior mark 
user) make these provisions hard to apply. However, a solution could be given with the reversal of onus 
of proof, as mentioned earlier in the present chapter.  
1031
  Cf the US case law and doctrine mentioned above, as well as the recent ECJ case law. 
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as already pointed out above, only these uses (that impair the distinctiveness or harm 
the reputation of the famous mark) will be enjoined. Misappropriation per se is not as 
per the grammatical interpretation of these provisions actionable. And it is not 
actionable under Unfair Competition legislation either, because in that framework as 
well, at least in Greece, damage must be suffered for these provisions to apply. This is 
why the L‘ Oreal ruling of the ECJ could be very useful to trade mark owners, by 
confirming that no damage to the mark or the proprietor is needed, thereby filling the 
lacuna of  protection that existed so far.  
 
And certainly, in establishing the further requirement of ―association,‖ the European 
case law appears to recognize that some similarity or identity will not lead to 
―association.‖ Therefore, Directive anti dilution provision requires trade mark owners 
to present evidence beyond the mere fact of the ―similarity‖ between the parties‘ 
marks to show that this ―similarity‖ actually produces or is likely to produce 
―association‖ in the minds of consumers.  
 
The question that arises in view of the L‘ Oreal ruling is to what extent the plaintiff is 
required to present evidence (beyond the mere fact of ―association‖ arising from 
―similarity‖) to show that the junior mark ―impairs the distinctiveness‖ of the senior 
mark. After all, as above, if a showing of association arising from similarity were 
enough, then there would be no need to include this further requirement for unfair 
advantage etc.  
 
Here, the term ―distinctiveness‖ means apparently distinctiveness of source. It does 
not mean uniqueness. The Directive establishes a cause of action for ―blurring‖ in the 
minds of consumers, not for loss of uniqueness in the marketplace. Thus, the senior 
mark holder must show, as an empirical matter, that consumers who are exposed to 
both the senior and the junior marks are less competent to make a ―mental 
connection‖ between the senior mark‘s owner as source of the goods or services. This 
is not an easy task, as, for very strong marks, this loss of consumer competence is 
unlikely.  
 
Could there be cases in which a famous mark is being used by another in a way that 
constitutes free riding or unfair competition, but which would not be captured by even 
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an expansive form of the test of a likelihood of confusion? Would such instances 
cause an indisputable and clearly demonstrable harm to the famous trade mark?  
 
One could at the end even raise reservations with regard to the detriment actually 
imposed on the first mark through dilution. Why is it detrimental for a connotation, a 
link, to arise? Is it not true that even bad advertising is better than no advertising? And 
what is ultimately the use of the mark by third parties, if not free advertising of the 
earlier mark? 
 
F. EPITOMISING DILUTION 
 
In the closing part of the argument on dilution, the logical defaults of the theory will 
be epitomised. It is not suggested however, that dilution theory has no rational basis 
whatsoever. On the contrary, it is submitted that the legal interest it seeks to protect is 
totally justified throughout. The “commercial magnetism” or “reputation” (or any 
other term used to denote the valuable asset that a mark can constitute for its owner) is 
beyond any doubt in need of protection from unauthorised use by third parties. As we 
have examined in Part I of the present thesis, trade mark is a sign. The sign acts as 
signifier and as such the sign sells the goods. Trade mark law, as opposed to unfair 
competition, passing off or even civil law, should be able to offer this kind of 
protection to the trade mark owner. Protection that cannot be enjoined through any 
other legal basis, because all other provisions are based on the subject of the right (the 
trade mark owner); protection in cases where the trade mark owner has suffered no 
material or any other kind of harm, protection of the sign as such.  
 
It is argued however, that certain pre-conditions should be met and certain 
clarifications should be made before the aforementioned protection is absolutely 
legitimised. The issue will be discussed in the light of the Directive; a proposal for an 
effective legal interpretation will be made. 
 
F. a. The Rational Limits of Protection 
As already mentioned, confusion is a factor not to be taken into account when the 
court is considering a case of dilution. However, is it possible for no likelihood of 
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confusion to arise (either when the use is on similar or on dissimilar products) when 
the two opposing marks are identical or sufficiently similar? If one is to adopt the 
notion of likelihood of association as a new (broader) reading of the notion of 
confusion, then it is highly  probable that such confusion will arise. In particular, this 
is so if the first mark is well known: the association in the mind of the consumer is 
unavoidable. However, no such mention is made neither in the Directive in the case of 
use on similar goods, nor in the Benelux trade mark law. It should be kept in mind 
that association is not likely unless a mark has a strongly distinctive character, namely 
the ability to remain in the consumer’s mind and be recalled whenever a stimulation is 
given.
1032
  
 
F. b.  Same/Similar Marks
1033
 - Similar Products 
The question that arises primarily in this context is whether  this association should be 
condemnable in the case of similar goods. On the one hand, the Benelux law  (which 
is said to accept the dilution doctrine) regulates this result as infringing the trade 
mark’ s distinctive character  despite the fact that there might be no detriment to the 
origin function (the consumer is not likely to believe that the two products emanate 
from the same source). On the other hand, the widely accepted broad definition of 
confusion in most continental European countries includes the likelihood that the 
consumer mistakenly believes that there is an economic or other connection between 
the two sources
1034
. It follows that although the prevailing view in Europe has been 
that trade mark law should not expand beyond the threshold of the origin and the 
quality function, the aforementioned semantic version of likelihood of confusion is 
very akin to the extended protection given under the Benelux trade mark law. It has 
up to now been established that the notion of likelihood of association and likelihood 
                                                 
1032
  It has been also submitted that stronger marks may be better able to withstand the diluting effects 
of at least certain unauthorised uses. 
1033
  The tendency that prevails in trade mark law literature and jurisprudence is to treat these two 
notions interchangeably. However, the validity of such an attitude can be questioned. It is certainly not 
the same for a third party to use an identical mark on his own products than to use only a similar one. It 
could be argued that in the former case, the likelihood of confusion is much stronger than in the latter 
case. The same is true for the diminution of the advertising function. It is characteristic to that respect 
that Fr. Schechter in his seminal article on dilution (Op. Cit. Supra n. 4) refers solely to the 
unauthorised use of the same mark on dissimilar products. However, in the present thesis the terms will 
be used interchangeably according to the prevailing practice, with the aforementioned reservations in 
mind. 
1034
  See infra Part II. 
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of confusion are not as rivalry as they were presented to be
1035
. The inclusion of the 
likelihood of association in the Directive is therefore compatible with the judicial 
practice followed throughout the past years in continental Europe. 
 
It will be argued thereof, that the dilution theory has indeed been incorporated into the 
Directive under the form of the words: “likelihood of association”. The dilution theory 
does not limit itself in cases regarding use of a mark on dissimilar goods. The mark 
could easily be “whittled away” of its distinctive character, even when used on similar 
products
1036
. What causes the detrimental effect on the mark is the loss of uniqueness 
when the same or a similar mark is encountered very often in the market (it should be 
noted that this is quite different from arguing that the often encounter of goods in the 
market could create the impression that all goods emanate from the same source). 
However a line must be drawn. Otherwise the registration for certain classes would 
prove to be meaningless. The most inherent danger is to accord trade marks a 
protection similar to that of copyright, giving the trade mark owner a monopoly right 
to object to any copying of his mark
1037
. The fact that confusion does not necessarily 
arise in that context; the fact that sufficient protection must be given to the advertising 
function of the mark; and the fact that the likelihood of association is likely to arise 
only as a facet of infringement of the advertising function, inherent mainly in well-
known marks, leads to the conclusion that likelihood of association is a notion that has 
incorporated the dilution rationale in the European context. 
 
F. c.  Same/Similar Marks - Dissimilar Products 
It could even be argued that the dilution theory has introduced the confusion test in 
the case of use of a mark on dissimilar goods. For it is difficult to imagine a situation 
where no likelihood of confusion exists when unauthorised use of famous marks is at 
                                                 
1035
  As it is evident throughout the course of this thesis, the opposition of  British academics and courts 
towards any infringement that does not directly emanate from the origin theory has been and still is 
quite vivid. However, this is not the case with the continental trade mark law commentators and courts 
(e.g.: in Germany or Greece). 
1036
  It has even been argued that dilution is more likely to occur in similar products. However, it is the 
proliferation of uses of a well-known mark on unrelated goods that is generally regarded as the 
threshold of dilution. Professor McCarthy has made an interesting remark: “The dilution concept 
presumes that defendant’s use of the mark does not cause such a strong mental link that confusion is 
likely. On the other hand, if a reasonable buyer is not at all likely to think of the senior user’s trade 
mark in his or her own mind, even subtly or subliminally, then there can be no dilution”. See, J. T. 
McCarthy, “Trade Marks and Unfair Competition”, 3rd ed., [1992] at 24-109. 
1037
  One of the basic principles of trade mark law is the “relativity” of  protection.  
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issue. When the consumer, for example, sees the name Kodak on the piano he is 
interested to buy, there is no possibility that he will not automatically think of the 
famous camera brand. He might even believe (and this possibility does exist for the 
average consumer) that the owner of the famous mark has expanded his business in 
the field of  musical instruments. Where does this leave the original producer? His 
right to expand his business is undoubtedly prejudiced. Apart from that, the depiction 
of the famous mark on the piano will (maybe only subconsciously) create a positive 
connotation to the mind of the buyer as to the quality of the product. All the above 
consequences are in effect quite probable. Thus they are prohibited by the Directive 
referring to the use that takes “unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the 
repute of the mark”. 
 
However, the other case of infringement resulting to the detriment of the distinctive 
character or the repute of the mark accordingly, needs further clarification. The 
detriment to the distinctive character is akin to the notion of pure dilution, as 
described earlier.
1038
 Nevertheless, the possibility that in some cases there will be no 
weakening effect of the advertising function of the mark could be put forward. What 
is more, the opposite may occur. The mind may be able to retain both marks without 
drawing any particular conclusion or may simply be reminded favourably of the first 
mark, in a way that strengthens the original owner’s mark. This could be a kind of 
free advertising. With regard to the detriment on the repute of the mark, this is the 
analogous of tarnishment, also described earlier. Again it would be difficult to find a 
case where no association is made with the infringed mark
1039
. It would not be an 
understatement to mention that negative advertising is still considered to be promoting  
the popularity and the sales of the product.
1040
 
 
F. d.  Empty Controversy 
It is suggested that what Schechter‘s theory of dilution protected, was ultimately the  
origin function. This is so, because the trade mark functions may not be regarded 
separately, in the sense that the protection of the advertising or the guarantee function 
                                                 
1038
  See above in par. A. c. 
1039
  The issue was also examined earlier. 
1040
  Negative advertising is very common with regard to celebrities. Hollywood scandals are notorious 
and they manage to be known throughout the global sphere! This analogy is not farfetched if one 
considers that American trade mark literature proposes the introduction of a “Right to Publicity” for the 
protection of the Trade Mark’ s “Persona”. See E. Winner, Op, Cit. Supra n.  834, at 260. 
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results to the protection of the origin function and vice versa. It is also suggested that 
the advertising function is inexorably linked  to the other two functions. The trade 
mark does in all instances act as signifier. It is therefore suggested that the protection 
to be given to trade marks should be one that takes as main standpoint the mark per se 
as sign. No harm to the trade mark owner or to the trade mark should be required. The 
mere use of the trade mark by another party without authorisation should be 
considered as infringement.  
 
The detraction of the selling power is the result of the consumer‘s coming to mind of 
more than one goods when seeing the mark. Not only the selling power (advertising 
function), but also the ability to distinguish the origin of the products (origin function) 
is impaired. Both trade mark origins come into mind, that of the senior and that of  the 
junior mark. However, this in fact regards strictly the origin function: not the 
guarantee or the advertising one. These are affected necessarily if the origin function 
is affected. When a consumer sees a trade mark, not one single origin but more come 
to mind. This means that the origin function is impeded, that the identity of the 
product is not clearly distinguished. Therefore, even in dilution cases the function that 
is harmed is the origin function, the ability to singly identify the product. The 
guarantee and advertising functions are harmed as a consequence of damage on the 
origin function. To go one step further: the risk of confusion or dilution is not the 
basis of protection, they merely serve for a systematisation of the legislative 
framework. What is actually infringing is the situation where not one but more 
meanings come into mind when the consumer encounters a certain trade mark. Where 
the signifier loses the unique connection to the signified
1041
. When the trade mark is 
not any more able to clearly convey one meaning, to act as a sign.  Whether this 
happens through confusion or dilution is of no importance. The outcome of both is the 
same: the impediment of the trade mark‘s function as a sign. A sign denoting the 
source of  origin and the quality and attracting consumer interest. Namely a sign 
which encompasses all three trade mark functions. 
 
At the end of the day, dilution theory suggestions can be drawn in very simple terms. 
Most importantly they will unveil the disguise of the “alien intruder” and prove to be 
                                                 
1041
 See Part I C of the present thesis on the analysis from the perspective of semiotics.  
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absolutely compatible with the needs of trade mark law as it has been presently 
formed.  
 
The advertising value of trade marks must be protected. The advertising value is 
diminished, thus the trade mark infringed, when there is a proliferation of same or 
similar signs in the market. So is the origin function. This is the general basis of 
infringement. Furthermore, a limitation in accordance with the acceptable trade mark 
functions must be safeguarded. In this context two cases should be distinguished: a. 
use on similar goods, b. use on dissimilar goods. In the former case the marks have 
adequately been protected by trade mark laws prohibiting the unauthorised use of 
identical or similar signs on similar goods. The precondition of confusion has 
functioned as the necessary limitation mentioned above. Not every use was infringing, 
but only that which amounted to consumer confusion. The balance between the 
interests of the trade mark owner and the consumer, on the one hand; and the interests 
of the trade mark owner and his competitors on the other, were thus maintained. In the 
latter case, namely when the use was on dissimilar products, the rationale remaining 
the same, a different limitation should be introduced, since it was difficult therein for 
a likelihood of confusion to be proved. That limitation was  the requirement that the 
mark be famous. This is how trade mark protection under the dilution theory can be 
explained.  
 
If one chooses to interpret this protection under the traditional origin theory, one is 
expected to reach more or less the same conclusions albeit following a different logic 
path. The use on similar goods is prohibited since it causes the consumers to be 
confused as to the origin of the product. The use on dissimilar products is, 
exceptionally, prohibited in the case of famous marks because the consumer might 
mistakenly think that the first producer has extended his business to new market areas. 
The right of the producer (and his respective legitimate interest) to expand his 
business is worth of protection by trade mark law. It then follows from the above that 
no substantial parting of ways exists between the traditional trade mark protection and 
the dilution rationale. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
We have examined in the present thesis the theoretical framework of trade mark 
protection and the application of it in European legislation and case law. Following 
the historical evolution of trade marks and trade mark theory, we passed through the 
categorisation and systematisation of trade mark functions in the framework of  
European harmonisation. Making a presentation of the applicability of semiotics on 
trade mark law, we proposed an analogy of signs to trade marks.  
 
After establishing the theoretical framework we moved on to the practical 
implementation of trade mark theory in the EU. We analysed the Directive provisions 
and ECJ case law on certain core matters, all related to the standpoint of trade mark 
functions: registrability, trade mark use, confusion, famous marks and dilution. In 
parallel, we examined, in comparison to the European jurisprudence, the national 
legal framework and case law of Greece on the same issues, whereby drawing also 
from the UK and the US jurisprudence. The similarities and differences were spotted 
and analysed. The prevailing tendencies and weaknesses, at the author‘s opinion, at a 
European and national level (Greece) were presented.  
  
The theory of dilution in the context of the European trade mark framework and 
national legislation was analysed against developments in the USA. The controversial 
doctrine of Schechter was seen, in view of the above, under a new light, whereby the 
origin function is actually impaired and not the advertising one. The confusion and 
dilution rationales were considered as not substantially different. Finally, it was 
proposed that trade mark protection should be based on solutions considering the 
three trade mark functions as a whole and conferring protection against any use, 
which would result in the nullification of  the trade mark‘s ability to function as a 
sign.  
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